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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. J, 
Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department ~ ~ 
of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of tM.., ,.,~ ___ _ ~ 
New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 ~ L_ -~ 
in July 197}.1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the~~~ 
Board and the Department had as a matter of ?fficial policy  . . 
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of 1J ~.... 
absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.2 IAA_ ~ ----
1 The complaint was amended on September 14, 1972 to allege a claim ~
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42. , U. S. C. L_ _ . 
§ 2000e ( 1970 ed., and Supp. V). The District Court held that the 1972 ~
amendments to Title VII did not apply retroactively to discrimination ,I 
suffered prior to those amendments even when an action challenging such  
prior discrimination was pending on the date of the amendments. :394 1.,;,. ~ ~ 
F. Supp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This holding was affirmed on appeaL -...-~ 
532 F. 2d 259, 261-262 (CA2 1976). Although petitioners sought cer- 4..,/ _ 
tiorari on the Title VII issue as well as the § 1983 claim, we restricted rz:J- • 
our grant of certiorari to the latter issue. 429 U.S. 1071. J , ~ 
2 The plaintiffs alleged that New York had a eitywide policy of forcing ~ 
women to take maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy unless 
a city physician and head of an employee's agency allowed up to an ~ ~ ~ -L_ ' ~ 
additional two months of work. Amended Complaint 128, App. 13-14. """""'-. f ~
The defendants did not deny this, but stated that this policy had been 
changed after suit was instituted. Answer ,113, App. 32-33. The plain-~ 
tiffs further alleged that the Board had a policy of requiring women to 
take maternity clave after the seventh month of pregnancy unless that #.-. _ '#':. 
month fell in the last month of the school year, in which case the teacher ....,..-~
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632' 
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for 
periods of unlawful forced leave. Named as defendants in the 
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board 
and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor. 
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in 
their official capacities.8 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners' 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief since the city of 
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had 
changed their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no 
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was 
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F. 
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The 
court did conclude. however, tha.t the acts complained of 
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. 394 F. Supp., 
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay were 
denied because any such damages would come ultimately from 
the City of New York and. therefore, to hold otherwise would 
be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities 
by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp., 
at 855. 
On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the· 
Board of Education~ was not a "municipality" within the 
meaning of Monroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the 
District Court had erred in barring a damage award against 
the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit rejected both contentions. The Court first 
could remain through the end of the school term. Amended Complaint 
~~ 39, 42, 4.5, App. 18-19, 21. ThiR alleg~tion was denied. Answer 
~118, 22, App. 35-37. 
3 Amended Complaint f24, App. 11-12. 
t Petitioners conceded that the Department of Social Services enjoys the 
same status as New York City for Monroe purposes. See 532 F. 2d, at 
263. 
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under 
§ 1983 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... , 
and, significantly, while it has the right to determine how the 
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final 
say in deciding what its appropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d 
259, 263 (1976) (citation omitted). The individual defend-
ants, however, were "persons" under ~ 1983, even when sued 
solely in their official capacities. Id. , at 264. Yet, because a 
damage award would "have to be paid by a city that was held 
not to be amenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a 
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities 
could not proceed. !d. , at 265. 
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider 
"Whether local governmental officials and/ or local inde-
pendent school boards are "persons" within the meaning 
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature 
of back pay is sought against them in their official 
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8. 
Although, after plenary consideration, we ha.ve decided the 
merits of over a score of cases brought under ~ 1983 in 
which the principal defendant was a school board 5-and, 
r. Milliken v. B1·adlcy , 4il3 U. S. 267 (1977); Dayton Board of Educa-
tion v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorchheimer v. School District 
of Philadelphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v. 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); 
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974); 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974); Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); San Antonio School District v . 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board 
of Education, 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish 
School Board, 396 U. S. 226 (1969); Alexander v. Holmes County Board 
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U. S. 621 (1969) ; Tinker v. D es Moines Independent School District, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969); M om·on v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U. S. 450 
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); School 
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indeed, in some of which § 1983 and its jurisdictional counter-
part, 28 U. S. C. ~ 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdic-
tion6-we indicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977), last Term that the question 
presented here was open and would be decided "another day." 
That other day has come and we now overrule M omoe v. J:.ape, 
supra, insoi:a;,r as it holds that local governments are wholly 
immune from suit under§ 1983.7 
I 
In Monroe v. Pape, we held that "Congress did not under-
take to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of 
[ § 1983] ." 36.? U. S. , at 187. The sole basis for this conclu-
sion was an inference drawn from Congress' rejection of the 
"Sherman amendment" to the Civil Rights Act of 1871-the 
precursor of § 1983- which would have held a municipal cor-
poration liable for damage done to the person or property of 
its inhabitants by private persons "riotously and tumultuously 
assembled." 8 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871) 
(hereinafter "Globe"). Although the Sherman amendment 
did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act, which is now § Hl83, and 
Dist1ict of Abington Township v. Sthempp, 374 U. S. 203 (19<33) ; Goss v. 
Board of Edu-;ation, 373 U. S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Educa-
tion, 373 U. S. 668 (1963) ; Orlrans Parish School Board v. Bush, 365 U. S. 
569 (1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 4R3 (1!)54). 
6 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 636 (1974); 
App., Keyes v. School District No.1, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-507, p . 4a; App., 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No. 
281, p. 465a; Pcti1ion for Certiorari , Northcross v. Board of Education, 
0. T. 1969, No. 1136, p. 3; Tinker v. Des Moines Indrpendent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 
U.S. 668,671 (1963). 
7 See Part II, infra, for a discussion of the effect of this opinion on 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 (1973); and 
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
8 We expressly declined to consider "policy considerations" for or 
against municipal liability. See 365 U. S., at 191. 
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although the nature of the obligation created by that amend-
ment wa.s vastly different from that created by § 1, the Court 
nonetheless concluded in Monroe that Congress must have 
meant to exclude municipa1 corporations from the coverage of 
§ 1 because "the House [in voting against the Sherma.n amend-
ment] had solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress 
had no constitutional power to impose any obl1'gation upon 
county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for 
the administration of state law." 365 U. S., at 190 ( em11hasis 
added), quoting Globe, at 804 (Rep. Poland). This statement, 
we thought, showed that Congress doubted its "constitutional 
power . . . to impose civil liability on municipalities." 365 
U. S., at 190 (emphasis added), and that such doubt would 
have extended to any type of civilliability.n 
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
and pa.rticularly of the case law which each side mustered in 
its support, shows, hovvever, that M onToe incorrectly equated 
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke '"ith 
"civil liability." 
A. An Overview 
There are three distinct stages in the legislative considera-
tion of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for 
a House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained 
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without 
9 Mr .. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, has suggested that the 
municipal exclusion might more properly rest on a theory that Congress 
sought to prevent the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose 
on municipalities. Soc C£ty of Kenosha v. Br-uno , supra, 11. 7, at 517-520 
(1973). However, this view has never been shared by the Court, see 
Monroe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 190; Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, 
n. 7, at 708, and tho debates do not support this position. 
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amendment.10 Sections 2 through 4 dealt primarily with the 
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in 
the southern States.11 The wisdom and constitutionality of 
these sections-not§ 1, now§ 1983-was the subject of almost 
all congressional debate and each of these sections was 
amended. The House finished its initial debates on H. R. 
320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later the Senate also voted 
out a bil1.12 Again, debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and 
that section was passed as introduced. 
Immediately prior to the vote on H. R. 320 in the Senate, 
Renator Sherman introduced his amendment.n This was not 
an amendment to ~ 1 of the bill. but was to be added as § 7 a.t 
the end of the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of 
tho amendment was allowed and , although attempts were 
made to amend the amendment, it was passed as introduced. 
In this form, the amendment did not place liability on munic-
ipal corporations, but made any inhabitant of a municipality 
liable for damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultu-
ously assembled." 1 4 
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amend-
ments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amend-
ment, and the respective versions of H. R. 320 were there-
10 Globe, at 522. 
11 Briefly, § 2 created certain frderal crimes in addition to those defined 
in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act , 14 Stat. 27, each aimed primarily at 
the Ku Klux Klan. Section ~ providrd that the President could send the 
militia into any State wracked with Klan violence. Finally, § 4 provided 
for suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in enumerated circumstances, 
again primarily those thought to obtain where Klan violence was rampant. 
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sc~ .. App., at 335-336 (1871) (hereinafter 
"Globe App.") . 
12 Globe, at 709. 
13 See id., at 663, quoted in Appendix, infra, at -. 
I{ Ibid . An action for rrcovr r~· of damagrs was to be in the federal 
courts and denominatrd as a suit ngainst the county, city, or parish in 
which tho damage had occurrrd. Ibid. Exrrution of the judgment was 
not to run against the property of the government unit, however, but 
against the private property of any inhabitant. Ibid . 
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fore sent to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill, 
however, was not a subject of this conference since, as noted, 
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of 
Congress. 
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed 
its work on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference 
committee draft of the Sherman amendment were these: 15 
First, a cause of action was given to persons injured by 
"any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled 
together; . . . with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for 
exercising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude .... " 
Second, the act provided that the action would be aga.inst , 
the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred and ) 
that it could be maintained by either ' the person injured or .l 
his legal representative. Third. unlike the amendment as 
proposed. the conference substitute made the government ) 
defendant liable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against ) 
individual defend9,nts who had committed the violence. If 
a municipality were liable, the judgment against it could be 
collected 
"by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or 
any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable 
to the enforcement of judgments against municipal cor-
porations; and such judgment [would become] a lien 
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county, 
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof." 
In the ensuing debate on the first conference report, which 
was the first debate of any kind on the Sherman amendment, 
Senator Sherman explained tha.t the purpose of his amend-
ment was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the en-
15 See Globe, at 749 and 755, quotrd in Appendix, infra, at - . 
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forcement of the civil rights laws by making their property 
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damage.16 Statutes drafted 
on a similar theory, he st,ated, had long been in force in 
Engla.nd and were in force in 1871 in a number of States.17 
Nonetheless there were critical differences between the con-
ference substitute and exta.nt state and English statutes: the 
conference substitute, unlike most state riot statutes, lacked 
a short sta.tnte of limitations and imposed liability on the gov-
ernment defendant whether or not it had notice of the impend-
ing riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to 
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted all reason-
able efforts to stop the riot, and whether or not the rioters 
were caught and punished.18 
The first conference substitute passed the Senate but was 
rejected by the House. House opponents, within whose ranks 
16 "Let the people of property in the southern States understand that if 
they will not make the hue and cry and take the necessary steps to put 
down lawless violence in those States their property will be holden respon-
sible, and the effect will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761. 
Senator Sherman was apparently unconcerned that the conference com-
mittee substitute, unlike the original amendment, did not place liability 
for riot damage directly on the property of the well-to-do, but instead 
placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes 
would be leYied against the property of the inhabitants to make the locality 
whole. 
17 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in 
England immediately after the Norman Conquest and had most recently 
been promulgated as the law of 7 & 8 Ceo. IV, ch. 31. See Globe, at 760. 
During the course of the debates, it appeared that Kentucky, Marylru1d, 
Massachusetts, and New York had similar laws. See id., at 751 (Rep. 
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 771 (Sen. Thurman); 
id., at 792 (Rep. Butler). Such a municipal liability was apparently 
common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman). 
1s In the Sena.tc, opponents, including a number of Senators who had 
voted for § 1 of the bill, criticised the Sherman amendment as an imperfect 
and impolitic rendering of the state statutes. Moreover, as drafted, the 
conference substitute could be construed to protect rights that were not 
protected by the Const.itution. A complete critique was given by Senator 
Thurman. See Globe, at 770-772. 
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were some who had supported § 1, were concerned with 
whether the Federal Government consistent with the Consti-
tution could obliga.te municipal corporations to keep the peace 
if those corporations were neither so obligated nor so author-
ized by their state chartC'rs and, therefore. were unwilling to 
impose damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which 
Congress could not require municipalities to perform. This 
concern is reflected in Representative Poland's statement that 
is quoted in M onroe.10 
Because the House rejected the first conference report a 
second conference was called and it duly issued its report. 
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment 
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any per-
son or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate 
.civil rights was afoot l, and having power to prevent or aid 
in preventing the same," who did not attempt to stop the 
same, liable to any person injured by the conspiracy.20 The 
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Con-
gress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986. 
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can 
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on 
the report of the first conference committee. This debate 
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised 
against the Sherman amendment would not have prohibited 
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state munici-
pal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act does not state expressly that municipal 
corporations come within its ambit, it is finally necessary to 
interpret § 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeed 
intended to be covered. 
B. Debate on the First Conference Report 
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and 
opponents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of 
19 See 365 U.S., at 190, quoted at p. 5, supra. 
20 Soe Globe, at 804, quoted in Appendix, infra, at-. 
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Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases 
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several 
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, how-
ever, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitu-
tionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an 
argument from the debates on the first conference report and 
those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed 
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states," 
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of 
Representative Shellabarger, the House sponsor of H. R. 320, 
is the most complete. 
Shellabarger began his discussion of H. R. 320 by stating 
that "there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the 
right consideration of this measure which is wholly unex-
plored." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess .. App., at 67 (1871) 
(hereinafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however. 
With respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Shellabarger relied on the statement of Mr. Justice Washing-
ton in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa. 
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV: 
"'What these fundamental privilC'gcs are[.] it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They 
may, however, be all comprehended under the following 
general heads: protection by the Government;'-
"Mark that-
" 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property 
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety .... ' " Globe App., at 69 (emphasis added), 
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at 380. 
Having concluded that citizens were owed protection,21 
21 Opponents of the Sherman amendment agreed that both protection 
and equal protection were guaranteed by t.he Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Globe, at 758 (Sen. Tmmbull) ; id., at 772 (Srn. Thurman); id., at 791 
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Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in providing that 
protection. Here again there were precedents: 
"[Congress has always] assumed to enforce, as against 
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions 
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con· 
stitution which restrain and directly relate to the States, 
such as those in f Art. T. ~ 10.1 relate to the divisions of 
the political powers of the State and General Govern-
ments. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of 
the States are ali of such nature that they can be, and 
even have been, ... enforced by the courts of the United 
States declaring voicl all State acts of encroachment on 
Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the 
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitu-
tion. But there arc some that are not of this class. 
These are where the court secures the rights or the liabili-
ties of persons within the States, as between such persons 
and the States. 
"These three are: first, that as to fugitives from jus-
tice [221 : second, that as to fugitives from service, (or 
slaves [231 ;) third. that declaring that the 'citizens of each 
(Rep. Wilbrd) . And tlw Snprrme Cnnrt of Indiana had ~o held in giving 
effort to the Civil Right~ Art of 1S66. Scr Smith v. M oody, 26 Ind. 299 
(1866) (following Coryell). onr of thrrr ~tntc snpremr ronrt rnses refrrred 
to in Globe App., nt 6S (Rrp. Shrllabn.rgcr). MorroYrr, ~ 2 of the 1871 
Art as pnsscd, unlike § 1. prosrrntrd prrROllR wbo violated frdrral rights 
whether or not that viol~tion wns under color of official anthorit~', appar-
ently on the theorv th1l Kn Klux I\:lnn violence was infringing the right of 
protection defined by C01-yell. 
22 U.S. Canst., Art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2: 
"A Person charged in any State with Trenl'on, Felon~'· or other Crime, who 
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shnll on Demand 
of the executive Authority of the Stn,te from which he fl ed, be delivered 
up, to be removed to the State having .Jurisdietion of the Crime." 
23 I d., cl. 3: 
"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Lnws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Lnw or Regulation 
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State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States.' [241 
"And, sir, every onC' of theRe-the only provisions 'vhcrc 
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the 
constitutional provisions-the only three where the rights 
or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these per-
sons and the States, are directly provided for, Congress 
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ... 
such persons." Globe App., at 69-70. 
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog 
of the Sherman amendment. ironically, was the statute imple-
menting the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions 
of Art. IV - thC' Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the 
constitutionality of which had been sustained in 1842, in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvam·a, 16 Pet. 539. There, Mr. Justice Story, 
writing for the Court, held that Art. IV gave slaveowners a 
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in 
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 612. 
Because state process for recovering runaway slaves might be 
inadequate or even hostile to the rights of the slaveowner, 
thC' right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to 
state implementation. !d., at 614. Thus, since the Constitu-
tion guaranteed the right and this in turn required a remedy, 
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had 
the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. !d., at 615. 
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy 
against municipalities and counties was an appropriate method 
for ensuring the protection which the Fourteenth Amendment 
made every citizen's federal right.25 This much was clear from 
therein, be di~chargrd from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered 
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due." 
24 I d., cl. 1. 
25 See Globe, at 751. Sec also id., at 760 (Sen. Sherman) (" If a State 
may .. . pass a law making a county ... responsible for a riot in order 
to deter such crime, then we may pass the same remedies .... "). 
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the adoption of such statutes by the several Sta.tes as devices 
for suppressing riot.~G Thus, said Shellabarger, the only seri-
ous question remaining was "whether, since a county is an 
integer or part of a State, the United States can impose upon 
it, as such, any obligations to keep the peace in obedience to 
United States laws." 27 This he answered affirmatively, citing 
Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 (1861), 
the first of many cases ~8 upholding the power of federal courts 
to enforce the Contract Clause against municipalities."0 
The most complete statement of the constitutional argument 
of the House opponents of the Sherman amendment-whose 
views are particularly important since only the House voted 
down the amendment-was that of Representative Blair: 30 
"The proposition known as the Sherman amend-
ment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a pre-
26 ld., at 751; seen. 17, supra. 
27 Globe, at 751 (emphasis added). Compare this statement with Repre-
sentative Poland's remark upon which our holding in Monroe was based. 
Sor p. 5, supra. 
28 Src, e. g., GPlpcke v. City of Dubuque. 1 Wall. 175 (1864); Von Hoff-
man v. City of Quincy, 4 id., 535 (1867): Rigos v. Joh nson County , G 
id., 166 (1868); Weber v. Lee County, 6 id., 210 (1868); Supervisors v. 
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (1869); Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 id., 313 (1869); Super-
visors v. Durant , 9 id., 41.'5 (1870). See grncrall~· C. Frtirman, History of 
the Supreme Court of tho United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 
1i<6-i-1888, chs. 17-18 (1971). 
29 See Globe, at 751-752. 
30 Others taking a view similar to Representative Blair's included: 
Representative Willard, sec icl., at 791; Representative Poland, see id., at 
794: Representative Burchard, see id., at 795; Representative Farnsworth, 
see id., at 799. Representative Willard also took a somewhat different 
position. He thought t lmt the Constitution would not allow the Federal 
Government to dictate the manner in which a. State fulfilled its obligation 
of protection. That is, he thought it a matter of state discretion whether 
it delegated the pe:tcekeeping power to a municipal or county corporation, 
to a sheriff, etc. He did not doubt, however, that the Federal Government 
could impose on the States the obligation imposed by the Sherman amend-
ment, and presumably he would have enforced the amendment against a 
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cedent in this country. . . . That amendment cla.ims the 
power in the General Government to go into the States 
of this Union and lay such obligations as it may please 
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the 
States alone. . . . 
" ... [H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an 
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to 
create tha.t obligation, and that is the provision I am 
unifblo to assent {o. The parallel of the hundred does not 
in tho least meet the case. The power that laid the 
obligation upon the hundred first put the duty upon the 
hundred that it should perform in that regard, and failing 
to meet the obligation which had been laid upon it, it was 
very proper that it should suffC'r damage for its neglect .... 
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong 
to the States, ... there are certain powers that inhere in 
the State governments. They create these municipalities, 
they say what their powers shall be and what their ohl i~a ­
tions shall bz¥, If the Government of the United States 
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not 
utterly destroy the municipality? If it can say that it 
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, . . . 
where r will] its power ... stop and wha.t obligations ... 
might{ it] not lay upon a municipality .... 
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court . . . 
decided rin Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871)1 that 
there is no power in the Government of the United States, 
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a State 
officer. Why? Simply because the power to tax involves 
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give 
the Government of the United States power to destroy 
the government of the States in any respect. It was held 
also in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania [ 16 Pet. 539' 
municipal corporntion to which t.hc peacekeeping obligation had been 
ddC'gatrd . See id .. at 791. 
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(1842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress 
of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer; 
that we cannot command a State officer to do any duty 
whatever, as such; and I ask ... the difference between 
that and commanding a municipality with is equally the· 
creature of the State, to perform a duty." Globe, at 795. 
While House debate primarily concerned the question 
whether Congress had the power to require municipalities to· 
keep the peace, opponents of the Sherman amendment in the 
Senate primarily questioned the constitutionality of the judg-
ment lien created by the Sherman amendment, a lien which 
ran against all money and property of a defendant munici-
pality, including property held for public purposes, such as 
jails or courthouses. Opponents argued 31 that such a lien once 
entered would have the effect of making it impossible for the 
municipality to function, since no one would trade with it. 
Moreover, everyone knew that sound policy prevented execu-
tion against public property since this too was needed if local 
government was to survive.32 Thus, whereas constitutional 
objection in the House had rested on potential danger to the 
independence of the Staks if the Federal Government were 
allowed to mandate the duties of state instrumentalities or 
officers, objection in the Senate rested on the actual probability 
that municipal government would be extinguished if ever ma.de 
subject to the lien. 
The position of the Senate oppo'nents, although not relevant 
to the question whether municipalities could be sued under 
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act, 33 nonethelef's underscores the fact 
31 See, e. g., Globe, at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 763 (Sen. Casserly). 
" 2 Sec. e. g., ibid. Opponrnts were correct thnt publir propcrt~· was 
grnernlly immune from rxcrut ion. Sec Meriwether v. Garrett. 102 U. S. 
472, 501, 513 (1880); The Pmtector, 20 F. 207 (CCD MnF~. 1894); 2 
Dillon, Municipal Corporal.ion~ §§ 4-15-4-±6 (1873 ed.). 
33 Execution in suits under § 1, like all other civil suits in fedrral courts 
in 1871, would have been governed by state proccdurcH under the process 
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that opponents of the Sherman amendment were arguing 
primarily that the Constitution, in Blair's words, did not 
"inten[d] to give the Government of the United States power 
to destroy the government of the States," and yet, somehow, 
proponents of the Sherman amendment were intending to· 
exercise just such a power. To understand why this was so-
and, more important, why § 1 of the civil rights bill did not 
threaten the government of the States in an impermissible 
manner-it is necessary to examine the cases cited by oppo-
nents of the Sherman amendment. 
The first case is Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra, which had also 
been cited by Shellabarger in support of the Sherman amend-
ment. See p. 12, supra. In addition to confirming a broad 
federa.l power to enforce federal rights against the States. Mr. 
Justice Story in Prigg held that Congress could not insist that 
the States create an adequate remedy for a federal right: 
"[Art. IVl is found in the national Constitution, and not 
in that of any state. It does not point out any state 
functionaries, or any state action to carry its provisions 
into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to 
enforce them; and it might well be deemed an uncon-
stitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist 
that states are bound to provide means to carry into effect 
the duties of the national government .... " 16 Pet., 
at 615- 616. 
Indeed, Story suggested that those parts of the Act of 1793· 
which conferred jurisdiction on local magistrates to assist in 
the arrest and return of slaves were unconstitutional, see id., . 
at 622, a proposition with which other Justices a.greed.3 ' 
acts of 1792 and 1828. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275; Act 
of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278. 
34 "The state officers mentioned in the law [of 1793] are not bound to 
execute the duties imposed upon them by Congress, unless they choose to 
do so, or are required to do so by a law of the state; and the state 
legislature has the power, if it thinks proper, to prohibit them. The act 
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The principle enunciated in Prigg was applied in Ken-
tucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861). There .. the Court was 
asked to require Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, to hand 
over Lago, a fugitive from justice wanted in Kentucky, as 
required by § 1 of the Act of 1793,35 s~tpra, which implemented 
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, t>f the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney, 
writing for a unanimous Court, refused to enforce that section 
·Of the Act: 
"[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under 
the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State offi-
cer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload 
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and 
disable him from performing his obligations to the State, 
and might impose on him duties of a character incompati-
ble with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by 
the State." 24 How., at 107-108. 
Although no one cited Dennison by name, the principle 
expressed there by Chief Justice Taney was well known to 
of 1793, therefore, must depend altogether for its exerution upon the offi-
()ers of the United States named in it." 16 Pet., at 630 (Taney, C .. T.). 
Mr. Justice McLean agreed that "[a]s a general principle" it was true 
"that Congres~ had no powN to impose dntirs on state officers, as 
provided in the act [of 1793] ," but he wondered whether the "positive" 
obligation created by the Fugitive Slave Clause did not create an excep-
tion. See id., at 664-665. 
35 "Be it enacted ... That whenever the executive authority of any state 
in the Union ... shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice ... 
and shall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found ... charging 
the person so demanded, with having committed treason, felony or other 
crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the 
state ... from whence the person so charged fled, it shall be the duty of 
the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall 
have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured ... and to · 
cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the demanding state] 
when he shall appear .... " 1 Stat. 302. 
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Members of Congress. 36 Reasoning identical to Taney's-that 
maintenance of the federal structure of the Nation was incon-
sistent with allowing Congress any power which might be used 
to impede the States from carrying out programs within their 
"legitimate spheres" of power, for if Congress had such power, 
it would inevitably override the independence of the States 
in violation of the federal plan of the Constitution 37-had 
provided the ground for the Court's decision in Collector v. 
Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), to which Blair and many others 
referred,:~s in which the Court held that the Federal Govern-
ment could not subject the salary of a state officer to a general 
income tax. Although Day and Dennison were the only 
Supreme Court cases setting a limit on the enumerated powers 
of the Federal Government, a, series of state supreme court 
cases ~ 9 in the mid-1860's had invalidated ~ federal tax on the 
process of state courts for the same reasons Dennison had 
invalidated the Act of 1793 :md these cases were cited with 
approval by opponents of the amendment.40 
Prigg obviously prohibited Congress from insisting that 
state officers or instrumentalities keep the peace. But it 
stands for only the narrow proposition for which it was cited 
:w "The Suprrmc Court of the Unitrrl. Statrs has rl.rcirl.rcl repeatedly that 
Congrrss rnn impose no duty on a State officer." Globr, at 799 (Rep. 
Farnsworth). Scr also id .. at 788-789 (Rep. Kerr). 
37 This is the principle of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Whent. 316 ( 1819), 
applied to protect States from fedcrn l interference in the same mnnner the 
Federal Government was protected from state interference .. 
38 Ser, e. (!., Globe, nt 764 (Sen. Davis): ibid. (Sen. Cnsserly); id., 772 
(Sen. Thmman) (reciting logic of Day): id., nt 777 (Sen. Frelinghuysen); 
id .. a.t 788-789 (Rep. Kerr) (reciting logic of Day); id., at 793 (Rep. 
Polnnd); id., at 799 (Rep. Farnsworth) (nlso rcciti11g logic of Day). 
=<u Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276 (1864): Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 
Wis. 369 (1865); Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505 (1867); Union Bank v. 
Hill, 3 Cold. (43 Tenn.) 325 (1866); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1867). 
40 Sec Globr, at. 764 (Sen. Davis): ibid. (Sen. Casserlcy). See also T. 
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by Representative Blair: that the Federal Government cannot 
compel a state government, agency, or officer to provide a 
remedy, either executive or judicial, for a federal right. 
Therefore, equally obviously, Prigg has no bearing whatsoever 
on the question whether a federal court could award damages 
under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act against a state agency or 
officer that violated a federal right, since when a federal court 
makes a damage award under that section, the positive govern-
ment action required to implement the federal right is carried 
out by that court, not by an agency or officer of the State. 
The limits of the principle of Dennison and Day are some-
what more difficult to discern as a matter of logic but more 
apparent as a matter of history. It must be remembered that 
Dennison a.nd Day coexisted with vigorous federal judicial 
enforcement of the Contract Clause. Thus, federal judicial 
enforcement of express limits on state power found in the 
Constitution, at least so long as interpretation of constitu-
tional limits was left in the hands of the judiciary, apparently 
was seen to create no threat to federalism. Since § 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act simply conferred jurisdiction on the federal 
courts to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-a situa-
tion precisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction 
under which the Contract Clause was enforced against munici-
palities--there is no reason to suppose that opponents of the 
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional 
barrier to § 1 suits aga.inst municipalities. 
Indeed, opponents expressly distinguished between imposing 
a.n obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil 
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by 
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for 
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated 
that a federal law that sought only to hold a municipality 
liable for using its authorized powers in violation of the 
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Constitution-which is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
went-would be constitutional: 
"I presume . . . that where a State had imposed a duty 
[to keep the peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action 
would be allowed to be maintained against them in the 
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions 
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by 
their own contract, or by a State la.w, in the courts, is a 
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or 
liability upon them by the national Government, which 
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no 
power or coutrol over them whatever." Globe, at 794. 
Representative Burchard agreed: 
"[T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the 
United States, or usually by State laws, upon a county to 
protect the people of that county against the commission 
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of 
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to 
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as 
corporations; they are conferred upon cities that have 
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities are con-
cerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded 
by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps 
the United States courts could enforce its perform-
ance. But counties ... do not have any control of the 
police . . . ." I d., at 795. 
That those who voted for § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, but 
against the Sherman amendment, would not have thought § 1 
unconstitutional if it applied to municipalities is also confirmed 
by c~msidering what exactly those votin_s; for § 1 had a,Eproved. 
Section 1 without question could be used to obtain a damage 
judgment against state or municipal officials who violated 
federal constitutional rights while acting under color of law!t 
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However, for Prigg-Dennison-Da.y purporses, as Blair and 
others recognized,42 tlwre was no distinction of constitutional 
magnitude between officers and agents-including corpora.te 
agents-of the Sta.te: both were state instrumentalities and 
the State could be imprdcd no matter over which sort of 
instrumentality the Federal Government sought to assert its 
power. Dennison and Day, after all, were not suits a.gninst 
municipalities but against officers and Blair was quite conscious 
that he >vas extending Prigg by applying it to municipal 
corpora.tions.4 :' Nonetheless. Senator Thurman. who gave the 
most exhaustive critique of.~ l-inter alia complaining that it 
would be applied to state officers, see Globe, at 217-and who 
opposed both § 1 and the Sherman amendment, the latter on 
Prigg grounds, agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitu-
tional.H Those who voted for § 1 must similarly have believed 
in its constitutionality def'pite Prigg, Dennison, and Da.y. 
In sum, there is no basis in holdings of this Court, the 
common understandi1;g of the bar, or the debates to find in the ~ 
Constitution as interpreted in Pn:gg, Dennison, or Day a bar to 
Federal Government power to enforce the Fourteenth ~nd-
at 367-368 (Rep. Sheldon): id .. n,t 385 (Rep. Lewis); Globe App., at 217 
(Sc•n. Thurman). In addition, officers were included among those who 
could be sued nndrr the second conference substitute for ihe Sherman 
Amendment. Sec Globe, nt 805 (exchnnge bet.ween Rep. Wilbrd and Rep. 
Shellabrrrger). There werr no constitutional objections to the second 
rC'port. 
42 See Globe, nt 795 (Rep. Blnir); id., at 788 (Rep. Kerr) ; id., at 795 
(Rep. Burchard); id., at 799 (Rep. Fa.rnsworth). 
<:l "fW]e ca.nnot commru1el a State officer to do any duty whn,tcver, as 
surh; and I ask ... the difference between that and commanding a munic-
ipality .... " Globe, at 795. 
41 Sec Globe App., at 216-217, qnoted, infra, at n. 45. In 1879, more-
OVPr, when the question of t.he limit~ of the Prigg principle was squarely 
prcscnt0d in Ex pdrte Virainia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880), this Court held that 
Dennison and Day and the principle of federali;;m for which they stand 
did not prohibit federal enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
through suits directed to st.ate officers. Sec 100 U. S., at 345-348. 
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ment against the States, or their agents, officers, instrumen-~ 
talities, or subdivisions, tl~ederal judicial action even 
though such enforcement would necessarily involve sanctions 
against officers or instrumentalities which violated that 
Amendment. 
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill 
From the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that 
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would 
have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question remains, however, whether the 
general language describing those to be liable under § 1-"any 
person"-covers more than natural persons. An examination 
of the debate on § 1 and application of appropriate rules of 
construction shows unequivoca.lly that § 1 was intended to 
cover legal as well as natural persons. 
Representative Shellaharger was the first to explain the 
function of § 1 : 
"[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons 
whose former condition may have been that of slaves, 
but also to all people where, under color of State law, 
they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which 
they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and 
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68. 
By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1 
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sections 
of the 1871 Act were addressed. Representative SheHabargcr 
also stated without reservation that the constitutionality of 
~ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 rontrollrd the constitu-
tionality of § 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been 
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of 
this Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit, who 
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of 
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every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to 
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1: 
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of 
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and con-
stitutional provisions authorizing such statutes a.re lib-
erally and beneficently construed. It would be most 
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the 
rule of interpretation. As has been again and again de-
cided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, 
and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpre-
tation, tho largest latitude consistent with the words 
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes 
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and 
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the 
people. . . . Chief .Justice Jay and also Story say: 
"''Where a power is rcmedial in its nature there is 
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed 
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation 
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 420.'' Globe App., 
at 68. 
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's 
opening speech were echoed by Senator Edmunds, the man-
ager of H. R. 320 in the Senate: 
"The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, 
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the 
United States when they are assailed by any Rtate law or 
under color of any State law. and it is merely carrying 
out the principles of the civil rights bill r of 18661' which 
have since becomr a part of the Constitution." Globe. at 
568. 
"rSection 1 isl so vrry simple and really rc0nacting the 
Constitution." ld., at 560. 
And he agreed that the bill "~ecurer edl the rights of white 
men as much as of colored men." Id., at 696. 
75-1914-0PINION 
24 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
In both Houses, statements of the supporters of § 1 cor-
roborated that Congress in enacting j 1 intended to exercise 
the entirety of its power to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth 
"--, -- -Amendmcnt.:;n=-
45 Representative Bingham, thl' author of § 1 of the Fourt<:'Cnth Amend-
ment, for example, declared thr hill's purpose to be "the enforcement .. . 
of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic .. . 
to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe 
App., at 81. He continurd: 
"The States never had the righL, though they had the power, to inflict 
wrongs upon free citizens by :l drnial of the full protection of the lawR .... 
r '\ndl the Sta tcR did deny to citizens the C(lllHl protection of the lawR, they 
did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the 
extent of the l'xprrR:> limitations upon tlw States, as I have shown, the 
ritizrn had no rC'medy. . . . They took propert~' without compl'nsation, 
and he had no remedy. They restncted lhe freedom of the press, and he 
had no remedy. Th·ey rrstrictrd the freedom of speech, and hr. had no 
remedy. They restricted the rights of conscienrl', and he had no rem-
edy. . . . Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended, 
that the nation cannot by law provide against all such abuses and denials 
of right as these in the States and by States, or combinations of per:·mns ?" 
Id., at 85. 
Representative Perry, commenting on Cong11ess' action in passing the civil 
rights bill also stated: 
"Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can 
U$Sert the mischief intended to be remedied. We have a<~~ertrd ns clearly 
as we can a<iBert our belief that it, is the duty of Congress to redress tha.t 
mischief. We have also asserted a<~ fully as we ran assert the constitutional 
right of Congress to legisl::tte." Globe, at 800. 
Sre al~o id .. at 376 (Rep. Lowe); id., at 428-429 (Rep. Bratty); id., 
at 448 (Rep. Butler); id., nt 475-477 (Rep. Dawe~); id., nt 578-579 (Sen. 
Tmmbull); id., at 609 (Sen. Pool); Globe App., id., at 182 (Rep. Mcrrur). 
Other supporters were quite clear that § 1 of the act extended a. remedy 
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also 
w~ere officers of the State refused to carry ont the law: 
"But the chief complaint is [that] by a systematic maladministration of 
[state law], or a neglect or refu~al to enforce their provisions, a portion of 
the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state 
of fa.rts is clearly made out, I believe [§ 5 of tho Fourteenth Amend-
ment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those 
75-1914--0PINION 
MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 25 
Since the debates show that Congress intended to exercise 
its full power under the Fourteenth Amendment and, further, 
that c ongress intended the stat ute to Be construed broadly in 
favor of persons injured in their constitutional rights, there 
is no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would 
have been excluded from the sweep of§ 1. Cf., e. g .. Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1880); Horne Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286-287, 294- 296 (1913). One 
need not rely on this inference alone, however. for the debates 
show that Members of Congress underPtood "persons" to 
include municipal corporations. 
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of 
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 
(1834), espPcia.lly in mind. "In rthatl case the city had taken 
private property for public use, without compensation . . . , 
and there was no redress for the wrong .... " Globe App., 
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly 
indicate his view that such takings as ha.d occurred in Barron 
persm•s who arc thus denied equal protertion." Globe App., at 153 (J\Tr. 
Garfield). Sec also Monroe v. Pape, snpm, n. 7, at 171-187. 
Importantly for our inquiry, even the opponents of § 1 agreed that it was 
constitutional a.nd, further, th3t it represented an attempt to exercise the 
full power conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Senator 
Thurman, who gave the most exh3ustive ('ritique of§ 1, said: 
"This section relnJes wholly to civil suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give 
to the Federal Judiciary that which now doeR not belon~ to it-a jurisdic-
tion that may be constitutionally conferred upon it, I grant, but that has 
never yet been conferred upon it. 1t authorizes any person who is deprived 
of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Com:titution of 
tho United States, to bring an action aga.inst the wrongdoer in the Federal 
cour1s, and that without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in 
controversy .... 
"I 'l']here is no limitation 10hatsoever upon the terms that are employed 
rin the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be used." Glob<' App., 
at 216-217 (emphasis added). 
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would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See id., at 85. 
More generally, and as Bingham's remarks confirm, § 1 of the 
bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress provided 
redress for takings, since that section provided the only civil 
remedy coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
Amendment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated tak-
ings.46 Given this purpose. it beggars reason to suppose that 
Congress would have exempted municipalities from suit, 
insisting instead that compensation for a taking come from an 
officer in his individual capacity rather than from the govern-
ment unit that had the benefit of the property taken.47 ~ 
In addition, by 1871, it was well understood that corpora- I'~-~~ ... ~ 
ti QE_s should be treated as na~ural persons for virtually all pur- ~ Jr ~ 
poses of con§...tillitionaf andstatutory an®'s1~ This had not 
always been B<f Wtlc'if t1hs=c'o'i1?thrsi"consitrered the question , , , , 
of the status of corporations, Chief Justice Marshall, writing 112.J~~ 
for the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons I~
as that term was used in Art. III and the Judiciary Act of 
1789. See Bank of th e United Sta.tes v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 
86 (1809). 48 By 1844. howev0r, thE' f5 r1'eaux doctrine was 
unhesitatingly abandoned: 
" [A l corporation crcat0d by and rloing business in a par-
ticular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes 
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of 
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a 
natural person." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 
558 (1844) (emphasis arldC'd). discusscrl in Globe, at 752. 
46 Sec Story, Cormnentarirs on the Constitution of the United States 
§ 1956 (Cooley ed. 1873) . 
47 Indred 1.he federal courts found no obstacle to awards of damages 
against municipalities for rornmon-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadel-
phia, 21 F. CnR. 392 (CCED Pn. 11\73) (No. 13,611) (awarditlg dam~1gcs 
of $2,273.36 and costs of $346.35 against the city of Philadelphia). 
•s N onethclPss, suits could bP brought in federal court if the natural 
persons who were members of the corporation were of diverse citizenship 
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Cranch, at !H. 
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And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights 
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), the 
Letson principle was automatically and without discussion 
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doctrine, 
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal 
courts ~o and this fact was well known to Members of 
Congress. 5° 
That the "usual" mraning of the word person would extend 
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of 
Congress which had been passed only months before the Civil 
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided that 
"in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may 
extend and be applied to bodies politic a.nd corpo-
rate ... unless the context shows that such words were 
intended to be used in a more limited senserJ ." Act of 
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. 
Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the 
phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the 
"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were 
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be 
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed. a Circuit 
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported 
49 See n. 28, supra. 
50 See, e. g., Globe, 777 (Rrn . Shcrm~n); id., at 7r52 (Rrp. Slwlla-
b~rgrr) ("rount.ic~. ritirs, and corporations of all sorto:, after ~rraxs of 
judicial conflict, haw brcomr thormw:hly r'='tnbli ~hrcl to br nn indi1•idual or 
person or entity of thr prrmnal rxistcncr. of whirh, ns n. citir,rn, indi,·icl-
unl, or inhabitant., thr United RtntrR Constitntion does tnke note anr! rndow 
with farult~· to sur nnd br ~urd in thr courts of tlw Unitrd Stntcs."). 
51 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Parle, 18 F. Cas . 393, 394 
(CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336); 2 Kent's Commentarirs ·*278--x-279 (12th 
0. W. Holmes eel. 1R78). R0c [dso United Stat('S v. Maw-ir:c , 2 Brock. 96, 
109 (CC Va. 1823) (l\far~hall. C .. T.) ("The Unitrd States is n govrrnmrnt, 
and, ronscqnently, n boclr pol it ir and corporate"); Briof for Prtitioncr in 
Monroe v. Pape, 0. T. HJ60, No. 30. App'R. D and E (collrrtinr.; Rtnte 
stntntrs which, in 1871, drfinccl municipal corporations a~ bodirs politic 
and corp0rate). 
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case under § 1, read the Dictiona.ry Act in precisely this way 
in a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal 
defendant. 52 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336).5 '' 
II 
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend 
"~'The rourt also noted that tlwre was no diRrcrnible reason why persons 
injmrcl by municipal corporniion,Q shonld not be able to recover. See 18 
F. C:~s., at 394. 
"''In considering ihc effrct of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871 in Monroe, how-
r\·cr . .Tustir<' Dom~h~. appn rently foru~ing on the word "may," sta,ted: "thiR 
drfinition [of person] is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." 365 
U. S., at 191. A review of the legislative history of the Dictionary Act 
shows tllis conclusion to be incorrect. 
There is no express reference in the legislative history to the definition of 
pen,on, but Senator Trumbull, the Act's sponsor, discusRrd thP phrase 
"words importing the masculine gender may be applird to females," 
( Pmphnsis addrd), which immectiately precedes tho definition o.f person, and 
l"tatcd: 
"The only objrct. r of ihe Act l is to get riel of a great de:tl of Yerbosity 
in our statutes by providing that when the words 'he' is user! it shall 
includ<' fem11lcs as well as mllles[] ." Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 3d 
Sess., 77.5 (.Tan. 27, 1871) (emphasis a.clded). 
Thus, in Trumbull's view the word "may" meant "shall." Such a manda-
tory URC of the extended mmJJings of the worcls definrd by iho Act 
i:l also required for it to perform its inLeuded fnncLion-to be a guide 
to "rules of construction" of Acts of Congress. See id., a.t 775 (Remarks 
of Sen. Trumbull). Were the defined words "a.llowabie, rbut.] not manda-
tory" constructions, as Monroe suggests, there would be no "rules" at all. 
Instead, Congress must have intended the definitions of the Art to apply 
across-the-board exrept where the Act Qy its Lerms called for a. dcvia,tion 
from this practicc-"[whrrc] ihe context shows that rdefinedl words 
were to he u~ed in a more limited sense." Certainly ihis is how the 
Northwestern Fertilizing court viewed the matter. Since there is nothing 
in the "context" of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act rnlling for n restricted 
interpretation of the word "person," the language of that section should 
prima facie be construed to include "bodies politic" among the entities that 
could be sued. 
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municipalities and other local government units to be in luded 
among those persons to whom ~ 1983 applies. 5 " Local overn-
ing bodies, therefore. can be Rurd dirrctly under . 983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief t least in those 
situa.tions where as hrre the action of tho m mc1pn 1ty that is 
alleged to be unc;-gtitut im1al implements or executes a' holic 
s a em_; m , <[._ man_2_e, regulation. or ecision officially adopted 
and promulgated '!2.;y that body's officers. Moreover, since the 
to;-ichst~e-;Rhe ~ 1983 action ag;inst a government body is 
an allegation that official policy or official action is to blame 
for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, 
unwritten practices or 'predilection~ whi.ch have by forcC' of 
time and consistent application m!ystalizcd into official policy 
can also, on an appropriate' factual showi.ng/r. provide a basis 
54 There is certainly no constitutional impediment to surh liabilit~· "The 
Tenth Amcnclmrnt's rr~rrvation of nrmdrlrgat.od powrrR to thr Statr~ i~ nol 
impliented by n fr-drrnl-romt judgment rnforcing 1 he rxprcH~ prohibit ionfl of 
unla.wful state conduct rnnrt rd by thr Fourtcrnth Amrndment ." Milliken 
v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 207, 291 (1977); r;ee Ex parte Virginia. 100 U. S. 
339, 34 7-348 (1880). For 1 his reason, National Len.gue o Cities v. Usury, I 
426 U.S. 83/l (1976), is irrclrvant. to our rons1 crat10n of thi~ rasr. (Nor 
iR thrrc anv basi~ for conclndin"' thnt thr EJc,nenth AmrnrlrnrPt i~ a l:iar to 
sue y. rc, e. g., '1tzpatnc c v. 1 zer, . , . 44o, 456 (1976); 
is, howevrr, limited to local governmrnt units which arr not con~idcred 
part, of the State for~lev~cndment p urposrs. Where this is not 
Lincoln Co y v. Luning, 138 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). Our holding today I 
t llc ca~e, "2il"Jma:;-v. "Jo;'aan, 415'"tl . S":1r5t ~1!f74) , nnd Milliken v. Bmdley, 
s1~pra, govern the framework for analysis. 
55 Given the vnriety of ways that official policy may be clrmon~tratcd, we 
do not today attempt to cstnbli8h any firm guidelines for dctrrmining whrn 
individunl action cxecutC's or impll'rnents official policy. HoweYCr, given 
our conrlm:ion infra thnt Congress did not intcnd to enact a rrgime of I 
virariouH liability, ilmt wha1C'\'N official nrtion is involvrd mu:;;t hC' ~nffi­
ricnt to support a conclu~ion thnt, n. local government it~elf is to hlamo 
or i~ at fault. 
Porexa~ple, in Rizzo "· Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we rrcognized 
tha.t. f~t is a cmeial factor in determining whether relief may run against 
a party for its alleged participntion in a constitutional tort. Distingui8hing 
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for suit against a local government. See A ickes v. S. H. 
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167- 169 (1970); Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 
U.S. 252,264-268 (1977). 
This conclusion is obviously at odds with some of our 
previous decisions. Therefore, we now consider to what extent 
previous holdin@:::~ be limited or ov;:ruled. 
A 
Only one of our cases, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 
507 (1973), dealt with a situation in which there was an 
allegation that official action of a local government was itself 
to blame for an alleged violation of constitutional rights. That 
the relief approYed by thr lO\\'('r courts in !l.i!zo from that ~anrtioned 
by thi;; Court in ;;chool de~q~rr~ation caR<'s, the Court. explained: 
"Respondents ... ignore a crit icnl fnrhwl distinction between their case 
and thr desegregation caf'es decided by this Court. In the lat,trr, segrr~~­
tion imposed by law had bren implrmrnted by state authoritie::; for varying 
prriods of time, whereas in 1 hr instant. ca~e the Di~trirt Conrt found that 
the responsible authorities had played no nffirmntin' pnrt in drprivin~ any 
m<'mhers o1 th e two m;pond<'nt rln~s('R of an:v romhttifional ri~hts. Tho.•e 
against whom injunctive rplief \\'1\fi dirertPd in rnses RUCh ns Swann r v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Ed?tcation. 402 U. S. 1 (1971),] m d 
Brown fv. Board of EduraLion. 347 U.S. 4R3 (1954),] were not adminis-
trators and school bonrd members who had in their Pmploy a ~mnll number 
of inrlividualR, which lattPr on their own deprived blnrlc st udents of their 
constitutional rights to a unitnry srhool sy;;tern. They were nclministrntors 
nnd school board members who werr found by tlwir own conduct, in the 
administration of the school systrm to hnn denied thosr rights. Herr, the 
District. Court found that none of the petitionrrs bnd drprived the 
rr;;pondent cln~scs of any ri~hts ;;rrurrd under lhr Con~titution. 423 U.S., 
n t. 377 ( emphnsis in original) . 
However, lwd there been an allr~a t,ion and showing th:1t the Mayor of 
Philadelphia or the Polire Commis.<>ioner had ronRciou~ly disregnrded steps 
t.hnt. mi~ht havr been taken to Rtop uncon~titutional police brutality, d. 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-1015 (1976) , or, indeed , a ~howin~ that 
RIICh offirinls had npproved or abetted surh brutality as officinl poliry, a. 
ra~e for § 198:3 relief ngainst the~e officials and the city might have been 
made out. 
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allegation was that the city of Kenosha and other Wisconsin 
cities had, by city council vote pursuant to state authorizing 
legislation, denied liquor licenses to taverns which featured 
nude dancing, in violation of both the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amelldment as 
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See 412 U. S., at 508; App .. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 0. T. 
1972, No. 72--658, p. 11. Under a proper a.nalysis of the 
lC'gislative history of ~ 1983, the allegation in City of Kenosha 
is sufficient to support a ca.usc of action against the various I '~ 
cities who were defendants in that case.56 Since City of • ~ A ~ 1\. 
Kenosha is flatly inconsistent with the correct construction of ._ 
~ 1983, it is hereby overrulec1."7 
56 Of course, plaintiffs in City of Kenosha might, not. h:we won on the 
mrrits. Cf. California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). Nonethcle~~. thrre 
ir;; no ~uggostion in the pleadings that thr constitutional violations 11llegC'd 
were so insubstantial that juriRdir1ion would have bC'en larking. Cf. Bell v. 
Ilond, ~27 U. S. 678 (1946): Mt. Ilealthy City Board of Ed . v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274,279 (1977). 
fi
7 Although "·e havr from timC' to time intim:~ted th:~t stare decisis has I 
more force in statutory :malysi:;; than in ronRtitut ional acljudiration, sec, 
e. (! .. Edelman v. Jordan. S1l])ra. n. 54, at fl71, and n. 14. wr hnYr nrvrr 
applied that dortrine mrrhanirall~· to prohibit o1·erruling our rarlier 
rrronC'ou,: opinionR dC'trrmining tbr mrnning of st.atuteR. Srr , e. (! .• Conti-
nental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Su/?•ania Inc .. 4~3 U. S. 36, 47-49 (1977); 
· • Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas ro .. 2R!5 U. S. 39~, 400 n. 1 (1932) 
. ~.J~ (Brandeis, J., dii:SC'nting) (rollrrting rase~). Nor is this n cn~e whrrc we 
~V should "place on the shouldrrn of CongrC'f'S thr hurdcn of the Court's own 
error." Giroum·d v. United States, 328 U. S. Gl, 70 (1940). Sinrc the 
modern revival of § 198~ in Monroe v. Pape, we have taken it. upon onr-
Rr!ws, without guidance from Congrr~~. to conQtrur the brond lnngu:1gf' of 
§ 19. 3 in light, of its histor~·. rC'nson, and purpoRr. SeC'. e. g., Pierson v. 
Rau, 3il6 U.S. 547 (1907): Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). If 
we were justified in tre::~ting § 19R~ in thitl way without ~reking rongres-
,:ional guidance--and nothing f'uggC'sts thnt we were not or that CongrCRs 
\YOu!d have us do othcnl'i~e--we arc cqtwlly ju~tifird in correcting our own 
mistakes, cf. United States v. Reliable 'l'ran~fr'r Co., Inc., 421 U. S. 397, 
400 (1975), csprcially whrre a;;; herr our mi:;takcn int{'rprctation of§ 1983 
limits Congress' undrniablc and princip:1l purpose of creating a civil rrmcdy 
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B 
Despite our conclusion that !If on roe v. Pape, supra., incor-
rectly held that cities ran never he subjected to ~ 1983liability, 
the judgment in Monroe need not be questioned. The only 
issue terore the C'OurtG tF"nt case was whether municipalities 
could be held liable on a respondPat superior theory-by which 
,\·as appa.rcntly meant (and which we now usc to mean) 
liability imposed on employers without regard to their fault or 
blame-for the torts of thc'ITcmp1oyees. 58 And we shall now 
explain. Monroe was correct insofar as it held that Congr_css ~ r 
did not intend municipalities to be held vicariously liable on 
such a t1ie0rY.'!rn-
- We ~);gin with the language of ~ 1983 as passed: 
"[A lny person who, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation. custom, or usage of any State, shall 
for constitutional violations. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 2:35, 241 (1970). 
58 Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in di~~ent in Monro!' that the complaint 
alle)!Cd that "it is the cuo;tom of the rchicago Police] Dep~rtment to arrest 
and conftne individuals for prolonged period<> on 'open' chnr!l:C'S for interro-
gation, with the purpose of inducing incriminating stntrmrnts, exhibiting 
itR prisonrrs for identification, holding them incommunicado while police 
oiJirers investigate their activities, and punishing thrm by impri~omncnt 
without judicial trial." 365 U. S., at 204. While this allegation rould be 
liberally constmed to enrompaf:s an allegation that tho cu~tom of the 
Police Department had cry:>t:tllized into its official policy, the plaintiffs in 
Monroe did not so interpret their own complaint. Instead, they proceeded 
on a respondeat superior theory in tclw District Court, ~ec App., Monroe v. 
Pape, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. :30, in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, see id., at 31-32, and in this Court, see Brief for Petitioner, 
Momoe v. Pape, 0. T. 1960, No. :39, pp. 21-22. 
50 Our decision in Moor v. County of Alameda, supra. n. 7, ::;t:mds on the 
mmo footing- as our decision regarding municipal liabili ly in Monroe, since 
the only quc~iion in Moor as in Monroe was whether the county was liable 
under a respondeat superior theory for tho torts of its police oiJicers. 
Nothing wo say today afferts tho conclusion reached in Moor, sec 411 U.S., 
at 703-704, that 42 U. S. C. § 1988 cannot be uoed to create a federal cause 
of action where § 1983 does not otherwise provide one. 
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subject, or cause to be subjected, any person ... to the 
deprivation of a.ny rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution of the United ~·Hates, shall. n.ny such 
law, statuk, ordinance. regulation. custom, or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the 
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... " Globe App., at 335 
(emphasis added). 
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a govern-
ment body that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an ~~ - .... ~~ 
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the (Y"-
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose 
l~biliiy vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of 
t1le"existence oT an employer-employee relationship with a 
tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically 
provide that A's tort bf'ca.me B's liability if B cavsC'd A to 
subject another to a tortious act suggests that Congress did not 
intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation n·as 
absent.60 
60 Support, for Rnch n conrlu~ion can be found in the legi~lntive history. 
As we have indicated, there is virtnnlly no di~f'USSion or § 1 or the Civil 
TiightH Act. Again, howrw·r, C'ongrrss' tre~1lmrnt of the Slwrmnn nmend-
mcnt gives a clue to whetlwr it would htwe de~irrd to imposr respondeat 
superior liability. 
Certninly the Sherman amrndment went. Yery far toward imposing 
vicarious liability on a community for the tortiouF< or criminal conduct of 
Rome of its citizens. Nonethrle;;s, it is important. to recognizr that the 
leg.1l basis for such li3bility was not Pome sort of respondeat superior theory 
but. ~t ~the J,Jart of the_community in its exercise of its peace-keeping 
powers:1j()flii'Tor Sherman, for example, de~rribed tile purpose of his 
amendment in terms of negligent or \vilfull failure to keep the peace. See 
Globe., at 761. See also Globe, at. 756 (municipalities are liable if "they 
fail to perform the duty or protection") (Sen. Edmunds); id., 3t 751-752 
(duty to provide protection limited to tho~e cases in which a riot was 
"committed tumultuously in the fnce of the community" :md where com-
munity was guilty of "negl-ect." of its duty to protect). But, as we ha.v£> 
already noted, sre p. 8, supra, Sherman's amendment was poorly drafted 
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat 
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation 
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the 
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not 
to impose because it thought such an obligation unconstitu-
tional. To this day, there is no agreed basis for imposing 
vicarious liability on an employer for the torts of an employee 
when the employer is not at fault for negligent hiring, improper 
training, or inadequate control or direction of his employees.61 
See W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 69, at 459 (4th ed. 1971). 
Nonetheless, 1wo justifications tend to stand out. First is the 
commonsense notion that no matter how blameless an em-
ployer appears to be in an individual case, accidents might 
nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the cost of 
accidents. See, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & F. James. The Law 
and many congres~mrn ~pokr against it. not. only on constitutional grounds, 
buL also becnnse, as drnftrd , it. impo~rd a form of strict or vicnrions liability 
on the citizens of an affrrtrd community. See Globe, at 761 (Sen. 
Stevens); id, at 771 (Sen. Tlmnnan); id., at 788 (Rep. Kerr); id .. at 791 
(Rep. Willard). WhilP the first conferpnce substitute was rPjrcted prin-
cipnlly on constitutional grounds. iL is plain from thP text of the second 
confrrenco substitute, sro Appendix. infra, at-, which was E'nn.rted ns § 6 
of tho 1871 Act and is now codifird as 42 U.S. C. § 1986, thnt a. majority of 
Congress rejeet•ed strict liability eVf'n whilr nrcrpting the bnsic principle 
thnt the inhabitants of a community were bow1d to providt' aid to the 
targets of Kn Klux violence if thry wrrc nwnre of impending violence and 
had tho power to intervene. St rict\~r s[waking, of cour:::e, the fact that 
Congr~s refused to impo~r vicnrious li abi lity on a. community for the 
wrongs of a few private ritizrns dors not. ronclu~ively rstnblish that it 
would similarly haVf' rrfused to impoRe respondeat supe11·or liability. 
NonethelC':'s, when this hiRtory is combined with tho absence of any 
language in § 1983 which can ca-=;ily be construed to crente respondeat 
superior liability, the inference that Congress did not intend to impose 
vicarious liability is quite stron!<. 
61 Whrrr there is fault in hiring, training, or direction, that fnult is the 
bnRiR for liability under thr common law, sec 2 F. Harper & F . .James, The 
Lnw of Tort.:o, § 26.1, at 1362-1363 (1956), not the fault of the cmployee-
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of Torts,§ 26.3, at 1368-1369 (1956). Second is the argument 
that the cost of accidents should be spread to the community 
as a whole on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id:, ~ 26.5; W. 
Prosser, supm, at 459. 
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for 
the Sherman amendment: "The obligation to make compensa-
tion for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitrary enactment of 
statutes, affirmatory law, and the reason of passing the statute 
is to secure a more perfect police regulation." Globe, at 777 
(Sen. Frelinghuysen). This justification was obviously insuf-
ficient to sustain the amendment against constitutional attack 
and there is no reason to suppose that a more general liability 
imposed for a similar reason would have been thought less 
constitutionally objectionable. The second justification was 
similarly put forward as a justification for the Sherman 
amendment: "we do not look upon [the Sherman amendment] 
as a punishment . . . . It is a mutual insurance." !d., at 
702 (Rep. Butler). Again, this justification was insufficient 
to sustain the amendment and, indeed, it would appear to be 
objectionable not only on Prigg-Dennison-Day grounds but 
also on the ground that the Constitution nowhere creates a 
right to insurance.62 
c 
Finally, it is necessary to comment briefly on our decision in 
Aldin(J!r v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). There we held that 
pendent party j uriscTiction predicated on 28 U.S. C. ~ 1343 (3), 
the jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, would be inconsistent 
62 A third justification, often cited but which on examinntion is insuffi-
cient to justify the doctrine of respondeat s1tperior, see, e. g., 2 F. H arper & 
F . James, supra, n. 61, § 26.3, is that liability follows the right to rontrol 
the actions of a tortfeasor. By our deri~ion in Rizzo v. Goode, supm, 
n. 5,5, we would appear to bave derided that the mere right to control 
without any control or direction haviug been exercif'ed and without any 
failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability. Sor 423 
U. S., at 370-371. 
75-1014-0PINION 
36 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
with Congress' refusal to create a cause of action against local 
governments. Sec 427 U. S., at 16-17. Our conclusion today 
that Congress did indeed intend to create a. cause of action 
against such governments is squa.rely inconsistent wjth the 
ra,t?'o decidendi of ~ldir!JJ._('r. Moreover, although we today 
conclude that <fon!!ress did not impose respondeat superior 
liability on local governments. the legislative history of the 
Civil Ri hts Act evinces no congressional hostility to federal 
court enforcement o sta c- aw c a1ms. n ee , 
history iS to the contrary. Scr p. 20, supra. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the question of pendent party 
jurisdiction decided in Aldinger, supra, and not before us here, 
must now be considered open for re-examination in an 
appropriate case. 
III 
Given our conclusion that local government bodies can be 
sued directly unrler ~ 1983 for all forms of relief, there remains 
the quflRtion what official immunity these bodie;are entitled 
to. O.&Jousl.Y. municipal entities cannot be entitled to an 
absolute immunity, lest our decision that ~uch bodies are 
suh.i('ct to suit under ~ 1983 "be drained of m('aning." Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. 248 (1974). Moreover, a grant of 
absolute immnnity to local government bodies sued for inflict-
in~ constitutional deprivations is not warranted under the 
approach we have consistently taken in determining whether 
and to what extent a given type of defendant is entitled to 
immunity in a ~ 1983 action-namely "a considered inquiry 
into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at 
common law and the interests behind it," Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U. S. 400, 421 (1976). Although th;-co-mmon law once 
afforded municipal bodies immunity in the performance of 
their "governmental'' functions,n:l this doctrine has not received 
t.hc repeated and consistent approval given the principle of 
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judicial and quasi-judicial imnmnity,C·' but instead "[flor \vell 
over a century ... has been subjected to vigorous criticism," 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 984 (4th eel. 1971).e5 
Indeed, this Court has described the tenet of absolute munic-
ipal immunity for the performance of governmental functions 
as "a rule of law that is inherently unsound." Indian Towing 
Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955). Dissatisfa.ction 
with the rule has resulted in "a minor avalanche of decisions 
repudiating municipal immunity," W. Prosser, supra, a.t 985, 
as a consequence of which 
"the majority rule appeaJ's to be, that in the absence of a 
statute granting immunity, a municipality is liable for its 
negligence in the same manner as a. private person or 
corporation. The common-law doctrine of sovereign or 
governnwnta.l immunity once asserted by the city. as a 
defense in actions against it based on tort, wonlcl appear 
to obtain in this country only in a minority of states." 
E. McQuillin, Mun icipal Corporations § 53.02 at 104 (3d 
rev. eel. 1977) (footnotes omitted). 
At present, it appears that no more than 11 States continue 
strictly to adhere to the old common-Jaw rule. SeeP. Harley 
& B. Wasinger, Government Immunity: Despotic Mantle 
64 Stump v. Sparkman, - U. S. -- (No. 76-1750, March 28, 1078); 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 
(1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 7 
Wall. 523 ( 1869) . 
65 "The sovereign or governmentrd immunity doctrine, holding that the 
state, its subdivisions m1d municipal entities, may not be hrld liable for 
tort.ious acts, was never completely aceepted by the courts, its underlying 
principle being deemed contrary to the basic concept of the law of to-rts 
tha.t liability follows negligence, as well as foreign to the spirit of the 
constitutiona.l guarantee that every person is entitled to n. legal remedy for 
injuries he may receive in his person or property. As a result, the trend 
of judicial decisions was ahvays to restrict, rather than to expand, the 
doctrine of municipal immunity." E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 
~ 53.02 at 104 (3d rev. ed. 1977) (footnotes omitted). 
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or Creature of Necessity, 16 Washburn L. Rev. 12, 34-53 
(1976). What sapped vitality remains of the largely repudi-
ated common-law rule of absolute municipal immunity pro-
vides a clearly inadequate basisTor adopting that rule in the 
§ 1983 context in the face of our determination that Congress 
intended to allow § 1983 suits directly against municipal 
bodies. 
Since the question of the nature of officia.l immunity to be 
afforded local government bodies has been neither extensively 
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we -express no views n its scope beyond holding that municipal 
bo 1es sued under§ 1983 are not entitled to absolute immunity. 
Cf. Bivens v. Si."C Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 
389. 397-398 (1971). 
IV 




As proposed, the Sherman amendment was as follows: 
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, 
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demol-
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in 
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with 
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; and if such offense was committed to 
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to 
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by 
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or 
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be com-
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, mitted shall be liable to pay full compensation to the 
person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to 
his widow or legal representative if dead; a.nd such com-
pensation may be recovered by such person or his repre-
sentative by a suit in any court of the United States of 
competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense 
was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, 
or his legal representative, and against said county, city, 
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment 
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any prop-
erty, real or personal. of any person in said county, city, 
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover 
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest, 
from any person or persons engaged as principle or 
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction." Globe. at 663. 
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the 
Sherman amendment is: 
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop. building, 
barn , or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demol-
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed. wholly or in 
part, by any persons riotously ancl tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with 
force and violence be whipped. scourged, wounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together, with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for 
exercising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous conditions of servitude, in every such casr the 
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses 
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensa-
tion to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if 
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such compensation may be recovered in an action on the 
case by such person or his rcprcsenta.tive in any court of 
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district 
in which the offense was committed, such action to be in 
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, 
and against said county, city, or pa.rish; and in which 
action any of the parties committing such acts may be 
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judg-
ment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plain-
tiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual 
defendant therein within two months next after the ' 
recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued 
against such individual defendant in such judgment, and 
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced ) 
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attach-
ment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding 
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of 
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judg-
ment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys in the 
treasury of such county, city, or pa.rish , as upon the other 
property thereof. And the court in any such action may 
on motion cause additional parties to be made therein 
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done. 
And the said county, city, or parish may recover the 
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and 
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal 
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish, 
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's 
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755. 
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the 
Sherman amendment is as follows: 
"r A lny person or persons, having knowledge that any of 
the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the 
second section of this act are about to be committed, and 
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having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, 
shall neglect or refuse so to do, a.nd such wrongful act 
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable 
to the person injured, or his legal representative." Globe, 
at 804 (emphasis added). 
I . 
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Memorandum of MR. JuS'l'ICE BRENNAN. 
~frt~ Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department 
rt.,.,_ ~ ..... ,. .._ of Social Services and the Board of Education of tlw City of 
~-c.~.J: ew York, commenced tltis action under 42 U.S. C.~ 1983 
He •. _ o _ J~ \ 971.1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the 
., ~ ' oa~ the Department had as a matter of official policy 
comp~llrd pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of 
1/-. w~u ~absence before such leaves were required for nwdiral reasons. 2 
~ 1 The romphint was amrnctcd on Srptcmbcr 14, 1972 to allegra rlaim 
• undrr Title VII of the 1954 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U. Fl. C. 
~ § 2000e (1970 ed., Supp. V). The District Court held thnL the Hl72 
IF- - - . ~ amendments to Title VII did not apply retroartively to di•<e rim111ation 
~•••U~C~ suffered prior to those nmendmrnl~ eYen when an artion challenging ~uch 
.J_ 7':.,. prior di~crimination was pending on the date of the amendments . :394 
P'O ~ C..~ F. Snpp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This holding was alfirm"d on appeal. 
~~~~ .. JIL~. 532 F. 2d 259, 261-262 (CA2 1976). Althongh petiliourr~ sought cer-;.., -:rr--:--- tiorari on the Tit le VII issue ns well as the § 1983 claim, we rc.'•ricted .t ,/J. ~ __ 
11 
~my grant of certiorari to thr la1ter is,.ue. 429 U.S. 1071. 
r '( -I ~he plaintiff~ allNSed that the rity had a ritywide policy of forcing 
". ~ :.. n A_ . " women to take maternity lea\'(' after the fifth month of prrgnaucy. 
....c.caA""""- Amended Complaint ~ .28, .App. 13-14. The ddm1d mts did nol deny this, 
J/l...,.,., ~ but stated that this policy had been rhnn~ed after suit was instituted. 
Answer ~ 13, App. 32-33. The plaintiffs furthrr allrged th:1t tlw Bonrd 
""0 .C •~•·K- _... J- 'Ja' ,. _ " ~\l'polir~eq~i ··z women lo tnke maternit)' leave aftrr the ::;ryenth 1th 01 peg n-: 11 r~s that month fell in the last month of the school 
year, in which cnse the teneher ro11ld r<'muin t hrough the end of lhc ~f'hool 
term. Amended Complaint n 39, 42, 45, App. 18-19, 21. This allega-
tion was denied. Answer 1117, 18, App. 35. 
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for 
periods of unlawful forced leave. Named a.s defendants in the 
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board 
and its Chancellor, and the city of Now York and .its Ma.yor. 
In each casr, the individual defendants were sued solely in 
their official capacitics.3 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court 
for the Southern District of Nc'v York held moot petitioners' 
cla . ims for injunctive and drclaratory relief since the city of 
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had 
changrd their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no 
11regnant employer would have to take leave unless she was 
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F. 
Rupp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The 
court did concludr. howrvcr. that the acts complained of 
were unconstitutional undPr LaFleur, SUJJra. ::394 F. Sup])., 
at 8fl.). Noncthclrsfl plaintiff'fl prayers for backpay were 
dr:niC'd hPcan::;e anv such damages would come ultimately from 
tlw city of New York and. thrrefore, to hold otherwise would 
lw to "circumvrnt" the immunity conferrrd on municipalities 
hy M onror v. Papc, 36fl r. R. 167 (] 961). Sec 394 F. Supp. , 
at R55. 
On appeal, prtitionrrs rrne"·ecl their arguments that the 
Board of Education 4 was not a "municipality" within the 
meaning of 111 onroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the 
District Court had rrrrd in barring a damage award against 
the individual defenclan ts. The C'ourt of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit rejrctecl both contentions, however. The court 
first held that the Board of Education was not a person under 
~ 1983 because "it performs a vita] governmental function ... , 
and, significantly, whiJr it has the right to determine how the 
a Amrndrd Complaint ,r 24, A pp. 11-12. 
• Pctitionrrs ronccdrd thnt thr Drpnrtmcnt of Roci:tl Scn·ircs rnjoy~ thr 
same status as New York City for Monroe purpos~. Sec 532 F. 2d , at 
263 . 
cIt z.. t.....~ H.-.-
~,... • .~.:.. ( S ~ S<, ..,..-c ''-
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funds appropriated to it shall be spent . . . , it has no final 
say in deciding what its appropriations sha.ll be." 532 F. 2d 
259, 263 (1976). The individual defendants, however, were 
"persons" under ~ 1983, even when sued solely in their official 
capacities. I d., at 264. Yet, because a damage award would 
"have to be paid by a city that was held not to be amenable 
to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a damage action against 
officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed. I d., 
• at 265. 
~ c.y-..;-~ 
~ .• JL~ 
~;.:4-
 




Our grant of certiorari in this 
limited to the question: 
~··~4b.-;J\ 
case, 429 U. S. 1071. Vi'as ~ ~_qt. 
~~Col ~~ --- • - ... 
"Whether local p;m·ernmcntal officials and/ or local inde- ,...~ 
pendent r51 school boards arc "persons" within the meaning ~ c...l Jtc.c..:., 
of 42 U. S. C'. ~ HJ83 when NFlitable relief in the nature ~
~ Contrury to prtitionen;' char:l.Ctrrization of 1 hP Board's Ft:11ns, the 
appeal" rourt i'uggei'1rd thnt thr Board is not in fflrt. indcprndrnt. See 
532 F. 2rl. nt 263-2()4. The fnrlnnl h:JI'i~ for t.hil' ronrlm:ion iR not 
nppnrrnt-the i"umm:1rv jurlgmrnt mo1ions did not nrldrri'~ thr i~~uP. If, 
ns I suggr~t. wr overml•r Monroe. t.hc drprndrn1/inrlrprnrlrnl di ~ tinrtion 
makes no diffrrcnrr. If, howc\'Pr. we do not O\'ern1lc Monroe. hut mrrely 
limit. its rerrrh short of !'<chool hoards, \\'e will be frrred with 1hr farturrl and 
legal qurrgmire of distin~ui~hing betwrrn Yarious typrs of school ho:-~rds. 
Indeed, one of the hr~1 re;l.~ons to O\'rrrule Monro!! outright i~ to avoid 
having to mrrke such di~t inrtions. 
1 frankly do 110t undPr~t n nd Bill'~ 8U ,ttgr~t ion in Part Ill-:\ of hi' 
mpmnmnrlum that somr ol'l10ol board~ mny he simpl:v· :1ggrrgat ion~ of 
indh·idllrrls with no r·0rporat" exio;;trnrr. I know of no suf'h r;1~r :Jll(! 
wmtlrl i'Uppose that, if it r'\i"ts, 1hrn 1he indi1·irhwls mu~l i'1ill hr ~mnr 
sort of strrte offirerl' :111d 1 hr bo:ncl :1 st :!1 P ngenry. Tn cit hrr ra~r. suf'h 
a hybrid lc~nl rnti1y II'Ollid be n. nonpet·son 11ndrr Mo117'oe's theory of 
~ l!) .q~ sinre 1hr dch:~lrs !ll'P \ ' C'l')' denr 1hal thr ron~titution;tl infirmity 
perrci\·ed in the Shrrman Amrndmrnt ran to all i'tntr inst111ment;1liti rs, 
rcgardles-=; of lr:z;:-~1 fonn. See infra. :1t pp.~ . .).fr.}.'f 
In any ea~r , I agree with Hi111h:-~t wr shoultl not :~tlempt to di~tinguish 
hct WCf'n those types of board that may br sued and those that m:1y not. 
In my judgment, however, thi~-; argues for allowing :11! hoards to hr ~urrl. 
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of back r>!LY is sought against them in their official 
capacitic;?l' Pet.. at 8. 
For analytic purpoSC'f', thiR question is best considered as two: 
1. Whether local indepf'ndent school boards are "per-
sons" within the rnC'aning of§ 1983? 
2. If local indepcnd<>nt school boards are not such per-
sons, what actions against officials in their official capaci-
ties will be considNcd actions against the school board 
"in fact" (if any) with tlw result that such actions are also 
barred hy Monroe v. Pape, supra? 
Obviously, if we hold that independent school boards may be I 
suC'd in their corporate names under § 1983, tlwre is 110 need Y 
to reach the SC'conrl question. If, however. we hold that school 
boards may not be sued in their corporate names, then we 
must grapple with the f!UC'stion whether school officials can 
be Stled only in their personal capacities or whether it is 
possible to adopt the theory of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
6!'il (1973). and Milliken v. Bradley,- U. S.- (1977) 
(Milliken II), or possibly some other theory. to allow a 
bifurcation between equitable and declaratory relief, on the 
one hand, and damage actions on the other. 
Before addressing the first qurstion, it is important to note I 
that the decisi.Q.n on thr first question logically determines the 
answer to the §Qrond. - -
Monroe stands for the principle that this Court is bound ? ? 
to recognize any limitations however archaic or erroneous put 
on § 1983 by the Congress that enacted it. As a matter of 
logic, this view of our function in § 1983 cases cannot be made 
to vary with the type of relief sought in a particular § 1983 
suit. Nor is there anything "in the legislative history dis-
cussed in Monroe, or in the language actually used by Con-
gress, [which suggests] that the generic word 1person' in § 1983 
was intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal 
corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought 
-
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against them." ° City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 
( Hl73). Moreov0r. tlw "historic construction" theory is 
apparently to be maintain0d even though we now know what 
M omoe ( 0rroneously. src Part II, infra) says the 1871 Con-
grC'SS did not kno'": That Congress has plenary constitutional 
power-unlimited by tlw Tenth Amendment. sec Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U. S. 330. 347-348 (1880); Milliken v. Bradley, 
ngainst state and local governments under § 5 of the Four-
~- U. S. -, - (Hl77) (Milliken II) 1-to authorize suits 
against state and local govNnmcnts under § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
0 A fortiori. nothing in thr legishtivr hi~tory or l:mgnagr of § Hl~~ 
suggr~ts that Rurh a bifurrat ion ran be arhieYed simply h~· rrdrn ft ing a 
complaint to name official" in their official capacity rathrr than thr ror-
porntc rntity of which thr? rtrr official~. 
1 "Fin:tlly, there is no mrrit to the petitioners' cl:lim~ ilwt thr rrlicf 
ordrred here ,·iolntr'l tlw Trn t h Amrndmrnt and grnPral prinriplrs of 
f<'drralism. The Tenth Amrndmrnt'~ rr~rn·at ion of nondrlrg:1trd powrrs 
to the Statrs is not impliratrc! hy a frdrral court judgmrnt rnforring the 
exprrss prohibitinP.R of unl:nl'fnl ~tate conduct cn:trtrd h~· the Fourteenth 
Amendmrnt." 45 U.S. L. W., at 4880. 
For this renRon, National League of Citirs v. Usury, 426 U.S. ~:n (1976), 
is irrelrvant to our considrra t ion oft his ":lSe. 
Nor is thrrr :tny ba~is for r.onrluding that the 1~71 Congrri's had 
Ele,·enth Arnendmrnt prohlrms in mind. That Congrc,.:: knr1Y that 
municipalitirs were rm1tinrly ~urd in federal courts, f'rr p. 17 and n. 32, 
infra. Sec al~o Lincoln C'ou.nty v. Luning. 133 U.S. 529, 580 ( lROO) ("With 
regard to the [Eicvcnth Amrndment] objrction, it may he ob.<crYed that 
tho records of this court for the la~t. thirty yearR arc full of suits against 
counties. . . . [This] juri~dirtion of thr Circuit court:;: i:o beyond ques-
tion"). In any casr, we now know that, the Eleventh Amendment 
rstnblishcs no limits on lcgi~Jation adoptrd under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
"[T]ho Eleyenth Amendment., :tnd the prinriplc of strtte sovereignty 
whirh it embodies ... arr nccr:osarib• lirnit<'d by the rHforcrmrnt provi-
sions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amt'ndmrnt. . . . We think that C'ongrc~s 
may, in drtermining what if' appropriate lrgi~lation for thr pnrpo~e of 
enforcing the provisions of the Fonrtrcnt h Amendmrnt, pr01·idr for 11rivatc 
suits against States or st.:ttc officials which nrc ron;;titution;tlly impermisHi-
hle in other conte:-.is ." Fitzpat1'ick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). 
I 
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Applying the historic construction theory to 1871 practice 
in representative capacity actions, it is quite clear that at 
least some official capacity suits against municipal officers 
would be barred were municipalities "as such" not suable 
unrler § 1983. In 1871, official capacity suits against munici-
pal officers were conreptualized as suits against the body cor-
pora.te of the municipality. Se<', e. (!., Thompson v. United 
States, 103 U. S. 480, 483-484 (1881) (citing many cases). 
Anrl, while this "subject ... is not free from casuistry because 
of the natural, even if unronscious, pressure to escape from 
tlw doctrine of sov<'reign immunity," 9 a lawyer of the 1870's 
would likely have assunwd that a suit against a.n official-
whethrr or not styled as an official capacity suit-which 
"d<'manded relief calling for an assC'rtion of "·hat was unques-
tionably official authority." 10 was a suit against the govern-
ment unit of which the officer was an agent.11 
If. therefore. WC' arr to tak<:- Monroe and City of Kenosha 
seriously. relief under § 198R would have to be limite to de--cbratory relief, amag;<'s against the offi.rcr p<'rsonally, ~nd 
that form of injunctivr relief which could be givC'n against an 
officer in his personal capacity. However. we have obviously 
paid little heC'd to these dictates of Monroe and Kenosha. 
Instead, in Edelma.n 12 and in Milliken II, we have felt free 
to expand injunctive relief to the limit of the federal courts' 
constitutional power as we now undNstand it. But, if Con-
gress in 1871 had any idea at all about tl1e complex problems 
9 8nyder v. Buck, 340 1T. R. 1.'5, 2!) (19!i0) (Frnnkfurt<'f . .T .. rli;;.~t'ntin~). 
10 Larson v. Domrstic: c~ Fm·!'i(Jn Comm!'rrr Cnr]J., 3:17 U. R. 6R2. 729 
(Hl49) (AnpPndix to opi11ion of Frnnkfnrter . .T.). 
11 Sec ibid. nnd rn>'rR rolll'rt.cd thrrein. There would appnrPntly have 
bern ::t limited CXCP]1t.ion 1o thi" prinriplc for those' inRtflnr<'s in which 
mnndnmu ronld ~ivo nll th<' rcqn<'f'i rd relirf. Rcr Thompson v. United 
States. 103 U .S. 480,485 (1881) . 
12 The Court trcnt('d Ed!'lman [lS n r::tR(' im·olving a right of action 
implied under the Constitutim1, but plnintiffR in fact plead § 1983. See 
Appendix in No. 72-1410, at 5 (Compl[lint ,f3 (b)) . 
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of government immunity from suit, capacity of defendant 
parties, and scope of permissible relief, that idea was certainly 
not that of Edelman and Milliken II. 
The plain thrust of the analysis above is that. were we to 
hold school boards exempt from suit under ~ - 1983, we would 
as a matter of logic and history overrule many if not all of our 
school dese c ation decisions, since virtually aU these cases 
~ate "relief ca11ing or an assertion of what [is] uooues-
tionably o.tlic.i~uthotity." Nor can our earlier school board ---cases be reconciled by adopting an "Eleventh Amendment 
analogy" as suggestrd by the Court of Appcals.'"n The 1871 
Con~ress certainly had no Eleventh Amendment analogy in 
mind tzb and therefore it would be indulging in anachronistic 
brute force for us to adopt such a theory if we arc serious 
about maintaining Monroe's "historic understanding" theory 
of § 198.1 interpretation. Moreover. even on Bill's. I submit 
I -rrroneous (sec pp. 1 0- 2q. 1·n fra). analysis that Congress did not 
impose civil rights liability on local government agencies lest 
federal remedies sap limited municipal resourcrs. it is logically ~ 
impossible to draw a line between damagc.s a.ncl the massive 
s§nd§i}f~e!G![]Y:§:nr sc]1ool :cases: fo/ e. g .. busing or 
magnet schools. Cf. 20 U. 8. C. ~ 1601 (a) (1970 ed .. Supp. 
V) ("Congress finrls that the process of eliminating or prevent-
ing minority group isolation and improving the quality of 
education for all children often involves the expenditure of 
additional funds to which local educational agencies do not 
havr access"). Alternatively. if the court below is correct and 
we arc in fact free to substitute our prcsrnt views for those of 
the 1871 Congress. the justification for this must be that we 
interpret § 1983 to be an effort by Congress to exercise the full 
of its power under ~ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. On 
this view. there is no continued vitality to Monroe, since that 
case put the municipal cxrmption exclusively on the ground 
l 2n See 5::!2 F. 2d, at 265-266. 
12 1> See P:ut. U, infra. Sec nl~o n. 7, supra. 
~-7 
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of legislative history which was said to show that Congress 
doubted its constitutional power to put obligations on munici-
palities. See Part II, infra. 
In short, 1 think there is already an clement of "casuistry" 
in om ~ 198:3 am'llysis and that we would only compound that 
clement if in the future we insist that municipalities, and by 
extension school boards, arc exempt from suit while continu-
ing to allow complete injunctive relief in official capacity suits. 
Rather than adopt such a course, ~think we would do better 
to .. recogniz£> what is in fact the case: That Congress in 1871 
did indeed intend to create a cause of action against munici-
palities and to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to 
implement that cause of action. Monroe must, of course. be 
overnlled to the extent it holds otherwiSe. '!'his aoes not 
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that municipalitiPs ha\"C' n ddC'nSC' to both clamagC's and 
in.i11nctive relief whC'n an officer acts "under color of" its bws 
lmt in a way that is in fact unauthorizC'd by thC' mnniripality. 
n 
In Monroe v. Pa7Je, 36f) U. S. 167. 187 (1961), we held that 
"Congress did not nndC'rtnkC' to bring municipal corporations 
within the ambit of f~ Hl83l." The solP basis for this con-
clusion was an illfercmcC' rlra wn from Congrec:s' rcjertion of the 
"Sherman a.mC'ndment" to the Civil Rights Act of 1871-the 
prC'rursor of ~ 1!)83-which would have hP1d a municipal cor-
poration liable for damage donC' to thC' JWrson or prope-rty of 
its inhabitants by private persons "riotously and tmnnltu-
ously assembled." 12c Cong. Glob<.>. 42d Cong .. 1st Srss .. 749 
(1871) (herC'inaftcr "Globe"). Although the RhC'rman 
amendment did not seck to amend § 1 of the Art. which is now 
~ 1083. a.ncl although tlw nature of the obligation created by 
that amendmC'nt wHs vastly different from that created by ~ 1, 
we nonetheless ro11cluderl that Congress must have meant to 
excludC' municipal corporations from the coverage of § 1 
b<"ca.use "the Hous<" fin voting against the amendme1it] had 
solemnly dcciclcd that in their judgment Congress had no con-
stitutional pow0r to impose any obligation upon county and 
town organizations, thC' mere instrumentality for the adminis-
tration of st.ate law." 36f) U. S., at 190 ( cm1)hasis added), 
quoting Globe, at 804 (remarks of Rep. Poland). This state-
ment. in our view, showed that Congress doubted its "con-
stitutional power ... to impose civil liabilitu on municipali-
tics." ~6!) U. R .. 2t 190 ( 0mphasis added), and that such doubt 
would ha.ve exte-nded to nny type of ciYilliability.13 
tzc We expressly declinrd to ronsidrr "policv considerations" for or 
Dg~inf<t muniripal liability. Srr 36.'i U. 8., at. 191. 
13 Mr . .Tustire DouJ!laS. thr author of l'v!onroe, has RUJ!Q;<'~trd that the 
mnniripal exrlusion might more propnrly rrRt on a throry th:1t Conp:re~s 
son~J;ht to prev<'nt the finanrial ruin that rivil rights liabilit~· might imposr 
on muniripalitirs. Scr City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 lT. S. 507, 517-520 
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An analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and 
particularly of the case law which each side mustered in its 
support, shows, ho\\·ever, that we improperly equated the 
"obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with "civil 
liability." 
A. An Overview 
There are three distinct stages in the legislative considera-
tion of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
On March 28. 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for 
a House select commiUee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained 
four sections. Section 1. now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
was the subject of only limitBd debate and was passed without 
amendment.14 Rections 2 t.hrough 4 dealt primarily with the 
"other purpose[]" of suppressin~ Ku Klux Klan violence in 
the southern States. 1r. The wisdom and constitutionality of 
tlwse sections-not § 1, now § 1983-was the subject of almost 
all con~ressioanl dPhate and each of these sections was 
amendPd. The HOltse finished its initial debates on H. R. 
320 on April 7, 1871 and one wC'ek lat0r the Renate also voted 
out a bill.16 Again. debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and 
that section was passed as introduced. 
( 1973) . However, this view haR ne' rr been shared by the Court, sre 
Monroe v. Pape, S11pra. 36.'i U. S., at 190: Moor v. Cmmty of Alamcdn, 
411 U. S. 593. 70R (1973), and there i~ not one l'hred of ,:upporf for i his 
Yiew in the debat.N>. 
H Globf', at. 522. 
15 Brirfty, §2 rrf'ated rf'riain federal rrime" in addifon io iho;;e defined 
in § 2 of the lR6o Civil Right" Art, 14 Stnt. 27, earh aimed primarily a,t 
thr, Ku Klux Klnn. RE>ction 3 provided thnt 1lH' Pre~idrnt rould send tlw 
militia into :my St<'ltr wrarked with Klnn Yiolenre. Finall~·. ~ 4 provided 
for su,:pen>:ion of the writ of ha hen>: rorpuR in enumerated rircumshwres, 
a~ain primarily tho:::e thought to obtain where Klan violenee was rampant. 
See Globe App., at. 335-336. 
10 Globf', at 709. 
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Immediately prior to the vote in the Sena.te, after time for· 
discussion had expired, Senator Sherman introduced his· 
amendment.17 I emphasize that this was not an amendment 
to ~ 1 of the bill, but was to be added as § 7 at the end of 
the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of the amend-
ment was aJlowed and, although attempts were made to 
amend the amendment. it was passed as introduced. In this. 
form. the amendment did not place liability on the municipal 
corporation. but made any inhabitant of the municipality 
liable for the damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumul-
tuously assembled." 18 
The House refuf'ecl to acquiesce in a numbC'r of amend-
ments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amend-
ment, and the respective versions of H. R 320 were there-
fore sen~ to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill, 
however, was not a subject of this conference since. as noted, 
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of 
Congress. 
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed 
its work on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference 
rommittee draft of thC' Sherman amendment were these.1~ 
First. a cause of action was given to persons injured by 
"any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled 
together. with intent to deprive any person of any right 
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. or to deter him or punish him for exercis-
ing such right. or bv reason of his race, color or previous 
condition of servitude .... " 
17 See id., at 663, quoted in Apprndix, infm. 
18 Globe, at 663. An nction for recovery of rlnmflgc~ wn~ to he in the 
fedrrnl courts and dcnominntcd as n suit rtgninst. tllC' countv , r-it~· . or p:triBh 
in whi<'h the damnge had orrnrrecl. Tln:d. Exrrn1 ion of 1 hr jnclgmrnt was 
not to run against t.he propert~· of thr gonmunrnt nnit, howcYcr, hut 
againRt the private property of nny inhnbitnnt. lbid. 
19 Sec Globe, at 755, qnoN'cl in Appendix, infra. 
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RC'cond, the act provided that the action would be against 
the county. citv, or pari:::h in which the riot had occurred and 
that it con]d he maintained by either the person injured or 
his legal representative. Fnlike the amendment as proposed, 
however, the conferenre :o.nbstitute made the 1-!:0vernment 
drfendant Jiable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against 
individnal defendants who had committed the vioknce. If 
a municipality were liable. the judgment against it could be 
collectrd 
"by exPrution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment. or 
any other proce<>ding in aid of execution or applicable 
to th~ enforcemrnt of .iudp.;ments against municipal cor-
porations; anrl such jndgment [would become 1 a lien 
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such connty, 
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof." 
In the Pnsuing debate> on thf' first conff'renre report, which 
was the first rl<>batc of any kind on the Sherman amendment, 
Rf'nator Sherman explainer! that the purpose of his amend-
m<>nt was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the en-
forf'cment of the civil rights laws by making their property 
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damage.20 Statutes drafted 
on a similar theory, hP stated, had long been in force in 
England and werf' in force in 1871 in a number of the States.21 
N onetrrless thNe wrre critical differences between the con-
20 "Let the people of proprrty in the southern States undrrstand that if 
they will not makr the hur and cry and take the nece~>sary steps to put 
down lawless violrnee i11 those States their property will be holden rr~pon­
sible, and the efTrct will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761. 
Senator Sherman was apparrntly unconcemed that the conferCllce com-
mittee substilute, unlike the original amendment, did not place liability 
for riot damnge directly on the property of t.he well-to-do, but instead 
placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes 
would be le,·ied against the property of the inhabitants to make the loeality 
whole. 
21 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in 
Engl:md immediately after the Norman Conquest ttnd had most recently 
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fNence substitute and extant state and English statutes: the 
conff'rence substitut0. unlike most state riot statutes, lacked 
a short statute of limitations and imposed liability on the gov-
ernml'nt defendant whether or not it had notice of the impend-
ing riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to 
exrrcise a police powf'r, wlwther or not it exrrted all rl'ason-
ablc efforts to stop tlw riot. and whether or not the riokrs 
were raught and pun ish eel. 
Tn the Senate. opponents. including a. number of Renators 
who had voted for § 1 of the hill, criticised the amendment as 
an imperfect and impolitic rendering of the state statutes. 
Moreover, as drafted. the conferencr substitute' could be 
construed to protect rights that were not protected by tbe 
C'or>stitution.2 2 However, their major argument was that the 
lien creatrd by the amendment, which would have made it 
impossible for a municipality to conduct its normal business, 
violated an implicit limit on Congress' pmYer under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Notwithstanding tbese objections, 
the Renate voted to adopt the report of the first conference 
rommittee. 
Debate in the House raised similar points to that in the 
Senate. except that House opponent..<;, within whose ranks 
were a1Po som<' who had supportrd § 1, were more concerned 
with the quec:;tion whether the Federal Government consistent 
with the Constitution could obligate municipal corporations to 
keep the peace if those corporations were neither so obligated 
nor so authori11ed by their state charters. This concern, as 
been promnlgatrd as the law of 7 & 8 Geo. IV, rh. :n. SeP Globr, at 760. 
During the cour~e of the cteb~ttcs, it appearrd that Kentucky, Maryland, 
Masf:achusctts, and New York had similar laws. ~re id., at 751 (Rep. 
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen . Steven~on); id., at 771 (Sen. Thunnan); 
id., at 791 (Rep. Butler). Snch a municipal liability was apparently 
common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman). 
22 Senator Thmman gave the most complete eri1ique of the conference 
substitute, showing that it was Rbominably drafted. See Globr, at 770-
772. 
75-1914-MEMO (A) 
14 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
will be developed in Part II-B, infra, was simply another facet 
of the lien problem discussed in the Senate and is the branch 
of the opponents' argument which Representative Poland was 
addressing in his statement that is quoted in M onroe. 23 
Because the House rejected the first conference report a 
SC'cond confrrencr "·as calkd and it duly issued its report. 
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment 
abannoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any per-
son or persons having kno"·kdge [that a conspiracy to violate 
civil rights was afoot]. and having power to prevent or aid 
in preventing the samC'." '"ho did not attempt to stop the 
same, liahle to any person injured by the conspiracy.2 • The 
amendment in this fom1 was adopted by both Houses of Con-
gress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986. 
The meaning of the lPgislative history sketched above can 
most readHy be devC'lopC'd by first considering the debate on 
the report of the first conference committe<'. This debate 
shows conclusively that thC' constitutional objections raised 
against the Sherman amC'nnmC'nt would not have prohibited 
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state munici-
pal coq)orations that infringed fPderal rights. Because § 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act doC's not state expressly that municipal 
corporations comC' within its amhit, it is finally necessary to 
intC'rprct ~ 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeC'd 
intended to be covered. 
B. Debate on the First ConfNence Report 
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and 
om)onents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of 
Congress was largdy that of a lrgal brief, with frequent refer-
ences to cascs drcided by this Court or by the supreme courts 
of the several Statrs. Proponents of the Shennan amend-
ment did not, howevC'r, discuss in dC'ta.il the argument in favor 
2 '1 Sec 365 U.S., at 190, fluotrd nt p. 9, supra. 
24 See Globe, at 804. 
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of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece 
together such an argument from the dcbates on the first con-
ference report and those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which 
because it allowed the Federal Government to prosecute 
crimes "in the states" had also raised questions of federal 
power. The account of Reprcsentative Shellabarger, the 
House sponsor of IT. R. 320. is the most complete. 
Shclla.barger began his discussion of § 2 by stating that 
"there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the right 
consideration of this measure which is wholly unrxplored." 
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 67 (1871) (here-
inafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however. 
Vlith respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and particularly its Privilcges or Immunities Clause, 
Shellabarger relied on thc statcmcnt of Mr. Justice Wa~hing­
ton in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa. 
1825), which defined the privileges protected hy Art. TV: 
"'What these fundamental privilcges are it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They 
may, however, bc all comprehended under the following 
gencral heads: protection by the Government';-
".Ma.rk that-
" 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property 
of every kind. and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety .. .'" C:lobc App .. at 69 (emphasis added), quot-
ing 4 Wash. C. C .. at 380. 
Having concludrd that citizens were owed protcction/5 
2 ~ Opponent.!:' of the Rhrrm:m amrndmrnt ngrrrd t.hat both protrction 
and equal protcrtion were gnnrantrrd by thr Fomtrrnth Amendmrnt. See 
Globe, nt 758 (Sen. Tmmbuii); id .. nt. 772 (Sen. Thmmnn); id .. nt 777 
(Sen . Frrlinghuysrn); id .. nt 700 (Rrp. \Vill:ml) . And thr Snprrmr Court 
of Tndinnn. hnd so held in giving rfferl to the Civil Right" Art of 1866. 
See Smith v. Moodu. 26 Ind. 29!1 (186fl) (following Cm·yell), rC'fC'nrd to in 
Globe App., nt 68 (Rep . Shellabarger). Moreo\·er, § 2 of the 1871 Act as 
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Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in providing that 
protection. Here again there were precccl en ts: 
"rCongress has always] assumed to enforce, as against 
the States, and also persons, every one of tho provisions 
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con-
stitution which restrain and directly relate to the States, 
such as those in r Art. T, § 10,1 relate to the divisions of 
the political powers of the State and General Govern-
ment. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of 
tho States are all of such nature that they can be. and 
even have hren, ... enforced by the courts of the United 
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on 
Feckral powers. Thus. and thus sufficiently, has the 
United States 'rnforcecl' these provisions of the Constitu-
tion. But thrre arc some that arc not of this class. 
These are where the court secures the rights or thr liabili-
ties of prrsons within the State's, as between such prrsons 
and the Stat<:'s. 
"These are three: first, that as to fugitives from jus-
tice (261 ; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or 
slaves (271 ;) third, that declaring that the 'citiz<'ns of each 
passed, unlike § 1. prosecuted persons who violated federal rights whether 
or not that violation was under color of official authority, apparently on 
the theory that Ku Klux Klan violence wns infringing the right of 
protection defined by Coryell. 
26 U.S. Canst., Art. IV,§ 2, rl. 2: 
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who 
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on DPmand 
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be deli1·ered 
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of tho Crime." 
27 Id., cL 3: 
"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such SerYice or Labor, but shall be deli1·ered 
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Sen ire or Labour may be due." 
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State shaH be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States.' [281 
And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where 
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the 
constitutional provisions-tlw only three where the rights 
or liabilities of persons in the States. as between these per-
sons and the States. are directly provided for, Congress 
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ... 
such persons." Globe App., at 69-70. 
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog 
of the Sherman f!mendment, ironically, was the statute imple-
mentin~ the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions 
of Art. IV-the Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7. 1 Stat. 301-the 
constitutiona.lity of '<vhich had been sustained in 1842. in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet . . 539. There. Mr. Justice Story, 
writing for the Court. held that Art. IV gave slaveowners a 
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in 
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 611 . 
Because state process for recovering; runaway slaves might be 
inadequate or indeed hostile to the rights of the sla.veowner, 
the right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to 
state implementation. !d., at 614. Thus, since the Constitu-
tion guaranteed the right and this in turn required a remedy, 
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had 
the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. !d., at 615. 
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy 
against municipalities and counties was an appropriate method 
for ensuring the protection which the Fourteenth Amendment 
made every citizen's federal right. 29 This much was clear from 
the adoption of such statutes by the several States as devices 
for suppressing riot. 30 Thus, said Shellabarger, the only seri-
28 !d., cl. 1. 
2u See Globe, at 751. 
30 Ibid.; sec n. 21, supra. 
,, 
75-1914-MEMO (A) 
18 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
ous question remaining was "whether, since a county is an 
integer or part of a state, the United States can impose upon 
it, as such, amy obligation to keep the peace in obedience to 
United States laws." s, This he answered affirmatively, citing 
Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 (1861), 
the first of many cases a2 upholding the power of federal courts 
to enforce the Contract Clause against municipalities.33 
The most complete statement of the constitutional argument 
of the House opponents of the Sherman amendment-whose 
views are particularly important since only the House voted 
down the amendment-was that of Representative Blair: '14 
"The proposition known as the Sherma:ri"'l:Uilend-
ment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a pre-
rodent in this country. . . . The amendment claims the 
power in the General Government to go into the States 
of this Union and lay such obligations as it may please 
upon the municipalitiC's, which are the crC'ations of the 
States alone. 
31 Globe, at 751 (emphasiR added). Comp:trC' thi~ statemrnt with Repre-
sentative Poland's remark upon which our holclinl!: in M on me was based. 
Sec p. 9, supra. 
32 See, e. g., Gilman v. City of Shebowan , 2 Bln,ck 510 (1863); Von IT off-
man v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (1867); Riggs v . .Johnson County, 6 
id., 166 (1868); Weber v. Lee County, 6 id., 210 (1R6R); Snpervisors v. 
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (1869); Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 id., 313 (1869); SupPr-
visors v. Durant, 9 id., 415 (1870). 
33 See Globe, at 7.51-752. 
34 Reprrsentative Wiltard t.ook a somrwhat differC'nt position. He 
thon11:ht thnt tho Constitntion would not allow the Federal Oovernmcnt to 
dict.'lte tlw mannrr in which ~~ 8tnte fulfilkd its obligntion of protrction. 
That is, he thought it a. matter of ~tatr dis(·retion whether it delegated 
the pcnr.ckcrpinl!: power ton muniripnl or !'ounty rorpomtion, to a. ~heriff , 
rt c. Hr did not donbt.. howcYrr. t h:t t tlw Feder::ll C:ovPrnmrnt rould 
im.ro~e on the States the ohligrr.tion impo~d hv the Rhrrman amendment, 
and preRumrrbly he would have enforrrd t.he amendment against a munici-
pal corpora.tion t.o which the pcacckrepinl!: oblig~~tion had been dclcg.'ltecl. 
Sec Globe, at 791. 
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" ... [H]ero it is proposed, not to carry into effect an 
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to· 
create that obligation, and that is the provision I am 
unable to assent to .... 
" ... fTllwre are crrtain rights an<i duties that belong 
to the States, ... tlwre ar<' CC'Tiain powers that inhere in 
the State government. They create these municipalities, 
they say what their powers shall be and what their obliga-
tions shall be. If the Government of the United States 
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not 
utterly <iestroy th<' municipality? 1f it can say that it 
shall be liable for damagrs occurring from a riot, . . . 
where [ willl its power ... stop and what obliga.tions ... 
might fit l not lay upon a municipality. 
"Now, only the othrr day, the Supreme Court ... 
decided fin Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871) l tha.t 
there is no power in the Govrrnment of the United States, 
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a Rtate 
officer. Why? Simply because the power to tax involves 
the power to oe1'troy. and it was not the intrnt to give 
the Government of the United States power to destroy 
the !!Overnment of the Rtatcs in any respect. It was held 
also in the ca.se of Prip;g ?'S. Prnnsylvania f16 Pet. 539 
(1843) l that it is not within the power of the Congress 
of thf' Unikd Staks to lav duties 11pon a Rtatc offic0r; 
that we eannot command a State offieer to do an~' duty 
whatever, as such; and I ask ... the differencr brtwern 
that and <'omml'l ncling a municipality with is equally the 
crf'ature of thr Stat", to perform a duty." Globe. at 795. 
While House debate primarily coneerned the question 
whether Congress had the power to require municipalities to 
keep the peace, opponents of the Sherman amendment in the 
Senate primarily questioned the constitutionality of the judg-
ment lien crrated hy the Sherman amendment, a lien which 
ran agai.nst all money and property of a defendant munici-
I 
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pallty, including property held for public purposes, such as 
jails or courthouses. Opponents argued 35 that such a lien once 
entered would have the effect of making it impossible for the 
municipality to function, since no one would trade with it. 
Moreover, everyone knew that sound policy prevented execu-
tion against public property since this too was needed if local 
government was to survive.36 (This is the only point being 
made by Congressmen Farnsworth and Kerr, whose speeches 
are quoted by Bill, at 7-8. In addition, Farnsworth's consti-
tutional objection was based on Day and Kerr's analysis 
applied to both municipalities and officers. Thus, if Kerr is 
credited, then § 1 of the Act would alsCAJ2ea~mconstitutional, 
which no one thought it was, see pp. ~ infra). Thus, 
whereas constitutional objection in the House had rested on 
potential danger to the independence of the States if the 
Federal Government were allowed to mandate the duties of 
state officers, objection in the Senate rested on the actual 
probability that municipal government would be extinguished 
if ever made subject to the lien. 
I must stress at this point that I have to say that ,llill is 
simply wrong in asserting, at 8, that "the tort remedy created 
by the Act would have seriously compromised [municipal 
financial stability] in a way which the contract cases, familiar 
to Congress, . . . did not." He forgets that the enforcement 
of contracts by the federal courts 
"led to a lively resistance in Iowa and then in Missouri; 
more limited conflicts occurred elsewhere in the Mid-
West, and even in up-State New York. The clash with 
Iowa in the '60's, and that with Missouri in the '70's, were 
35 See, e. g., Globe, at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 763 (Sen. Casserly) . 
36 See, e. g., id., at 763 (Sen. Casserly). Opponents were clearly correct 
that public property was generally immune from execution. See M e:ri-
wethet v. Gatrett, 102 U. S. 472, 513 (1880); The Protectot, 20 F. 207 
(CCD Mass. 1884); 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations §§ 445--446 (1873 
ed.). 
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comparable to the well-known episodes of defiance by 
the Virginin court under Spencer Roane . . . ." C. 
Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888, pt. 1, at 
919 (1971). 
The reason for this unrest was often that the bonds being 
enforced were for enormous sums, were often fraudulently 
obtained or passed in a manner not in accord with state law-
but w0re nonetheless enforced in federal courtl-and often 
put great financial burdens on the issuing municipalities, 
frequently ending in municipal bankruptcy. Sec id., at 
918-1009. 
If all this was constitutional and acquiesced in by the 1871 
Congress-and it clearly was-it is difficult to see how tort 
liability would be unronstitutional simply because it might 
force a municipality to pay a lot of damages. The only way 
to reconcile these facts, which were notorious. with what was 
said about the lien remedy is to recognize that the Sherman 
amendment's lien attached to all money and property, whether 
or not that money or property was needed to discharge the 
judgment. thereby disabling the municipality from providing 
essential public functions. As I undrrstand it, not even bank-
rupt communities were stripped of the ability to perform 
public functions, and similarly the judgments of federal courts 
under the Process Acts (see n. ~6a, infra)-which would have 
included a judgment under § 1 of the 1871 Actr-would not 
have prevented municipalities from discharging essential 
public functions. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 
(1880) . I submit, therefore, that no inference with respect to 
the constitutionality of tort remedies executed under the 
Process Acts can be drawn from the unprecedented and almost 
punitive remedy imposed by the Sherman amendment. Cer-
tainly a judgment was not unconstitutional simply because it 
was large. 
The position of the Senate opponents, although not relevant 
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to the question whether municipalities could be sued under 
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act, 36a nonetheless underscores the fact 
that opponents of the Sherman amendment were arguing 
primarily tha.t the Constitution, in Blair's words, did not 
"inten[d] to give the Government of the United States power 
to destroy the government of the States," and yet, somehow, 
proponents of the Sherman amendment were intending to 
exercise just such a power. To understand why this was so-
and, more important, why § 1 of the civil rights bill did not 
threaten the government of the States in an impermissible 
manner-it is necessary to examine the cases cited by oppo-
nents of the Sherman amendment. 
The first case is Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra, which had also 
been cited by Shelh1ba.rger in support of the Sherman amend-
ment. In addition to confirming a broad federal power to 
enforce federa.l rights aga.inst the States, Mr. Justice Story in 
Prigg held that Congress could not insist that the States create-
an adequate remedy for a federal right: 
"r Art. IV] is found in the national constitution, and not 
in that of any state. It does not point out any state, 
functionaries, or any state action to carry its provisions, 
into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to· 
enforce them; and it might well be deemed an uncon-
stitutional exercise of the power of interpretation to insist 
that states are bounrl to provide means to carry into· effect 
th~ duties of the national govcrnment." 16 Pet., at 615-
616. 
Indeed, Story suggestPd that those parts of the Act of 1793 
which conferred jurisdiction on local magistrates to assist in 
3611. Execution in suits under § 1. like n,U other civil suits in federal courts 
in 1871, would have been governed by state procedures under the process 
acts of 1792 and 1828. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275; Act 
of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278. 
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the arrest and return of slaves were unconstitutional, see id., 
at 622, a proposition with which other Justices agreed. 37 
The principle enunciated in Priog was appli<'d in Ken-
tucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861). There, the Court was 
asked to require Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, to hand 
over Lago, a fugitive from justire wanted in Kentucky, as 
r<'quired by§ 1 of the Act of 1793,38 supra, which implemented 
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney, 
writing for a unanimous Court, refused to enforce that section 
of the Act: 
"rwJ e think it clear. that the Federal Government, und0r 
tho Constitution. has no power to impose on a, State offi-
cer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it: for if it possessed this power, it might overload 
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and 
disable him from performin~ his obligations to the State, 
37 "The state offirers mentioned in the Jaw fof 1793] arc not bound to 
execute the dutirs imposrd upon thrm by Congress, uniM'l thr~· rhoosr to 
do so, or are reqnirrd to do so by a law of the f'iatc; and the state 
Jcgislaturr has the power if it thinkR proper, to prohibit. thrm. The Art 
of 1793, thereforr, mu"t drprnd ['!]together for itR CWf'lll ion upon thr offi-
cers of the Unitrd Statrs n[lmrd in it." lG Pet.. :1t 630 (Tane~·. C . .T.). 
Mr. Justice McL>an agreed that "[als a general principle" it was true 
that, "that Congre&~ had no J10wcr to impose dut ics on Rtatc offircr~, as 
provided in the art r of 1793] ," hut he wondetwl whether thr "posit i\·e" 
obligation crrated bv the Fugitive ~bYe Clau"c did not rrratr nn Pxrcp-
tion. Rce id., at 664-665. 
38 "Be it enacted ... That whenever the executi\·e authority of an~· ~lute 
in the Union ... shall drmnnd any perso11 as a. fugitivr from juPtiec ... 
and shall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found ... charging 
the person so dcmandrd, with hn,ing committed trejl,oon, felony or other 
crime, certified as authentic hy the gowrnor or chief mngistratc of the 
state ... from whcncr the prl"'on so rhnrgcd fled, it .ohall be thr duty of 
the executive authority of the state or territor~' to which ~nrh prr,on ~hall 
have fled, to cause him or her to be nrrcstc(l and flcrnrcd ... and to 
cause the fugitive to be dcliwrcd to such ngent [of the dem:mding state] 
when he shall appear ... " 1 Stat. 302. 
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and might impose on him duties of a character incompati-
ble with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by 
the State." 24 Hmv., at 107-108. 
Although no one cited Dennison by name, the principle 
expressed there by Chief Justice Taney was well known to 
Members of CongrPss.~0 Reasoning identical to Taney's-
that maintenance of the federal structure of the Nation was 
inconsistent with allowing Congress any power which might be 
used to impede the States from carrying out programs within 
their "legitimate spheres" of power, for, if it had such power, 
it would inevitably override the independence of the States 
in violation of the federal plan of the Constitution 40-had 
provided the ground for the Court's decision in Collector v. 
Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), to which Blair and many others 
referred,41 in which the Court held that the Federal Govern-
ment could not subject the salary of a state officer to a general 
income tax. Although Day and Dennison were the only 
Supreme Court cases SC'tting a limit on the enumerated powers 
of the Federal Government. a series of state supreme court 
cases 42 in the mid-1860's had invalidated a f<'deral tax on the 
proce!;!S of state courts for the same reasons Dennison had 
invalirlated the Act of 1793 and these cases were cited with 
approval by opponents of the amendment.43 
80 Representative Farnsworth, for example, stated the holding of Denni-
son without mentioning it by na.me. See Globe, at 799. 
4 0 This is tho principle of McCulloch v. Ma1'yland, 4 Wheat. 315 (1819), 
applied to protect States from f<'deral interference in tho &lme mann<'r the 
Federal Government was protected from state interference. 
41 Soc, e. g., Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis); id., at 761, 772 (Sen. Thur-
man); id., at 777 (Sen. Frelinghuysen); id., at 788-789 (Rep. Kerr) 
(reciting logic of Day); id., at 793 (Rep. Poland); id., at 799 (Rep. 
Farnsworth) ( al~o reciting logic of Day). 
42 Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 279 (1854); Jones v. Estate of KP-ep, 19 
Wis. 369 (1865); Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505 (1867); Union Bank v. 
Ifill, 3 Cold. (43 Tenn.) 325 (1866); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1857). 
4 3 See Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis); id., (Sen. Casscrlcy). See also T. 
Cooky, Constitutional Limitations ·X·4s2-·x·4s4 (1871 ed.). 
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Prigg obviously prohibited Congress from insisting that 
state officers or instrumenta.litics keep the peace. But it 
stands for only the narrow proposition for which it was cited 
by Representative Blair: that the Federal Government cannot 
compel a state government, agency, or officer to provide a 
remedy, either executive or judicial. for a federal right. 
Therefore, equally obviously, Prigg has no bearing whatsoever 
on the question whether a federal court could award damages 
unc!er § 1 of the 1871 Act against a state agency or officer for 
a violation of a fecl0ral right, since when a. federal court makes 
a damage award under that section, the positive government 
action required to implement the federal right is carried out 
by that court, not by an agency or officer of tho StatC'. 
The limits of the principle of Dennisorn and Day are some-
what more difficult to discC'J'n as a matter of logic hut more 
appa.rent as a matter of history. It must be remC'mborod that 
Dennison and Day coexisted with vigorous foc!eral judicial 
enforcement of the Contracts Clause. Thus, fC'dcral judicial 
enforcement of express limits on state power found in the 
Constitution, at least so long as interpretation of constitu-
tional limits was left in the hands of the judicia.ry, apparently 
was seen to create no throat to federalism. Rince ~ 1 of tho 
1871 Act simply conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to 
enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation pre-
cisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under 
which the Contract Clause was enforced against munici-
palitie&-there is no reason to suppose that opponents of the 
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional 
barrier to § 1 suits against municipalities. 
Indeed, opponents expressly distinguished between imposing 
an obliga.tion to keep the peace and merely imposing civil 
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by 
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of 
the Fourteenth' Amendment. Representative Poland, for 
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated 
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that a federal law that sought only to hold a municipality 
liable for using its authorized powers in violation of the 
Constitution-which is as far as § 1 of the 1871 Act went-
would be constitutional: 
"I presume . . . that where a Sta.te had imposed a duty 
[to keep the peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action 
would be allowed to be maintained against them in the 
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions 
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by 
their own contract, or by a State law, in the courts, is a 
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or 
liability upon them by the national Government, which 
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no 
power or control over them whatever." /d., at 794. 
Representative Burchard agreed: 
"[Tl here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the 
United States. or usually by State laws, upon a county to· 
protect the people of that county against the commission 
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of 
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to 
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as 
corporations; they are conferred upon cities that have 
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities are con-
cerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded 
by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps 
the United States courts could enforce its perform-
ance. But counties ... do not have any control of the· 
police .... " ld., at 795. 
Moreover, if Dennison and Day arc read broadly to prohibit 
federal courts from directing municipalities or their officers to 
the extent needed to enforce federal decrees, they would be in 
conflict with many other cases. The power to enforce decrees 
against state officers to prevent them from violating the 
Constitution or to force them to hand over money or property 
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taken or held in violation of the Constitution wa.s repeatedly 
exercised by federal courts both before and after 1871, see, 
e. g., Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 
(1820); Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 220 (1871) (collecting 
cases); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876), 
and, in the same Term in which Dennison was decided, the 
Court held contrary to an expansive reading of Dennison or 
Day that federal courts could issue mandamus to municipal 
officers to enforce judgments in Contract Clause suits, see 
Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 ( 1861), 
discussed in Globe. at 751-752. The Dennison issue was not 
argued in Aspinwall, but if Denm:son was meant to create a 
restriction on the power of the federal judiciary, that restric-
tion would be "jurisdictional" and should have been noted sua 
sponte. Moreover, if Dennison established such a limit. it 
would have overruled Osborn, yet that case was repeatedly 
rcnJfirmed by this Court after Dennison was decided. See, 
e. g., Davis v. Gray, supra. Indeed, cases applying the princi-
ple announced in Aspinwall are legion, seen. 32, supra, yet in 
none of them does it appear to have occurred to counsel that 
the federal courts lacked power to issue decrees because of the 
federalism principle announced in Prig(], Denniso'YI, or Day. 
These cases, of course, do not establish that Prigg-Denn?'son-
Day did not bar federal judicial decrees against state officers, 
"but they have much weight. as they show that rthe Prigg-
Dennison-Day l point neither occurred to the bar or the bench; 
and that the common understanding of intelligent men rwas 
otherwise]." Bank of the United Sta,tes v. Deveaux, 5 
Cranch 61, 88 (1809) (Marshall. C. J.). In 1879, moreover, 
when the question of the limits of the Prigg principle was 
squarely presented in Ex parte Virginia. 100 U. S. 339. this 
Court held that Dennison and Day and the pdnciple of fed-
eralism for which they stand did not prohibit federal enforce-
ment of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment through suits 
directed to state officers. See 100 U. S., at 345-348. 
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That those who vot€d for § 1 but against the Sherman 
amendment would not haYe thought § 1 unconstitutional if 
it applied to municipalities is also confirmed by considering 
what exactly thof'e voting for ~ 1 of the civil rights bill had 
approved. Srction 1 without question could be used to obtain 
a damage judgment against state or municipal officials who 
violated federal constitutional rights while acting under color 
of law.44 However, for Prigg-Dennison-Day purposes, as Blair 
and others rccognized,45 there was no distinction of constitu-
tional magnitude between officers and agents-including 
corporate agents-of the State: both were state instrumen-
talities and the State could be impeded no matter over which 
sort of instrumentality the Federal Government sought to 
assert its power. Denm'son and Day, after all, were not snits 
against municipalities but against officers and Blair was quite 
conscious that he was extending Prigg by applying it to 
municipal corporations.<0 Nonetheless. Senator Thurman, who 
gave the most exhaustive critique of ~ 1-?:nter alia com]1lain-
ing that it would be applied to state officers, see Globe, at 
217-and who opposed both ~ 1 and the Sherman amC'ndment, 
the latter on Prigg grounds. agreed unequivocally tha.t § l was 
con.,titutional!7 Thosr who voted for ~ 1 must similarly have 
44 Sre, e. (J., Globe, nt 3~4 (Rrp. ITonr); id. at ~()5 (Rep. Arthnr); id., 
nt 374-375 (Re11. Lowe); id., nt 385 (Rep. LewiR): Globe App., nt 217 
(Sen. Thurmnn); id., nt. 21() (Rrn. Sumner). In nddition, officers were 
inrlndcd nmong tho~c who rould be 1<urd nndrr the srcond ronfePence 
Rubstitute for the Sherman Amendment. Sec Globr, nt. 805 (exchange 
hctwern Rrp. Willnrd nnd Rep. Shrllnbnrger). There were no constitu-
tional objections to the Recond report. 
~" Ser Globe, nt 795 (Rrp. Blair): id .. at 7SS (Rep. Krrr); id., nt 79.'i 
(Rep. Burchard); id., at 799 (Rrp. Farnsworth). 
46 "fViTlc cannot romrnand n stntc oflirer to do an~· duty whatever, as 
stlf'h: nnd I ask . . . thr differmrr bet\\'CC'Il that and commanding a munic-
ipnlity .... " Globe, at 795. 
47 See Globe App., at 216-217. quoted, infra, atffi-82-. .U 
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believed in its constitutionality despite Prigg, Dennison, and 
Day. 
Thus, there is no basis in holdings of this Court, the com-
mon understanding of the bar, or the debates to find in Prigg, 
Dennison, or Day a bar to Federal Government power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the States, or their 
agents, officers, instrumentalities, or subdivisions, through 
federal judicial action even though such enforcement would 
necessarily involve sanctions against officers or instrumentali-
ties who violated that Amendment. 
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill 
From the discussion in Part B, supra, it is readily apparent 
that nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would 
have prevented holding a municipality liahle under § 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question remains, however, whether the 
general language describing those to he liahle under § 1-"any 
person"-covers more than na.tural persons. An examination 
of the debate on ~ 1 and application of appropriate rules of 
construction shows unequivoca.lly that § l was intended to 
cover legal a.s well as natural persons. 
1. The Substance of the Debate 
The civil rights hill was introduced in the House on 
March 28. 1871 hv itR author ::tnd manager. Represcnta.tive 
Shellabarger, and he was the first to expla.in the function of 
the first section of the hill: 
"rsection 1] not onlv provides a civil remedy for persons 
whose former condition may have been that of slaveR, 
but also to all JWOple where. under color of State law. 
they or any of tlwm may he deprived of rights to which 
they arc entitled unrlcr the Constitution bv rPason and 
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App .. at 69. 
By extending a rf'mcdy to all people. including whites, § 1 
went well beyond the mischief to which the remaining sections 
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of the 1871 Act, including the Sherman amendment, were 
adrlressed. 
Although he had advPrted to difficult questions of consti-
tutional law at the outset of his speech, Representative Shella-
ba.rger stat<'d without resPrvation that the constitutionality of 
~ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitution-
ality of ~ 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been ap-
proved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of this 
Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit;n who 
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of 
every provision of this act." Globe App., at 67. He then 
went on to describe how the courts would and should inter-
pret § 1: 
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the presrrvation of 
human liberty a.nd human rights. All statutes and con-
stitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are lib-
erally and ben<>ficpntly construed. It would be most 
strange and , in rivili11rd law. monstrous were this not the 
rul<> of interpretation. As has been again ancl again de-
cided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, 
and evPrywlwre else where there is wise judicial interpre-
tation, the lar!l;est latitude consistent with the words 
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes 
and constitutional provisions as are mea.nt to protect and 
ddrnd and p;ive remedies for their wrongs to all the 
people. . . . Chid Justirr Jay and also Story say: 
" 'Wlwre a power is remedial in its nature there is 
m11ch reason to contend that it ought to be construed 
liherally, and it is generally ailopted in the interpretation 
of laws.' 1 Story on Constitution, sec. 429." Globe 
App. , at 67. 
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's 
49 The reference is to United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (CCD 
Ky. 1866) (Swayne, J.) (No. 16,151). 
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opening speech wer0 cchoed hy Senator Edmunds, the man-
agcr of the civil rip:hts bi1l in tlw Senate: 
"The first. section i!" one that I believe nobody objects to, 
as defining the rights !"ecnrcd by the Constitution of the 
United States when they arc nssailcd by any Rtate law or 
under color of any state law, and it is merely carrying 
out the prineiplcs of the civil rights biH [of 18661. which 
have since become a part of the Constitution. . . . [Sec-
tion 1 is l so very simple and really reenacting the Con-
Rtitution." Globe. at 569. 
And he agreed that the bill "sccurdedl the rights of white 
men as much as of colored men." Id., at 696. 
In both Houses, stat{:'ments of the supporters of ~ 1 cor-
roboratf'd three points mnck by its managers: (1) that Con-
gress in enacting ~ 1 would cxercise the entirety of its power 
under § 5 of the Fomteenth Amendment; (2) that right 
thinking required a liberal construction of the jurisdiction 
thus confcrrrd on thc federnl courts: and (3) that the con-
stitutionality of ~ 1 followed immediately from the constitu-
tionality of ~ 2 of the 1866 Act under the enforcetnC' nt wo-
visions of th0 Thirteenth Amendment. 
Representative Bingham, the author of ~ 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, for example, declared the bill's purpose to 
be "the enforcement ... of the Constitution on behalf of 
every individual citizen of the Republic ... to the extent of 
the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe 
App., at 81. He continued: 
"Th0 Stnt0s never had the right, though they had the 
power, to inflict wrongs upon freP citi;~,cns bv a. denial 
of the full protection of the laws. . . . fA l nd the 
States did deuy to citi11e11S the equal protection of the 
laws, they did deny the rights of citizens under the Con-
stitution, and except to the extent of the express limi-
tations upon the States ... , as I have shown, the 
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citizen had no remedy. They took property without 
compensation, and he had no remedy. They restricted 
the freedom of the press, and he had no remedy. They 
r<'strirted the frc<'dom of speech. and 11<' had no remedy. 
They restricted the rights of conscience. and he had no 
remrrly. . . . Who dare say, now that the Constitution 
has been amenckd. that the nation cannot by law provide 
against all such abw:;es and d<'nials of right as these in 
the States and by Rt.ates, or combinations of persons?" 
ld .. at 85. 
RE'pr<'scntative Perry, commenting on C'ongress' action in 
passing thr civil rights bill also stated: 
"Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as 
fully as we can assNt the mischief inwnded to be remedird. 
\Ve have asserte-d as elearly as we ean assert our belief 
that it is the duty of Congr<'SS to r<'drE'ss that mischief. 
\Ve have also asserted as fully as we can assert the con-
stitutional right of C'ongrcss to legislate." Globe, at 800. 
Other support<'rs Wf'l'f' quite clear that § 1 of the act 
<'xtcmk•d a rem<'dy not. cmlv where a Rtate had passed an 
unconF~titutional statute. hut also wherr officers of the State 
rcfus<'ri to carry out th<' law: 
"But the chid complaint is r that l by a systematic mal-
administration of r stat(' law l' or a neglect or refusal 
to enforce tlwir 1)rovisions. a portion of the people are 
<knird equal protection under them. \Vhenever such a 
stat<' of facts is clE'arly m1.1.de out, I believe that [ § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment l empowers C'ongrcss to step 
in and provide for doing .iusticc to those persons who are 
thns <kniE'd rqual protection." !d., at 153. 
Importantly for our inquiry, E'ven the opponents of § 1 agreed 
that it wns constitutional and, further, that it represented an 
attempt to exercise the full power conferred by § 5 of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Senator Thurman, who gave 
the most exhaustive critique of§ 1, said: 
"This section relates wholly to civil suits. . . . Its 
whole effect is to give to the Federal Judiciary that which 
now does not belong to it-a jurisdiction that may be 
constitutionally conferred upon it, I gra.nt, but that has 
never yet been conferred upon it. It authorizes any per-
son who is deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity 
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States. 
to bring an action aga.inst the wrongdoer in the Federal 
courts, and that without any l·imit whatsoever as to the 
amount in controversy. . . . fT]here is no limitation 
what~oever upon the terms that are employed fin the 
billl. and they are as comprehensive as can be user!." 
Globe App., at 216-217 (emphasis addect). 
2. The Meaning of the Debate 
Since the debates show that Con~ress intended to <'Xereise 
its full power under the Fourteenth Amendment and , further, 
that Congress intender! the statute to be construed broadly in 
favor of persons injurPcl in their constitutional rights, there 
is no r0ason to suppose that municipal corporations would 
have been excluded from the sweep of ~ 1. One need not rely 
on this inference alone, however, for the debates show that 
Members of Congress might well have understood "persons" 
to include municipal corporations. 
Representative Bingham. for example, in discussing ~ 1 of 
the bill, explained that he had drafted ~ 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 
(1834), especia.lly in mind. "In that case the city had taken 
private property for public use, without compensation ... , 
and there was no redress for the wrong .... " Globe App., 
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly 
indicate his view that such takings as had occurred in Barron 
would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See 1'd., at 85. 
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More generally, and a.s Bingham's remarks confirm, § 1 of the 
bill would logica.lly be the vehicle by which Congress provided 
redress for takings, since that section provided the only civil 
remedy coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment and tha.t 
AmP11dment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated tak-
ings.50 Given this purpose, it beggars reason to suppose tha.t 
Congress would have ex0mpted municipalities from suit, 
im:isting instead that compensation for a taking come from an 
officer in his individual capacity rather than from the govern-
ment unit that had the benefit of the property taken.51 
In addition. by 1871. it was well understood that corpora-
tionR should be treated as natural persons for virtually all pur-
poses of constitutional and statutory analysis. This had not 
aJways been so. When this Court first considered the question 
of the status of corporations, Chief Justice Marshall, writing 
for the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons 
as that te-rm was nsed in Art. III and the Judiciary Act of 
1789.52 See Bank of the Unaed States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 
61, 86 (1809). By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was 
unhesitatinp;ly abandoned: 
"A corporation crPated by and doing business in a par-
ticular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes 
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of 
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a 
natural perRon." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 
558 (1844) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 751. 
50 That takings would be covered by § 1 of the Fourtceuth Amendment 
was not merely a pet theory of Rep. Bingham, but the general under-
standing, can be SEl<'n by comparing Story, Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States § 1956 (Cooley ed. 1873). 
51 Indeed the federal courts found no obstn,cle to awards of damages 
against municipalities for common-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadel-
phia, 23 F. Cas. 396 (CCED Pa. 1873) (No. 13,611) (awarding damages 
of $2,273.36 and costs of $346.35 against the city of Philadelphia). 
52 Nonetheless, suits could be brought in federal court if the natural 
persons who were members of the corporation were of diverse citizrnship 
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Cranch, at 91. 
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And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights 
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), the 
Letson l!rinciple was automatically and without discussion 
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doc·trine, 
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal 
courts 53 and this fact was well known to Membrrs of 
Congress. 54 
That the "usual" me::tninp; of the word person would extend 
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of 
Congrrss. the so-called "Dictionary Act," which had hem 
passed only months before the Civil Rights Act was passed. 
This Act provided that 
"in all Acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may 
rxt0nd and be applied to bodies politic and corpo-
rate ... unless the context shows that such words were 
intended to lw us0d in a more limited Sf'nscfl." Act of 
Frh. 25, 1871, ch. 71, ~ 2, 16 Stat. 431. 
Municipnl corporations in 1871 were included within the 
phrase "hodirs politic and corporate" sr, and, accordingly, the 
no3~ 
53 See l" · 7 u. 94, sttpra. 
54 See, c. g .. Globe, at 777 (remnrks of 8en. Sherman); id., at 752 
(remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) ("rountie8, cities, and rorpor~tions of all 
sorts, after ye[lr~ of judicial conflict, have become thoroughly es1 nblished 
to be nn i ndividn ~d or perRon or rntity of the personal exiRtence. of whirh, 
as a citizen. individnal, or inJ1abitant., the United States Con8ti1u1ion dOf>s 
t ake note nnd endow with facnl1:v to Rue and be sued in the rourts of the 
United Stf\tf's.") . 
" 5 Sec Northwestern FerWizing Co. v. Hyde Pa,rk, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394 
(CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10.33fl ): 2 Kent's Commen1arirs ~·278-·Y.·279 (12th 
0. W. Holm~o ed 1873). See a!Ao Unitrd States v. Hodson, 10 Wf\11. 39!'5, 
407 (1870) (the United RtntrR described as a body politic); United 
States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 109 (CCx,·x 1823) (Ma.rPhall, C. J.) ("The 
United States is a government, and, ronsr(]uently, a body politic and 
eorpornte"). IndPed, the thought that bodies politic amt corporate 
included govcrnmen1 s was suffiriently common in 1871 t hf\t the draftsmrn 
of the Revised United St.atrs Rtatutrs removed the phrnse from the Dir-
tionary Act. one yenr later to avoid the inconvenience of requiring words 
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"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were 
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be 
sned under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, a Circuit 
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported 
casr, under § 1, read the Dictionary Act in precisely this way 
in a caf:e involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal 
defendant. 56 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND IlL 1873) (No. 10,336).57 
limitin~ tho rrach of sta.tntes to private corporations. 1 Revision of the 
U nitcd Stutes St.ututes 19 (1872). 
56 The rourt also relird on "prinriple," noting that tlwrr was no disrrrni-
hl<' rNtRon why pPrson;; in.inrrrl hy municipal corpor:1tion;; should noi hc 
able to rcrover. See 1R F. C:tK. at 394. 
57 In ronRidcring the effcrt of tho Dictionary Art in Monroe, however, 
.T ust.ice DouglaR, apparrntly focusing on the word "mny," Rt ntcd: "this 
drfinition rof perRonl iR mrrrl~· :m :11JowabJo. not. a mnndatOD', one." 365 
U. S., at 191. A review of the legiRlntive histor~' of the Dirtionary Act 
shows tJ1is ronclu:;:.ion to be inrorrrrt. 
Thrre is no exprr~s rrfcrrnre in thr lcgislativr hiRtory to t.hc drfinition of 
person, but Senator Trumbull, tho Dirtion:uy Aet'K sponsor, di~cu~sed the 
phrn.<:c "wordo; importing the maRrulino gender mny be npplird to femalrs," 
which immedintely precedes that definition, and stntrd: 
"Tho onl~r object r of tho art] i!'. to ~rt rid of II grmt drnl of wrbo~ity in 
our RtatuteR b~r providin~ that when the word 'he' is usrd it. shall include 
femnlr;; ns well n~ mnleRrl" C'ongJ•e:::"ionnl Globr, 41st Con~J:., :)d Scss., 775 
(Jrm. 27, 1871) (rmphnRis added). 
Thns, in Trumbull's virw t.hr word "mny" mmnt "Rhnll." Snrh n mnnd:1-
tory use of the extended meanings of tho wordR drfincd by tho Dictionary 
Act is also requirPd for it to perform its intrndrd funrtion-to br n guide 
to "rules of conl"truction" of Arts of Congresf'. Sec id., at, 77.5 (Remarks 
of Sen. Tn1mbull). Were the defined words "ullow:1blr, I butl not manda-
tory" ronstructions, as Monroe suggeRts, there would be no "rulrs" at all. 
InRtend, Congre:::~ mm:.t have intrndrd tho drfinitions of the Dictionary Act 
t0 apply nero~R-the-bonrd excrpt whrro the Art by ib trrmR rallrd for a. 
deviation from this practice-"rwhNo] tho context showR th:.1t [defmed] 
words were to be uRrd in a more limited Rrnsr." Certainly this is how the 
N 07'thwestern Fertilizing court viewed the rnattrr. Since there is nothing 
in tho "context" of § 1 of tho civil rights bill calling for a restricted 
intrrpretation of tho word "person," the language of tha.t section should 
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III ~JI!:,~ ~ 
This Court has not frequently followed stare decisis with the 
punctiliousness argued for by Bill. N onethelesR, assuming 
that John Harlan was correct that one seeking to set aside 
precedent has a heavy burden to bear, that burden is dis-
charged here. In addition, in considering how much weight 
Monroe and its progeny ~ll-due, it is useful to keep in mind 
that no party briefed the municipal liability issue in M onr;ge. 
Nor, indeed'";" did anyone brief the issue in City of Kenosha or 
Moor. Indeed, petitioners in Moor did not even challenge 
Monroe's holding. See Brief of Petitioner, M oar v. County 
of Alameda, at 9. Therefore, with all humility, I suggest that 
the arguments resented b amici here and in Part II uprra, 
are wholly new an go substantia y eyond anything so far 
prcsentedtothe Court. 
Moreover, I suggest that one can find ambiguity in the 
congressional debates only by attributing to all Members of 
Congress, as Bill does. the clearly erroneous beliefs of a few. 
If, however. one attributes to Congress an intent to apply the 
then recently announced constitutional doctrine of Collector v. 
Da.y, supra, which is tlw case cited most frequently in the 
debates, the debates become very clear. When a correct con-
stitutional theory, under which the Sherman amendment was 
unconstitutional, is available and repeatedly referred to in the 
debates, I ask what possible .iustification there can be for 
assuming that Congress had some other, erroneous constitu-
tional limit in mind? 
Even if a majority does not agree with me that Monroe 
should be overruled outright, certainly the error of our ways 
is sufficiently clear that Monroe should not be extended to 
cover school boards. 
The Reconstruction C'ongn'ss tl1at pa'lsf'd the C'ivil Rights 
Act of 1871 did not. of conrsc, directly acldreRs th0 qtH'stion 
prima facie be construed to inrlnde "hodies politic" among 1 he rnt it ir::; that 
could be sued. 
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whether quasi-municig~l boJ].ies such a.s school boards were 
subject to suit under the Act. Indeed, since public education 
was in its rudimentary stages at the time the Act was adopted, 
compulsory school attendance being virtually unknown, 
Br0wn v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. 490 (]954), it 
would have been most surprising had it done so. Given that 
the Dictionary Act of 1871, enacted only months before the 
passage of the provision that became ~ 1983, provided that 
"in all Acts hPreafwr passed ... the word 'person' may extend 
and be applied to hoctics politic and corporate ... unless the 
context shows that r the word wasl intended to be used in a 
more limit<'d sense," the only plausible basis for concluding 
that the Congress that enflrted ~ 1983 did not envision, and 
would not have approved. school boards being sued unctcr 
that provision is the reason we found the explicit language 
of the Dirtionarv A~"t unpersuasive in Monroe, namely the 
rejection of the Sherman a.mendm0nt. With respect to con-
gressionnl nower, there is simply no reason to suppose that 
the 1871 CongreRs would have thought itself at a greater 
disability in acting to impose obligations on, and reach the 
conduct of. quasi-municipal bodies than it was in regulating 
the municipa.lities themselves. Thus the demonstration in 
Part II that the rejection of the Sherman amendment cannot 
be interpreted as evincing a firm congressional decision to 
place municipalities outside the ambit of ~ 1983 applies with 
at least equal force to the question whether school boards are 
subject to suit under that section. 
Nor do our cases compel us to exempt school bo s from 
suit. Far from It. s we and anyone in this country who -reads the newspapers knows, the situation is precisely the 
contra.ry. We have, after plenary consideration, decided the 
merits of well over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in 
which the principal defendant was a school board.58 In a 
ss Milliken v. Bradley, - U. S. - (1977); Dayton Boa1'd of Educa-




"' ... 12~ 
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number of these cases, § 1983. coupled with 28 U. S.C. § 1343, 
was the only allegPd basis of jurisdiction.59 Moreover, the 
re ief souO' t ao·a · st the school boards in these cases has not 
of Philadelphia. 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v. 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 41'3 U.S. 717 (1074); 
Bradlry v. School Board of tlw City of Richmond, 416 U. S. 690 (Ul74); 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 63.2 (1974); Keyes v. 
School District No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1970); San Anton-io School Distr'ir,t v. 
Rodri(Juez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte· Nfecklenbur(J Board 
of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Northr;ross v. City of Mem])his Uoard 
of Eduration. 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Cartrr v. West Feliciana Parish 
School Board, 396 U. S . .226 (1969); Ale:rander v. Holmes Count11 Board 
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969): Kramer v. Un1:on Free School District, 
395 U.S. 6.21 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
3!13 U.S. 621 (1969); Monrne v. Board of Commissioners, .'{91 U.S. 450 
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (196S); Green v. 
Countu School Board of New Kent Countu, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); District 
of Abin(Jton Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Goss v. Board 
of Eduration. 3n U.S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Edncation, 373 
U. S. 668 (1!163); Bush v. Or-lPans Parish School Board. 365 U. S. 569 
(1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (19!'l4). 
59 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 636 (1974); 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U. S. 189 (1973) , Appendix, at 4a; 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), 
Anpenclix, at 465a; Northrross v. City of Memphis Board of Education, 
397 U.S. 232 (1970), Prtition for Certiornri. at 3; Tinker v. Des MoinP.~ 
Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeesP v. Board 
of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671 (1963). 
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his discussion of the nature of school desegregation suits in 
Milliken I {... where he observed: 
,... 
11Norma1ly, the plaintiffs in this type of litigation are 
students, parents and supporting organizations who desire 
to desegregate a school system alleged to be the product, 
in whole or in part, of de jure segregative action by the 
public school authorities. The princ£pal defendant is 
usually the local board of education or school board. 
Occasionally the state board of education and state offi-
cials are joined as defendants." Milliken v. Bradley, -
U. S. -, - (1977) ( 45 U. S. L. W. 4873, 4880 
(June 27, 1977)) (PowELL, J. , concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
Altl1ough we did not 0xpressly address the jurisdictional 
quest,ion of a school board's amenability to suit under ~ 1983 
in our previous decisions, too much water has flowed under the 
bridge to consider the issue anything but settled. As Chief 
Justice Warren said in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370· 
U. S. 294, 307 (1962): 
"While we are not bound by previous exercises of juris-
diction in cases in which our power to act was not ques-
tioned by was passed sub silentio ... neither should we 
disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial author-
ity assumed to be proper for over [33] years." 
Over a century and a half earlier, Chief Justice Marshall ren-
dered a similar admonition. In holding that a corpora.tion 
was capable of bringing suits in federal court under the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, he reasonedt: 
"Such has been the universal understa.nding on the sub-
ject. Repeatedly has this court decided causes between 
a corpora.tion and an individual without feeling a doubt 
respecting its jurisdiction. Those decisions are not cited 
as authority; for they were made without considering this 
particular point; but they have much weight, as t,hey 
show that this point neither occurred to the bar or the 
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bench; and that the common understanding of intelligent 
men is [that jurisdiction exists]." Bank of the United 
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,88 (1809). 
Congressional action taken in the wake of our decisions, far 
from showing any disRatisfaction with our notion that school 
boards can be sued under ~ 1083, has presumed that school 
boards arc subject to suit under the statute and approved that 
principle. In 1972. spurred by a finrling "that the process of 
eliminating or preventing minority group isolation and 
improving the quality of education for all children often 
involves the expenrlitnre of additional funds to which local 
educational agencies do not have access," 20 U. S. C. 
~ 1601 (a) (1970 ed .. Supp. V), Congress passed the 1972 
Emergency School Act. Section 643 (a)(1)(A)(i) of that 
Act, 20 U. S. C. ~ 1605 (a) (1) (A) (i) (1970 ed., Supp. V), 
authorizes the Assistant Secretary 
"to make a grant to, or a contra.ct with, a lotal educational 
agency [wlhich is im.plementing a 7Jlan wh:irh has been 
undertaken pursuant to a final order issued by a cnurt of 
the United States ... which requires the desrgregation of 
minority group · Sl'~rcgakd children or faculty in the 
elementary and S('Condary f<chools of such agency, or 
otherwise r0qnir0s the eliminntion or reclnct.ion of minor-
ity group isolation in such f'chools." (Emphasis added.) 60 
60 A "!oral edura.tional age>nry" is de>fincd by 20 U. R. C. § 1619 (8) fif' 
"a puhli" board of edur~tion or o1hrr public authori1~' lrgallv con~titn1rd 
within a. State for Pi1hrr ndmini~tra1 iYr ront.rol or dircd ion of, public 
elPmcn1ary or serondar:v srhools in a. rity, rmmty, township. srhool, or 
other political snbdiYision of n RU11c, or n frdrrally rr(·ognit~"d Indian 
res<'rvation , or mrh rombin~tion of srhool dis1rir1R. or rountics fiR are 
rprognizrd in a. Rta1o :u:< ~ n admini~tr[ltiv<' ngcnr~' for it ~ !'Uhlir r\Pmrn1ary 
or scrondary srhools , or [I romhinntion of lorn] edura1ional ~crcnrir~: and 
includrs any other puhlir insti1n1inn or ngcnry hnvi1~g adminif'l r[lti,: c ron-
trol and direction of a puhlir rlrmrn1 ary or secondarv Fwhool l'llld where 
respon::;ibility for thr ron1 rol and dirrrtion of Lhe art ivitiC!' in f'nch srhools 
which nre to be aRsi~trd m1drr this cha]Jtcr is vr>;trd in an agrnry ~uhor-
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Congress thus clearly recognized that school boards were often 
parties to federal school desegregation suits. Since virtually 
every federal school desegregation case brought up until the 
time the 1972 Emergency School Act was passed was brought, 
at least in part, under § 1983, it simply cannot be said that the 
federal desegregation suits Congress had in mind were not 
brou!!,ht under that provision. In § 718 of the Act, 20 U. S.C. 
§ 1617, Congress gave its explicit approval to the institution 
of federal desegregation suits against school boaJ·d&-presum-
ably undrr § 1083. That section provides: 
"Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the 
United States against a local education agency ... for 
failure to comply with any provision of this chapter or 
for discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national 
origin in violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, or the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution 
of the UnitRct States as they pertain to elementary and 
secondary education, the court, in its discretion, upon a 
finding that the proceedings were necessary to bring about 
compliance, ma.y allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." (Emphasis added.) 
Two years later, Congress found that "the implementation 
of deRegregation plans that require extensive student trans-
portation has, in many cases, required local educational agen-
cies to expand r sic] large amounts of funds, thereby depleting 
their financial resources . . . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a)(3) 
(1970 ed., Supp. V). (Emphasis added.) Congress did not 
respond by declaring that school boards were not subject to 
suit under § 1983 or any other federal statute,61 "but simply 
dinate to such a board or other authority, the Assistant Secretary ma.y 
consider such subordinate agency as a local educational agency for pur-
pose of this chapter." 
61 Indeed, Congress. expressly reiterated that a cause of action, cogniza-
ble in the federal courts, exists for discrimination in the public school 
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flegislated] revised evidentiary standards and remedial priori-
ties to be employed by the courts in deciding such cases." 
Brief for National Education Assn. and Lawyers' Committee 
for Civil Rights Under Law, at 15-16. 
Copgres!_ most recently legishted _in light of the fact that 
school boards have long been deemed "pesrons" within the 
meaning of § 1983 in ena.cting the Civil Rights Attorney's 
Fees Award Act of 1976, 4:?, U. S. C. A. § 1988. That act 
allows the award of nttorney's to the prevailing party, other 
than the United States. in a number of civil rights actions, 
including "any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 
sectionR 1981. 1982, 1983, 1985. and 1986 of this title f 42 
U. S. C.l .... " The Senate Report on the Act observed: 
"[D l efenda.nts in these cases are often state or local 
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is 
intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, 
will be collected either directly from the official, in his 
official capacity. from funds of his agency or under his 
control. or from the State or local government (whether 
or not the agency or government is named as a party)." 
Both the Senate and House Reports cited with a.pproval a 
number of cases brought under § 1983 in which a school boa.rd 
context. 20 U. S. C. §~ 1703, 1706, 1708, 1710, 1718. The Act assumes 
that school boards will usually be the defendants in such Rnits. For exam-
ple,§ 211 of the Art, 20 U. S.C.§ 1710 provides: 
"The Aitorney Geneml shall not institute a civil under srrtion 1706 of 
this title [ whirb rllows for suit bv both private pa.rticR and the Attorney 
General to redress discrimination in public educntion] before h0-
"(a) gives to ihe approprinte edurntionn.l11grncy notice of the condition 
or conditions whirh, in his jndp:mcnt, rollstitute a viohtion of part [the 
prohibitions against discrimination in public education]." 
Section 219 of the Act, 20 U. S. C. ~ 1718, provides for the termination 
of court ordered bming "if the court finds the defendant educational 
agency has satisfied the requirementR of the fifth or fourteenth amendments 
to the Constitution, whichever is applicable, and will continue to be in 
compliance with the requirements thereof." 
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was the primary defendant.02 Congress was thus well aware, 
as it was in passing the 1972 Emergency School Aid Act and 
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, that school 
boards and other local governmental bodies could be, and very 
often were, sued under § 1983. In passing the Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fees Awa.rd Act of 1976, Congress affirmatively 
built upon this principle and displayed its willingness to hold 
those bodies liable for monetary as well as declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
Just as Congress' passage of legislation premised on the 
assumption that school boards are properly the subject of 
civil rights suits, the vast majority of which are brought under 
§ 1983, bespeaks its acceptance of that notion, so too does its 
persistent refusal to enact legislation limiting the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts over school boards. During the heyday 
of the furor over busing, both the House and the Senate 
refused to adopt bills that would have removed from the fed-
eral courts jurisdiction 
"to mal\:e any decision, enter any judgment. or issue any 
order requiring any school board to make any change in 
the racial composition of the student body at a.ny public 
school or in any class at any public school to which stn-
oents are assigned in conformity with a freedom of choice 
system, or requiring anv school board to transport any 
students from public school to another public school or 
62 The Senate Report citNI Bradley v. School Board of the Cit?! of 
Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (Hl74), for thP proposition that nnder thP Art, 
counsel's fees could be awarded pendente lite. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5. 
The Report also cited with approvnl several lower conrt cnses in which 
att-orney's fees were awardPd af!;ainst school boards in n.ctions brr)Ught 
under § 1983. Ibid. The Hon~c Re11ort., in arldit.ion to approvingl)r citing 
Rradley, H. R Rep. No. 94-1558. at 4 nn. 6. 8, n.nd Nortlu;ross v. MPrnphi~ 
Board of Education, 412 U. S. 427 (1973). id .. at, 6. 9, observed: "Section 
1983 is 11tilized to challenge official discrimination. such Hs racial segrega-
tion imposed by law. 81'0'Wn v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 
(1954)." !d., at 4. 
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from one place to another place or from one school dis-
trict to another school district or denying to a.ny student 
the right. or privilege of attending any public school or 
class at any public sehool chosen by the parent of such 
student in conformity with a freedom of choice system, or 
requiring any school board to close any school nnd trans-
fer the students from the closed school to any other 
school for the purpose of alterim: the ra.cial composition 
of the student body at any public schooL or precluding 
any school board from carrying into effect a.ny provision 
of any contract hetween it and any member of the faculty 
of any public school it opera.tes specifying the public 
school where the mt'mber of the facnlty is to perfonn his 
or her duties under tlH' contract." R. 179, 93d Cong .. 1st 
Ress .. ~ 1207 (1073): H. R. 159. 92d Cong., 1st Ress., 
~ 1207 (Hl71) (emphasis added) . 
Other bills designed <:>ither completely to remove the federal 
courts from the school desegre2;ation controversy, S. 287. 03d 
Cong., 1st S<:>ss. (1073). or to limit the ability of federal courts 
to subject school boards to remedial orders in desegregation 
cases, S. 619. 93d Con g .. 1st Sess. (1973): S. 179, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess., ~ 3 (a) (1973): H. R. 13534, 92d Cong. , 2d Scss., 
§ 2922 ( 1972) , have similarly failed . 
T n sum, support for the proposition that school boards are 
not "persons" subjeet to suit under ~ 1983 cannot be found in 
the congressional understanding at the time ~ 1983 was passed, 
our subsequent construction of that provision, or t.he congres-
siona] respons<:> to onr decisions. To the contrary. each of 
these considerations compels nreciRf'ly the opposite conclusion. 
The only possible justification for holding that school boards 
cannot be sued under ~ 1083 is a desire for some modicum of 
consistency with Monroe's holding barring§ 1983 suits directly 
against municipalities. Yet such an outcome stretches stare 
decisis beyond its breaking point by extending a clea.rly 
1fc,.4 ........ .p-~ If:( 
#), sj~ ~""1 
~AW·e.Jl~ 
j;t ~~-'--.~~ 
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erroneous decision at the price, as John sa.id at Conference, of 
making ourselves "look like fools." 
IV 
The following ractical consequences flow from the )reced-
ing examin&tion an ana ys1s o ,§ 1 83. Quasi-municipal 
bodies such a.s school boards at the very ]east, a.nd, ideally, 
municipalities themselves as well, may be sued directly under 
~ 1983 for both monetary and injunctive relief when the l 
l11,Y-nicipalit_y or quasi-municipal body bears a significant 
degree o_i respon sibility for a consti tutional deprivation. The 
most cfear~ cas es are those in which th e unconstitutional 
action is taken pursuant to a municipal ordinance or regula-
tion. Because unwritten practices and predilections may, by 
force of time and consistent application, crystalize into official 
pol~y, these too may provide a basis for direct suit agamst 
municipal and quasi-municipal bodies. See Adickes v. S. H. 
Kress& Co., 398 U.S. 144,167-169 (1970). ? 
The cornerstone of this approach is tha.t a municipal or I 
quasi-municipal bony may be directly sued under § 1983 for 
any relief necessary to redress a constitutional deprivation 
when it bears some blame or fault for the constitutional 
infringement.63 'tfonverse'tv, where the body bears no signifi-
63 In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), we recor;nizPd that fault is 
a crucial factor in drtermining whether relief may run against. a party for 
its alleged pn.rticip:ttion in n constitutional tort. Distingnishing the relief 
approved by the lower courts in the case at hand from thnt sanctioned by 
this Court in school dC's<'gregation cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), JusTICE HEHNQUIS'r explained: 
"Hespondents ... ignore a critical fn.etual distinction be1w0en their 
case and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In 1 he latter, 
segregation imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for 
varying periods of time, whereas in the instant C3se the District Court 
found that the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in 
depriving a.ny members. of the two respondent, classes of any cons:titutiona.l 
rights. Those aga.inst whom injunctive relief was direrted in cases such 
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<'ant responsibility for the harm suffered hy a ~ 1083 plaintiff, 
it should ~t b~'dcnriously li~hle to SPit under the doctrine 
of respondeat sui)(;'ior; for su'cti liability without fault is 
precisely analogous to the liability imposed by the Sherman 
amendment, which the 1871 Congress refused to impose. This 
Co~.,rt recognized as much in Moor, where we obsrrver! that 
"Congress did not intend. as-;;:-;natter of federal law. to 
impose vicarious liabilitv on municipalities for violations of 
frrkrr>l civil rights hv their 0mployees." 411 U. R .. Dt 710 
n. 27 (emphasis in ori~inal).G• 
nP Swann and Brown were not ndmini~t.rators and s~hool bonrd mrmb"rs 
who hnrl in thrir employ a. ~mrtll nnmbrr of individual~, whirh lntter on 
their own drprh·rrl black E:tudents of thrir constiutionnl rirrhts to a nnit11ry 
srhool Rvstem. Thev wrre administrntor.'> and school board mrlTlhrrs who 
were found by their own rondmt in ihe ndministmtion of the ~rhool ~vs­
tem to hrtve dfmied those right"R. H<:>re, the Distrirt. Conrt fonnd that 
none of the petiiioncrs hnd dcprivrd t.he respondent rhf'SPR of any 
rights srrured 1mdcr the Constitution. 423 U. S., at :377 ( rmph~sis in 
origii1nl) . 
Had the Mayor rmd Polire Commis8ioncr of Phila.delphia br<'n rC'Spnnsiblc 
for i he ron::;titutional drprivn.tion~. aR wer<:> the school b0'1 rd~ in 8wann 
and Brown, appropriate relief could have order0d against them. 
For pmnrses of 11 defendnnt's nmrnnbilit.y to suit, this approach trrats 
all constitutional violations perpetrated by a. muPiripaJ or qu:1si-m1miripnl 
body, con~il:'tentlv . without regard to the iype of relief that is songht to 
redress them. Bill, on the other hand, would permit snits against 
municipal officinls in their officinl ca.pa,city where the relief requcstrd is 
injunctive only, and would b:u such snits only where monetary relief is 
sought. This approach would resnrrect precisely the type of inconsistency 
we condemned in Kenosha,. 
64 Most lower conr1 s confronted with the is8ne have also fonnd the 
dortri11e of respondeat superior inapplirable ton § HJ88 nrtion. Sec Note, 
Developments in the Law-SPrtion 1988 :mel Feder::JJiPm, 90 IIarv. L. 
Rev. 1133, 1207 (1977) : Levin, The Section 1983 Municip~l] Tmmunity 
Doctrine, 65 Geo. L. J. 1483, 1533-1.'>34 (1977). As the Seventh Circuit 
recently with respect to monetary relief: 
"We arc not aware of a.ny decision which holds a local government 
entity liable in money damnges for the constitutional deprivations com-
mit1 ed hy its' agents, indeprnd<:>ntly of any official policy. The principle of 
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Thus, municipal and quasi-municipal entities, like govern- ) 
mental officials, must bear r<'sponsibility for their unconstitu- (_ 
tional acts. Where injunctive relief is sought. the effect of 
this doctrine on extant law wlll be negligible. Virtually all 
d<'cisions since Moor ha vc read that case, in effect, simply as 
announcing a rule of pleading that prohibits the issuance of 
injunctive relief directly against a municipality, and have 
permitted any in.iuncti,·e relief necessary to remedy a con-
stitutional violation to issn<" agninst the governmental official 
responsible for fonnulating or implementing the unconstitu-
tional act or policy. Wlwre monetary damages are sought I 
against a municipal body under ~ 1983 to redress a constitu-
tional violation, however, the matter 1s a hit more 
complicated. 
Undrr casl"s such as Wood v. Strirkland. 420 U. S. 308 
(Hl7fi), and Sche?tfr v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). many 
governmental ofuc1als ar0 ; ntitlrd to a qnalifi0d goocl-fa.ith 
immunity. which is. in 0ffcct. a def0nsc. At first blush, there 
·wonlrl ap1war to he little r0ason to hold municipal and quasi-
municipal hodil"'>. as such. to a higl1er standard for safeguard-
ing constitutional rights t,l1an the standarrl the officials who 
com1)rlS<> those hodi0s and formulate their policil"s arC' held to. 
This initial impn's~ion is huttrcl'sed hv the fact that the -common lg,w g€'n £QlllY affordC'd municipal bodies immunity in 
th!" performance ofth cir '1governm0ntal" functions r.G coupled 
with the approach WI" have consistently taken in determining 
wlwthcr :md to '':hat C'xtcnt a given defendant is entitled to 
immlmity in a ~ 19R3 action-nam<"lv "a considcr0d inquiry 
into thr immunity historically accorded the relevant official 
at common law and the intcrN:ts behind it." Imbler v. Pacht-
re.~pondeat .~uperior baR not h rr n :1pplird u11clrr § 19i<1. :1!thnngh it m11~t 
be notrd thnt thr opportunit~· to :~ppl~r it to mnni r· ipnl hodir:-: wns fore-
closrd by the stntntory intcrprct<t1ion thnt f'nrh bodirs W<'re not snbjrrt 
to § 19113 liability." McDonald v. State of Illinois, .557 F. 2d 596, 604 
(C-\7 1977). 
Gr. Rcc 18 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporatious § li1.24 (3d <:'d. 1963). 
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man, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). However, for two_Easons I 
believe tha.t it is both unwise and unwarrantea , at this point, 
to a.nnounc~at rUic"""triat intr"n'iCipal and quasi-municipal' 
bodies are entitled to precisely the same type of immunity 
afforded governmental officials under Wood and Scheuer .. 
~t, the common law of municipal immunity "[fl or well· 
over a century ... has been subjected to vigorous criticism."· 
W. Prosser. Handbook of the Law of Torts 984 (4th eel. 1971). 
As a consequence, there has been ''a minor avalanche of deci-
sions repudiating municipal immunity" that portends "a 
radical change in the law. /d., at 985. Second. the policy 
considera.tions tha.t underlie the doctrine '""'cllDunicipal im-
munity differ significantly from the concerns we identified 
as the source of the qua.lified p:ood-faith immunity recognized 
in Scheuer. Neither of those concerns-" ( 1) the injustice, 
particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to lia-
bility an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his 
position' to exercise discretion; r or l (2) the danger that the 
threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute 
his office with the deci.siveness and the judgment required by 
the public good" GG_srems particularly poignant where the · 
§ 19R~ defendal1t is a municipal or quasi-municipal body. 
With respect to the first concrrn, it could be argued that. far 
from being unjust, it is quite fair t,o saddle a governmental 
entity that has harmed an individual with the responsibility for 
rectifying that harm; for this sprearls the cost of the nncon-
stitutional action among the members of the polity-those 
who reap the benefits of the municipal body's actions and who 
are ultimately responsible for them.67 With respect to the 
second concern, "the risk thnt imposing liability unqualified 
by an irrununity or goorl-faith defense upon 1mmicipnlities 
66 Seheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. 8. 2~2, 240 (1974). 
67 See Note, Dnmage Rrmrrli<'S Agninst MHnicipnlitirs for Con~ti1ntional 
Violations, 89 Hnrv. L. Rr·v. 922, 9.'5fi-958 (1976); Note, Vir:uion~ Li:1bili1y 
Under Section 1983, 6 Ind. L. Hev. 509, 515 (1973). 
~ G..-&4.'-'H4o ~ 
-&~) 
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would deter their officials from conscientiously executing their 
public duties seems much more attenuated than the risk 
attendant to imposing such liability upon the officials them-
selves." Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for 1 
Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 922, 957 (1976) . 
(a journal whose ~om Bill appa.rently recognizes). Indeed, 
it might even be that the imposition of liability directly on 
governmental bodies could have a beneficial effect on per-
formance by providing responsible officials with an incentive 
to correct abuses. 
Given thes0 considerat.ions, the most judicious course is 
clearly to permit the lower courts to grapple with the question 
of the nature of the immunity municipal and quasi-municipal 
bodies are ent1tlrd to when sued for monetary relief under 
§ 1983. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
403 U. S. 389, 397-398 (1971). Only a.fter the issue has 
received f'nffieient vent.ilation and percolation in the lower 
courts will it be meet for our consideration. 
APPENDIX 
As proposed, the Sherman amendment was as follows: 
"That if mi.y house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, 
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demol-
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in 
part, by any persons riotously a.nd tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with 
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; and if such offense was committed to 
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by 
the Constitution aud laws of the United States, or to 
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by 
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or 
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be com-
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mitted shaH be liable to pay full compensation to the 
person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to 
his widow or legal representative if dead; and such com-
pensation may bo recovered by such person or his repre-
senta.tive by a suit in any court of the United States of 
competent .inrisdiction in the district in which the offense 
was committed, to be in the name of the person injmed, 
or his legal representative, and against said county. city, 
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment. 
rendered in such suit nnd may be levied upon any prop-
erty, real or personal. of any person in said county, city, 
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover 
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and intPrest, 
from any person or persons engaged as principle or 
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of com-
pet.ent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663. 
The complete text of the conference substitute for the 
Sherman amendment is: 
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, 
barn, or granary shall be unlRwfully or feloniously demol-
ished. pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in 
part. by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shaH unla.wfully and with 
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together, with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for 
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous conditions of servitude, in every such case the 
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses 
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensa-
tion to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if 
living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and 
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the 
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case by such person or his representa.tive in any court of 
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district 
in which the offense was committed, such action to be in 
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, 
and against said county, city, or pa.rish; and in which 
action any of the parties committing such acts ma.y be· 
joined as defendants. And any payment of a.ny judg-
ment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plain-
tiff in such action , may, if not satisfied by the individual 
defendant therein within two months next after the 
recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued 
against such individual defendant in such judgment, and 
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced 
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attach-
ment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding 
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of 
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judg-
ment shall be a Jien as well upon all moneys in the 
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other 
property thereof. And the court in any such action may 
on motion cause additional parties to be made therein 
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice ma.y be done. 
And the said county, city, or parish may recover the 
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and 
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal 
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish, 
so paying, shall also be subrogated to an the plaintiff's 
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 755. 

To: The c~.:~ Mr. Jus ce , rt 
Mr. J . . . 
Mr. Justice M:trnhall 
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1 
Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Depart~~ ,SA.~ 
; of Social Services and the Board of Education of t.he c)'cy'" ~ 
New York, commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § ~ ~ ~ 
IJ.Q in July 1971.1 The gravamen of the complaint was tha.t the 
1 Board and the Department had as a matter of official p~ 
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of 
absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.2 
1 The complaint was amended on September 14, 1972 to allege a claim 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e ( 1970 ed., and Supp. V). The Dist.rict Court held that the 1972 
amendments to Title VII did not apply retroactively to discrimination 
suffered prior to those amendments even when an action challenging such 
prior discrimination was pending on the date of the amendments. :39'1 
F. Supp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This !lclding wns :~ffirmc d r.n !!fPC:>.!. 
532 F. 2d 259, 261-262 (CA3 1976) . Although petitioners sought cer-
tiorari on the Title VII issne us well us the § 1983 claim, we restricted 
our grant of certiorari to the htter issue. 429 U. S. 1071. 
2 The plaintiffs alleged that ~cw York had a citywide policy of forcing 
women to take maternit~· le:1.vr after the fifth mont,h of pregnancy unless 
a city phy~ician and the head of nn employee's agency allowed up to an I 
additiorml t\ro months of work. AmendL·d Complaint ~ 28, App. 13-14. 
The defendants did not deny t.his, but stated that this policy had been 
change-d after suit was instituted. Answer 1 13, App. 32-33. The plain-
tiffs further alleged that the Board had a policy of requiring women to 
take maternity leave after the seventh month of pregn:mcy tmlcss that I 
month fell in the last month of the school year, in which case the t-eacher 
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 
(19'74). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for 
periods of unlawful forced leave. Named as defendants in the 
~ction were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board 
~nd its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor. 
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in 
their official capacities. 3 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners' 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief since the city of 
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had 
.changed their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no 
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was 
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F. 
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The 
court did conclude, however, that the acts complained of 
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. 394 F. Supp., 
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay ·were 
. denied because any such damages would come ultimately from 
the City of New York and , therefore, to hold otherwise would 
' be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities 
by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp., 
at 855. 
On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the 
-Board of Education 4 was not a "municipality" within the 
meaning of Monroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the 
District Court had erred in barring a damage award against 
the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit rejected both contentions. The court first \ 
could remain through the end of the school term. Amended Complaint 
'i'l 39, 42, 45, App. 18-19, 21. This allegation was denied. Answer 
n 18, 22, App. 35-37. 
~Amended Complaint , 24, App. 11-12. 
• Petitioners conceded that the Department of Social Services enjoys the 
same status as New York City for Monroe purposes. See 532 F. 2d, at 
263. 
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under 
§ 1983 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... , 
and, significantly, while it has the right to determine how the 
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final 
say in deciding what its appropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d 
·259, 263 (1976) (citation omitted). The individual defend-
ants, however, were "persons" under § 1983, even when sued 
f?Olcly in their official capacities. I d., at 264. Yet, because a 
damage award would "haYe to be paid by a city that was held 
·!lot to be amenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a 
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities 
cb~ld not proceed. !d., at 265. 
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider 
"Whether local governmental officials and/or local inde-
pendent school boards are "persons" within the meaning 
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature 
of back pay is sought against them in their official 
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8. 
Although, after plenary consideration, we have decided the 
merits of over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in 
which the principal defendant was a school board 5-and, 
5 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977); Dayton Board of Educa-
iton v. Brinkman. 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorchheimer v. School District 
o/ Philadelphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v. 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); 
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); 
Cleveland ·Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974); Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); San Antonio School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board 
of Education, 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish 
School Board, 396 U. S. 226 (1969); Alexander v. Holmes County Board 
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist1ict, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners. 391 U.S. 45() 
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); School 
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indeed, in some of 'vhich § 1983 and its jurisdictional counter-
part, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdic-
tion6-we indicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), last Term that the question 
presented here was open and would be decided 11another day." 
That other clay has come and we now overrule Monroe v. Pape, 
supra, i11sofar as it holds that local governments are wholly 
immune from suit under§ 1983.7 
I 
In Monroe v. Pape, we held that 11Congress did not under-
take to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of 
[ § 1983] ." 365 U. S., at 187. The sole basis for this conclu-
sion was an inference drawn from Congress' rejection of the 
"Sherman amendment" to the bill which became Civil Rights I 
Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13-the precursor of§ 1983-which would 
have held a municipal corporation liable for damage done to 
the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons 
"riotously and tumultuously assembled." 8 Cong. Globe, 42d 
·Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871) (hereinafter 11Globe"). Although 
-the Sherman amendment did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act, 
'District of Abington Township v. Schempp. 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Gas.~ v. 
Board of Education, 373 U. S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Educa-
tion, 373 U. S. 668 (1963); Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 365 U. S. 
·569 (1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
8 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 832, 636 (1974); 
App., Keyes v. School District No.1, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-507, p. 4a; App., 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No. 
281, p. 465a.; Petition for Certiorari, N orthcross v. Board of Education, 
0. T. 1969, No. 1136, p. 3; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 
U.S. 668,671 (1963). 
1 However, we do affirm Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), insofar 
as it holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for 
rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of 
their employee.il. Sec Part II, infra. 
8 We expressly declined to consider "policy considerations" for or 
against municipal liability. See 365 U. S., at 191. 
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which is now § 1983, and although the nature of the obligation 
created by that amrndment " ·as vastly different from that 
created by § 1, the Court nonetheless concluded in Monroe 
that Congress must have meant to exclude municipal corpora-
tions from the coverage of § 1 because "the House [in voting 
against the Sherman amendment] had solemnly decided that 
in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to 
impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, 
the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law." 
365 U. S. , at 190 (emphasis added) , quoting Globe, at 804 
(Rep. Poland). This statement, we thought, showed that 
Congress doubted its "constitutional power ... to impose 
civil liability on municipalities," 365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis 
added), and tha.t such doubt would have extended to any type 
of civil liability.9 
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
and particularly of the case law which each side mustered in 
its support, shows, however, that Monroe incorrectly equated 
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with 
"c)villiability." 
A. An Overview 
There are three distinct stages in the legislative considera-
tion of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for 
a House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained 
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without 
9 Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, has suggested that the 
municipal exclusion might more properly rest on a theory that Congress 
sought to prevent the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose 
on municipalities. Sec City of Kenosha v. Bruno, -!12 U. S. 50i , 517- 5::!0 
(1973). However, this view has never been shared by the Court, see 
Monroe v. Pa.pe, supra, n. 7, at 190; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 
U. S. 693, 708 ( 1973), and the debat·cs do not support this position. 
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amendment.10 Sections 2 through 4 dealt primarily with the 
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in 
the southern States. 11 The wisdom and constitutionality of 
these sections-not § 1, now § 1983-was the subject of almost 
all congressiona1 debate and each of these sections was 
amended. The House finished its initial debates on H. R. 
·320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later ~he Senate also voted 
out a bill.12 Again. debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and 
that section was passed as introduced. 
Immediately prior to the vote on H. R. 320 in the Senate, 
Senator Sherman introduced his amendment.1 3 This was not 
an amendment to § 1 of the bill , but was to be added as § 7 at 
the end of the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of 
the amendment was allowed and, although attempts were 
made to amend the amendment. it was passed as introduced. 
·In this form, the amendment did not place liability on munic-
ipal corporations, but made a.ny inhabitant of a municipality 
liable for damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultu-
ously assembled." a 
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amend-
--ments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amend-
ment, and the respective version~ of H. R. 320 were there-
1o Globe, at 522. 
11 Briefly, § 2 created certain federal crimes in addition to those defined 
: in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat.. 27, each aimed primarily a.t 
the Ku Klux Klan. Section 3 provided that the President could send the 
militia into any State wracked with Klan violence. Finally, § 4 provided 
for suspension of the writ. of habens corpus in enumerated circumstances, 
again primarily those thought to obtain where Klan violence was rampant. 
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Seos. , App ., at 335- 336 (1871) (hereinafter 
!!QJobe App.") . 
12 Globe, at 709. 
13 See id., at 663, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 41-42. 
u Ibid. An action for recovery of damages was to be in the federal 
courts and denominated as a suit against the county, city, or parish in 
which t-he damage had occurred. Ibid. Execution of tl1e judgment was 
pot to run against the property of the government unit, however, but 
ag.ainst the private property of any inhabitant. Ibid. 
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fore sent to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill, 
however, was not a subject of this conference since, as noted, 
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of 
Congress. 
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed 
its wc·:k on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference 
committee draft of the Sherman amendment were these: 15 
First, a cause of action was given to persons injured by 
11any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled 
together; ... with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States. or to deter him or punish him for 
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude .... " 
'Second, the act provided that the action would be against 
'the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred and 
that it could be maintained by either the person injured or 
his legal representative. Third, unlike the amendment as 
proposed, the conference substitute made the government 
defendant liable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against 
individual defendants who had committed the violence. If 
··a municipality were liable, the judgment against it could be 
·collected 
uby execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or 
any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable 
to -the enforcement of judgments against municipal cor-
porations; and such judgment [would become] a lien 
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county, 
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof." 
In the ensuing debate on the first conference report, which 
was the first debate of any kind on the Sherman amendment, 
Senator Sherman explained that the purpose of his amend-
ment was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the en-
1s See Globe, at 749 and 755, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 42-43. 
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forcement of the civil rights laws by making their property 
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damnge.10 Statutes drafted 
on a similar theory, he stated, had long been in force in 
England and were in force in 1871 in a number of States.u 
Nonetheless there were critical differences between the con-
ference substitute and extant state and English statutes: the 
conference substitute, unlike most state riot statutes, lacked 
a. short statute of limitations and imposed liability on the gov-
ernment defendant whether or not it had notice of the impend-
ing riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to 
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted all reason-
-able efforts to stop the riot, and whether or not the rioters 
-were caught and punished.18 
The first conference substitute passed the Senate but was 
Tejected by the House. House opponents, within whose ranks 
16 "Let the people of property in the southern States understand that if 
·they will not make the hue and cry :md take the necessary steps to put 
down lawless violence in those States their property will be holden respon-
sible, and the effect will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761. 
Senator Sherman was app:trently unconcerned that the conference com-
:mittee substitute, unlike the original amenclmrnt , did not place liability 
'for riot damage directly on the property of the well-to-do, but instead 
;placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes 
would be levied against the property of the inhabitants to make the locality 
'Whole. 
11 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in 
England immediately after the Norman Conquest and had most recently 
been promulgated as the law of 7 & 8 Geo. IV, ch . 31. See Globe, a.t 760. 
During the course of the debates , it appeared that Kentucky, Maryla.nd, 
Massachusetts, and New York had simil::Lr laws. See id., at 751 (Rep. 
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 771 (Sen. Thurman); 
id., at 792 (Rep . Dutlr r). Such a. municipal liability was apparently 
common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman). 
18 In the Sena te , opponents, . including a number of Senators who had 
voted for § 1 of the bill, criticised the Sherman amendment as an imperfect 
and impolitic rendering of the st:tte statutes. Moreover, as drafted, the 
conference substitute could be con~trued to protect rights that were not 
protected by the Constitution. A complete critique was given by Senator 
Thurman. See Globe, at 770-7i2. 
7~1914-0PINION 
,MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 9 
were some who had supported § 1, thought the Federal Gov-
ernment could not, consistent with the Constitution, obligate 
municipal corporations to keep the peace if those corporations 
were neither so obligated nor so authorized by their state t:J1~ 
charters. And, because of this constitutional objection, oppo-
nents of the Sherman amendment were unwilling to impose 
damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which Congress 
could not require municipalities to perform. This position is 
reflected in Representative Poland's statement that is quoted 
in M onroe.19 
Because the House rejected the first conference report a 
second conference was called and it duly issued its report. 
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment 
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any per-
son or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate 
eivil rights was afoot], and having power to prevent or aid 
in preventing the same," who did not attempt to stop the 
same, liable to any person injured by the conspiracy.20 The 
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Con-
gress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986. 
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can 
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on 
the report of the first conference committee. This debate 
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised 
against the Sherman amendment-on which our holding in j h1L 
:Monroe was based, seep. 5. supra-would not have prohibited 1 V'l. 
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state munici-
pal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act does not state expressly that municipal 
corporations come within its ambit, it is finally necessary to 
interpret § 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeed 
intended to be included within the "persons" to whom that \ OJZ 
section applies. 
19 See 365 U.S., at 190, quoted at p. 5, supra. 
~0 See Globe, at 804, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 43. 
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B. Debate on the First Conference Report 
The style of a.rgument adopted by both proponents and 
opponents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of 
Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases 
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several 
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, how-
ever, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitu-
tionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an 
argument from the debates on the first conference report and 
those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed 
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states," 
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of 
:Representative Shellabarger, the House sj5onsor of H. R. 320, 
is the most complete. 
Shella.barger began his discussion of H. R 320 by stating 
that "there is a domain of constitutionai law involved in the 
right consideration of this measure which is wholly unex-
plored." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 67 (1871) 
_(hereinafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however. 
With respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
'Shellabarger relied on the statement of Mr. Justice Washing-
ton in Garfield v. Coryell, 4 'iVash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa. 
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV: 
" 'What these fundamental privileges are [ ,] it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They 
tnay, however, be all comprehended under the following 
general heads: protection by the Government;'-
"J.l.fark that-
.,, 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property 
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety .... '" Globe App., at 69 (emphasis added), 
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at 380. 
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Having concluded that citizens were owed protcction,21 
Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in providing that 
protection. Here aga.in there were precedents: 
11 [Congress has always] assumed to enforce, as against 
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions 
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con· 
stitution which restrain and directly relate to the States, 
such as those in [Art. I, § 10,] relate to the divisions of 
the political powers of the State and General Govern-
ments. . . . These prohibitions upon political po'l'l·ers of 
the States are all of such nature that they can be. and 
even have been, ... enforced by the courts of the United 
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on 
Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the 
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitu-
tion. But there are some that are not of this class. 
These are where the court secures the rights or the liabili-
ties of persons \vithin the States, as between such persons 
and the States. 
"These three are: first, that as to fugitives from jus-
tice r22J; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or 
21 Opponents of the Sherman amendment agreed that both protection 
and equal protection were guaranteed by the Fourt{!enth Amendment. See 
Globe, at 758 (Sen. Trumbull); id ., at 772 (Sen. Thurman); id., at 791 
(Rep. Willard). And the Supreme Court of Indiana had so held in giving 
effect to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Sec Smith v. Moody , 26 Ind. 299 
(1866) . (following Coryell ) . one of three state supreme court cases referred 
to in Globe App., at 68 (Rep. Shelhba.rger). l\loreover, § 2 of the 1871 
Act as passed, unlike § 1, prosecuted prr~ons who violated federal rights 
whether or not that violation was nndr r color of official authority, appar-
ently on the theory that Ku Klux Klan violence was infringing the right of 
protection defined by Coryell. 
22 U.S. Canst ., Art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2: 
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who 
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand 
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered 
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." 
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slaves £231 ;) third, that declaring that the 'citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States.' £241 
"And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where 
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the 
constitutional provisions-the only thr~e where the right.<; 
or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these per-
sons and the States, arc directly provided for , Congress 
has by legislation affirmatiYely interfered to protect ... 
such persons." Globe App., a.t 69-70. 
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog 
of the Sherman amendment, ironically, was the statute imple-
menting the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions 
of Art. IV-the Act of Feb. 12. 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the 
.constitutionality of which had been sustained in 1842, in Prigg 
.v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539. There, Mr. Justice Story, 
writing for the Court, held that Art. IV gave sla.veowners a 
·federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in 
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 612. 
Because state process for recovering runaway slaves might be 
inadequate or even hostile to the rights of the slaveowner, 
.the right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to 
state implementation. Id ., at 614. Thus, since the Constitu-
tion gua.ra.nt.eed the right and this in turn required a. remedy, 
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had 
.the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. Id., at 615. 
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy 
against municipalities and counties >vas an appropriate-andj 
23 !d., cl. 3: 
''No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
Elicaping into another, shall, in Cousequcncc of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be disch:~rged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered 
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due." 
u !d., cl. 1. 
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hence constitutional-method for ensuring the protection l 
which the Fourteenth Amendment made ('Very citizen's federal 
right. 25 This much was clear from the adoption of such 
statutes by the several States as devices for suppressing riot.~c 
Thus, said Shellabarger, the only serious question remaining 
was "whether, since a county is an integer or part of a State, 
the United States can impose upon it, as such, any obligations 
to keep the peace in obedience to United States laws." 2 ' This 
he answered affirmatively. citing Board of Commissioners v. 
Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 ( 1861). the first of many cases ~ 8 
upholding the po\\'er of federal courts to enforce the Contract 
Clause against municipalities.~0 
The most complete statement of the constitutional argument 
of the House opponents of the Sherman amendment--,:v·hose 
views are particularly important since only the House voted 
down the amendment-,vas that of Representative Blair: 30 
"The proposition known as the Sherman amend-
ment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a pre-
25 See Globe, at 751. See also id., at 760 (Sen. Sherman) ("If a State 
may ... pass a law making a county ... responsible for a riot in order 
to deter such crime, then we may pass the same remedies .... "). 
2c !d., at 751; seen. 17, supra. 
27 Globe, at 751 (emphasis added). Compare this statement with Repre-
sentative Poland's remark upon which our holding in Monroe was based. 
Seep. 5, supra. 
28 See, e. g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque. 1 Wall. 175 (1864); Von Hoff-
man v. City of Quincy, 4 id .. 535 (1867) ; Riggs v . Johnson County, 6 
id., 166 (1868); Weber v. Lee County, 6 icl., 210 (1868); Supervisors v. 
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (1869); Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 id., 313 (1869); Super-
visors v. Durant, 9 id., 415 (1870). See generally C. Fairman, History of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 
1864-1888, chs. 17-18 (1971). 
29 See Globe, at 751-752. 
30 Others taking a view simihr to Repref'entative Blair's included: 
Represcnta.tivo Willard, see id., at 791 ; Representative Poland, see id., at 
794; Representi~,tive Burchard, sec id ., a.t 795; Representative Famsworth, 
see id., at 799. Representative Willard also took a somewhat different 
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cedent in this country. . . . That amendment claims the 
power in the General Governn1cnt to go into the State§ 
pf this Union and lay such obligations as it may please 
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the 
States alone .... 
" ... [H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an 
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to 
position. He thought that the Constitution would not allow the Federal 
(,}overnment to dictMe the mannr r in which n State fulfilled its obligatiQI) 
P.f protection. That is, he thought it a matt er of state disc retion whether 
tt delega.ted the pen.crkreping power to a municipal or county corporatioi), 
to a sheriff, etc. He did not doubt, howeYer, that the Federal Gowrnmcnt 
could impose on the States the obligation imposed by the Shermnn amenq-
ment, and presumably he would have enforced the amendment against a 
municipal corporation to which tJ1e peacekeeping obligation had been 
delegat.ed. See id., nt 791. 
Opponents of the Shrrman amrndmcnt in the Senate agrerd with Blair 
Jhat Congress had 110 power to pass the Sherman amendment because it 
'fell outside limits on national power impli('it in the federal structure of the 
{jonstitution, and recognizrd in, e. g., Collector Y. Day, 11 Wall.113 (1871). 
How~ver, thr Senate opponrnts focu:<cd not on the amrnclment's attempt 
1
t<> obligate municipalitie~ to krep thr peaee, but on the lien created by the 
amendment, which ran against a!? monr.y and property of a, defcn!lant. 
municipality, including property held for public purpo~rs, such as jails or 
courthouses. Opponents argued that such a lien once enterrd would haYe 
,the effect of making it impo~~ible for the municipality to function , since no 
pne would trade w.ith it.. Sec, e. g., Qlobc, nt 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., 
at 763 (Sen. Ca::serly). :.Ioreover, 'everyone knew that sound policy 
prevented execution against public property since thi,; too was needed if 
local government was to 8urvive. Sec, e. g., ibid, See also Meriwether v. 
(Jarrett, 102 U. S. 472, 501, 513 (1880) (recognizing principle that public 
ro · · ):tlity not subject to execution); 2 Dillon, ?viunicipal 
Corporations §§ 4-15-!-!6 73 eel.) (~ume). 
Although the argmnrnt:;; of the Srnntc orponents appear to be a correct 
,11nalysis of thrn-controlling eon~titutional and common-law principlrs, their 
arguments are not rrlevant to an analy~is of lhc canst it ut ionality of § 1 of 
tho Civil Rights Act :o: ince any judgmrnt under that section, as in any civil 
suit in the fedcrnl court~ in 1871, would hnw been rnforcrd purHuant. to 
state laws under the procr~s acts of 1792 and 1828. Sec Act of Muy 8, 
1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 215; Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278. 
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create that obligation, and that is the provision I am 
unable to assent to. The parallel of the hundred docs not 
in the least meet the case. The power that laid the 
obligation upon the hundred first put the duty upon the 
hundred that it should perform in that regard, and failing 
to meet the obligation which had bern laid upon it, it was 
very proper that it should suffer dnmage for its neglect . ... 
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong 
to the States, ... there are certain powers that inhere in 
the State governments. They create these municipalities, 
they say what their powers shall be and what their obliga-
tions shall be. If the Government of the United States 
can step in a.nd add to those obligations, may it not 
utterly destroy the municipality? If it can say that it 
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, . . . 
where [will] its power ... stop and what obligations ... 
might [it] not lay upon a municipality .... 
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court ... 
decided [in Collector v. Day, 11 \Vall. 113 (1871)] that 
there is no power in the Government of the United States, 
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a State 
bfficer. Why? Simply because the pO\YCr to tax involves 
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give 
the Government of the United States power to destroy 
the government of the States in any respect. It was held 
also in the ·case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania [ 16 Pet. 539 
(J842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress 
of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer; 
that we cannot command a State officer to do any duty 
whatever, as such; and I ask ... the difference between 
that and commanding a municipality \Yhich is rqually the 
creature of the State, to perform a duty." Globe, at 795. 
Any attempt to impute a unitary constitutional theory tol 
Opponents of the Sherman amendment is. of course. fraught 
with difficulties, not the least of which is that most Members 
75-1914-0PINION 
16 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
of Congress did not speak to the issue of the constitutionality 
of the amendment. Nonetheless, two considerations lead us 
to conclude that opponents of the Sherman amendment found 
it unconstitutional suSStantia]f, bc"ca se of the reasons stated 
by eJ!resenta 1ve Bl~r: 1 irs Blair's analysis is precisely 
that of Poland'7""whose views were quoted "S authoritative in 
Monroe, see p. 5, supra, and that analysis \vas shared in large 
part by all House opponents who addressed the constitution-
ality of the Sherman amcndment. 31 €cin])Blair's exegesis 
of the reigning constitutional theory of is day, as we shall 
explain, was clearly supported by precedent-albeit precedent 
that has not survived, see Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 
347-348 (1880); Graves v. N ew York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 
46 9)-and no other o ·e constitutional formula 
was advanced by any other participant in the House debates. 
Collector v. Day, cited by Blair, was the clearest and, at the 
time of the debates, the most recent pronouncement of a 
doctrine of coordinate sovereignty tha.t, as Blair stated, placed 
limits on even the enumerated po,Yers of the N a.tional Govern-
ment in favor of protecting State prerogatives. There, the 
Court held that the Uuited States could not tax the income of 
Day, a Massachusetts state judge, because the independence 
of the States within their legitimate spheres would be imperiled 
if the instrumentalities through \vhich States executed their 
powers were "subject to the control of another and distinct 
government." 11 Wall .. at 127. Although the Court in Day 
apparently rested this holding in part on the proposition that 
the taxing "power acknowledges no limits but the will of 
the legislative body imposing the tax," id., at 125-126; cf. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 \Vheat. 316 (1819) , the Court had 
in other cases limited other national powers in order to avoid 
interference with the States.3 ~ 
31 See n. 30, supra. 
32 In addition to the <'ilses di~russcd in text , see Lane County v. Oregon, 
7 Wall. 71, 77, 81 (1869), in which the Court held that the federal legal 
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In Prigg v. Pennsylva.nia, supra, for example, Mr. Justice 
Story, in addition to confirming a broad national power to 
legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause, seep. 12, supra, held 
that Congress could not "insist that states ... provide means 
to carry into efTect the duties of the national government." 
16 Pet .. at 615-616.33 And Mr. Justice McLean agreed that, 
"[a]s a general principle," it was true "tha.t Congress had no 
power to impose duties on state officers. as provided in the 
[Act of 1793, supra]." Konetheless he wondered whether 
Congress might not impose "positive" duties on sta.te officers 
where a clause of the Constitution, like the Fugitive Slave 
Clause, seemed to require affirmative government assistance, 
rather than restraint of government, to secure federal rights. 
See id., at 664-665. 
Had Justice McLean been correct in his suggestion that, 
where the Constitution envisioned affirmative government 
assistance, the States or their officers or instrumentalities could 
be required to provide it. there would have been little doubt 
that Congress could have insisted that municipalities afford 
by "positive" action the protection 31 owed individuals under 
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, any such argu-
ment, largely foreclosed by Prigg, was made impossible by the 
Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861). 
There, the Court was asked to require Dennison, the Governor 
of Ohio, to hand over Lago, a fugitive from justice wanted in 
tender acts should not be construed to require the States to accept taxes 
tendered In United States notes since this might interfere with a legitimate 
State activity. 
3s Chief Judge Taney agreed: 
"The state officers mentioned in the l:lw [of 1793] are not bound to 
execute the duties imposE'd upon them by Congress , unless they choose to 
do so, or are required to do so by a law of the state; and the state 
legislature has the power, if it thinks proper, to prohibit thE'm. The act 
of 1793, therefore, must depend altogether for its execution upon the offi- ( 
cers of the United States named in it." 16 Pet., at 630 (Taney, C. J.). 
34 See pp. 10-11, and n. 21, supra. 
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Kentucky, as required by§ 1 of the Act of 1793.~" supra, which 
implemented Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. of the Constitution. Chief 
Justice Taney, writing for a unanimous Court, refused to 
enforce that section of the Act: 
lt[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under 
tl:.e Constitution, has no power to impose on a State offi-
cer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload 
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and 
disable him from performing his obligations to the State, 
and might impose on him duties of a character incompati-
ble with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by 
the State." 24 How., at 107-108. 
The rationale of Dennison-that the Nation could not 
impose duties on state officers since that might impede States 
in their legitimate activities-is obviously identical to that 
which animated the decision in Collector v. Day. Sec p. lG, 
supra. And, as Blair indicated. municipalities as instrumen-
talities through which States· executed their policies could be 
equally disabled from carrying out State policies if they were 
also obligated to carry out federally imposed duties. Although 
no one cited Dennison by name. the principle for which it 
stands was well known to Members of Congress,30 many of 
35 "Be it enacted ... That whenever the executive authority of any state 
in the Union ... shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice ... 
and shall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found ... charging 
the person so demanded, with ha,ving committed treason, felony or other 
crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the 
state ... from whence the person so charged fled, it sha,l! be the duty of 
the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall 
have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured ... and to 
cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the demanding state] 
when he shn 1! appear .... " 1 Stat. 302. 
36 "The Supremr Court of the United States has decided repeatedly that 
Congress can impose no duty on a State officer." Globe, at 799 (Rep. 
Farnsworth). Sec also id ., at 788-789 (Rep. Kerr). 
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whom discussed Day 37 as well as a series of state supreme 
court cases "8 in the mid-18GO's which had invalidated a fecleml 
tax on the process of state courts on the ground that th e tax 
threatened the independence of a vital state function. :w Thus, 
there was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman 
amendment, by putting mtmicipalitirs to the Hobson 's choice 
of keepmg the peace or paylllg c1vd damages, attempted to 
impose obhgah ons on munJcJpa hbes b mchrectwn that could 
not e Impose irectly. thereby threatening to "destroy the 
government of the States." Globe, at 795. 
If municipal liability under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
created a similar Hobson's choice. we might conclude, as 
Monroe did, that Congress could not have intended munici-
palities to be among the "persons" to which that section 
applied. But this is not the case. 
The limits on federal power mandated by the doctrine of 
coordinate sovereignty are some\vhat difficult to discern as a 
matter of logic, but quite apparent as a matter of history. It 
must be remembered that the same Court · · ndered Day 
also vigorously enforced the Contracts ause aga nst munici-
palities.40 Under the theory of dual olvereignt set out in 
Prigg, this is quite understandable. S.~:w.~llill:~~.w.ti~~~ 
were vindicating the Federal Constitution, they were providing 
the " ositive" government action required to protect federal 
constitutional rig ts an no questron ·was raise o en IS mg e 
States in "positive' ' action. Moreover, federal judicial enforce-
87 See, e. g., Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis): ibid. (Sen . Casserly); id ., 772 
(Sen. Thurman) (rec iting logic of Day) ; id., at 777 (Sen. Frelinghuyscn); 
id., at 788- 789 (Rep. K err) (reciting logic of Day) ; id ., at 793 (Rep. 
Poland); id., at 799 (Rcp. Fam sworth) (also re<'iting logic of Day). 
88 Warren v. Paul , 22 Ind . 2il3 (1 ~6-0 ; Jo nes v. Estate of Keep. 19 
Wis. 369 (1865); Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich . 505 (1867); Union Bank v. 
Hill, 3 Cold. (43 Tenn.) 325 (1866); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1867) . 
3 9 See Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis ); ibid . (Sen . Casserlcy). See abo T. 
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *483-*484 (1871 ed.). 
40 See n. 28, supra. 
, 
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ment of the Constitution's express limits on state po,ver, since 
it was done so frequently, must notwithstanding anything said 
in Dennison or Day have been permissible, at least so long as 
the interpretation of the Constitution was left in the hands of 
the judiciary. Si nee § 1 of the Civil Rights Act simply 
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce § 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation precisely analogous 
to the grant of diversity j uriscliction under which the Con tract 
Clause was enforced against municipalities-there is no reason 
to suppose that opponents of the Sherman amendment \vould 
have found any constitutional barrier to § 1 suits against 
municipalities. 
Indeed, opponents expressly distinguished between imposing 
an obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil 
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by 
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for 
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated 
that Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction on the 
federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold municipalities 
liable for using their authorized powers in violation of the 
.Constitution-v•hich is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
.went: 
"I presume ... that where a Sta.te had imposed a duty 
[to keep the :peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action 
would be all~wed to be maintained against them in the 
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions 
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by 
their own contract, or by a State law, in the courts, is a 
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or 
liability upon them by the national Government, which 
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no 
power or control over them whatever." Globe, at 794. 
Representative Burchard agreed: IJt f" flit '1 
"[T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the v&<J, i1' 1.S 
United States, or usually by Sta.te laws, upon a county to \ .s .,..._..c.. 




o.pr"~ ... } 
o'f ~c. 
s&..u.--.•" . ~ 
AIMuJ. ........ 
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protect the people of that coun tv against the commission 
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of 
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to 
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as 
corporations; they are conferred upon cities that ha.ve 
'qualified legislative power. And so fa;,· as cities are con-
.cerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded 
by a State is imposed upon a city by State ln,ws, perhaps 
the United States courts could enforce its perform-
ance. But COU!;l~ies . . : . do not have any control of the 
police .... " I d., at 795 . 
.... " ·. 
That those who voted for § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, but 
against the Sherman 'amendment, '~·ould no't have thought § 1 
unconstitutional if it applied to municipalities is also confirmed 
. by considering what exactly those voting for § 1 had approved. 
Section 1 without question could be used to obtain a damage 
judgment against state or municipal officials who violated 
.federal constitutional rights while acf o m er color of law.4 1 
However, for Prigg-Dennison-Da.y purpors , as Blair and 
others recognized,42 there was no di incti of constitutional 
. magnitude between officers and agents- including corporate 
. agents-of the State : both were state instrumentalities and 
the State could be impeded no matter over which sort of 
instrumentality the Federal Government sought to assert its 
,power. Dennison and Day, after all , were not suits against 
_'municiRalities but against officers and Blair was quite conscious 
that he was extending Prigg by applying it to municipal 
41 See, e. g., Globe, at 334 (Rep. Hoar) ; id., at. 365 (Rep. Arthur); id ., 
at 367-368 (Rep. Sheldon) ; id., at 385 (Rep. Lewis) ; Globe App., at 217 
~(Sen. Thurman). In addition, officers were included among those who 
could be sued under the srcond conference substitute for the Sherman 
Amendment. See Globe, at 805 ( cxch~.ngr between Rep. Willard and Rep. 
Shellabarger). There were no constitutional objections to the second 
report. 
42 See Globe, at 795 (Rep. Blair); id ., at 788 (Rep. Kerr); id., at 795 
~Rep. Burchard) ; id., at 799 (Rep. Farnsworth). 
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corporations.~~ Nonetheless, Senator Thurman, who gave the 
most exhaustive critique of § l-inter alia. complaining that it 
would be applied to state officers. see Globe, at 217-and v;ho 
opposed both § 1 and the Sherman amendment, the latter on 
Prigg grounds, agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitu-
tional.44 Those who voted for § 1 must similarly have believed 
5n its constitutionality despite Prigg, Dennison, :md Da.y. 
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill 
~ 01-.{ is.~1'lh'\ ~ 
U:r6 k•S -
From the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that J.top,d .....,.£+ 
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would 
have prevented holding a municipality liable under§ 1 of the ~ """ P1· 
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the FourtBenth ']..k }...1.. of t 
Amendment. The question remains, however, whether the +I.e. t~ ... br•f.: 
general language describing those to be liable under§ 1-"any -t&..£+ +f"o'-'blc.l 
person"-covers more than natural persons. An examination .AS ~ 
of the debate on § 1 and a.pplication of appropriate rules of • /____.--
construction shows unequivocally that § 1 was intended to 
cover legal as well as natural persons. 
Representative Shellabarger was the first to explain the 
function of § 1 : 
"[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons 
whose former condition may have been that of slaves, 
but also to ail people where, under color of State law, 
they or any of tJiej';l"'" may be deprived of rights to which 
they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and 
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68. 
43 "[W]e cannot command a State officer to do any duty whatever, as 
Sllch; and I ask ... the difference between that and commanding :1 munic-
ipality .... " Globe, at 795. 
44 See Globe App., at 216- 217, quoted, infra, at n. 45. In 1879, more- ~DI'Ifl 
over, when the question of the limits of the Priag principle was squarely r--, 
presented in Ex parte Fir inia. 100 U.S. 339 (1880), this Court hrld that 
Dennison an ay and the principle of federalism for which they stand 
did not prohibit federal enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
through suits directed to state officers. See 100 U. S., at 345-348. 
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By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1 
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sections 
of the 1871 Act were addressed. Representative Shellabaq~er 
also stated without reservation that the constiTutionality of 
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitu-
tionality of § 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been 
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of 
this Union" and by 1\fr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit, who 
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of 
every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to 
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1: 
w '"!'his act1rr-;;;1eaial, and in aid of the prcse;-ation of 
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and con-
stitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are lib-
erally and beneficently construed. It ·would be most 
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the 
rule of interpretation. As has been again and again de-
cided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, 
and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpre-
tation, the largest latitude consistent with the words 
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes 
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and 
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the 
people. . . . Chief Justice Jay and also Story say: 
"'Where a power is remedial in its nature there is 
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed 
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation 
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 429." Globe App., 
at 68. 
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's 
opening speech were echoed by Senator Edmunds, the man-
ager of H. R. 320 in the Scnt>.te: 
"The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, 
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the 
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United States when they are assailed by any State law or 
under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying 
out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866], which 
have since become a part of the Constitution." Globe, at 
568. 
"{Section 1 is] so very simple and re.:t.Uy reenacting the 
Constitution." I d., at 569. 
And he agreed that the bill "sccure[ed] the rights of white 
men as much as of colored men." I d., at 696. 
L In both Houses, statements of the supporters of § 1 corrob-
~ Q\A tN' ~ ,...,.. i orated that Congress, in enacting § 1, intended to give a 
-, W'j 1S co1nplete remed;; for violations of federally protected c1v1 
A'l( \A~C. 
1 
rights.1 5 Moreover, since municipalities through their official 
-to .. ,,..$\"" 





H Representative Bingham, the author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, for example, declared the bill's purpose to be "the enforcement . . . 
of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic .. . 
to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe 
.App., at 81. He continued: 
"The States never had the right , though they had the power, to inflict 
wrongs upon free citizens by a denial of the full protection of the laws ... . 
[And] the States did deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws, they 
.did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the 
extent of the express limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the 
citizen had no remedy. . . . They took property without cornpen&'ltion, 
and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press, and he 
had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no 
remedy. They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no rem-
edy. . . . Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended, 
that the nation cannot by la.w pro,·ide aga inst all such abuses and denials 
of right as these in the States and by States, or combinations of persons?" 
il.d., at 85. 
Representative Perry, commenting on Congress' action in passing the civil 
·rights bill also stated: 
"Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can 
:-assert the mischief intended to be remedied. \Ve have asserted as clearly 
as we can assert our belief that it is the duty of Congress to redress that 
tJj~ 
"•> 
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acts, could equally with natural persons create the harms I 
intended to be remedied by ~ 1, and, further, since Congress 
intended § 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to 
suppose that municipal corporations would have been excluded 
from the sweep of § 1. Cf., e. g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 
339, 31.6-347 (1880); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 
mischief. We have also a~i"erted as fully as we can assert the constitutional 
right of Congress to legislnte." Globe, at 800. 
See also id., at 376 (Rep. Lowe); id., at 428-429 (Rep. Beatty); id., 
at 448 (Rep. Butler) ; id., at 475-477 (Rep. Dawes); id ., at 578-579 (Sen. 
Trumbull); id., at 609 (Sen. Pool); Globe App., at 182 (Rep. l\1ercur). 
Other supporters were quite clear that § 1 of the act. extended a remedy 
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also 
where officers of the State were deliberately indifferent to the rights of 
black citizens: 
"But the chief complaint is [that] by a systematic maladministration of 
[state law], or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of 
the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state 
of facts is clearly made out, I believe [§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those 
persons who are thus denied equal protection." Globe App., at 153 (Mr. 
Garfield). Sec also Monroe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 171-187. 
Importantly for our inquiry, even the opponents of § 1 agreed that it. was 
con<>titutional and, further. that it repre~ented an attempt broadly to 
exercise the ower conferred by§ 5 of the Fourteent mencmen . 
Senator 1Urm:m, w o gave 1e most exhaustive critique of § 1, said: 
"This section relates wholly to civil suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give 
to the F·ederal Judiciary that which now doC';; not belong to it-a jurisdic-
tion that -may be constitutionally conferred upon it, I grant, but that has 
never yet been conferred upon it. It authorizes any person who is deprived 
of any right, privilege, or immunit~· tiCcured to him by the Constitution of 
the United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal 
courts, and that without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in 
controversy .... 
"[T]here is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed 
[in the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be used." Globe App., 
at 216-217 (emphasis added). 
7 7 
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227 U.S. 278, 286-287,204-206 (1013). One nerd not rely on 
this inference alone, however, for the debates show that Mem-
bers of Congress understood "persons" to include municipal 
corporations. 
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of 
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltim Pet. 243 
(1834), especially in mind. "In [that] case t e city hal taken 
·private property for )Ublic use, w1t 1ou co ens n ... , 
an t 1ere was no re ress for t e wrong .... " Globe App., 
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly 
indicate his view that such takings as had occurred in Barron 
would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See id., a.t 85. 
More generally, and as Bingham's remarks confirm, § 1 of the 
bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress provided 
redress · · that section provided the only civil 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
46 See Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
'§ 1956 (Cooley ed. 1873). 
41 Indeed the federal courfs found no obstacle to awnrds of dama:;es 
~gainst municipalities for common-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadel-
phia, 23 F. Cas. 392 (CCED Pa. 1873) (No. 13,611) (awa.rding damages 
of $2,273.36 and costs of $346.35 against the city of Philadelphia). 
I" ..,.., 
.! u . .J, ..,,.,. 
u 11. 'tt/Cr"f . "",. ......... .... 
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1789. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 
86 (1809).48 By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was 
unhesitatingly abandoned: 
"[A] corporation created by and doing business in a par-
ticular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes 
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of 
being treated as a citizen of that s1ate, as much as a 
natural person." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 
558 (184.4) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 752. 
And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights 
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 ·wall. 118, 121 (1869), the 
Letson principle was automatically and without discussion 
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doctrine, 
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal 
courts 49 and this fact was well known to Members of 
Congress. 50 
That the "usual" meaning of the word person would extend 
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of 
Congress which had been passed only months before the Civil 
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided tha.t 
"in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word 'person' may 
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corpo-
rate ... unless the context shows that such words were 
intended to be used in a more limited sense [] ." Act of 
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. 
Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the 
48 Nonetheless, suits could be brought in federal court if the natural 
persons who were members of the corporation were of diverse citizenship 
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Crunch, at 91. 
-t9 See n. 28, supra. 
50 See, e. g., Globe, at 777 (Sen. Sherman); id., at 752 (Rep. Shella-
barger) ("counties, cities, and corporations of all sorts, after yea.rs of 
judicial conflict, have become thoroughly established to be n.n inJi,·idual or 
person or entity of the personal existence, of which, as a. citizen, individ-
ual, or inhabitant., the United States Constitution docs take note n.nd endow 
with faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States."). 
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phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the 
"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were 
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be 
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed , a Circuit 
Judge, ·writing in 1.873 in what is apparently the first reported 
case ur.der § 1, read the Dictionary Act in precisely this way 
in a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal 
defendant."2 See N ortl11cestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336).63 
61 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co . v. Hyde Park, 18 F . Cas . 393 , 394 
(CCND Ill . 1873) (No. 10,336) ; 2 Kent's Commentaries '-·278-~:·279 (12th 
0 . \V. Holmrs ed. 1873). SeE' abo United States v. Mawice, 2 Brock. 96', 
1'09 (CC Va. 1823) (1\fnr;;hall , C. J.) ("The Unitffi St:~t e::; is a government, 
and, con ·equently , a body politic and corporate" ) ; Brief for Petitioner in 
llfonroe v. Pape, 0 . T. 1960, No. 39, App's. D and E (collect ing state 
statutes which, in 1871, defined municipal corporat ions as bodies politic 
~nd corporate) . 
·. 62 The court also noted that there was no discernible reason why persons 
injured by municipal corporations should not be able to recover. See 18 
F. Cas., at 394. 
53 In considE'ring the effrct of the Ad of Feb . 25, 1871 in Monroe, how-
ever, Justice Douglas, apparently focusing on the word "may," stat ed : " this 
'definition [of person] is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." 36.5 
·U. S., at 191. A review of the legisla tive history of the Dictionary Act 
sbows this conclusion to be incorrect. 
There is no express referrnce in the legislative history to the definition of 
1person, but Senator Tmmbull , the Act 's spon.sor, di ·cu&;ed the phrase 
1'\vords importing the masculine gender may be applird to females ," 
(emphasis added), which immediately precedes the definition of person, and 
,stated: 
~'The only object. [of the Act] is to get rid of a great deal of verbosity 
·'in our statutes by providing that when the words 'he' is used it shall 
· include females as well as malrs[]." Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 3d 
. Sess., 775 (Jan. 27, 1871) (rmphasis added). 
Thus, in Trumbull's view t.he word "may" meant "shall." Such a manda-
tory u~e of the rxtendcd mc-.:wings of the words dd incd by the .\ct 
is also required for it to pC' rform its intended function-to be a guide 
to "rules of construction" of Act · of Cong,re~s . Sec id., at 775 (Remarks 
of Sen. Trumbull). Were the defined words "allowable, [but] not ma.nda-
75-1914-0PINION 
MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 29 
II 
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend 
municipalities and other local government units to be included 
among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. 51 Local govern-
ing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or mJunctive relief where, as here, the 
action that is alleged to be unconstitutioiialimplcmentsor 
executes a pollcy statemei~t,orclinail(;, regulation , or decisloi1 
officially adopted and promu1gated by '"t!1atbody's oHicffs. 
lV!Orcover, alt't'i'Ol7gh the touchstone of the § 1983 action against 
a government body is an allegation that o c1al polic is 
responsible for a deprivation of rights protec e y t 1e Con-
stitution, local governments, like every other § 1983 "person," 
tory" constructions, as ~Monroe suggests, there would be no "rules" at all. 
Instead, Congress must. ha \'e intended the definitions of the Act to apply 
across-the-board except where the Act by its terms called for a deviation 
from this practicc-"[where] the context shows that [defined] words 
were to be used in a more limited sense." Certainly this is how the 
Northwestern Fertilizing court Yiewed the matter. Since there is nothing 
in the "context" of § 1 of the Ci\·il Rights Act calling for a restricted 
interpretation of the word "person," the language of that section should 
prima facie be construed to include "bodies politic" among the entities that 
could be sued. 
M There is certainly no constitutional impediment 1o munici])a] liability.j 
"The Tenth Amrndmcnt's reserYation of nondelegatcd power::: to the States 
is not implicated by a fedrral-court, judgment enforcing the expre~s prohibi-
tions of unlawful state conduct {'nartcd by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977); see Ex parte Virginia. 100 
U. S. 339, 347-348 ( 1 80). For this reason, National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), is irrcle\·ant to our con~ideration of this case. 
Nor is there any basis for conrluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a 
bar to municipn.l liability. See. e. g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U . S. 445, I 
456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529,530 (1890). Our 
holrling todny is, of conr~e, limited 1o local government units which nre not 
considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Where 
this is not the ca::;e, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 {1974), and Milliken 
v. Bradley, supra, govern the framework for analysis. 
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by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitu-
tional deprivations visited pursuant to governmenta.l "cus-
tom" even though such a custom has not received formal 
approv,gltErotighthe bO<i'Ys Ofi'i'C'ia1 decisionmaking chann~ls. 
As Mr. Justice Harlan recognized: "Congress included custom -and usage [in § 1083] because of persistent :end widespread 
discriminatory practices of State officials. . . . Although not 
authorized by written la\Y, such practices of state officials could 
~ well be ~o _p~m_an(ill.t aJ1<L \Vell setJ;kd as to _constit~ a 
'custom oru ag7' with tie fOrce of law." Acli'Ck.es v. S. H. 
Kress · o. , 398 . S. 144, 16 - 1 8 ( t0). 55 
On the other hand, the language of § 1983, read against 
the background of the same legislative history, compels the 
~-4----conclusion that Congress did not inte1 icipalit' e 
held liable unless official municipa action f some nature 
caused a constitutional tort. In par · -. we conclude tha 
a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs 
a tortfeasor-or. in other words, a municipality cannot be hel 
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat supe1·ior theory. 
We begin with the language of § 1983 as passed: 
"[A]ny person who, under color of any law, 
~~~See also Justice Frankfurt e r'~ $lntemrnt in Nashville, C. & St. L. R. 
/]o. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 363, 369 (1940): 
"It would be a narrow concept ion of juri~prudence to confine the notion of 
'Jaws' to what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the 
gloss which life has writ ten upon it. Settled :;tatr practice ... can 
establish what is state lnw. The Equal Prot rction Clnu~e did not write an 
,empty formali sm into tho Coni'titution. Deeply embecldccl tmditional ways 
.of carrying out stnte policy, such as tho~e of which petitioner compla ins, 
are often tougher and truer law thnn tho dr:1d words of the writt en text." 
Moreover, m.Het iY ~cucrol crrote n , ·joht.i(lU...of the C.ons.t.itut.icm"ns we · 
affinned two Terms ngo, where thr Con.-<t itution impo,:e::; :t dut~· on s tate 
officials to act, and they are delibcrntrly indifferent to th:1t duty-n form 
of inaction which by its nature \\'Ill sclcTOm be olhcwlly adopted or written 
local policy-§ 1983 provides an a \'Cnue of rcdr~d . Sec Estelle Y. Gamble, 
429 U. S. 97, 104--105 (Hli6) . 
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall 
subject, or c~ tQ be subje~ted, any person ... to the 
deprivation of any rights, priVileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, a.ny such 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation , custom, or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwith standing, be liable to the 
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... " Globe App., at 335 
(emphasis added). 
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a govern-
ment that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an 
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the 
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose 
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of 
the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a 
tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically 
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B "caused" A to 
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend 
§ 1983 liability to attach "·here such causation '"as absent."a { 
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370-371 (1976). 
56 Support for such a conclusion can b<' found in th <' lcgi;:Jatiw hi~ tory . 
As we have indica ted , there is virtually no di::;cussion of § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act. Again, however, Congress' treatment of the Sherman am<'nd-
ment gives a clue to whether it would have desired to impose respondeat 
superior liability. 
The primary consti tutional justification for the Sherman amendment was · 
that it was a nece>'sa ry and proper rr medy for the failure of localitie:; to 
protect citizens a ~ the PriYilege,: or Immunities Clau~e of the Fomtecnth 
Amendment required . SeC' pp. 10-13, supra . And according to Sherman, 
Shellabarger, and Edmund:;, the amendmC'nt camr into play only when a 
locality was a t fault or h:1d neglreted it ~ dut~· to proYide protec tion . See 
Globe, at 761 (Sen. Sherman): id .. at 75G (Sen. Edmunds) ; id., at 751-752 
(Rep. Shellabarger). But other propon ent.~ of the amendment apparently 
viewed it as a form of Yi ra ri ou~ liability for th<' unlawful nets of the 
citizens of the locality. See id ., at 792 (Rep. Butler). And whether 
intended or not, tho amendment as drafted did impose a species of 
vicarious liability on municipalities since it could be construed to impose 
'\...o'V 
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat 
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation 
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the 
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not 
to impose because it thought imposition of such an obligation 
unconstitutional. To this clay, there is disagreement about 
the basis for imposing vicarious liability on an employer for 
the torts of an employre when the employer itself is not at 
fault. 57 See W. ProEscr, Law of Torts, § 69, at 5G9 (4th ed. 
1971). Nonethclca:l,. two justifications tend to stand out. 
First in the commonsense notion that no matter how blame-
liability even if a municipnlity did not know of an impending or ensuing 
riot or did not have the whc!·ewithall to do anything about it. Indeed, the 
statute held. a municipality linblc even if it had done everything in its 
power to curb the riot. Sec p . 8. supra; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Stevens); id., 
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id .. at 7 8 (Rep. Kerr); id., at 791 (Rep. Willard). 
While the first conferenre substitute was rejected principally on constitu-
tional grounds, see id., at 804 (Rep. Poland), it is plain from the text of 
the second conference substitute-which limited liability to those who, 
having the power to inteJTcne ngainst Ku Klux violence, "neglect[ed] or 
refuse[d] so to do," see Appendix, infra, at. 41, and which was enacted as 
§ 6 of the 1871 Act and is now codified as 42 U.S. C. § 1986-that Congress 
also rejected those elements of vicarious liability contained in the first 
conference substitute even while nccepting the basir principle that the 
inhabitants of a communit~· were bound to provide protection against the 
Ku Klux Klan. Strictly speaking, of course, the fact thnt Congress refused· 
to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens does 
not conclusively establish that it would similarly have refused to impose 
vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees. Nonethe-
less, when Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious liability 
presented to it is combined with the absence of any langunge in § 1983 
which can easily be construed· to create respondeat superior lin.bility, the 
inference that. Congress did not intend to impose such liability is quite 
st.rong. 
57 We note, however, thnt where there is fault in hiring, training, or 
direction, thnt fnult is the bnsis for li:1bi!ity under the common law, sec 2 
F. Harper & F. James, The Law of TorL, § 26.1, at 1362-1363 (1956), not 
the fault of the employcc-tortfeasor vicariously applied to the employer. 
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less an employer appears to be in an individual case, accidents 
might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the cost 
of accidents. Sec, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & James, The Law 
of Torts, § 26.3, at 1368-1369 ( 1956). Second is the argument 
that the cost of accidents should be spread to the community 
as a whole on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id., § 26.5; 
v.,r. Prosser, supra, at 459.58 
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for 
the Sherman amendment: "The obligation to make compensa-
tion for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitrary enactment of 
statutes, affirmatory law, and the reason of passing the statute 
is to secure a more perfect police regulation." Globe, at 777 
(Sen. Frelinghuysen). This ·usti cation was obviously insuf-
ficient to sustain the amendment against percCJvc constitu-
ti~na1 difficulties and there is no reason to suppose that a more 
general liability imposed for a similar reason would have been 
thought less constitutionally objectionable. The second jus-
tification was similarly put forward as a justification for the 
Sherman amendment: "we do not look upon [the Sherman 
amendment] as a punishment.... It is a mutual insurance." 
/d., a.t 792 (Rep. Butler). Again, this justification was insuf-
ficient to sustain the amendment. 
fusum, a local government may be sued for monetary, 
declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983 when it is at 
fault, but not for the fault purely of its employees or agents.59 
58 A third justification, often cited but which on examination is appar-
ently insufficient to justify the doctrine of respondeat superior, see, e. (1., 
2 F. Harper & F . James, supra, n. 61, § 26.3, is that. liability follows the 
right to control the actions of a tortfeasor. By our decision in Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we \Yould appear to have decided that the 
mere right to control without. any control or direction having been cxcrci~ed 
and without any failure to ~upcrvbe is not. enough to support § 1983 
liability. Sec id., at. 370-371. 
59 Given the Yariety of wa~·s that official polirv ma~· be> demon,.trate>d. we 
do not today attempt to e>stabli5h any firm guidelines for determining when 
individual action executes or implements official policy. However, given 
7.'>-1914-0PINION 
34 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
It is only when the government's policy, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 
to represent official po~cy. ~elf inflicts the injury or itself 
authorizes orc'i'irCcts the speciflCUct charged against its officer r.o 
that the government is responsible under ~ 1983. In all other 
cases, a § 1983 action must be brought against the individual 
officer;.: whose acts form the basis of the § 1983 complaint. 
III 
Although we have stated that stare decisis has more force in 
statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, 
in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistakes 
our conclusion that Congress did not intend to enact a. regime of vicarious 
liability, whateYer offirial action is involvrd must be su ffi cient to support a 
conclusion that a local gov<'rnmrnt itself is to blame or is at fault. 
For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we recognized 
that fault is a crucial factor in determining whether relief may run against 
a party for its alleged participation in a constitutional tort. Distinguishing 
the relief approved by the lower courts in Rizzo from that sanctioned 
by this Court in school desegregation cases, the Court explained: 
"Respondents ... ignore a critical factual distinction between their case 
'and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In the latter, segrega-
tion imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for varying 
'periods of time, whereas in the instant case the District Court found that 
'the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any 
members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional rights. Those 
against whom injunctive relief was directed in cases such as Swann [v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971),] and 
Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) ,] were not adminis-
trators and school board members who had in their employ a small number 
•of individuals, which latter on their own deprived black students of their 
constitutional rights to a unitary school system. They were administrators 
and school board members who were found by their own conduct in the VV:f B 
administration of the school system to have denied those rights. Here, the 1.. ~ 
District Court found that none of the petitioners had deprived the V\ A~ _ II 
respondent classes of any ri~hts secured under the Constitution. 423 U. S., d (0 ,. p t:(l( 
at 377 (emphasis in original). 1\ f'k 1 AJ+ 
Go See, however, n. 55, supra. (.. f (' 
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through legislation , see, c. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
671, and n. 14 (1974), "·;c have never applied stare dccis·is 
mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions deter-
mining the meaning of statutes. See, e. g. , Conti11ental T. V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1977); Burnet 
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U. S. 393, 406 n. 1 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., disf'\rnting) (collecting cases) . . Nor is this a case 
where we should "place on the shoulders of Congress the 
burden of the Court's 0\\'11 error." Girouard v. United States, 
328 u.s. 61,70 (1946). 
First, Monroe v. ?ape, supra, insofar as it completely 
immunizes municipalities from suit under§ 1983, was a depar-
ture from prior practice. See, e. g., Northwestern Fertilizing 
Co. v. Hyde Park, supra; City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 
F. 2d 661 (CAl 1941); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F. 2d 
87 (CAl 1941); Douglas v. City of Jeann ette, 319 U. S. 157 
(1943); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 3t50 U. S. 879 (1955), in 
each of which municipalities were defendants in § 1983 suits.a1 
Moreover, the constitutional defect that led to the rejection 
of the Sherman amendment would not have distinguished 
between municipalities and school boards, each of which is an 
instrumentality of state adminif'\trntion. See pp. 14-22. supra. 
For this reason, our cases-decided both before and after 
Monroe, sec n. 5, supra-holding school boards liable in § 1983 
actions are inconsistent with Monroe, especially as }vfonroe's 
immunizing principle was extended to suits for injunctive relief 
in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973).G2 And 
61 Each case cited by 1\:[ onroe, see 365 U. S., at 191 n. 50, as consistent 
with the position that local governments were not § 1983 "persons" 
reached its conclusion by ns~uming that state-hw immunities overrode the 
§ 1983 cause of action. This hns never bren the lmv and, as we set. out in 
Part IV, injm. muni rip:1litirs rnjo~' no ::tb~olute immunity. 
62 Although mnny suit s ngainst !'>Chool bonrds also include privnte indi-
viduals ns partie , the "princlp:1l drfcncbnt is usually the locnl board of 
1 education or school. bon rd." Milliken v . Bradley, supra, n. 4, a.t -
V (PowELL, J., concurrmg). 
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although in many of these cases jurisdiction ..,vas not ques-
tioned, we ought not "disregard the implications of an exercise 
of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [100] years." 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962); 
see Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, supra, at 88 
,(Marshall, C. J.) ("Those decisions are not cited as author-
-ity ... but they have much weight, as tr·2Y show that this 
point neither occurred to the bar or th e bench" ). Thus, while 
. we have reaffirmed JJ1 omoe without further examination on 
. three occasions /;3 it can scarcely be said that JJ1 onroe is so 
consistent with the warp and woof of civil rights law as to be 
·beyond question. 
Second, the principle of blanket immunity established in 
-Monroe cannot be cabined short of school boards. Yet such 
an extension would itself be inconsistent with recent expres-
sions of cong,Tessional intent. In the wake of our decisions, 
·Congress not only has shown no hostility to federal court 
decisions against school boards, but it has indeed rejected 
efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over school 
boards.64 Moreover, recognizing that school boards are often 
63 Moor v. County of Alamerla, 411 U. S. G93 (1973) ; City of Kenosha v. 
Bruno, 412 U. S. 5.07 .(1973) ; Aldinger v . IIoword, 427 U.S. 1 (197G) . 
64 During the heyday of . the furor 0\-er -busing, both the House and the 
Senate refused to adopt bills that would haYe removed from the federal 
courts jurisdiction 
"to make any decision,. enter any jud!!:ment, or issue any order requiring 
any school board to make any change in the racial composition of the 
student body at any public cchool or in any class at any public school to 
which students are assiO'ned in conformity with a. freedom of choice system, 
or requiring any school board to tru.nsport any students from public school 
to another public school or from one place to another place or from one 
school di trict to another school district or denying to any student the 
. right or privilege of attending any public school or class a.t any public 
school chosen by the parent of such ~ tucl ent in conformity with a freedom 
of choice system, or requiring any school board to clo~e any school and 
transfer t.he students from the closed school to any other school for the 
· · purpose of altering the racial composition of the stmlent body at any 
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defendants in school desegregation suits, which have almost 
without exception been ~ 1983 suits, Congress has twice 
passed legislation authorizing grants to school boards to assist 
them in complying with federal court decrees.0 " Finally, in 
public school, or precluding any school board from carrying into dfect any 
provision of any contract bct\Yeen it and any mrmher of the fa.cult y of any 
public school it operates sper if) · in~ the publi r school whrrc the member of 
the faculty is to perform hi ~ or her dutic~ under the contract." S. 179, 
93d Cong., 1st Se:::s ., § 1207 (1971) (emphasis added) . 
Other bills designed either completely to remove the federal courts from 
the school desegregation controversy, S. 287, 93d Cong., 1:::.t Srss. (1973), or 
to limit the ability of federal courts to subj ect school bon rds to rcmrdial 
orders in desegregation ca~rs, S. 619, 93d Cong., 1st Srss . ( 1973) ; S. 179, 
93d Cong., 1st Scs8., § 2 (a) (1973) ; H. R 13534, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. , 
§ 2922 (1972) , have similarly failed. 
65 In 1972, spurred by a finding "that the process of eliminating or 
preventing minority group i ~ol a tion nnd impro,·ing the fJualit? of cducntion 
for all children often involn's the expendit ure of additional funds to \Yhi ch 
local educational agencies do not have nccess," 20 U. S. C. § 1601 (a.) 
(Supp . V, 1975), Congress pM~ed the 1972 Emergency School Act. Section 
643 (a.) (1) (A) (i) of that Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1605 (a ) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. V, 
1975), authorizes the Assistant Secretary 
"to make a grnnt to, or a contract. with , a local educational agency [tchich] 
is implementing a plan which has been undertaken 7JUrsuant to a final order 
issued by a court of the United States . . . which requires the dC:"egrega-
tion of minority group segregated children or fa culty in the elementary and 
secondary schools of such agency, or otherwise requires the elimination or 
reduction of minority group isolation in such schools." (Emphasis added.) 
A "local educational agency" is defined by 20 U. S. C. § 1619 (8 ) (Supp. 
V, 1975), as "a public board of education or other public authority lega lly 
·constituted within a State for either administrati\·c control or direction of, 
public elementary or secondary schools in a, city, county, township, school, 
or other political subdivision of a State, or a federally recognized Indian 
reservation, or such combination of school distri cts, or counties as arc 
recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary 
or secondary schools, or a combination of loc::U educational agencies .... " 
Congress thus clearly recognized that school board· wcrP often parties to 
federal school de:;cgregation ;;uit ;; . In § 718 of the Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1617 
(Supp. V, 1975), Congress gave its explicit approval to the inst.it.ution of 
I 
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A t rne s' Fees Award Act of 1976,- Sta.t. 
-, which allows prevailing parties in § 1 83 suits to obtain 
attorneys fees from the losing party, the Senate stated: 
"[D] efendan ts in these cases are often State or local 
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is 
intended that the attorneys' fees , like other items of costs, 
will be collected either directly from the official, in, his 
federal desrgregation suit s :tgainst school boards-presumably under § 1983. 
That section provides: 
~'Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a 
local education agency ... for discrimination on the bas is of race, color, or 
national origin in violation of ... the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution of the Unitrd States ... the court may allow t.he prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs.!' (Emphnsis added.) 
Two years Inter, Congress found that. "the implementation of desegrega-
tion plans that require extcnsin student transportation has, in many cases, 
required local educational agencies to expand [sic ] large amounts of funds, 
thereby depl<:-ting their financial re~ources . . . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a) 
(3). (Emphasis added.) Congress did not. respond by declaring that 
school boards wrre not subject to suit under § 1983 or any other federal 
statute, "but simply [legi ~lated] revised evidentiary standards and remedial 
priorities to be employed by the courts in deciding ~uch cases." Brief for 
National Education ..-\>:sn., at 15-16. Indeed, Congress expressly reiterated 
that a cau e of action, cognizable in the federal courts, exists for discrimina,... 
tion in the public school context. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1703, 1706, 1708, 1710, 
1718. The Act as:::umes that school boards will usually be the ddendants 
in such suits. For example,§ 211 of the Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1710 provides: 
"The Attorney General shall not institute a civil action under section 
1706 of this title [which allows for suit by bot i1 private parties and the 
Attorney General to redress disc rimination in public education] before he-
"(a) gives to the appropriate educational agency notice of the condition 
or conditions which, in his judgment, constitute a violation of part [the 
prohibitions against discrimination in public education]." Section 219 of 
the Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1718, proYidrs for the termination of court ordered 
busing "if the court finds the defrndant educational agency has satisfied the 
requirements of t.he fifth or fourteenth amrndments to the Constitution, 
whichever is U]lplicable, and will continue to be in compliance with the 
requirements thereof." 
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of!icia.l capacity, from funds of his agency or under his 
control, or from the State or local government (whether 
or not the agency or government is named as a party). 
S. Rep. No. 94-1101, at- (emphasis added). 
Far from showing that Congress has relied on Monroe, there-
fore, events since 1961 show that Congress has refused to 
extend the benefits of M on roc to school boards and has 
attempted to limit Monroe to allow a\Yards of attorneys' fees 
against local governments even though Monroe, City of 
Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 
1 (1976), have made the joinder of such governments 
impossible.6 a 
Third, municipalities can assert no reliance claim which can 
support an absolute immunity. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
·said in Monroe, "[t]his is not an area of commercial law in 
~:which, presumably, individuals may have arranged their affairs 
otO I+. in reliance on the expected stability of decision." 365 U. S., 
"{ .at 221-222 (dissent). Indeed. municipalities simply cannot 
~ "arrange their affairs" on an assumption that they can violate 
4 .,constitutional rights indefinitely since injunctive suits against 
local officials under § 1983 \Yould prohibit any such arrange-
ment. And it scarcely need be mentioned that nothing in 
Monroe encourages municipalities to violate constitutional 
.rights or even suggests that such violations are anything other 
than completely wrong. 
Finally, even under the most '5tringent test for the propriety 
of overruling a statutory decision proposed by Mr. Justice 
Harlan in Monroe 67·-"that it must appear beyond doubt from 
66 Whether Congress' attempt is in fact effective is the subject of Hutto 
.v. Finney, 1977 Term, No. 7G-1660, and therefore we express no view on 
it here. 
67 We note, ho\Yever, that l\Ir. Justice Harlan's test hns not been 
expressly adopted by this Court. Moreover, t.!Htt test is based on t.\\-o 
factors: stare decisis and "indications of eongrcs,.;ional a.cceptance of this 
Court's earlier interpretation [of the: statute in question]." 365 U. S., at 
75-1914-0PINION 
.40 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
the legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] mis-
apprehended the meaning of the [section]," Monroe v. ?ape, 
supra, at 192 (concurring opinion) - the overruling of Monroe 
insofar as it holds that local govrrnmcnts arc not "persons" 
who may be defendants in ~ 1083 suits is clearly proper. It 
is simply beyond doubt that, under the 1.871 Congress' view 
of the hw, were § 1083 liability unconstitutional as to local 
governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as 
to state officers. Y ct everyone-proponents and opponents 
alike-knew § 1983 would be applied to state officers and none-
theless stated that ~ 1083 was constitutional. See pp. 21-22, 
supra. And, moreover, there can be no doubt tha.t § 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act was intended to provide a complete remedy, 
to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation 
of federally protected rights. Therefore, absent a clear state-
ment in the legislative history supporting the conclusion that 
§ 1 was not to apply to the official acts of a municipal corpora-
tion-which simply is not present-there is no justification for 
excluding municipalities from the "persons" covered by § 1. 
For the reasons stated above. therefore, we hold that stare 
decisis does not bar our overruling of Monroe insofar as it is 
·inconsistent with Parts I and II of this opinion.6 8 
IV 
Since the question whether local government bodies should 
192. As we have explained, the second consideration is not. present in this 
case. 
68 No useful purpose wmild be served by :m attempt. at thi:< bte date to 
determine whether Monroe was correct. on it s fact s. Similarly, since this 
case clearly mvolves official policy and docs not involve respondeat superior, 
we do not assay a view on how our ra~e~ which haw reliE'd on that as ect 
·of Monroe that is overruled today:-M oor v. ounty o amc a, supra, 
n. 9, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, n . 9, and Aldinger v. Howard, 
supra, n. 63-should haYe bem decided on a. correct view of § 1983. 
Nothing we ';n.y today affects the couC'lu .. •ion reached in llfoor, sec 411 
U. S., at 703-704, that 42 U. 8. C. § 1988 cannot. be used to create a 
federal cause of action where § 1983 docs not otherwise provide one. 
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be afforded some form of official immunity was not presented 
as a question to be decided on this petition and was not 
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we 
express no views on the scope of any municipal immun~ 
beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 can-
not be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that 
such bodies arc subject to suit under § 1983 "be drained of 
meaning," Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U .. S. 232, 248 (1974). Cf. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 
389, 397-398 (1971). 
v 
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tiThat if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, ? ~ -rL 
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demol- WWW 
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in ~ 
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem- 1 • ~ ~ . 
bled together; or if any person shall unla.wfully and with ~ • 1. 
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or _.A ~Jy#' -
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem- ~~ J _.~ .. J 
bled together; and if such offense was committed to (l..-~ . • 
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by 
th~ Constitution and laws of the United States, or to 
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by 
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or 
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be com-
mitted shall be liable to pay full compensation to the 
person or persons damnified by such ofiense if living, or to 
his widow or legal representative if dead; and such com-
pensation may be recovered by such person or his repre-
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. sentative by a suit in any court of the United States of 
·competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense 
· was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, 
r.Or his legal representative, and against said county, city, 
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment 
· rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any prop-
erty, real or personal , of any person in said county, city, 
{)r parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover 
· the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest, 
from any person or persons engaged as principle or 
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663. 
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the 
Sherman amendment is: 
HThat if any house, tenement, cabin, snop, building, 
barn, or granary shall' be unlawfully or feToniously demol-
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed·, who1ly or in 
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unla.wfully and with 
force and violence be whipped, scourge·cl , ><rounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and' tumultuously assem-
'hled together, with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
t.he United States, or to deter him or punish him for 
· e~ercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous conditions of servitude, in every such case the 
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses 
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensa-
tion to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if 
living, or to· his widow or legal representative if dead; and 
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the 
·case by such person or his representative in any court of 
·the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district 
·in which the offense was committed. such action to be in 
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, 
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and against said county, city, or parish; and in which 
action any of the parties committing such acts may be 
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judg-
ment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plain-
tiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual 
defendant therein within two months next after the 
recovery of such judgment upon ext;cution duly issued 
a.gainst such individual defendant in such judgment, and 
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced 
a.gainst such county, city, or parish, by execution, attach-
ment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding 
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of 
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judg-
ment shall be a lien as ''"ell upon all moneys in the 
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other 
property thereof. And the court in any such action may 
on motion cause additional parties to be made therein 
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done. 
And the said county. city, or parish may recover the 
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and 
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal 
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish, 
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's 
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755. 
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the 
Sherman amendment is as follows: 
"[A]ny person or persons, having knowledge that any of 
the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the 
second section of this act are about to be committed, and 
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, 
shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act 
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable 
to the person injured, or his legal representative." Globe, 
at 804 (emphasis added). 
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Mn. JusTICE BnENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioners, n. class of female employees of the Department 
of Socinl Services and the Board of Education of the City of 
New York, commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 
jn July 1071,1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the 
Board and the Department had as a matter of official policy 
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of 
absence before such leaves were required for me<.lical reasons.~ 
1 The compbint wns amendrd on Srptember 14, 1972 to allege a claim 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Right s Act, as amended, 4'2 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e (J970 rd., nnd Supp. V). The District Court held thnt the 1972 
:~mendmPnts to Title VII did not apply retroactively to discriminntion 
suffered prior to those amendments even when an action challenging ~uch 
prior discrimination wn;; pending on t.he dnte of the amendments. :39-1 
Jt'. Supp. 853, 850 (SDNY 1()75) . This holding was affirmed on appenl. 
532 F . 2d 250, 261-262 (CA2 1!)76). Although petitioners sought cer-
tior:tri on the Title VII i~te as well as the § 1983 claim, we rest ricted 
out· grant. of certiorari to the httcr if'sue. 429 U. S. 1071. 
2 The plnintifTs n!lrgrd th:1t New York hnd a citywide policy of forcing 
womE>u to take mate rnit~ · l<'nn> nfter the fifth month of pregnnney unless 
a city phy~ici :m and t hr hrad of an employee',- agency nil owed up to nn 
addit.ional two month~ of work. Amcnd<'d Compbint ~~ ~S, App. 13-14. 
The dc f1't1<bnts did not, drny this, but st:1ted that this policy had been 
chrwgro after suit wn~ ins tituted. Answer ,i 13, App. 32-33. The plain-
tilTs furl her all(•gPti that the Board ~1acl a policy of requiring women to 
take m:t!Prnity h'<I V!' :tft cr the ;:f'vcnth month of pregnancy unless tha.t 
month [(•II in the la:.t month of the school. year, in which cnse the teacher 
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Bducation v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for 
pm·ious of unla·wful forced leave. Named as defendants in the 
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board 
and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor. 
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in 
their official capacities.3 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners' 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief since the city of 
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had 
chauged their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no 
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was 
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F. 
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challe11ges this conclusion. The 
court did conclude, however, that the acts complained of 
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. ~94 F. Supp., 
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay were 
denied berause any such damages would come ultimately from 
the City of Xew· York and. therefore, to hold otherwise would 
be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities 
by },Jom·oe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp., 
at 855. · 
On appeal , petitioners renewed their arguments that the 
Board of Education~ was not a "municipality" within the 
meaning of ~Monroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the 
Di,·trict Court had erred in barring a damage award against 
the individual defemlants. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit rc.i<>cted both contentions. The court first 
rould remain thron~h the end of the srhobl term. Amended Complaint 
'~ 39, -13, -15, App. 18-19, 21. This allegation was denied . Answer· 
,1~ 18, 22, App. 35-37. 
8 Amended Cornpl:llnt 124, App. 11-12 . 
... Pt>tJtioners conredcd that the Dcpartmrnt of Social Services enjoys the 
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under 
§ 1980 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... , 
and, significantly, while it has the right to deteanine how the 
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final 
say in deciding what its appropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d 
259, 263 (1076) (citation omitted). The individual defend-
ants, however, were "persons" under § 1083, even when sued 
solely in their official capacities. /d., at 264. Yet, because a 
damage award would "have to be paid by a. citr that \vas held 
not to br an tenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a 
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities 
could not proceed. !d., at 265. 
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider 
~'Whether local governmental officials and/ or local inde-
pendent school boards are "persons" within the meaning 
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature 
of back pay is sought against them in their official 
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8. 
Although, after plrnnry consideration, we ,have decided the 
merits of over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in 
which the principal defendant was a school board "-and, 
5 Millikeu v. Hradley, 4~3 U. S. 267 (1977) ; Dayton Bom·d of Educa-
tion v. Brinkman. 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorrhheimrr v. Srhool District 
of Plnlodrlphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board\'. 
Marshall, -124 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); 
Bradley v, School Board of the City of Ilil'hrnond. 416 U.S. 606 (19i4); 
Clet•cland Uoartl of Eduration v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (19i4); Keyes v. 
School District No.1, 413 U.S. 180 (1973); San Antonio School District v. 
Rodri!ruez, 411 U. 8. 1 (1973); Swnnn v. Charlotte-Mrcklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U.S. I (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board 
of EdHcotion, 307 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Peliciana Parish 
SchoollJoard, a96 U.S. 226 (1069); Alc:rander v. Holmrs County Board 
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1069); Kramrr \'. Union Pree School District, 
395 U . S. 621 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indewndcnt School Dist1ict, 
393 U. S. 503 (1069); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 
(196S) ; Roney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (196S); Green v. 
Cou11.ty School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (19GS); School 
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indeed, in some of whieh ~ 1983 and its jurisdictional counter-
part, 28 U. 8. C. § 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdic-
tion6-we inuicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274.270 (1977), last Term that the question 
presented here was open and would be decided "another day." 
That otlH•r day has come and we now overrule !11 onroe v. Pape, 
supra, insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly 
immune from suit under§ H)83.7 
I 
In !lfonroe v. Pape, we held that "Congress did not under-
take to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of 
[ § 1983] ." 365 U. S., at 187. The sole basis for this conclu-
sion was an inference dra \\11 from Congress' rejection of the 
'"Sherman amendment" to the bill which became Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13-th<• precursor of ~ 1983-which \Vould 
have held a municipal corporation liable for damage done to 
the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons 
"riotously and tumultuoul'ly assembled.''' Cong. Globe, 42cl 
Cong .. 1st Sc>ss .. 74!J ( 1871) (hereinafter "Globe''). Although 
the Shenm111 amendment did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act, 
J>ist1ict of Abington Totcnship ". 8chempp. 37-l U. S. 203 ( 1963); Goss v. 
Board of EducatiOn, 373 U.S. (i/\:{ (1911:3): 'McNeese v. Board of Educa-
tion, 373 U.S. G68 (19G3): Orleans 11orish School Board v. Bush, 365 U.S. 
'569 (19!H); Brown v. Hoard of Rducntivn. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . 
6 Cleveland Board of Education v. /_.aF'lcur, 414 U. S. G32, 63.6 (1974); 
App., Keyes v. School District No . .1, 0 . T. Hli2, No. ·71-507, p. 4a; App., 
Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklcnlntrg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No. 
281, p. 465a; Petition for C:!'rtiorari, Northcross v. Board of Education, 
0 . T . 19G9, No. 113G, p. ~; Tillker \'. Des M vines Independent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 504 (HJliU); Jl!cNcc~>c v. Board of Education, 373 
, U . S. 608,671 (lOG:{) . 
7 Howrvc-r, wr do aflirm Monroe \' . fJapr' , :3G5 U.S. 1G7 (1961), inf'of:tr 
. as it hold,; that thr do<'tnm· of rr~]IOIIrfcnl I>U]Irrior i ~ not a basis for 
rrnd!'ring mtmirtpalittr:< ltahl!' undt>r § J9S:3 for the constitutional tort~ of 
. their rmployre . .; . Srt> Part II. otfrn 
8 We exprrs:;l~· declined t.o consider " poliey considerations" for or 
t1gainst ~nnmcip:ll liability . S('Q aG5 lJ S ., at HJL 
75-191.4-0PlNlON 
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which is now ~ 1983, and although the 11ature of the obligation 
created by that amendment "·as vastly different from that 
created by § 1, the Court nonetheless concluded in .Monroe 
that Congress must have mea1lt to exclude municipal corpora-
tions from the coverage of ~ 1 because "'the House [in voting 
against the Sherman amendment] had solemnly decided that 
in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to 
impose any obligation upon county and town organizations. 
the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law.'" 
365 U. ~ .. at 190 (emphasis added). quoting Globe. at 804 
(Rep. Poland). This statement. '"e thought. showed that 
Congress doubted its "constitutional power ... to impose 
civil liability on municipalities.'' 365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis 
added), and that such doubt would have extended to any type 
of civilliability.1' 
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
and particularly of the case law which each side mustered in 
its support. shows, however. that Monroe incorrectly equated 
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with 
"civil liability ." 
A. An Overview 
There arc three distinct stages in the legislative considera• 
tion of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for 
a House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained 
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without 
9 Mr. Justice Douglas, thr :lllthor of Monroe, hns suggested that the 
municipal excluston might more properly rrst on a. theory that Congress 
sought to prevent the tin:111rt:tl ruin that einl ri~hts liability might. impose 
on munictpaht IC':<. Sr<> City of E<.eno81W Y. 13 runo, -H2 U. S. 507, 517- 520 
(1073). However, this view has ne\'C'r be<>n :-harrd by thr Court, sec 
Mo11roe v. Papl', wpra. n. 7, at. 1\JO ; )!oar v. County of Alameda, 411 
U.S . ()9:~, 70S (197:~), ;uul thr.· drb:ttr:; do not ~ll]l[JOrt thi:< poxition. 
75-1914-0PlNIO~ 
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amendment. 10 Sections 2 through 4 deall primarily with the 
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in 
the southern Statcs. 11 The wisdom and constil·. utionality of 
these sections-not§ 1, now § 1983-was the subject of almost 
all congressional debate and each of these sections was 
amended. The .House finished its initial debates on H. R. 
320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later the Senate also voted 
out a bill.12 Again, debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and 
that section was passed as introduced. 
Immediatrly prior to the YOtC' on H. R. 320 in the Senate, 
Senator Sherman introduced his amendment.13 This was not 
an amendment to ~ 1 of the bill. but was to be added as § 7 at 
the end of thr bill. Under the Senate rules. no discussion of 
the amendment "·as allowed and. although attempts were 
made to amend the amendment. it was passed as introduced. 
·In this form, the amendment did not place liability on munic-
ipal corporations, but made any inhabitant of a municipality 
liable for damage inflictl'd bJ' persons "riotously or tumultu-
ously assembled.' ' 11 
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amend-
ments made by the Srnate, including the Sherman amend-
ment, and the respective versions of II. R. 320 were there-
10 Globe, nt 522. 
11 Bridly, § 2 crrntrd cprtain f<•dPrnl rrimrs in nddition to t.hose defined 
in § 2 of tlw lSGG ('j,·il Ri~ht ,.; Art, U ~tn1. 27, ench nimcd primnrily nt 
tho l\u mux Klnn. ~Prt.ion ::! Jli'O\'id<·<l th:lt the President rould send the 
militia mlo nn~· Stnte wrnr·k<·d witlt 1\l:tn violence. Finn11y, § 4 provided 
for suspen~ton of the wnt of hahr:ts rorpu,.: lll cnumrrntccl circumstnnces, 
ngnin primnnly tho5e thought. to obtnin wherr Klan violence was rampant. 
Sec Cong. Globr, 42d Con~ .• bt Sc,;..s., App., at. ::!35-336 (1871) (hercinnfter 
''Globe A pp " ) 
a Globe, at. 70H. 
1 ~ &e. ·u/., at 6o:~, quotrcl in Apprndtx, iufra, nt 41-42. 
14 Ibid. An art ion for rr<·ovrr~· of dam:tgt'" wn::; to be in the fedrral 
court,; and denomm:tt('d a~ a tittit again,.:t tlw ronnt~·. rity, or pnrish in 
whtch t.ltt~ dama~r had oerurrC'd. Ibid . ExecutiOn of thr judgment was 
not to nm agamst thr proprrt_,. of t h<' gon~mment nnit,, however, but 
~Rfttn:>t the privHIC prop<•rty of any inhahttant.. lbitl. 
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fore sent to a conference cotnJTllttC'e. Section 1 of the bm, 
however, ·was not a subject of this confercneo since, as noted, 
it was pa::.sed vcrbatitn as introduced in both Houses of 
Congress 
On April 18, 1871, the first roJJfcrcnce committee completed 
its work on H. R. :3~0. Thr lllain features of tho conference 
conuuittre draft of the Slwnnan amendment ''"ere these: '~ 
First, a cause of action was giv!'ll to persons injured by 
1'any persons riotously an!! tumultuously assembled 
togetlwr ; . . mth llltrnt to deprive a11y person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution amllaws of 
tlw United States. or to deter him or punish him for 
exorcising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous CO!ldition of servitude " •• / 9 
Second, tho act provided that the action would be against 
the county, ctt.y, Ot' parish in whith the riot had occurred and 
that it could be mamtainrd by rithcr the person injured or 
his legal reprosentatlv<>. Third. unlike the amendment as 
proposed. the conference substitute made tlw government 
defendant liable on thr j11dgmcnt if it was not satisfied against 
individual ddondants who hnd committed the violence. If 
a municipality \vero hablc. tlw judgment against it could be 
collected 
11by execution, attaehntent. mnndamus, garnishment, or 
any other procccdn1g- 1n aiel of rxecution or applicable 
to the enforcemrnt of juclgnwnts against municipal cor-
por·ations; and such judgme11t [would become] a lien 
ns \\'ell upon all 111011eys ]n thr treasury of such county, 
city, or pansh. Uti upon the other property thereof." 
]n the en:-;ulllg drbatt• on tlw lirst confprcncc report. which 
was the tin;t debate ot' any k1nd 011 the Shrrman amendment, 
Senator Sherman explamed tha.t the purpose of his amend-
ment was to enhst. thr aHl of persons of property in the on-
l" 8<·i' Globe, at 'i'4fl and 755, r1uoted in Apprndtx, infra, nt 42-43. 
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forcement of the civ1l r1p;hts laws l>y ~na)dng ~hcjf ppopepty 
11responsible" for Ku I\lux Klan damage. 11' ~tatutes drafted 
on a similar theory, he stated, had long been in force in 
England and \\'ere in force in 1871 in a nurnber gf States.17 
'Nonetheless Lhere wcl'o crit1cal differences Letween the con~ 
ferencc substi~ulc and r;dant state and English stAtute§: the 
conference substitul('. unlike inust state riot statutcr=;, ]p,cked 
fl. short statute of limitations ai1d imposed liabiiity on the gov .. 
r-rnment defendant wh ether or not it had notice of the impend-
ing riot, whethei~ or not the municipality 'vas authorized to 
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted ail reason;. 
i1ble efforts to stop the rwL. and \\.:hcthef or not the rioters 
\vcrc caught allCi punish(•d . '' 
The .first confcrencr substitute passeli the Senate but was 
rejected by the House. Hotlse oppoi1ents, within wh.ose ranks 
16 "Let the rwoplP of propr rty m the southern St:'1tes understand that if 
they will not mnke the hue nnd ery nnd bkc the neccssnr:v steps to put 
down hwless violrnce in tho~e Stat{':-; 1llf'ir property will be holden respon-
sible, and the rfTrct wtli br mo;r wlwlrsoinr.j' Globe, a~ 7Gl. 
Senator Sherman was npp~1rentl.v UIH'OIH'C'I ned thnt the conference com-
inittce substitut e, 1inlike thr ona:ma l nmend111 ent, did not plncc liability 
for not cbrri:1~c direet lv Qll tlw propert~' of .the .wrll-to-do, but instrod 
placed it on the local go,·ern in rnt . Pr('sttmably he n<'surncd that taxes 
would be lcviPd agamst tl1r p\·opcrty of thr inhn.bitnnts to mnke the locn.J.ity 
whole 
17 Accordutg to Sc•l1ator Shrrm:in, the law haci originnlly been ndoptcd in 
,Englnnd t111n\P1Iiatcly :1ftcr thu .2\nrinar~ Cohqucst and hnd most recently 
bl'en promulgnted as thP law of 7 & S hl'o. IV, ch. 31. Sec Globe, at 760. 
1).urinA tlw coui·sc of the drlwr~. ~t appcai·ed thnt Kent\Jcky, l\Inryland, 
Massnchu,ctts, and ~l'\1' York had ~mllhr lnws. Sec id., nt 751 (Rep. 
S)JCilabarger); ul., at. 7G2 (SPn . St('ven,on) ; id., at 771 (Sea. Thurman); 
·id., at 792 (HqJ. But]('r) Sur]~ a. 111\lllieipal li:~bility was nppnrcntly 
bornmon throU)!;houL NPw F.n~l:1'nd. See td., nt. 7Gl (Sen. Sherman). 
ts In the Senate, ,opponelltl", inr.lucling :1 number of Senators who had 
votPd for§ J of the bill, C'riti(·f~f'(.] th'c Sherman !liTl;Cndment as nn imperfect 
and m1iJOlrti e rl'nclcnng of thr ~ t :dc ~tatutcs. l\[orcovcr, as drafted, t.hc 
confrrrncc subst it'utc ('Ould be ('Oil~tmrd to protect. n 'ghts that were not 
protPctl'(l by t hn Cow:t it ut ion. .-\ ('umpletc eritrcltic wns given by Scuatot 
Thur.iJ:\:1;1 . ~¢,;'ntobe.nt (7()..772 , 
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were some who had supported ~ 1, thought the Federal Gov-
ernment could not, consistent with the Constitution, obligate 
municipal corporations to keep the peace if those corporations 
were 11eithcr so obligated nor so authorized by their state 
charters. And. because of this constitutional objection. oppo-
nents of the ::-iherman amendment were unwilling to impose 
damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which Congress 
could not require municipalities to perform. This position is 
reflected in Representative Poland's statement that is quoted 
in !11 onroe. u! 
Because the House rejected the first conference report a 
second conference was called and it duly issued its report. 
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment 
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any per-
son or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate 
civil rights was afoot], and having power to prevent or aid 
in preventing the same,)) 'vho did not attempt to stop the 
same, liable to any person injured by the conspiracy. 20 The 
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Con-
gress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986. 
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can 
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on 
the report of the first conference committee. This debate 
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised 
against the Sherman amendment-on which our holding in 
Monroe was L>ased. sec p. 5. su,pra--,vould not have prohibited 
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state munici-
pal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act docs not state expressly that municipal 
corporations come within its ambit. it is finally necessary to 
interpret ~ I to confirm that such corporations were indeed 
intended to be mcludcd within the ''persons" to whom that 
section apphes. 
Ill &c 3fi5 U.S., :tt 190, quotrcl at p. 5, supra. 
'!!<'See Globe•, 111 80~, quot<•d 111 Appendix, wfra, at 43. 
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R Debate on the First Conference Report 
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and 
opponents of the Sherman amendment in bo.th Houses of 
Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases 
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several 
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, how-
ever, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitu-
tionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an 
argument from the debates on the first conference report and 
those on ~ 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed 
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states," 
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of 
Representative Shellabarger~ the House sponsor of H. R. 320, 
is the most complete. 
Shellabnrger began his discussion of H. R. 320 by stating 
that "there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the 
right consideration of this measure '"hich is wholly unex-
plored.'~ Cong. Globe. 42cl Co11g .. 1st Sess .. App .. at G7 (1871) 
(hereinafter "Globe App."). There \\'Cre analogies. however. 
vVith respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause,. 
Slwllabaq;cr relied on the stat('ment of Mr. Justice Washing-
ton in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 'Vash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa. 
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV: 
"'What these funuamcntal privileges arc[.] it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They 
may, however, be nll comprchenclecl under the following· 
general heads: proh'etion by the Government;'-
ullfarl~ thal--
li 'protection by the Govermnent; the cnjoy1ncnt of life· 
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property 
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and' 
safety . . .. '" Globe App .. n.t 6!) (emphasis added) .. 
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at :j80. 
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I 
Building on his conelusio ii that c:itiz('ns \\'ere owed protec-
tion-a conclusion not disput<'d by oppOII<'Ilts of th<' Sherman 
Amendment "'- :-ilH'llnbarg<'r tlwn considered Congress' role in 
providing that proteetJOII. H<'n' agai11 Uwrr \\·ere precedents: 
DEJ..t 710 I'{ I 
u[Cm1gress has al\\'ays] assumed to enforce, as against 
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions 
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con· 
stitution which rt'strain and directly relate to the States, 
such as those in [Art. l, ~ 10,] relate to the divisions of 
the political powers of the State ami General Govern-
ments. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of 
the States are all or such nature that they can be, and 
even have been, , .. enforced by the courts of the United 
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on 
Federal powers. Thus. and thus sufficiently, has the 
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitu-
tion. But there are some that arc not of this class. 
These arc where the court secures the rights or the liabili-
ties of persons within the States, as bct;veen such persons 
and the Sta.tes, 
,, See Globe·, nt 75~ (Sen·. Trumbull); iii .. nt 772 (Sen. Thurmnn); id., 
at 791 (Hc•J>. Willnrcl). The Supn•me Court of Indiana had ~o held in 
givmg efi"ect to the CIVIl H1ght~ :\('t of J~GG. See Smith v. Moody, 26 Incl. 
2D9 (1866) (following Cor.llcll), OIH' of thrl'r stntt· suprPme court ca.,p,.; 
referrrd to in Globe .-\pp., at G~ (Hep. Shellal.J;nger) . :\lorrover, §2 of 
the lt:71 Act a::: pa::;~ C"d, unlil.;:e § 1, pro~c·c·utrcl JlC'I"~olls who violatrd fl'deral 
right>< whrther or not that vwl:II!Oil \1":1~ illlrlrr color of onirial anthority, 
appare11tl~ · on the thror~· that J\.u 1\lux Klan violrnrP wn ::; infringing the 
right of proter1ion dd inf'd IJ,· CoJ·yell. Nonrthl'les,.;, oppom•nt:-: nrguecl 
that lll\lll!C!]lalil H's wc·re not grnerall~ · rhargcd by the States with kPrping 
the peace and henc· e d1d not havr polire forces, so thnt thr dut~· to afl'ord 
protrriJOil ought 110t devol\'!' on the mun1rip:tl!ty , but on whaten' r agency 
of ~tate governml'Jlt, wn:; eh:trgC'd b~ · the ::>tate with kerping thr pt•arl'. 
"Seep. -, and 11 :lO, iujm. Tn addition, thr~· argued that Congre:::s could 
not c·on~t1tntionall y add 10 1hr clulw::; of muniripa!Itie:;. SrC' pp. 1:3- 19, 
tnf1 i.U. 
75-1914-0PINlON 
12 MONELL v. NEW YOitK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
"These three arc: first, that as to fugitives from jus-
tice rnl; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or 
slaves L231 ;) third, that declaring that the 'citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of Citizens in the several States.' l~41 
"And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where 
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the 
constitutional provisions--the only three where the rights 
or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these per-
sons and the Stat<'s. arc directly provided for, Congress 
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ... 
such persons.'' Globe App., at 69-70. 
Of legislation mcntwnrd by Shellabarger, the closest analog 
of the Sherman amendment. ironically. was the statute imple-
menting the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions 
of Art. JV- the Act of Feb. 12, 1703, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the 
constitutionality of which had bern sustained in J 842. in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 530. There, Mr. Justice Story, 
w-riting for the Court, held that Art. TV gaYe slaveowners a 
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in 
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet .. at 612. 
Because state process for rrcovrrmg runaway slaves might be 
inadequate or even hostile to the nghts of the slaveowner, 
the right iutended to be conf<'ITrcl could be negated if left to 
~~U.S. Con~t., Art . IV , ~~ . cl 2. 
''A Person chargrd ia an)· St;1lf' wtth Tr,•a8on, Felony, or other Crime, who 
shall fl ee from Just tce, nnd br found m another Stale, shall on Demand 
of the executive Authonty of th<' State from which he fled, be delivered 
\1p, to be remover! to tlJc State havmg Juns(IJction of the Crime." 
2 ~ /d., cl. 3. 
" No Person held to ServH·c or Labom in one State, under the La\\'s thereof, 
escaptng mto another, shall, m Consequcn('c of any Lnw or H.rgulntion 
thercm, be dt,;charged from -<urh ~rrYir<' or Ltbom, but shall be delivered 
up on Claim of th~ Party to whom such Scrvtre Qr Labour may be due!" 
~·ld d . 1. 
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state irnplcmcntatwn . !d., at (514.. Thus, since the Constitu-
tion guaranteed the right ancl this in turn required a. remedy, 
Story helu it to lX' a. anatural inference" that Congress had 
the power itself to rn sur'e at1 appropriate (in the Necessary 
and Proper Clnuse sc11se) remrdy for the right. !d., at 615. 
Building on Prigg , Shellalmrgcr argued that a remedy 
agaillst municipaliti rs tllld counties was an appropriate-and 
hence constitu tional- method for ensuring the protection 
which the Fourteen th Amrnciment made every citizen's federal 
right.z" 1this IIlilCh was elt>ar from thE' adoption of such 
statutes by th e several States as devices for suppressing riot."u 
Thus. said :::ih cllaoarg<' r. the oilly snious question remaining 
was "whether. since a county is an integer or i)art of a State, 
the United States can impol'r upon it. as such, any obligations 
to keep the peace in obc•di t> nce to L'nit0d States laws. " "~ This 
he answered a ffir' tna t ivPly. citing i3oard of Commissioners v. 
Aspinwall, 24 liO\\' . ~37G ( lRGl). the first of many cases zs 
upholding thP power of fedcml courts to enforce the Contract 
Clause again st lllllll Jcipalities."'' 
I 
House opponr nts of Lbe ShNman amendment- whose views 
arc particularly illl portan L ;:; i11 cc only the House voted dov.ni 
25 Sec Globe , at 751. Sec a bo hi., a t iGO (Sen . Sherman) ("If a State 
may . •. pnss :t law mnkmg a ccnlnLy .. . responsible for a riot in order 
to deter such en me, then we mny pass thP >'amc remedies . .. . "). 
26 /d., nt. 751 ; ~Pc n. l i, supra 
~ 7 Gloor, at. 751 (rmpha~is add ed) . Compare this sla trmcnt with llepr<'-
;;clllat ivc Poland\ rema rk upon win ch ou r holding in Monroe was based . 
Sec p . 5, svpro. 
28 Src, e. g., Gelpcke v. ('ity of D ulut que. 1 W:tll. 175 (1SG·I); l'on Hoff-
man v . Cz'ty of Quincy, 4 uf., 5:)5 (1SG7) ; Riggs v . John son County, G 
id., lGG (1868) ; IVrber v. La County, G id ., 210 (1868 ) ; Supervisors v. 
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (I SII!l), Ucnbow v. lmra City, 7 id., 313 (1869); Super-
visors v. Durant , !) irl ., -115 (JS70) . Ser I!;Pil('rally C . Fairmnn , History of 
the Supn·mr Court of the Unit1•d StntPs : Hccon~tru ction and Heuliion. 
'JSfi4- 18SS, chs Ji- 18 (JDil 1 
1 ~ Sce <:Ito~;~, " ' 7;)1 - 7!'>'2 . 
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the anwn chnen t- d 1d not d ispu tc :-ilwllabarger ·s claim that the 
Fourteenth AmcndnH'Ilt cn•a tNI a fc~dPra l right to protection. 
see n. :21. SU]Jra., but tlwy arp:ued that the~ local units of 
governlll<'Ilt upon \\·hich the ain<'IHlnwnt fa stc•neclliahility W<'l'e 
110t obligated to kc<'p the p<•ace at statr law and further that 
the Federal Go\'C'I'I1Il1Cilt could 110t constitutionally require 
local governmciits to ('rente polieC' forces. 1vhcther this require-
ment was levird directly. or indirectly by imposing damages 
for breach of the pracC' on munieipalitirs. The most complete 
statement of this positio11 is that ofRepresrntative Blair: ao 
"The propositiOn known as the Sherman amend-
ao Others taklllg a VJ<'II' sinular to Ht'prc~cntat ivc Blair'· incluocd: 
Rcprcscntatire '\Villard. ~C<' id .. at 7\ll; H<'prr~<'ntatiw· Polaml, sec id., nt 
794; Rcprescntntn·c Burchard,~<'<' id .. at 705 ; Hrpre~cntnti1·r Farnsworth, 
see id., at 799. Tieprr~rntativr \'\'illard :1bo took a ;:omrwhat ditfrrcnt 
position . He thought that ilw Con~titution would not nllow the Feclcrnl 
Government. to dirtatl' till' tll:llllll'l' in which a State fnllillrcl it ~ obligntion 
of prott'ction . That. i ~, he thourrht. it <l mattrr of ~tale di~rrrtion whether 
it clrlq~[lted the pr:lrrkP<'Jlinp; poii'N to ~~ municipal or count~· corporation, 
to a sheriff, etc. lie did not doubt, lwwrvrr, thaL thr Fcurral Government 
could impo~c on the State.~ the ohlip;:ttion impo~rd by the Sherman amend-
ment., and Jlrr,;umably he II'Ould hav<· rnforcecl the nnwndmcnt. against a 
municipal corporatiotl to. whirh the prarckrPping obligation hnd been 
delegated. Sec id .. at. 791. 
Opponent:-: of the Slwrm:m allH'lHimrnt in tlH' S<•nate agrred with l3lnir 
that Conp;n·~~ had no pmH•r to p; 1 ~,.: the SIH'rman anwndmrnt brcau~c· it 
fell out~i<k limit :-: on Il:llion:d poll'<'!' mtpli<'it in the fl'd<'ral ~tructmr of the 
Con~titution , aJHI n·cogniz<·d in, 1' . fl. C'ollector , .. lJa!f, 11 Wall. 11;) (lF:/1). 
Ho11·c1·r r, thr 8c•n;d<· oppon<·nt~ fol'u"<'d not on tiH' anH' tHlmrnt',.; attempt 
to obltp;atr nnmi<'tpaliti <•,.: to kP<'P tlw prac·c·, bnt on tlw li!'n tr<'alt•d by the 
amendment, which ran agam~t all mott<'~ · an<l proprrty of a. drfrndant. 
munieipalit .~·, it1clndmg propNt~· hrld for public Jllll'!HJ:'<'~. :-;ueh a.s jaib or 
eourthon:-:e~ . Oppom•Jlt ::< arg1n'd th;1t ~urh a lic·n otH·t· t•nl<•rPd would have 
tlw <'ffert of making it intpo~~i hl<' for tht• munieipalit~· lo function. ~im·p no 
onr would trad<· with 11 . ::'.<'<', c·. fl .. t:lolH•, at 702 (Sc•n . Steven:-:on); id., 
at. /(i;J (8<'11. Ca:-N•rl~·). \lon·o1·P r, '!'\'N ,I'Oilt' knc•\\' that ~ound polic·~· 
prc1·<·ntrd exreutwn ag; lllt ~ t pul,lte propc·rt~ · ,.: itH'<' thi~ too wa,..; nc•rdrd if 
lo!'al. go1·c•rnnwnt w:t." to ~ttn·in•. ~t'<', <'. u .. ibid. S<'c abo llferiu•cthcr v. 
Garrett, ltr2 U. ::-;. 41'2, .'iOI, 5]:{ (1~~0) (l'l'<·ogni%ing princ·ipl!' th:lt. public 
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ment . , is entirrly new. lt is altogether without a pre-
cedent in this country. . . That amendment claims the 
power in the General Government to go ~nto the States 
of this Union aml l:ty such obligations as it may please 
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the 
States alone. . . . 
" . . . [H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an 
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to 
create that obligation, and that is the provision I am 
unable to assent to. Thr parallel of the hundred docs not 
in the least nwt•t the> case. The power that laid the 
obligation upon the hundred fi.rst put the duty upon the 
hundred that it should pc>rfonn in that regard, and failing 
to meet the obligation ''"hich had been laid upon it. it "'as 
very proper that it should suffer damage for its neglect .... 
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong 
to the States .... there arc certain powers that. inhere in 
the State governments. They create these municipalities, 
they sny what their powrrs shall be and what their obliga-
tions shall be. lf the Government of the Unikcl States 
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not 
utterly d(•stroy the municipality? If it can say that it 
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, .. . 
where [will] its power ... stop and what obligations .. . 
might [it] not lay upon a municipality .... 
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court 
decided lin Collector v. D£ty, 11 \Vall. 113 (1871)] that 
propPrt~· of a mumripallt~ · not 'nh.)r<:t. to cxrcution); 2 Dillon, l~Iunicip::~l 
Corporation::< §§ 4-!5-4-!() {11'7:) rd.) (oame) . 
Although th<' ar)!umrnt ~ of thr Srnat<• opponents app<·ar to bra correct 
anal~·"i" of then-controlling eon:<titlltiOII:d and common-law principlr~, tlwir 
argnmc•nt::< an• not rPic·v:tnt to an an:lly~i:; of the eon,-titutionality of§ 1 of 
tho C'iYil H1ghts Ac-t ~IIH'<' an.v Jtidgmrnt undrr that ~ection, a::< in any ciYil 
:mit in thC' frdPr:tl eottrt~ in li'/1. would haY<' !wen ('!lforced pursuant to 
~tat~ Ja.w,- undrr th<' prore:<~< act:< of 1/9:2 and 1i':2<S. Sc'<' Act. of ;\[ay 8, 
1792, ell. :3fi, l t'lt41t. :2if>, :\ct of l\lay 19, 1S2~, rh . tiS, 4 Stat.. 278. 
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there IS no power in the Government of the United States, 
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a State 
officer. Why'! Simply because the power to tax involves 
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give 
the Government of the United States power to destroy 
the government of the States in any respect. It was held 
also in the case of P1·igg vs. Pennsylvania [ 1G Pet. 539 
(1842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress 
of the United States to Jay duties upon a State officer; 
that we cannot comhland a State officer to do any duty 
whatever, as such; ll.nd I ask ... the tlifference between 
that and commanding a municipality which is equally the 
creature of the State, to perform a duty.'' Globe, at 795. 
Any attempt to impute a unitary constitutional theory to 
opponents of the Sherman amendment is. of course, fraught 
with difficulties. not tlw irast of "·hich is that most Members 
of Congress did not speak to the isflue of the constitutionality 
of the amendment. Xonetheless. two considerations lead us 
to conclude that opponrnts of the Sherman amendment found 
it unconstitutional substantially because of the reasons stated 
by Representative Blail' : First. Blair's analysis is precisely 
that of Poland, whose views \\'err quoted as authoritative in 
Monroe, see p. 5. SUJn·a., and that analysis was shared in large 
part by all House opponents \\'ho adclressecl the constitution-
ality of the Sherman amrndment."' Second. Blair's exegesis 
of the reigning constitutional theory of his day, as \Ve shall 
explain. was clearly supported by precedent-albeit precedent 
that has not survivrd. ser E.r f>arte Viryin-ia, 100 U. 8. 339, 
347- 348 (1880); Graves v . . Yew 1' orl\ c:l' rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 
466. 48G ( 103\J )- and no otlwr constitutional formula \Vas 
advanced by participants in thr IlOUfiC debates. 
Collector v. Day, citt>d by I31air. " ·as the clrarest and. at the 
time of the debates. tlw most rrcent pronouncement of a 
doctrine of coordinate sovert'ignty that, as Blait" stated, placed 
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limits on en·n the enurnNated pow<'rs of the Xational Govern-
ment in favor of protc•ctin~ State• (H'<'rogatives. There. the 
Court held that the United States could not tax the income of 
Day. a Massachusetts state .iud!!;e. because the independence 
of the States within their lC'gitimate spheres would be imperiled 
if the instrumentalities through which States executed their 
powers were "subject to the control of another and distinct 
govennnent.'' 11 Wall.. at 127. Although the Court in Day 
apparently rested this holding in part on the proposition that 
the taxing "power acknowlrdgrs no limits but the \Vill of 
the legislative body imposing the tax." id., at 125-126; cf. 
:McCulloch v. Maryla11d, 4 'Yhcat. 316 (1819). the Court had 
in other cases limited otlwr national powers in order to avoid 
i11tcrference with the States. :• ~ 
Ill Prigy v. Pellnsylvania, supra, for example. Mr. Justice 
Story, in addition to confirming a broad national po\ver to 
legislate under the Fugitive Slave Chwse. seep. 12. supra, held 
that Congress could not "insist that states ... provide means 
to carry into rffect the duties of the national government." 
16 Pet., at 615-GlG.":' And Mr. Justice McLean agreed that, 
"[a]s a general principle." it was true "that Congress had no 
power to impose duti<>s on state officers. as provided in the 
[Act of 1793. supra]." i\ on<'theless he wondered whether 
Congress might not impose "positive'' duties on state officers 
where a clause of the Cor1stitution. like the Fugitive Slave 
3~ lu ndthtton to tlw rase::: discu::::::rd in tPxt. ::'('('Lane C'ounty v. Orfgon, 
7 Wall. 71, 77, til (I~G!.JJ. in which tlw Court !wid that th<' fpdcrallegal 
t<'ndrr art:> :;hould not U<' ron~tnt<•d to rpquire thP Statrs to neerpt taxes 
t{'ndf'r<•d in l'nitrd Stntr~ notps ~<inep thi~ might interfere with a legitimate 
Stnt{' art .i,· it~· 
aschil'f .Ju~tiCP Tnnp~· ngrred : 
"Tho statr ollir<·r,; nwntioned in tlw Ia\\' [of 179:~) nre not bound to 
execute the dutirs imposr<l upon them by Congress, unless they choose to 
do so, or arc required to do ~o by a hw of the state; and the state 
legi::;laturc hns the power, if it thinks proprr, to prohibit tlwm. The act 
of 1793, then'fore, nm,.;t clrpencl altogrther for its execution upon the offi-
cers of the l.Tnitrd States nam<'cl in it.." Hi Pet., at, 030 (Taney, C. J.). 
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Cla.usc. seemed to require affirmative government assistance, 
rather than restraint of govPrmnent, to secure federal rights. 
Sec id., at GG4-GG5. 
Had Justice McLC'an been correct in his suggestion that, 
whe>re the Const1 tu tion C'n visioned affirmative govem men t 
assistance. the States or their officers or instrumentalities could 
be required to provide it. there would have been little doubt 
that Congress could have im;istr.d that municipalities aft'orcl 
by "positive" action the protection"' owed individuals under 
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Anwnclment whether or not municipali-
ties \\'ere obligated by state law to keep the peace. However, 
any such argument. largely foreclosed by Prigg, was made 
impossible by the C'ourt's holding iu Kentucky v. Dennison, 
24 How. 66 (1861 ). There. the C'ourt was asked to require 
Dennison, the Governor of Ohio. to hand over Lago. a fugitive 
from justice \\'anted in Kentucky. as required by~ 1 of the Act 
of 1793.'''' supra, which implemented Art. IV, ~ 2. cl. 2. of the 
Constitution. Chief JusticC' Taney. \\Titing for a. unanimous 
Court, refused to enforcr that St'ction of the Act: 
"[W]e think it clear. that the Federal Government, under 
the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State offi-
cer, a.s such. any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload 
the offirer with cluti('S which would fill up all his time, and 
disaLle him from pC'rforming his obligations to the State, 
~· SPe pp. 10-11. nnd n. 21, supra. 
35 "Be it Pnact<•d ... That " ·h<'n<'ver the rxrcutive authority of nny state 
in the Union ... shnll dcmatHI :my person as :1 fugitive from ju3t ice ... 
nnd shall moreover produce a ropy of an indictment found ... charging 
the prr~on so dt•mandrd , ll'il h having committed trc.'l .~on, frlony or other 
crime, ccrtifird as authrntic u,v the gon·mor or chief magistrate of the 
state . .. from whPncr the pPr,.:on f'.O l'hnrged llr,l, it shniJ be the duty of 
the executive authorit~· of thr »tate or trrritory to whirh sueh person sh:tll 
have fled, to rau:;;e hun or hrr to be arrp:;;trd and scrmPd ... and to· 
cause the fugitive to be d('ll\·rrrd to such agent [of t.he demanding state] 
whrn he ~hall apprar '' 1 Stat. :302. 
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and might impose on him duties of a character incompati-
ble with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by 
the State." 24 How., at 107-108. 
The rationale of Dennison-that the Nation could not 
impose duties on stat<' offic(•rs since that might impede States 
in their legitimate activities- is obviously identical to that 
which animated the dt'cision in Collector v. Day. See p. 1G, 
supra. And. as Blair i1Hlicated. municipalities as instrumen-
talities through which Statrs executed their policies could be 
equally disabled from carrying out State policies if they were 
also obligated to carry out fcd<'rally imposed duties. Although 
110 one:' cited Dennison by name. the principle for which it 
stands was well known to Memb<'rs of Congress."" many of 
whom discussed Day ~ ~ as W(' ll as a series of state supreme 
court cases"' in the mid-1860's ,,·hich haJ invalidated a federal 
tax on the process of state rourts on the ground that the tax 
threatened the independence of a vital state function.' 1" Thus. 
there was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman 
am0nclment. by putting mtmicipalities to the Hobson's choice 
of keepi11g the peace or paying civil damages. attempted to 
impose obligations on municipalitirs by indirection that could 
not be imposed directly. thereby thr<'at<'ning to "drstroy the 
government of the States." Globe. at 705. 
If municipal liability under ~ 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
36 "The Supreme Court of thr Ullltrd Statrs has decich•d rrfJC'.1trdly that 
Congress can impose W> duty on :1 Stntr oHicrr ." Globe, at 7U9 (Rep. 
Farwworth). Srr also id., at 7S8-7~9 (Hep. Kerr). 
37 Sre, e g., Globe. at 'irr~ (Srn . D:tvi ,;): ibid . (Sen. Cm;:o:rrl~·); id .. 772 
(Sen. Thurma1,) (reciting logic of D ay ): icl ., at 777 (Sen . Fn•lingl111ysrn); 
id., at 7R8-7 9 (Hep. Krrr) (rr C'Iting logic of Day); id., at 79:3 (Rrp. 
T>oJand) ; id., at 799 (nrp. Farnsworth) (:tl,:o rrciting logic of Day) . 
all H'arrrn ,._ l'aul. 22 lnd. 2/(i (J."fi.l): ./onrs Y. Estate of K.cl'p, 19 
Wis. 3G9 (1865); Fifu·ld v. Closl', 15 :i\[ich. 505 (1SG7); Union Bank v. 
llill, 3 Colt!. (-t3 Tenn.) 325 (ISGG); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (18G7). 
~ 9 S<·c' Globe, nt 76-t (Sr11. na,·i,:); ibid. (Sen. Ca.,~erley). Sec also T. 
Coolt•y, Con.;titutional Limitations ·X·-t~3--'"48-t (JR71 cd.) . 
.. 
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created a Sllmlar Hobson's choice, we might cone] udc. as 
]lfonroc did. that C'onp;rcss could not have intended munici-
palities to be among the "persons" to \vhich that section 
applied. But this is not the case. 
First. opponents expressly distinguished between imposing 
. an obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil 
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by 
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for 
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated 
that Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction on the 
federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold municipalities 
liable for using their authorized powers in violation of the 
Constitution-which is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
'vent : 
"I presume ... that 'vhcre a State had imposed a duty 
[to· keep the peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action 
would be a.llowed to be maintained against them in the 
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions 
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by 
their own contract, or by a State la·w, in the courts, is a 
very widely different thing from devolving a ne'v duty or 
liability upon them by the national Government, which 
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no 
power or control over them whatever." Globe, at 794. 
Representative Burchard agreed : 
"[T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the 
United States, or usually by State laws, upon a county to 
protect the people of that county against the commission 
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the. burning of 
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to 
person. Police powers arc not conferred upon counties as 
corporations; they arc conferred upon cities that have 
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities arc con-
ccrne<l, where the equal protection required to be afforded. 
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by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps 
the United States courts could enforce its perform-
ance. But counties ... do not have any control of the 
police .... " 1 d., at 795. 
See also the views of Rep. Willard. discussed at n. 30, supra .. 
Second, the doctrine of dual sovereignty apparently put no 
limit 011 the po,ver of federal courts to enforce the Constitution 
against municipalities that violated it. Under the theory of 
dual sovereignty set out in Priem, this is quite understandable. 
So long as federal courts wrre vindicating the Federal Consti-
tution. they were provided the "positive'' government action 
required to protect fedrral constitutional rights and no ques-
tion was raised of enlisting the States in "positive" action. 
The limits of the principles announced in Dennison and Day 
are not so well defined in logic. but are clear as a matter of 
history. It must be remembered that the same Court which 
rendered Day also vigorously rnforcPCl the Contracts Clause 
against municip~::.lities-an enforcement effort which included 
various forms of "positive" relief. such as ordering that taxes 
be levied and collected to discharge federal court judgments. 
once n constitutional. infraction was found. 10 Thus, federal 
4 n Sec ca~rs citrd at n. 28, supto. Sin('r this Court V-ranted unques-
tionably "po,.;itive, relief in Contracts Clau;:r rasrs, it appran; that the 
di~tinrtion bet\\'P<'n the Shrrman :mwnclmrnt and tho~r ca,;rti wn:-; not that. 
the former rrratrd n po~ iti\'e ohlig:llion whrrras thr latter imposrd 0111~· 
a !legati\·r rr,.;trnint. ln:; tracl, thr di :-;t inction must have be<'n that a viola-
tion of the Con:-:titution wns thr prrdicntc for ·'po:;itivr" rrlief in thr Con-
t.r:tets Clausr casrs, whrrrns thr Sltrrmnn amrndment impo~rd damagrs 
without n•garcl to wbcthrr n lo<·al .!!:O\'C'rnmrnt wns in nn~· wa~· at fault 
for the bn·ach of thr prncr for \\'hidt it was to be hrlcl for damages. See 
p. 8, supra. Whilr no onr stated this distinction rxpre:,;slr during tho 
ciPbatP:;, t hr infc·n·ncr iti strung that Congres,.:mrn in 1871 would haYe 
dr:1wn this distinction since it <•xpl:1ins wh~· H<•prrscntatiw;; l'olnnd, 
Burchard, nnd Willard, ""r p. -, supra. could opposr thr amrndmrnt 
\\'lulr at the :same timr sa~·ing that tiH' F!'drral Go\'<•rnmrnt mig-ht impose 
damagc·s on a loeal govemmrnt that h:1d drfaultcd in a :;tatc-impo,cd duty 
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judicial enforcetucnt of Lbe Constitution's expr<'SS limits on 
statr power. s1nce it was done so fr<'qucntly. must notwith-
standing anything said in Dennison or Day have 1lecn permis-
sible. at lrast so long us the int<'rpretation of the Constitution 
was left in the hands of the JUdiciary. fJince ~ 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act simply conferrPd jurisdiction on the federal courts 
to enforce ~ 1 of the Fourtepnth Amendment-a situation 
precisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under 
'>vhich the Contract Chwse was enforced against munici-
palities-there is no reason to suppose that opponents of the 
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional 
barrier Lo ~ 1 suits against municipalities. 
Finally, the very votes of those Members of Congress, who 
opposed the Sherman amendment but who had voted for ~ 1, 
confirm that the liability imposed hy ~ 1 was something very 
different from that imposed by the amendment. Section 1 
without question could he used to obtain a damage judgmc11t 
against state or municipal nflirials who violated federal consti-
tutional rights while acting under color of law.41 However, for 
/ Prigg-Dcn nison-Day purposes. as Blair and others recognized.'~ 
there was no distinction of constitutional magnitude bet>veen 
officers and agents-including corporate agents-of the State: 
both were state instrumentalities and the State could be 
impeded no matter over which sort of instrumentality the 
1
1o keep the pl'ace and Jt nbo l'Xplain" wll~· rYrl)·onr np;rrrd that n stat~ 
or mumcipal oflicrr could con,;t it ut ionall~· hr lwld liahl<' undC'r § 1 for 
\'iolation~ or tlw Cun::; titution. SP(' Jl. -, infra. 
41 Sec, e. g., Globe, at 33·~ (Hep. Hoar); id., at 3G5 (Hep. Arthur); id., 
at 3G7-3G8 (Rep. Shrldon); icf .. at :3t-:.5 {HPJl. Lrwis); Globr App. , at 217' 
(Sen. Thurman). In add it iou, ofllccrs werl' included among those who· 
could be suc·d under the ~l'cond eonfrrencc ~~~b~titutc for the Sherman 
Amendment .. Sec GlobP, at S05 (exl'hanp;l' between Hep. Willard nnd Hcp .. 
Shl'llabnrger) . There were no constitutional objections to the second 
report . 
42 See Globe, nt 795 (Hcp. Blair); id., at 788 (Hcp. Kerr); id., .r,t 795. 
(Rep. Burchard); id., at 79\'l (Hep . .Fam;;worth). 
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Federal Government sought to assert it,s powrr. Dennison 
and Da.y, after all, were not snits against municipalities but 
against ofj,cers aJJcl Blair was quite conscious that he was 
extending these cast's by applying thrm to municipal cor-
porations. I :I ;\ onethcless, fi<'na tor ThUrman' who gave the 
most exhaustive critique of ~ l-inter alia. complaining that it 
would be applied to state officers, sec Globe, at 217-and who 
opposed both § 1 and the Shennan amendment, the latter on 
Prigg grounds. agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitu-
tional."4 Those who voted for ~ 1 must similarly have believed 
in its constitutionality despite Prir;g, Dennison, and Day. 
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill 
From the foregoing discussion. it is readily apparent that 
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would 
have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourt<>enth 
Amendment. The question rrmains. howevrr, whether the 
general language' describing those to be liable under § 1-"any 
person"-covers morr than 11aiural prrsons. An examination 
of the debate on § 1 and application of appropriate rules of 
construction shows unequiYoenlly that § 1 \Vas intended to 
cover lE'gal as well as natural prrsons. 
Representative Shellabarger was the first to explain the 
function of § 1 : 
" [Section 1] not, only provides a civil remedy for persons 
·~ "rWJc <":mnot command a St[t!e oflicl'r to do any duty whatever, as 
such; and I ask .. . t)l(' differc·n cc bctwern th:~t and ('ommancling a munic-
ipality . . .. " Globe, at 705. 
44 Sec Globe App., at 21G-2J7, quotf'd, infra, a,t n. 45. In 1879, more-
over, whf'n the question of tlw limit,; of t·hf' Priug principle w:u; squarely 
prl'scnt<'d in Ex ]Jarte l'irg111ia, 100 U.S. 3:39 (1~~0), this Court held that 
Dennison and Day and the principle of fl'der:lli~m for which they sta11d 
did not prohibit feder:tl l'nforcrnwnt of § 5 of the Fourtrl'nth Amendment 
ihron,gh snit:; Jirrewrl to :;tall' ofllcers. See 100 U.S., at 3-15-3-18. 
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whose former· condition may have been that of slaves, 
but also to all people where, under color of State law, 
they or ::wy of them may be deprived of rights to which 
they arc entitled under the Constitution by reason and 
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68. 
By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1 
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sectionR 
of the 1871 Act were addn,ssc·d. Jlepreseutative Shellabarger 
also stated without reservation that the constitutionality of 
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitu-
tionality of ~ 1 of the 1871 Act. am! that the former had been 
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of 
this Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne. sitting on circuit, who 
had concluded "\Ve have no doubt of the constitutionality of 
every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to 
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1: 
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of 
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and con-
stitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are lib-. 
erally and beneficently construed. It would be most 
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the 
rule of inrerpretation. As has been again and again de .. 
cided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, 
and everywhere else ·where there is wise judicial interpre .. 
tation, the largest latitude consistent with the words 
employed is uniformly given in construing such statures 
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and 
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the 
people. . . . Chief Justice Jay and also Story say: 
" 'Where a powel' is remedial in its nature there is 
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed 
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation 
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 420." Globe App., 
at 68. 
The Sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarg~t's 
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opening speech were echoed hy Senator Edmunds, the man-
ager of H. R. 320 in the Senate: 
"The first section is OIH' that I believe nobody objects to, 
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the 
United States when they are assailed by any State law or 
under color of any State law. and it is merely carrying 
out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866], which 
have since become a part of the Constitution." Globe, at 
568. 
"[Section 1 is] so vPry simple and really reenacting the 
Constitution ." !d., at 569. 
And he agreed that the bill "secure[cd] the rights of white 
men as much as of colored men." I d., at 606. 
In both Houses, statemcn ts of the supporters of ~ 1 corrob-
orated that Congress. in enacting ~ 1. intenued to give a 
· J broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil 
rights:' 5 Moreover, since municipalities through their official 
~ 5 Representative Binghnm, the nut hor of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, for example, declarrd the bill's purpo~e to be " the enforcement .. . 
of the Constittltion on bchnlf of en~ry indiYidunl citi zen of the Republic .. . 
to the extent. of thr rights gu nrnnt ecd to hitn by the Constitution." Globe 
App., nt 81. He cent inned : 
"Tho States never had the n ght , though the~· hnu thr power, to inflict 
\vrongs tipon free citizen;; by a. dr nial of the full prot ection of the lnws . ... 
(And) the Sta tes did den~· to C'itizen~ the equal prot r etion of the lltws, they 
did drny the rights of citi zen~ undrr the Con~ titution . nnd except to the 
extent of the express lnnitat.wns upon the St a trs, as I have shown, the 
citizen had no rcmed~·. . . . They took property without. compensation, 
and he had no remedy. ThL'Y restrirl<·d the freedom of the prrss , and he 
lmd no rrnwdy. Th ry rr,; trictl'd the frerdom of :-:perch, and he had no 
remedy. They restrict ed thr ri~ht ,; of eon~C'irnce , :111d he lwei no rem-
edy. . . . Who dare ~;ay , now that. the Constitution has been amended, 
that the nation cannot by law proYicle again,: t all such nhuse:; and denials 
of right ns thege in the Stat e;; and by Stat e,;, or combinations of persons ?" 
ld , at. 85. 
Hcpresentativn Perry , commenting on Congre;;,; ' nction in pa.sing the civil 
right,~ bitt al ~o stated . 
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acts, cou1d equally with natural pcrso11s create the banns 
intended to be remedied by ~ 1. and, further, since Congress 
intended ~ 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to 
suppose that municipal corporatwns would have been excluded 
from the sweep of ~ 1. Cf.., e. g., Ex J>arte Virginia, 100 U. S. 
"Now, Ly our nction on this · bill we have asserted as fully ns we can 
assert t.lw mischief intended to be remedied. We haYc a~scrted as clearly 
as we can n;;::;ert our belief that it is the duty of Congrr~s to rrdre:>s that 
mischief. We have also assrrtcd as fully as we can assert the constitutional 
right of C'AJngrrss to legislate.' ' Globe, a.t. 800. 
See also id., <lt 376 (Hep. Lowe) ; id., at 428-429 (Rep. BeaHy); id., 
at 448 (Hep. Butlrr); id., at. 475-477 (Hcp. Dawrs); id .. at 578-579 (Srn. 
Trumi.Jtill) ; id., at GOU (Srn. Pool); Globr App., ut 182 (Hep. J\fprcur). 
Other supporters were quite clenr that§ 1 of the act. extended a rrmedy 
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also 
where otriccr::> of the State wrrc drliberatcly iudifi'ercnt to the rights of 
black citiz<'n l'; : 
''But the chief complaint b [that] by a. sy:;tematic mnlndministrntion of 
[state law], or a. neglrct. or rcfu~al tv enforce their provi,;ions, a portjon of 
the people arc denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a stare 
of facts is clrarly made out, I brlievc [§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amencl-
·menL] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those 
persons who are thus denied equnl protection." Globe App., at 153 (Mr. 
Garfirld) . See also Monroe v. Pape, supra, n . 7, at 171-187. 
'Importnnt.Iy for our inquiry, even tho opponents of § 1 ngrecd that. it was 
J constttutional and , fmt.hcr, that it swept. vrry broadly. Thus, Senator· 
Thmmau, who ga\'C the mo:;t rxhau ::;tivc critiqur of§ 1, said: 
«This sertion rel:des wholly to ei1·il suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give· 
to the F<·c!Pral Judiciary that. which now floc:; not belong to it-a jurisdic-
tion that may be constitutionally couferrerl U]JOn ·it, l grant , but that has 
never yet. been conferred upon it. It. :l\lthorize:< any per::~on who i::; deprived 
of any right , ]Jrivilq;r , or immunit~· ~ccurrd to him by the Con~!itut.iun of 
the United StatP;;, to bring nn action again;;:t the wrongdoer in the Federal 
courts, and t.hat wtthout nny limit whatsoever as to the amount in 
cont.roveriiy. , . • 
''['!']here is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are en17Jloyed 
lin the bill], am! they are as cornprehe11s£ve as ccm be used." Globe App.~ 
.!\t 21fl-21? (Pmphasis nddrd) , 
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339. 346- 347 (1880); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 
227 U. S. 278, 286-287. 204-206 ( 1013). One need not rely on 
this infer~llce alone, however, for the debates show that Mem-
bers of Congress understood "persons" to include municipal 
corporations. 
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of 
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 
(1834), especially in mind. "In [that] case the city had taken 
private property for public usc. without compensation ... , 
and there was no redress for the wrong .... " Globe App., 
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly 
J indicate his view that such takings by cities. as had occurred 
in Barron, \\'Ould be redressable under ~ 1 of the bill. See 
id., at 85. More generally. and as Bingham's remarks confirm, 
§ 1 of the bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress 
I 
provided redress for takings. since that section provided the 
only civil remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations and 
that Amendment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated 
takings:"; Given this purpose. it beggars reason to suppose 
that Cougress \\'Ould have exempted municipalities from suit, 
i.nsisting instead that compensation for a taking come from an 
officer ~n his individual capacity mther than from the govern-
ment unit that had the benefit of the property taken.47 
In addition, by 1871, it was well understood that corpora-
tions should be treated as natural persons for virtually all pur-
poses of constitutional and statutory analysis. This had not 
always been so. When this Court first considered the question 
of the status of corporations, Chief Justice Marshall, writing 
fm· the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons 
~uSee Story, Commrntaries on the Constitution of the United States 
§ 195<i (Coolry ('d. 1873) . 
47 lndrcd the frdrr:1l courts found no obstacle to awnrds of damnges 
11gainst municipalities for cornmon-l:nv t:~kings. Sec Sumner v. Philadel-
7Jhia, 23 F. Cns. :m2 (CCED P:1. 1873) (No. 13,611) (:1warding damages 
of $2,27:l.36 and c0sts of S346.a5 ngainst the city of Philadelphia). 
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as that term was used 111 Art. III and the Judiciary Act of 
1789. See Bank of the V nited States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 
86 (1809).' 8 By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was 
unhesitatingly abandonefL 
"fA] corporation created by and doing business in a par-
ticular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes 
as a person, although a11 artificial person, ... capable of 
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a 
natural person." Lou£sville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 
558 (1844) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 752. 
And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights 
Act, in Cou·les v. ilferr:cr Cou11ty, 7 Wall. 118, 1~H (1869), the 
Letson principle "·as automatically and without discussion 
extended to municipal corporations. L'nd<>r this doctrine, 
municipal corporations \\·ere rout.iuely sued in the federal 
courts ~ 9 and this fact was well known to Members of 
Congress.r·o 
That the "usual" meaning of the "·ord person would extend 
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of 
Congress which had been passC'd 01lly months before the Civil 
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided that 
"in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may 
extend and he applietl to bodies politic and corpo-
rate ... unless the context shows that such words were 
intended to be used in a more limited sense[]." Act of 
Feb. 25, 1871, ch . 71, § 2, 1o Stat. 431. 
46 Noncthrlri'~, suits could be hrought. in feueral court if the natural 
person>; who wrrc mPmbc·r:; of thf' ·corpor:~tion were of divrrse citizenship 
from the other part irs to the litigation. Sre 5 Cranch, at 91. 
4° Sec n. 28, supra 
~0 Src, r. g., C:lobc, at 777 (Srn. ShPnnan); id .. at 752 (Rep. Shclla-
h:trgcr) ("countil':-;. citiP~, and corporation~ of all sorts, after years of 
judicial confli(·t, have Lrconw thornu~hl~· e:-;tahli,.:hf'd to be an individual or 
person or entity of t lw Jwr,.:onal <·xi~t<·nrP, of which, :1s n cit izcn, individ-
u:~l, or inh:1bitant, thr Unlt<'d Stntr,:; Con,.:titution do('S take note and endO\\;· 
\V~th f:t<'\\11~· to ~llf' and lw supd iu tlw comt:l of the Unit('(lStates.") .. 
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Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the 
phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the 
"plain mea11ing" of § 1 is that local governmC;Ut bodies were 
to be includeu within the ambit of the persons who could be 
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed. a Circuit 
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported 
case under § 1, read the DictioHary Act in precisely this way 
iii a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal 
defendant.r.~ See l\'orthwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Parle, 
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336).53 
51 S<'e Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cns. 393, 394 
(CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,:33fi); 2 Kent's Commentaries ·X·27s-·r.·279 (12th 
0. W. Holmes ed. 187:3). S('e abo United States Y. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 
109 (CC Va. 1823) (Mar::;hall, C. J.) ("The United States is a gov<'rnment, 
and; consequently, a body politic and corporat<'"); Brief for Petitioner in 
Monroe v. Pape, 0. T . HlGO, No. 39, App's. D and E (collect ing state 
statutes which, in 1871, defined municipal corporations as bodies politic 
nnd corporate). 
52 The court also noted thnt. there was no discern ible reason why persons 
injured by municipal corporations should not be nble to recover. See 18 
F . Cas., at 39-L · 
li3 In con~idrring the effect of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871 in lii on roe, how-
C\'er, Justice Douglas, appnrentl~· focu~ing on the word ';may,"~ta.ted: "this 
definition fof person] is mE'rely an nllowable, not n mandatory, one." 365 
U. S., nt 191. A review of tlw lf•gi;;]ativc history of the Dictionary Act 
shows this conclusion to lw incorrf'ct. 
There i~ no expre ·s reference in the lt>gislative l1istory to the definition of 
pen;on, uut. Sena.tor Trumbull, the Art!s sponSOJ', disci!~ ·cd the phrase 
"'words importing thl~ masculine gender may be applied to fE'mnle::;," 
(t-mphnsis n.ddcd), which immt>dintdy prerf'dPs thr. definition of per~on, and 
stated: 
·· 'The only object [of tlw Act] is to get rid of n. great deal of verbosity 
in our statutr::; by providing that whrn thf• words 'he' is u::;ed it. shall 
include frmales a;; well as male:;[]." Congres:;ional Globe, 41 ·t Cong., 3d 
Ses...:;., 775 (Jan. 27, 1871) (C'mpha~is nclclf'd). 
Thus, in Tnunbull's vif'w the word "may" meant. "::;hall." Such n manda.-
tory me of the E'Xtendf'd meanings of thr. words dl'finrd by the Act 
i::; abo rf'quirPd for it to perform Jt:< intf'tHh·d funetion-to hf' a guide 
to ''mlcs Qf ~.onstruction" of Ads of Congn•ss. See id .. at 775 (llem~tr~ 
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Our analysis of the legislativt> history of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 cc. :npels the conclusion that Congress did intend 
municipalities and other local govprnmcnt units to be included 
among those per~on s to \\·hom ~ Hl83 applies.r.• Local govern-
iug bodies. '·· therefore, can lw sued directly under ~ 1083 for 
monetary, declaratory. or iJJjUJlCtivC' relief \\'here . as here. the 
action that is allegc•cl to ht> unconstitutional implements or 
executes a policy statement., ordinance, regulation. or decision 
of Sen. Trumbull). Werr the ddined words "::tllowablr, [but] not manda-
tory" ronstructions, a,: Jlfonroe ~11ggests, tlwre would be no "rules" at all. 
Instead, Congre:;s mu8t h:n-r intr·ndrd tlw definitions of the Aet to npply 
across-the-board except. wlwrr the Act by it ~ term~ callrd for a. drviation 
from this practice--'· L whrre] the context. shows that [defined] words 
wrre to be u~ed in a more limi ted srn~e." Ccrtailll~- this is how the 
N orthwcstern Fertilizing court, viewed the matter. Since there is nothing 
in the "context" of § 1 of thr Civil Rights Act calling for a rr::;tricted 
interpretation of the word "person," the langu:1gc of that section should 
prima facie be constr\ted to inc:lude "bodies politic" among thr entities th:1t 
could be sued . 
54 Therr i::; ccrtaml~· no <'Oll"titutwn:il illlpPdimrnt to municipal li:tbility. 
''The Te11th Anwndml'llt ·~ rl'>'Pn·:l t ion of tlondrlef(at <'cl ]HJ\1'<' 1':< to thr States 
b- not. implicated b~- a kd<·ral-<"uurt ,iudgnwnt <'nfort'ing tlw <'XJll'l'>'>' prohibi-
tions of unlawful "tate• l'ondtJ<·t ''nactrd h~ · th<· Fourteenth Aml'ndnwnt." 
flfilliken v. Brudle!/. -J;~;{ L'. 8. ::!Iii, :291 (1Yi'7l; ~l'<' R.r partl' l'iroiuia. 100 
U.S. 339, :347-:l-±E' (1>'1'0). For thi,; rl'a ~on, Natio11al L<'O{IUC of Cities v. 
Usery. -J2(i U.S. R:l;) (19i'ti). i,; Jfrl'll'\'aJJt to om con:<idl'ration of thi,; e:J,.;e. 
Nor i:; thrrr an~· ba,;i ,; for eoncluding 1hat thr EI<·,Tnth AmPndmrnt is a 
bar to munieipal liahiht~ · . ~<·<-. e. (/ .. Fitzpatrick , .. Bit zer, -J-:27 U.S. 445, 
456 (197(}): Li11co/n ('oun/!f , .. 1-tmill(l. 1:n ll . ~ . 5:29, 5:~0 (ll'!lO). Our 
holdinf( toda~· i,;, of eour~t· , limiH·d to lor·al f(m·emm<·nt 11t1it,; which an' not 
/ <·onsidrrl'd part of t he• Stat<· for Elc-n'n t h _ \nwndnH•nt pu rpo"e:;. 
''''Si ner oflicl:tl capa<·it~· ~ 11it :- g<'nf'r:tll~· reprrsrnt on!~· anotll('r way of 
pkadmg nn artion agalll:-<l :111 rnt.itl· of which an oflirrr i,; an agPnt-at 
lea,;t wlwrp Elrn•nt h Am<'tHinH•nt c<mstdPration~ do not control :mal~·~is­
our hoJdinf( toda~· I h:l I lora] ,!:(U\'\'fllllll'nt ~ Call ])(' ::< lll'd lllld<•r ~ ] ()i-);3 IH'C-
(',;,;aril~· d<·<·i cle,.: th:tt. loeal ~O\'f'l'llllH'Ilt oflieial,.: :'\tl'd ill tlwir oflieial eapar-i-
tiC'~ arC' " p<·r:;ons" nllcll'r ~ l!JK:i ill tho:;<' ea:<e:; in whic·h , a::; h<·n•, a local 
~overlllllC'll_t would. ht• ~ 11abl!• ill it,; 0\\'11 nanw .. 
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officially adopted a1td pruntulgated by that body's officers. 
Morcov0r. although the touchstone of the~ 1!)8;~ action against 
a government body is an allegation that oilicial policy is 
responsible for a deprivation of rights prot<>cted by the Con-
stitution, local govcrnmPJl\:-'3. like every other ~ 1083 "person," 
by the very terms of the statute. ma.y l>e sued for constitu-
tional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "cus-
tom" even though such a custom has not received formal 
I 
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels. 
As Mr. Justice Harlan. writing for the Court. said in Adickcs 
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 308 l'. :-l. 144. 167- IGS ( 1970): "Congress 
included custom and usage lin ~ HJ83] because of persistent 
and widespread discriminatory practices of State officials .... 
Although not authorized by \\'ritten law. such practices of state 
officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to 
constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." ''0 
On the other hand. the language of ~ 1083. read against 
the background of the same legislative history. compels the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be 
} held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy 
of some nature caused a constitutio11al tort. In particular. \Ve 
conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely 
because it employs a tortfeasor-or. in other words. a munici-
pality cannot be held liable under ~ 1083 in a respondeat 
superior theory. 
\Ve begin with the language of § 1983 as passed: 
"[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, 
I ~6 Srr a~o .Tu::;ticr Frankfurthrr·~ :;tatrmrnt for thr Court in Nashville, 
I 
C. & St. L. R. Co . , .. Urutcuiu:~. :HO U.S. Jti:!, :Hi9 (19-!0): 
"lt would bra natTO\\' conceJHion of juri~prud<'tH·(• to tonfitH' tlw notion of 
'htw:;;' to what i,; found writi<'Il 011 t!H· :<tatllt<' book~. and to di~n·gard the 
glo~ whirh !if<· ha~ writt<'ll upo11 it. SPttkd :;t:ttP practiPr ... can 
P><tabli~h what i,; ,.;tatr law . TIH• Fqual l'rotf'ction CJau,.;e did not write an 
empty form:tli:<m into t lw Con:<t it ution. l)pppJ,\· rmlwddN! traditional ways 
of carrying out ~tate polie~·. ;;mh a>< tho:<<' of whieh petitiom•r complain:;, 
urc oft<'ll 1011ghrr and trurr law than thP dPad \\'on!,- of the written lPxt." 
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall 
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person ... to the 
depriva~.ion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution of the United States. shall. any such 
law, statute. ordinance. regulation, custom, or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the 
party injured in any action at Jaw, suit i11 equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... " Globe App., at 335 
(emphasis added). 
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a govern-
ment that. under color of some official policy, "causes" an 
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the 
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose 
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of 
the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a 
tortfeasor. Indeed. the fact that Congress did specifically 
provide that A's tort beeauw B's liability if B "caused" A to 
subject anoth<'r to a tort suggests that Congress did not in tend 
~ 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent."7 
See Hizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370-371 (1976). 
r- 7 Support for such :1 conclu~ion c:m be found in thr legislative histo~·. 
As we have indicated, there is Yirtually no discussion of § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act.. Again, howrvcr, Congrr~s· treatment of the Sherman amend-
ment givrs a clue to whet her it would ha\'e drs ired to impose respondeat 
superior liability. 
The primar~· con>'titutiOnal Jll>'tifiration for thr Slwrman amrndment. wns 
that 1t \\'a,; a. JJ<'Cl'.-;~a r~· and propc·r rrmed~ · for t1w failure of loraliti~ to 
protrct citizrn,; a,; tlw Prh·ilrgr,; or 1mmunitiP<' Clau,.:e of the Fourteenth 
Amcndml'nt. rl'(!UJn•d. Srt• pp. 10-1:~, supra. And ac!'ording to Sherman, 
Shrlhbarger, and Ednmnd:;, the anH•ndnwnt <·amr into play only when a 
/ locality wa:o at fault or had knowin::;ly JH'glcctPd it :; duty to pro,·ide pro-
,tcction. S<·e C:lohr. at 7()1 (SPn . Shrrman); ill ., :lt 75(i (Sril. Edmumb); 
td ., at 751- 75:2 (H rp. ShPllabargn). But othPr proponrnt:; of thl' amrnd-
mrnt apparrntl~· VJC'\I'Pd it a,; a form of vicariou,.: liability for thr unlawful 
arb of tlw citiz<•n,.: of tht• loeality . Srr id .. at 79:! (Hep. Butlc•r). And 
whethl'r mtrndl'd or not, thr allH'lHlm<·nt as draft<·d did impo,.;r a >'JlC'Cir~ of 
Yi<'<\TiO\lS lial1ility on mtmicipalit i<•s sitlt:('· it could be c:on~t f\Jt'd to impo~ 
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat 
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation 
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the 
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not 
to impose because it thought imposition of such an obligation 
unconstitutional. To this day. there is disagreement about 
the basis for imposing liability on an employer for the torts of 
an employee when the sole nexus bet\vecn the employer and 
the tort is the fact of tlw 0mploycr-employee relationship. 
See \V. Prosser. Law of Torts. ~ 69, at 5(:)9 (4th eel. 1971). 
1\onethcless, two justifications tend to stand out. First is 
the commonsense notion that no matter how blameless an 
employer appears to be in an individual case. accidents rnight 
nonetheless be reduced if rmploycrs had to bear the cost of 
accidents. See, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & F. James, The La.w 
liability rvcn if a municipalit)· did not know of an impending or ent-:uing 
riot. or did not. have the whrrewithall to do :m~·thing nbout it. Indeed, the 
~t<ttute hdd a. municipnlit)· 'li:lblE' c·ven if it had dollP everything in its 
powrr to <·mb tlw riot. Ser p. ~. suwa; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Steven;;); id., 
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id .. at 788 (Tirp. KNr); 1:d .. at 791 (H('p. Willard). 
Whilr the fir~t collfer<:'nre ~tib.•titute was rejected principally on con,;titu-
t.ional ground:', :-'Pe id .. at 80-J. (Th-p. 1>oJnnd), it. i::; plain from the text of 
the second confrrrnce sub~titutl~,,;hich limitrd liability to tho:-;p who, 
having tho powrr to intt>rvem· again"t Ku Klux violenre, "neglect [ rd] or 
refu:>P[d] ~o to do,"::>('!.' Apprndix, infm, at -11. and which wa::; rnacted as 
§ 6 of thr 187] Act and is now rodifird a;; -~2 ll. S.C.§ HJS()-fhat Congre:::s 
:d:-:o rri<·dcd t ho::;e elenwnt~ of Yicnrious li:ibility containril in the first 
confPn'llCP ><ub:::titutP even while accepting the ba::;ir principle that the 
inhabitant::; of a r·ommunit~· wrrr bound to providP protrctiun against the 
Ku Klux Klan. Strictly ::;prn king. of couw·, the fact that Congre,:.,; refu~ccl 
to impo"P Yicariom; liability for thr wrong~ of a f<'w privatP citizen::; doc:; 
not. <·onelu:::in·l~· e,:tabli><h that it would ::;imilarl~· have refu::;rd to impose 
viearium; liability for th<• tort" of a municipality's pmploy('('::;, Noncthe-
1<~, wlwn Congre~;;' rC'j1•ction of the on]~· form of vieariou::: liability 
presen!t'(l to it. i::; combined with tlH' ab,rn1·e of an~· lazJj!uag<' in § 198:3 
which can t'a:-'i!y be con.;tnzC'd to crPate respondeat SU]Jt>rior liability, the 
id<·n·zH:e that Congre::;:; did uot intend to impo:::<' ::;ueh liability is quito 
l'ltrong. 
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of Torts. ~ 2G.3. at l~GR-l~6D (1!)56). Second is the argument 
that th<' cost of accidents shou ld be spread to the community 
as a wholE' on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id., § 26.5; 
\V. Prossf'r. supra, at 459.''s 
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for 
J statutes likr tlw Sherman amendment: "The obligation to 
make comJwnsation for injury resulting from riot is, by arbi-
trary enactment of statutes; affirmatory law. and the reason 
of passing the statute is to secure a more perfect police 
regulation." Globe. at 777 (Sen . Frelinghuysen). This justi-
fication was obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment 
against prrcE'ived constitutional difficulties and there is no 
reason to suppose that a more general liability imposed for a 
similar reason would havr been thought less constitutionally 
objrctionabl<'. The second justification was similarly put 
forward as a justification for the Shennan amendment: "we 
do not look upon [the Sherman amendment] as a punish-
ment . . . . It is a mutual insurance." !d., at 792 (Rep. 
ButlE'r). Again. this justification was insufficicn t to sustain 
the amendmC'nt. 
We conclude. therefore. that a local government may not be 
sued for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 
Instead. it is \\·hen execution of a government's policy or 
custom. whether made by its la\vmakers or by those whose 
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, 
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsi-
ble under ~ HJ83. Since this case unquestionably involves 
official policy as the moving force of the constitutional viola-
58 A third jui'tification, often citrd but which on rxamination is appar-
ently insufficimt to justify the doctrinE' of 1·cspondrat superior, sec, e. g., 
2 F. Harper <.\: F. James, supra. n. rn, § 2o.3, i::: that. liability follows the 
right to control the action~ of :1 tortfrnsor. B~· om deci~ion in Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U. S. 3o2 (1976), wr would apprar to havE' decided thnt the 
mf.'re right. to control without an~· control or din'ction having brrn exrrcisE'd 
and without any failurP to Sll]Wl'Vi>;;C' is not <'llOUgh tO SUpport. § !g83 
liability. See ir.l., n.t 370-:3i. !.. 
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tion found hy th<' Distnct. ( 'ouri. f;<'(' pp. 1- :2. ~111d n. 2. suwa, 
\\'e must rPver:se the judgment lH'IO\\'. In so doing. we ha.ve no 
occasion to address. and do not addrPss. \\'hat the full contours 
of municipal liability UJHI<'r ~ 1\J83 may lw. We have at-
tempted only to sketch so much of the ~ 1 m~;j caus<' of action 
against a local govcnlltH'llt as is appart'nt from tlw history of 
the 1871 Act ami our prior cases and \\'C expressly leave further 
development of this action to anothC'r day. 
Jil 
Although \\'e have stated that stare decis-is has more force in 
statutory analysis than in cottstitutional adjudication because, 
in the former situation, Congress can corrC'ct our mistakes 
through legislation. see. e. g., Edclma11 , .. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
671, and n. 14 (HJ74). \\'C hu.ve never applied stare decisis 
mechanically to prohibit ovC'rrulittg our C'arlier decisions deter-
mining the meaning of statutes. See. e. g., Con6ne'ltlal1'. V., 
lnc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 r. R. 36. 47-4D ( 1977); Burnet 
v. CoTonado Oil & Gns Co .. :285 lT. S. 393. 406 n. 1 (1932) 
(Brandeis. J.. dissenting) (collecting cases). Nor is this a case 
where \\'e should "place on the shoulders of Congress the 
burden of the Court's owll error." GiTouaTd v. United States, 
328 U.S. 61,70 (Hl46) . 
First, M onToc v. Pape, supra, insofar as it completely 
immunizes municipalities from ~uit under ~ 1983. \\'as a depar-
ture from prior practiee. Sc<>. e. fl., KoTthwestern FeTtilizing 
Co. v. Hyde Park, s·upra; ('ity of ManchesleT v. Leiby, 117 
:F'. 2cl GG1 (CAl 1041); l!nnnau v. City of Haverhill, 120 F. 2cl 
87 (C'Al 1041); Douulrts V. (Sty of .Teannett:e, a1n u. S. 157 
(1943); Holmes v. City of Alla11ta, :150 U.S. 870 (1955), in 
('ach of which municipaliti('s wNe defendants in ~ HJSa suits.~\' 
I "•" .Earh ea~P CltNI b~· Monroe. ~P<' :~;i(i U. ~ .. at 191 n. 50, a~ con:;;i~trnt . 
with tht" po~1t10n that local !!O\'!'rnmrnt~ \\·err not § HJo:{ "per~on~" 
rrachPd it;-; con<'hi~IOil b)· a~:<umin~ that ~tat!'-law immunitir:- overrode th~ 
/ § 19~ <:<tl~~<· of ~.ction . Tin~ ha:< n<·,.<:r hP~II th<• law .. 
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Moreover. the constitutional ddect that led to the rcjection 
of tht· Sherman amendment would not have distinguished 
betwC'en municipalities and school boards. each of which is an 
instrumentality of state administration. See pp. 14-22. supra. 
For this reason. our cas<'s-drciclcd both before and after 
Monroe, see 11. 5, s-upra-holding school boards liable in ~ 1983 
actions are inconsistent, \\·itlt Monroe, especially as llfonn>e's 
immunizing principle was (•xtc•ttded to suits for injunctive relief 
in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 F. S. 507 (Hl73)."11 And 
although in many of these cns<'s jurisdiction was not ques-
tioned, we ought not "disrrgarcl the implications of an exercise 
of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [100] years." 
Brown Shoe Co. v. Um.led States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962); 
see Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, s-upra, at 88 
(Marshall, C. J.) ("Those decisions are not cited as author-
ity ... but they have mueh weight. as they show that this 
point neither occurred to the bar or the bench"). Thus, while 
we have reaffirmed Jf on roe without further examination on 
three occasions.'a it can scarcely be• said that Af ouroe is so 
consistent with the warp and \\·oof of civil rights la.w as to be 
beyond question. 
Second. the principlr of blankrt. immunity established in 
Monroe can not be cabinPd short of school boards. Yet such 
an extension \\'Oulcl itsrlf be inconsistent \\'ith recent expres-
sions of congressional itttent. Jn thr \\'ake of our decisions, 
Congress not only has shown 110 hostility to federal court 
d~cisions against school board". but it has indeed rrjccteu 
efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over school 
boards."~ Moreowr. n•cognizing that school boards are often 
" 0 Although many :-:ull" a~a1n~1 ~t·huol bu:mb :d"o inclmll' pri,·at(' indi-
viduals a:; partit>:-:, thr " prine1p:tl dd('ndant i" u~u.11ly tlw local board of 
rdura11011 or srhool hoard.. .lfilhk('ll , .. Bnullt ·!t. ~upra. 11 . -t, at :29:2-293 
(PowELl,, .J ., ronrurring! 
"' !lfoor v. C'oulll!f of Alo1111'rla . -Ill l'. S. ()!);) ( 1\JI:{): Cit!fof Kenosha v. 
Hruuv, 412 ll . S. 501 (191:{) : Alrltll!fer , .. lloll'anl. -1:27 U.S. I (197G). 
G~ Pltring tlw heyday of tlw furor owr h11~illg, both tlw lln\Js<• <111<.! the.' 
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defendants in school desegrcgatioll suits, which have almost 
without Pxception been ~ HJ8:1 suits. Congress has twice 
passed legis;a.tion authorizing grants to school boards to assist 
them in complying \\'ith federal court drcrc<'s."" Finally. in 
Sen at n rrfw<ed t{) :tdopt bill~ that would ha.\·r rt'lllO\'(•d from the fedNal 
court.~ juri:<d iet ion 
"to make any deci~ion, enter any judgment, or i:<.~ur any ord<·r n·quiring 
any stlwol board to makP any change in thr racial compo~it ion of the 
studrnt hod~· at an~· publie ~chool or in ar)~· cia,.:,-: at. an~· pnblic ,.;chool to 
which ,.:tuclrnt~ an• a;-;~il!: nrd in conformit:> with a. frr<'dom of choicr ~·~·~trm. 
or reqniring an~· ~c hoo l board to tmn,.:port nn ~· ~tudrnt ::; from public school 
to anotlwr puhlie ~chool or from onr pbce to another placr or from one 
sehool di::;trict. to anoth~·r ::;chool di:;trict or dt>n~·ing to any ~tudrnt. the 
right. or privi!PgP of attrnding any public sehool or cia;;.-; at any public 
school eho~rn h~· the parent. of ~urh ~ tud<'n t in conformity with a frredom 
of choice ,.;y,.:trm, or rpquiring an~· school board to close any ~c hool and 
tnmsf(•r Ur<' student s from the cio::•Pd school to any other :;chool for the 
purpo,.;e of altering the racial rompo~it ion of 11w ,.;tuclrnt. body at. any 
puhlie :>ehool, or pr<'rluding :my ~rhool board from carrying int o •effect. any 
provi~ion of an~· ron tract brt \\'een it all(! any member oft hr faculty of any 
publi<' ~clwol it opPratr" ,;pPcif~·mg tlw public ,;c hool \\'lwre the member of 
the faeulty i~ to perform hi~ or lwr dutir~ unclr r thr contract." S. 179, 
9acl Cong., 1~t Se~s., § 1207 (Hl71) (emphn~i" added). 
Other bill :; de"i~nPd either cmnpletrl~· to n•movr the federal courts from 
the school dP:;egr<'gation rontro,·<·r~~·. S. 21\7, 9:3cl Cong., ]:;t Se::;::;. (1973), or 
to limit the abilit~· of fpderal rourt::; to Hubject ~chool board,; to rpmrdial 
order,.; in de::wgrPga tion rn:oe,;, S. (il\l, 9~d Cong., 1l't Sr,;::;. (197:3); S. 179, 
93d Cong., M Sr:<:>., § 2 (a) (197:{); H. n. 13534. 92d Cong., 2d Se:;s., 
§ 2922 (1972) . ha,·c· ~imilarly fa ike! . 
n:. In 1972, :<purrrd b~· a finding "thnt. thr ]Horr:<~ of rliminat.ing or 
preventing minorit~· group i ~o l ation and imprm·ing thP quality of rclucation 
for ;~ll chilclrrn oftt>ll iuvolvr;; the <':qwnditmP of additioual fuud :; to which 
local rducational agrneip:; do not h:t\'C' ac·rp:;,.:," 20 U. S. C. § 11301 (n.) 
(Supp. V, 1975) , Congrr~~ pa~~Pd thr 1!172 Emergency School .Aet. Section 
64:3 (n)(1)(A)(i) of that Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1605 (a.)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. V, 
1!175), n.uthorizr::; the :\ ,.;,.;istant Sccrrtar~· 
"to make a grant to , or a ('Ontract \\'ith , a local educational O(!Ctii: .IJ ['Which] 
is implementill(l a plu11 tchich has bt•cn 11ndcrtakcn pur~urwt to a final order 
-i~sued by a l'ourt uf th l.' Cnited State .. ~ ... which rrquire:; thr d<':'rgrrga-
tion of minorit~· ~roup :;rgrrp;ated childrl'n or faculty in the clrmrnt~try nnd 
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tlw Civil Hight. Attoi'll<'ys' Fr<'s Award Act of 1D7o. !)O :-\tat. 
/2641, \\'h ich allows JH'('\·ai J i ng part irs ( i 11 thr discretion of the 
secondarr :;ehooJ,.; of ><ueh ngPJH·~·. or ot hrrwi:<r rrquirr:< the rlimination or 
reduction of minont~· ~!roup 1"ol:tl ion 111 snch >'ClJools." (Empha><is addrd.) 
A "local ('dueational :IJ.?:<'IH'.\'" 1" drfinrd by :.W U.S. C. § lfi1!l (8) (Supp. 
V, I!-J75), a.~ "a publil' board of Pducation or oth('r public authority lrgally 
con::titutccl within a St:il<' for ('ith<·r administrative control or direction of, 
public· (']cmcntar~· or :;cconclar~· :<choob in a city. county, town:;hip, school, 
or othrr political ~ub1livi"ion of a State, or a frdrrall)' recognized Indian 
res<·n·at ioll, or >'llch <·ombination of ;;chool di:;trict:;, or counties ns are 
recognizl'd in a ~tatl' a>' an admiHi:;tratiVP ngrnc)· for its public rlcmrntary 
or ><<'<'O!Jdar~· >'rhools, or a combination of local Pdnration:t! agenci(',.; . ... " 
Congrr::'.~ tlm>< clmrl)· rrcognized that :;chool hoard~ \\'Pre oftrn part iPs to 
fcdrrnl ~<chool dc·>'rgrcg:Jtion :;uit:;. In§ il~ of the Act, 20 U.S. C. § 1617 
(Supp. V, 1975), Congrt'.;s gan• it>' explicit approvnl to the in><titution of 
fcdrrnl de . ..:egrega tion suits again,;! school board:;-pre~umably under § 1983. 
That srction provides : 
"Upon thr. entry of a final ordPr by a court of the United States against a 
local education O(/l'IIC/1 •. • for di~crimination on thr b;l.~i,; of rae<·, color, or 
nn.tional origin in \·iolation of . .. tlw fomternth nmriHin1C'nt to thP 
Con:>titution of thr Fnitl'd StatP~ .. . thr court mn~· allow thr prevailing 
part)', other than thr l 1nitc•d Statr,;, a rensonable attornry':; fee a" part of 
the co:;t:;." (Empha:;i" adclNl.) 
Two yrars latrr, Congre~~ found that ''the implementation of dr,;cgrega-
t.ion plane that. rrquirc rxtrn>'i\·r stuclrnt transportation has, in many cases, 
requirrd local Pducatimwl aoenne~; 1 o <'Xpand [ ~;ic] largr amount;< of funds, 
thPrrh~· dPplrting thrir finanrial rr>'OtHCr~ .. . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a) 
(!l) . (Empha~i;:; addrd.) Congrr:;:< did nor re:<poml by drclaring that 
~chool board,; W<"re not ><ubjrrt to ~lilt und<"r § 1mn or an~· oth<·r frclrral 
statui<'. "but :;imply [ lrgi"latcdJ rrYi:::NI rYidr11tiar~· ~tandard:-< ami remc·dial 
prior it i<•;; to br <·mplo)'Pd b~· th<' cmtrt:< in ckciding :::urh <':l~r:;." Brief for 
National Education A,;.~Il., at 15-Hl. Inclrrd, Congrr:;,; c·xprl's~l:-· rritrratetl 
that. a eau:;<· of aetwn, c·ogrnzabl<' in. tiH• fpdrral comt:;, l'Xists for discrimina-
tion in tlw public ~<·hool rontl'xt. :20 U. S. C. ~§ li03, 170!\, 170.S, 1710, 
lilK Thr Act. a>':<Uill<':< that "<'hoof board,; will ll>'llall)· br thr drfmdant:; 
in such suit:<. For examplr. § :211 of th<· A!'t, :20 U.S. C.§ 1710 provide:;: 
''The Attome)· C:rnPrnl ;;hall not in~111ute n ci\·il action uncJpr ,;ection 
170U of thi~ title• [winch ;dlow:< for :<uit h~ · both priYal<' parti<•::; and the 
AttQrney Uen<'ral to rrdrr"~' di:<rrinunation in puhlir edu<'ation] brfore he--
...... 
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/ court) in ~ 10~3 suits to obtain attomeys fees from the losing 
party, the Senate stated: 
"[D]efendants in these cases are often State or local 
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is 
intend<>cl that thE' attorneys' fe<'s. like other items of costs, 
will be collected either directly from the off-icial. in his 
official capacity, fro1n funds of his agency or under his 
control, or from tile State or loral government (whether 
or not the ayency or uovermnen t is named as a party). 
S. Rep. Xo. 94-1101, at 5 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted). 
Far from showing that C'o11gress has r<>lied on Monroe, there-
fore, events since HHH sho\\' that Congress has refused to 
extend the benefits of Af on roe to school boards and has r attempted to aliO\\' a\\'ards of attorneys' fees against local 
govemments even though M omoe, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 
supm, and Aldinger V. Hou•ard, 427 r. S. 1 (Hl76), have made 
the joinder of such g()\Wnments impossible.r. 1 
Third, municipalitirs can assert no reliance claim \\'hich can 
support an absolute immunity. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
said in Jfonro e, "[tlhis is not an area of commercial law in 
which, presumably. individuals may have arranged their affairs 
in reliance on the cxp<>ct<'d stability of decision." 365 U. S., 
" (a) gin•,; to thr nppropriate rdlll':ttional agl'n<'~· notirl' of the condition 
or condition,; ll'hich, in hi~ juclgmrnt, rou . :titutr a violation of part. I the 
prohibition:< :11 . .!;11in~t di;,;rrinnn:ltton in puhlir. rdueationj." Sl•ction :21\J of 
the Al't, 20 l'. S.C. § 171S. pr01·idl',.; for tlw tl'nnination of rourt ordl'rl'd 
busing .. if t ht• l'omt fi ncl:< t hl' cldrnd:t nt rduea tiona I ag<'IlC'Y ha;; ~a ti"fird t ht• 
rt'quir<'llll'llt" of ihe fifth or fourtrrnth anwndmrnt,.; to thr Con::;titution, 
whichrver j,.; :tppfieaull'. and will l'Olltinur 10 Ue in compliance with the 
n"quireml•nt;:; tiH'I'l'PL" 
104 Whrthl'r Congn•:-;;:;' attempt. i~ in iart rfrrrtivr i~ tlw :mbjrC't of Huto 
v. Fi1mey, 1917 Trrm, No. 7G- 1GGO, and therrforr we rxpre,;,; no view on 
it here. 
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at 221- 222 (dissent). lntkccl. municipalitiPs simply cannot 
"arrange their affairs'' on an assumption that they can violate 
constitutional rights indefinitely since injunctive suits against 
local of-ficials under ~ HJ~3 ,,·ould prohibit any such arrange-
ment. AnJ it scan•ely IH'cd he mentioned that nothing in 
Monroe encourages muniripalitiPs to violate constitutional 
rights or even suggests that such violations are anything other 
than completely wrong. 
Finally, even under the most "tringent test for the propriety 
of overruling a statutory decision proposed by Mr. Justice 
Harlan ill N!onroe ""- "that it must appear beyond doubt from 
the legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] mis-
apprehended the meaning of the [section]," Monroe v. Pape, 
supra, at 192 (concurring opinion )- the overruling of Monroe 
insofar as it holds that local governments arc not "persons" 
who may be defendants in ~ 1983 suits is clearly proper. It 
is simply beyond doubt that. under the 1871 Congress' view 
of the la>v. were § 1983 liability unconstitutional as to local 
goverumcnts. it would have been equally unconstitutional as 
to state officers. Yet cYcryone-proponrnts and opponents 
alike-knev.- § Hl83 would be applicu to stak officers and none-
theless stated that ~ 1083 was constitutional. See pp. 21- 22, 
supra. And. moreover, there can be no doubt that ~ 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act \vas intcnclrcl to provide a complete remedy, 
to be broadly construed. against all forms of official violation 
of federally protected rights. Thr·refore, absent a clear state-
ment in the legislative history supporting the conclusion that 
~ 1 was not to apply to the of-ficial acts of a municipal corpora-
';5 We note, howPvrr, that \Ir. Ju:::tiel' Harlan':< tr::;t ha::: not bren 
expre;;::;ly adopted b~· thi,; Court. \Jon•ovl'r, that tp::;t is basrd on two 
factors: stare drcisis all(] '·indications of c·ongn•:o::::ional arcrptanec of this 
Court.'s earlier interprPtalion !of tlw ~t~Ltllll' in quc•stionl." 3115 U.S., at 
19:!. As we haYl' cxplaitl('d , the :;Pcond con~idcrntion is not. prr.~cnt in this 
•<:\l~C. 
... - .. 
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tion-which simply is not prrs<•ntr-therc is no justification for 
excluding municipalities from the "persons" covered by ~ 1. 
For the rea~ons stat<'d above. thcn•fore. we hold that stare 
decisis does not bar our ov<'tTulitJg of llf onroe insofar as it is 
inconsistent with Parts 1 and II of this opinion.•;G 
IV 
Siuce the question whether local government bodies should 
be afforded some form of official immunity was not presented 
as a question to be decided ou this petition and was not 
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we 
express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity 
beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under ~ 1983 can-
not be entitled to an absolute immunity. lest our decision that 
such bodies are subject to suit under ~ 1983 "be drained of 
meaning." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 41611. S. 232, 248 (1974). Cf. 
Bivens v. Si:t Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. 8. 
389, 397-398 (1971). 
v 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is 
Reversed. 
r.n ~o u~f'ful purposf' would be Sf'rvf'd by :m attempt at thi::; late date to 
drtf'rminr wlw1 ht•r M Ollrul' wa:< corrrct on its fac1". Similarly, since this 
case clearly involvrs oflicial polic~· nnd docs not involve respondeat s·upe1ior, 
we rlo 1101. a~a~· a virw on how om eas<'" whirh havr rl'li<'tl on tha1 aspect 
of .Vonroc that. j,; ovprrulrd today-.1loo1' v. C'ou11t11 uf Alameda, supra, 
n. 9, City of Kenosha y nru/10, ~upra. II. 9, and Aldinge1' v. lloward, 
suwa., 11. G;j- should ha\'l' lwl'n dl'cided on :1 correct virw of § 198:t 
No1hing \IT1 .;ay today nff<·('1::; tlw conclusion rC'arhrd in Moo1'. ~ee 411 
1.1. S., nt im-iO.J, that .J:.l ll. S. C. § 1988 cannot. br u,;;rcl to crrate a 
f<'dC'r:d (':ltl><r of aetion whPn' ~ HJ~:3 rlo<>::< not othrrwi:<c provid<' on or the 
eondH"ioH rra('lwd 111 f'ity of Ko10~ha, :<<'C' .Jl~ U. S., at 513, that 
"uo1hin~ ... :<u~g<'><1[:< I tha1 tiH· gew·rir word ·ppr::;on' in § 19H;~ was 
in1<'1Hled 1o han• a hifm<':i!Pd applira1ion to munieipal corpor:ttions dc-
pcm.lin).!; on thP na111rr. of the n•Jirf :<ough1. again~1 . thrm.." 
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APPENDIX 
As proposed, the Sherman amentlment was as follows: 
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, 
bam, or gra.nary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demol-
ished, pulled tlown , burned. or destroyed, wholly or in 
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with 
force a11d violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; and if such offense was committed to 
deprive any pNson of any right conferred upon him by 
the Constitution and laws of tho United States, or to 
· deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by 
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or 
·parish in which any of the saitl offenses shall be com-
mitted shall be liable to pay full compensation to the 
person or persons damnifierl by such offense if living, or to 
his widmv or legal representative if dead; and such com-
pensation may be recovered by such person or his repre-
sentative by a. suit in any court of the United States of 
competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense 
was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, 
or his legal representative, and again st said county, city, 
or parish. And execution may be issued on a jutlgment 
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any prop-
erty, real or personal , of any person in said county, city, 
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover 
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest, 
fron1 ally person or persons engaged as principle or 
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663. 
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the 
Sherman amendment is : 
"That if ttn:y house, tenement, cabin, shop, building1, 
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bam, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demol-
ished, pulled down, burned. or destroyC'd, wholly or in 
part, by ally persons riotously and tumulL.ously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with 
force and violence be ":hipped, scourged. \vountlecl , or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together, with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for 
exercising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous conditions of servitude, in every such case the 
county, city, or parish in which ally of the said offenses 
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensa-
tion to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if 
living, or to his wido'v or legal representative if dead; and 
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the 
case by such person or his representative in any court of 
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district 
in which the offense was committed. such action to be in 
the name of the person injured. or his legal representative, 
and against said county. city, or parish; and in which 
action any of the parties committing such acts may be 
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judg-
ment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plain-
tiff in such action. may. if not satisfied by the individual 
defendant therein within two months next after the 
recovery of such judgment. upon execution duly issued 
against such individual defendant in such judgment. and 
returned Ullsatisfied, in >Yhole or in part, be enforced 
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attach-
ment, mandamus, garnishment. or any other proceeding 
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of 
judgments against municipal corporatious; anu such judg-
ment shall be a lien as \vell upon all moneys in the 
treasury of such county. city, or parish , as upon the other 
}Jroperty thereof. And the court in any such action may 
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on motion cause additio11al parties to be made therein 
prior to issue joineu, to the end that justice may be done. 
And t~e said county, city, or parish may recover the 
full amount of such judgment. by it paid. with costs a.nd 
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal 
or accessory in such riot. in an action in ally court of 
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish, 
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintifi's 
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755. 
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the 
Sherman amendment is as follows: 
"[A]ny person or persons. having knowledge that any of 
the wrongs conspired to be clone and mentioned in the 
second section of this act are about to be committed, and 
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, 
shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act 
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable 
to the person injured, or his legal representative." Globe, 
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Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department 
of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of 
New York, commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 
in July 1971,1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the 
Board and the Department had as a matter of official policy 
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of 
absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.2 
1 The complaint wa,; amended 011 September 14, 1972 to allege a claim 
under Titlo VII of the 1964 Civil ]lights Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000P (1970 rd., and Supp. V) . Thr Di~t.rict Court held that the 197Z 
amrndmen1s to Title VIl did not apply retroactively to discrimination 
suffered prior 1 o those amendments even when an action challenging such 
prior discrimination was pending on the date of the amendments. 894 
F . Supp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This holding was affirmed on appeaL 
532 F . 2d 259, 261-262 (CA2 1976). Although petitioners sought cer-
tiorari on the TiLle VII is.-;uo as well as the § 1983 claim, we resr.ricted 
our gran1. of certiorari to the latter iRsue. 429 U. S. 1071. 
2 Tho plaint iffK ;dle~Pd that New York had a citywide policy of forcing 
WOJnt·n to takt• matPrni(y leave af1rr the fifth mont,h of pregnancy unless 
a t·i1 y phy~trt;m and. (he h!'ad of an employee's agency allowed up to an 
nddi1.ional two monthH of work. Ammdrd Complaint ~28, App. 13-14. 
Tlw (lrfrndantH did not. dPH~· this, but stated tha,t this policy had been 
<"lmngrd af1rr Kuit waH in::;titu1ed . An;,wer ,113, App. 32-33. The plain-
1.iffH fmther all(•gt"d that thr Hoard -had n policy of requiring women to 
takr ma.trrnit .y lt%\'C' aflrr the H<'vPnth month of pregnancy unless that 
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for 
periods of unlawful forced leave. Named as defendants in the 
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board 
and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor. 
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in 
their official capa.cities.8 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners' 
claims for injunctive· and declaratory relief since the city of 
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had 
changed their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no 
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was 
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F. 
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The 
c.ourt did conclude, however, that the acts complained of 
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. 394 F. Supp., 
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay were 
denied because any such damages would come ultimately from 
the City of New York and, therefore, to hold otherwise would 
be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities 
by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp., 
at 855. 
On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the 
Board of Education • was not a "municipality" within the 
meaning of Monroe v. Pape, supra, and tha.t, in any event, the 
District Court had erred in barring a dama.ge award against 
·the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit rejected both contentions. The court first 
could remain through the end of the school term. Amended Complaint 
H 39, 42, 45, App. 18- 19, 21. This allegation was denied. Answer 
n 1s, 22, Apr. 35- 37. 
3 Amended Complaint f24, App. 11- 12. 
• Petitioners conceded that the Department of Social Services enjoys the 
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under 
§ 1983 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... , 
and, significantly, while it has the right to determine how the 
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final 
say in deciding what its a.ppropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d 
259, 263 (1976) (citation omitted). The individual defend-
ants, however, were "persons" under § 1983, even when sued 
solely in their official capacities. I d., a.t 264. Yet, because a 
damage award would "have to be paid by a city that was held 
not to be amenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a 
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities 
could not proceed. I d., at 265. 
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider 
"Whether local governmental officials and/or local inde-
pendent school boards are "persons" within the meaning 
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature 
of back pay is sought against them in their official 
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8. 
Although, after plenary consideration, we have decided the 
merits of over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in 
which the principal defendant was a school board 5-and, 
5 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977); Dayton Board of Educa-
tion v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorchheimer v. School Disttict 
of Philadelphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v, 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); 
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974); 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974); Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); San Antonio School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board 
of Education, 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish 
School Board, 396 U. S. 226 (1969) ; Alexander v. Holmes County Board 
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 lJ. S. 621 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969); Monroe v. Boatd of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (196.8); SchooL 
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indeed, in some of which § 1983 and its jurisdictional counter~ 
part, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdic~ 
tion6-we indicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), last Term that the question 
presented here was open and would be decided "another day." 
That other day has come and we now overrule Monroe v. Pape, 
supra, insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly 
immune from suit under§ 1983.7 
I 
In Monroe v. Pape, we held that "Congress did not under-
take to bring municipaJ corporations within the ambit of 
[ § 1983] ." 365 U. S., at 187. The sole basis for this conclu-
sion was an inference drawn from Congress' rejection of the 
"Sherman amendment" to the bill which became Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13-the precursor of§ 1983-which would 
have held a municipal corporation liable for damage done to 
the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons 
"riotously and tumultuously assembled." 8 Cong. Globe, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871) (hereinafter "Globe"). Although 
the Sherman amendment did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act, 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Goss v. 
Board of Educat·ion, 373 U. S. 683 (1963) ; McNeese v. Board of Educa-
tion, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 365 U. S. 
569 (1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . 
6 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 63,6 (1974); 
App., Keyes v. School Di.st1'ict No.1, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-507, p. 4a; App., 
Stvann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No. 
281, p . 465a; Petition for Certiomri, Northcross v. Board of Education, 
0 . T. 1969, No. 1136, p. 3; 'Pinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 
U. S. 668, 671 (1963) . 
1 However, we do affirm Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), insofar 
as it holds that the doctrine of respondeat supe1·ior is not a basis for 
rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitut.ionaJ torts of 
their employees. See Part II, infra. 
s We expressly declined to consider "policy considerations" for or 
against municipal liability. See 365 U. S., at 191. 
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which is now § 1983, and although the nature of the obligation 
created by that amendment was vastly different from that 
created by § 1, the Court nonetheless concluded in Monroe 
that Congress must have meant to exclude municipal corpora-
tions from the coverage of ~ 1 because " 'the House [in voting 
against the Sherman amendment] had solemnly decided that 
in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to 
impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, 
the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law.'" 
365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis added), quoting Globe, at 804 
(Rep. Poland). This statement. we thought, showed that 
Congress doubted its "constitutional power ... to impose 
civil liability on municipalities." 365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis 
added), and that such doubt would have extended to any type 
of civil liability.9 
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871; 
and particularly of the case law which each side mustered in 
its support, shows, however, that Monroe incorrectly equated 
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with 
"civil liability." 
A. An Overview 
There are three distinct stages in the legislative considera-
tion of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for 
a. House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained 
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without 
9 Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, has suggested that the 
municipal exclusion m1ght more properly rest on a theory that Congress 
sought to prevent the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose 
on municipalities. See City of Kenosha , .. Btuno, 412 U. S. 507, 517-520' 
(1973) . However, this view has never bef'll shared by the Court, see 
Montoe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 190; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 
U. S. 693, 708 (1973), and the debates do not support this position. 
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amendment.10 Sections 2 through 4 dealt primarily with the 
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in 
the southern States.11 The wisdom and constitutionality of 
these sections-not§ 1, now§ 1983-was the subject of almost 
all congressional debate and each of these sections was 
amended. The House finished its initial debates on H. R. 
320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later the Senate also voted 
out a bill.12 Again, debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and 
that section was passed as introduced. 
Immediately prior to the vote on H. R. 320 in the Senate, 
Senator Sherman introduced his amendment.18 This was not 
an amendment to § 1 of the bill. but was to be added as § 7 at 
the end of the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of 
the amendment was allowed and, although attempts were 
made to amend the amendment, it was passed as introduced. 
In this form, the amendment did not place liability on munic-
ipal corporations, but made any inhabitant of a municipality 
liable for damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultu-
ously assembled." 14 
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amend-
ments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amend-
ment, and the respective versions of H. R. 320 were there-
to Globe, at 522. 
11 Briefly, § 2 created certain federal crimes in addition to those defined 
in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat .. 27, each aimed primarily at 
the Ku Klux Klan. Section 3 provided that the President could send the 
militia into any State wracked with Klan violence. Finally, § 4 provided 
for suspension of the writ of habeas corptJR in enumerated circumstances, 
again primarily those tlwught to obtain where Klan violence was rampant, 
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., lst Sess., App., a.t 335-336 (1871) (hereinafter 
" Globe App " ) 
12 Globe, at 709 
13 See id., at 663, quotrd in Appt>nclix, wfm, at 41-42. 
14 lbtd. An action for rrcovrry of damagrs was to be in the federal 
courts and denommalrd a~ a suit against the county, city, or parish in 
which t·he damage had occurred. Ibid. Execution of the judgment was 
not to run against the property of the government unit, however, but 
a-gainst the private property of any inhabitant. Ibid. 
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fore sent to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill, 
however, was not a subject of this conference since, as noted, 
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of 
Congress. . 
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed 
its work on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference 
committee draft of the Sherman amendment were these: 15 
First, a cause of action was given to persons injured by 
"any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled 
together; ... with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for 
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude ...• " 
Second, the act provided that the action would be against 
the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred and 
that it could be maintained by either the person injured or 
his legal representative. Third, unlike the amendment as 
proposed, the conference substitute made the government 
defendant liable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against 
individual defendants who had committed the violence. If 
a municipality were liable, the judgment against it could be 
collected 
"by execution, . attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or 
any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable 
to the enforcement of judgments against municipal cor-
porations; and such judgment [would become] a lien 
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county, 
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof." 
In the ensuing debate on the first conference report, which 
was the first debate of any kind on the Sherman amendment, 
Senator Sherman explained that the purpose of his amend-
ment was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the en-
l5Sc·e Globe, at 749 and 755, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 42--43. 
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forcement of the civil rights laws by making their property 
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damage,l6 Statutes drafted 
on a similar theory, he stated, had long been in force in 
England and were in force in 1871 in a number of States.17 
Nonetheless there were critical differences between the con-
ference substitute and extant state and English statutes: the 
conference substitute, unlike most state riot statutes, lacked 
a short statute of limitations and imposed liability on the gov-
ernment defendant whether or not it had notice of the impend-
ing riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to 
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted all reason-
able efforts to stop the riot, and whether or not the rioters 
were caught and punished.18 
The first conference substitute passed the Senate but was 
rejected by the House. House opponents, within whose ranks 
16 "Let the people of property in the southern States understand that if 
they will not make the hue and cry and taJm the necessary steps to put 
down lawless violence in those States their property will be holden respon-
sible, and the effect will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761. 
Senator Sherman was apparently unconcerned that the conference com-
mittee substitute, unlike the original amendment, did not place liability 
for riot damage directly on the property of the well-to-do, but instead 
placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes 
would be levied against the property of the inhabitants to make the locality 
whole. ' 
17 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in 
England immediately after the Norman Conquest and had most recently 
been promulgated as the law of 7 & 8 Geo. IV, ch. 31. See Globe, at 760. 
During the course of the debates, it appeared that Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, and New York had similar laws. See id., at 751 (Rep. 
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 771 (Sen. Thurman); 
id., at 792 (Rep. Butler). Such a municipal liability was apparently 
'Common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman). 
J.s In the Senate, opponents, including a number of Senators who had 
voted for § 1 of the bill, criticised the Sherman amendment as an imperfect 
:and impolitic rendering of the state statutes. Moreover, as drafted, the 
'Conference substitute could be construed to protect rights that were not 
protected by the Constitution. A complete critique was given by Senator 
'Thurman. See Globe, at 770-772. 
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were some who had supported § 1, thought the Federal Gov-
ernment could not, consistent with the Constitution, obligate 
municipal corporations to keep the peace if those corporations 
were neither so obligated nor so authorized by their state 
charters. And, because of this constitutional objection. oppo-
nents of the Sherman amendment were unwilling to impose 
damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which Congress 
could not require municipalities to perform. This position is 
reflected in Representative Poland's statement that is quoted 
in Monroe. 19 
Because the House rejected the first conference report a 
second conference was called and it duly issued its report. 
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment 
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any per-
son or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate 
civil rights was afoot], and having power to prevent or aid 
in preventing the same," who did not attempt to stop the 
same, liable to any person injured by the conspimcy.20 The 
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Con~ 
gress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986. 
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can 
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on 
the report of the first conference committee. This debate 
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised 
against the Sherman amendment-on which our holding in 
Monroe was based. seep. 5, supra-would not have prohibited 
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state munici-
pal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act does not state expressly that municipal 
corporations come within its ambit, it is finally necessary to 
interpret § 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeed 
intended to be included within the "persons" to whom that 
section applies. 
1u See 365 U.S., a.t 190, quoted at. p. 5, supra. 
'2° See(Globe, at 804, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 43. 
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B. Debate on the First Conference Report 
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and 
opponents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of 
Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases 
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several 
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, how-
ever, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitu-
tionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an 
argument from the debates on the first conference report and 
those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed 
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states," 
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of 
Representative Shellabarger, the House sponsor of H. R. 320, 
is the most complete. 
Shellabarger began his discussion of H. R. 320 by stating 
that "there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the 
right consideration of this measure which is wholly unex-
plored." Con g. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 67 (1871) 
(hereinafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however. 
With respect to the meaning of§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Shellabarger relied on the statement of Mr. Justice Washing-
ton in Garfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa. 
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV: 
"'What these fundamental privileges are[,] it would per-
haps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They 
may, however, be all comprehended under the following 
general heads: protection by the Government;'-
uMark that-
" 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property 
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety .... '" Globe App., at 69 (emphasis added)~ 
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at 380. 
·. 
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Building on his conclusion that citizens were owed protec-
tion-a conclusion not disputed by opponents of the Sherman 
Amendment 21-Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in 
providing that protection. Here again there were precedents: 
11 [Congress has always] assumed to enforce, as against 
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions 
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con· 
stitution which restrain and directly relate to the States, 
such as those in r Art. I, § 10,] relate to the divisions of 
the political powers of the State and General Govern-
ments. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of 
the States arc all of such nature that they can be, and 
even have been, ... enforced by the courts of the United 
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on 
Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the 
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitu-
tion. But there are some that arc not of this class. 
These are where the court secures the rights or the liabili-
ties of persons within the States, as between such persons 
and the States. 
21 Sec Globe, at 758 (Sen. Trumbull); id .. nt 772 (Sen. Thurman); id., 
at 791 (Rep. Willard). ThP Supremr Court of Indiana had so held in 
giving effect to the Civil Rights Art of 1866. Sec Smith v. Moody, 26 Incl. 
299 ( 1866) ( followi11p; Coryell), one of t hrrc state supreme court cases 
referred to in Globr App ., at 68 (Rep. ShPilabarger). Moreover, § 2 of 
t·he 1871 Act as passrd, unlike § 1, prosecuted persons who violated federal 
rights whcther or not that violation was under color of offteial authority, 
apparently on the theory that Ku Klux Klan violrnce was infringing thc 
nght of protection drfinrd by Coryell. Nonetheless, opponents argurcl 
that municipalitirs were not general!~· charged by the States with keeping 
thr peace and hence did not lmvc police forces, ~o that the duty to afford 
protcction ought not devolve on thr municipality, but on what('ver agency 
of state government wa~ charged by the State with keeping the peace. 
Sre p. 7f-• and n. 30, infra. In addition, they arguPd that Congrrss could 
not constitutionally add to the duties of municipalities. Sec pp. 13-19, 
iufra. 
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"These three are: first, that as to fugitives from jus-
tice r221 ; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or 
slaves r281 ;) third, that declaring that the 'citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States.' r24J 
"And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where 
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the 
constitutional provisions-the only three where the rights 
or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these per-
sons and the States, are directly provided for, Congress 
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ... 
such persons." Globe App., at 69-70. 
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog 
of the Sherman amendment. ironically, was the statute imple-
menting the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions 
of Art. IV-the Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the 
constitutionality of which had been sustained in 1842, in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539. There, Mr. Justice Story, 
writing for the Court, held that Art. IV gave slaveowners a 
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in 
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 612. 
Because state process for recovering runaway slaves might be 
inadequate or even hostile to the rights of the slaveowner, 
the right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to 
22 U. S. Canst., Art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2 : 
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who 
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand 
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered 
up, to be removed to 1,he State having Jurisdiction of Lhe Crime." 
23 I d., cl. 3 · 
" No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
'l:lSeaping mto another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered 
up on Claim of the Party to :whom such Service. or Labour may be due:~ 
24 /ri ., cl. 1. 
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state implementation. ld., at 614. Thus, since the Constitu-
tion guaranteed the right and this in turn required a remedy, 
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had 
the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessa~:y 
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. ld., at 615. 
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy 
against municipalities and counties was an appropriate-and 
hence constitutional-method for e11suring the protection 
which the Fourteenth Amendment made every citizen's federal 
right. 25 This much was clear from the adoption of such 
statutes by the several States as devices for suppressing riot. 26 
Thus, said Shellabarger, the only serious question remaining 
was "whether, since a county is an integer or part of a State, 
the United States ca11 impose upon it. as such, any obligations 
to keep the peace in obedience to United States laws." 27 This 
he answered affirmatively, citing Board of Commissioners v. 
Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 ( 1861), the first of many cases 28 
upholding the power of federal courts to enforce the Contract 
Clause a.gainst municipalities. 20 
House opponents of the Sherman amendment-whose views 
are particularly important since only the House voted down 
25 See Globe, at 751. See also id., at 760 (Sen. Sherman) ("If a State 
may ... pass a law making a county . . . responsible for a riot in order 
to deter uch crime, then we may pass the same remedies .. . . ") . 
:G fd., at 751 ; seen . 17, supra. 
2 7 Globe, at 751 (emphasis added) . Compare tlns statement with Repre-
sentative Poland's remark upon which our holding in Monroe was based. 
Seep. 5, supra. 
28 See, e. g., Gelpcke v . City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1864) ; Von Hoff-
man v. Clt.1J of Quiucy, 4 Wall. 535 (1RG7) ; Rioos \'. Johnso11 County, 6 
Wall. 16() (lSGR): Weber v. Lee Count!J. n Wall. 210 (lkoH): .'iupervisors 
v. Rooers. 7 \Vall. 175 (lkH9) ; BenboiC v. iowa Ctiy , 7 Wall. :H:3 (1R69) ; 
Supervisors v Dumut, 9 Wall. 415 (1870) . St>t> g<'IH'rall~ · C. Fairman, 
1Iititory of the Suprrnw Court of tlw Unitrd Rtn!t'~ : RPcon~trurtion and 
Hrunion , 1864-1888, rh ~. 17- 18 (1971} . 
~9 l;!,ee Globe, at 751- 752. 
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th<' amendment-did not dispute Shellabarger's claim that the 
Fourteenth Amendment created a federal right to protection. 
see n. 21, supra, but they argued that the local units of 
government upon which the amendment fastened liability were 
not obligated to keep the peace at state law and further that 
the Federal Government could not constitutionally require 
local governments to create police forces. whether this require-
mel! t was levied dir<'ctly. or indirC'ctly by imposing damages 
for breach of the peace on municipalities. The most complete 
statcmen t of this position is that of R<'prescn tative Blair: 30 
"The proposition known as the herman amend-
so Others takmg a view s11111lar to Hepresentative Blair's included: 
Repre~ntativo Willard, :oer id., nt 701; Hepre::;enl<ltive Poland, >:ee id., at 
794; Repre~entative Burchard, ~:;ep id., at 7H5; Hepresen!atiw Farn::;worth, 
soe id., at 799. Representative Willard abo took a ::;omewhat different 
po~1tion. He thought tha.t the Constitution would not allow Ow Federal 
Government to dict<lte the mannpr in which a State fulfilled it~:; obligation 
of pro1Rction. That i:s, hr thought it a maf!Pr of ::;taft' discretion whether 
it delrga ted I he pracrkPrping powN to n municipnl or county eorporation, 
to a sheriff, pfc. He did not doubt, howPv<•r, that the Fedrral Govrrnmenl 
could impo:-;r on the Stales the obligatwn imposed by the Sherman amend-
ment, a,nd prP~:;umably lw would ba.ve enforcrd the amendment against a, 
municipal corporation to which tlw peacekeeping obligation had been 
delegatro . Ser id .. at 791. 
Opponent,; of tlw Hlwrman anwndnwnt 111 thr SPnatr ag;n•('(l with Blair 
that, C'ongn•ss had no pow<•r to pa~s tlw Rll('rman anH·ndnwnt l>reau;;e it, 
ft'll out-~id<• limit s on natwnal pow<'r implic·it in tlw fcdc·rnl struetur<' of tlw 
Con~titution, and f<'<'Ognizrd in, e. o. C'ollettor v.lJay. 11 Wall. ll:l (li-171 ). 
Howpvrr, tlw HPnate opponpnts rocu~Pd not on the amPndnwnt.'s attempt 
to ob!Jgate munit'ipallli<•s to kPrp tlw pPa<'e, but on tlw liPn crc•atPd h~ · th<' 
anwndmPnt, wlurh ran agam~t all moiH·~· and propert~· or a defendant 
mum<·Jpalit~·, meluctmg propPrt~· held for public purposPH, >:urh as jail,; or 
eourt hou,;t•s. Oppom·nts a rgu<'d that surh a, lien oneP <•nt!'rC'd would have 
th<• rlf<'rt of making it impo::;~ihlr for the· 1!1\llllt'ipality to function. since• no 
on<' woulll trade• with it . He<',<'. o .. nlolw, at 7(i:2 (Sen. StPvt·n~on): id., 
<Lt. 7();~ (8<'11. ( 'a.~S<'rl.\·). :\I orrovc•r, i('VP r~·o iH' km•w that ~ound policy 
pr<'v<·ntrd t'Xt'<'UtJon again~! publi<' propnt .\· ::;imP thi~ too waH nrrdecl if 
lora! gov<"rnmt•nt wa" to ~urvi\"t'. RrP, 1'. (! .• ibid. SP<' al~o 1\frriU"ether v. 
(Jarrett, 102 l ' H, -1(:2, .101, f)l:~ (11--r;O) ( n·<"ognizing prinripl<' that publie 
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ment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a pre· 
cedent in this country. . . . That amendment claims the 
power in the General Government to go into the States 
of this Union and lay such obligations as it may please 
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the 
States alone .. .. 
" ... [H] ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an 
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to 
create that obligation, and that is the provision I am 
unable to assent to. The parallel of the hundred does not 
in the least meet the case. The power that laid the 
obligation upon the hundred first put the duty upon the 
hundred that it should perform in that regard, and failing 
to meet the obligation which had been laid upon it, it was 
very proper that it should suffer damage for its neglect .... 
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong 
to the States, ... there are certain powers that inhere in 
the State governments. They create these municipalities, 
they say what their powers shall be and what their obliga-
tions shall be. If the Government of the United States 
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not 
utterly destroy the municipality? If it can say that it 
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, . . . 
where [will] its power ... stop and what obligations ... 
might [it] not Jay upon a municipality .... 
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court 
decided [in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall 113 (1871)] that 
property of a, municipalit~· not. subject to t'xccution); 2 Dillon, Municipal 
Corpomtion~ §§445-446 (1873 rd.) (same). 
Although tlw argumrnt:; of the Senate opponrnts appear to be a, correct 
ana.Jy::;i::; of then-controlling constitutional and rommon-lnw principles, their 
argumrnt.::; a.r<> uot rrlevnnt to an ana]y~is of the constitutionality of § 1 of 
tlw Civil Hight ::; Act ::;incr any judgmrnt under that. ::;cction, a::; in any rivif 
,m iL in thr fedE-ral court:; in 1R71 , would have been enforced pur:;uant to 
state law~ undE-r the proce&-; acts of 1792 and 1828. See Act of May 8,, 
J792. rh. 3(i, 1 Stat,. 271'l ; Act. of May 19, 1828,_ ch. 68, 4 St.<J.t, .. 2.7&. 
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there is no power in the Government of the United States, 
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a Stat('} 
officer. Why? Simply because the power to tax involves 
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give 
the Government of the United States power to destroy 
the government of the States in any respect. It was held 
also in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania [16 Pet. 539 
(1842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress 
of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer; 
that we cannot command a State officer to do any duty 
whatever, as such ; and I ask .. . the difference between 
that and commanding a municipality which is equally the 
creature of the State, to perform a duty." Globe, at 795. 
Any attempt to impute a unitary constitutional theory to 
opponents of the Sherman amendment is, of course, fraught 
with difficulties, not the least of which is that most Members 
of Congress did not speak to the issue of the constitutionality 
of the amendment. Nonetheless, two considerations lead us 
to conclude that opponents of the Sherman a.mendment found 
it unconstitutional substantially because of the reasons stated 
by Representative Blair: First, Blair's analysis is precisely 
that of Poland, whose views were quoted as authoritative in 
Monroe, sec p. 5, supra, and that analysis was shared in large 
part by all House opponents who addressed the constitution-
ality of the Sherman amendment.~, Second, Blair's exegesis 
of the reigning constitutional theory of his da.y, as we shall 
explain, was clearly supported by precedent-albeit precedent 
that has not survived. see Ex Parte Virgim'a, 100 U. S. 339, 
347-348 (1880); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 
466, 486 (1939)-and no other constitutional formula was 
advanced by participants in the House debates. 
Collector v. Day, cited by Blair, was the clearest and, at the 
time of the debates, the most recrnt pronouncement of a 
doctrine of coordinate sovereignty that, as Blair stated, placed 
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limits on even the enumerated powers of the National Govern-
ment in favor of protecting State prerogatives. There, the 
Court held that the United States could not tax the income of 
Day, a Massachusetts state judge, because the independence 
of the States within their legitimate spheres would be imperiled 
if the instrumentalities through which States executed their 
powers were "subject to the control of another and distinct 
goverument." 11 WalL at 127. Although the Court in Day 
apparently rested this holding in part on the proposition that 
the taxing "power acknowledges no limits but the will of 
the legislative body imposing the tax," id., at 125-126; cf. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the Court had 
in other cases limited other national powers in order to avoid 
interference with the States.32 
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra, for example, Mr. Justice 
Story, in addition to confirming a broad national power to 
legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause, seep. 12. supra, held 
that Congress could not "insist that states ... provide means 
to carry into effect the duties of the national government." 
16 Pet., at 615-616. 3a And Mr. Justice McLean agreed that, 
"[a]s a general principle." it was true "that Congress had no 
power to impose duties on state officers, as provided in the 
[Act of 1793, supra]." Nonetheless he wondered whether 
Congress might not impose "positive" duties on state officers 
where a clause of the Constitution, like the Fugitive Slave 
82 In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Lane County v. Oregon, 
7 Wall. 71, 77, 81 (1869), in which the Court held that the federal legal 
tender act<; should not be construed to rpquire the States to accept taxes 
tendered in United States notcR since this might interfere with a legitimate 
tate act.ivity. 
sa ChiCf Justice Tan e)' ngrrrd : 
"The state ollic.ers mentioned in the law ror 1793] are not bound to 
execute the duties 1mposed upon them by Congress, unless they choose to 
do so, or are required to do so by a law of the state; and the state 
leg1slature has the power, if it thinks proper, to prohibit them. The act 
of 1793, therefore, must depend altogether for its execution upon the offi-
<eers of the Umted States named in it." 16 Pet., at. 630 (Taney, C. J.). 
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Clause, seemed to require affirmative government assistance, 
rather than restraint of government, to secure federal rights. 
See id., at 664-665. 
Had Justice McLean been correct in his suggestion that, 
where the Constitution envisioned affirmative government 
assistance, the States or their officers or instrumentalities could 
be required to provide it, there would have been little doubt 
that Congress could have insisted that municipalities afford 
by "positive" action the protection R4 owed individuals under 
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment whether or not municipali-
ties were obligated by state law to keep the peace. However, 
any such argument, largely foreclosed by Prigg, was made 
impossible by the Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison, 
24 How. 66 (1861). There, the Court was asked to require 
Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, to hand over Lago. a fugitive 
from justice wanted in Kentucky, as required by § 1 of the Act 
of 1793,35 supra, which impleme11ted Art. IV. § 2. cl. 2, of the 
Constitution. Chief Justice Taney. writing for a unanimous 
eourt, refused to enforce that section of the Act: 
"[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under 
the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State offi-
cer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload 
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and 
disable him from performing his obligations to the State, 
a; See pp. 10-11, and n . 21, supm. 
35 "Be it enacted .. . That whenever the executive authority of any state 
in the Union ... shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice . . . 
and hall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found . . . charging 
the person so demanded, w1th having committed treason, felony or other 
'Crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the 
state ... from whence the person so charged fled, it shall be the duty of 
the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall 
have fled, to cause hnn or her to be arrested and secured .. . and to 
'Cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the demand.ing state] 
\-vhen he shall appear .... " 1 Slat. 302. 
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and might impose on him duties of a character incompati-
ble with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by 
the State." 24 How., at 107-108. 
The rationale of Dennison-that the Nation could not 
impose duties on state officers since that might impede States 
in their legitimate activities-is obviously identical to that 
which animated the decision in Collector v. Day. See p. 16, 
supra. And, as Blair indiqated, municipalities as instrumen-
talities through which States executed their policies could be 
equally disabled from carrying out State policies if they were 
also obligated to carry out federally imposed duties. Although 
no one cited Den:nison by na.me, the principle for which it 
stands was well known to Members of Congress,'w many of 
whom discussed Day H7 as well as a series of state supreme 
court cases HH in the mid-1860's which had invalidated a federal 
tax on the process of state courts on the ground that the tax 
threatened the independence of a vital state function.'j 9 Thus, 
there was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman 
amendment, by putting municipalities to the Hobson's choice 
of keeping the peace or paying civil damages, attempted to 
impose obligations on municipalities by indirection that could 
not be imposed directly, thereby threatening to "destroy the 
government of the States." Globe, at 795. 
If municipal liability under ~ 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
36 "The Suprcme Court of thc Umtcd States has decidcd rcpcatcdly that 
Congre~s can nnposc no duty on a State• offirer." Globe, at 799 (Rep. 
Farnsworth) . Sce also td., at 788-789 (Rep. Krrr) . 
'17 See, e. {f., Globe, at 7G4 (Srn. DaviK) ; ibid. (Srn . Cnsserly); id., 772 
(Sen. Thurman) (rcritmg logic of Day); id., at 777 (Sen. Frrlinghuysen); 
ul., at 7 8-789 (Rep. Kerr) (reciting logic of Day); id., at 793 (Rep. 
Poland) ; id., at 799 (Rep. Farnsworth) (also reciting logic of Day). 
38 Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276 (1864) ; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 
Wis 369 (1865), Fifield v Close, 15 Mtch. 505 (1867); Union Bank v. 
llzll, 3 Cold (43 Trnn .) 325 (1866), Smith v Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1867). 
1" SeP Globe, at 764 (Sen . DaviK); ibid. (Sen. ca~~erley). See also T. 
99c!e~ 1 C'on~titutiOnal L!mitat~ons *483-·x-184 (1871 rd .), 
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created a similar Hobson's choice, we might conclude, as 
Monroe did, that Congress could not have intended munici-
palities to be among the "persons" to which that section 
applied. But this is not the case. 
First. opponents expressly distinguished between imposing 
an obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil 
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by 
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for 
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated 
that Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction on the 
federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold municipalities 
liable for using their authorized powers in violation of the 
Constitution- which is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
went : 
"I presume . . . that where a State had imposed a duty 
[to keep the peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action 
would be allowed to be maintained against them in the 
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions 
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by 
their own contract, or by a State law, in the courts, is a 
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or 
liability upon them by the national Government, which 
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no 
power or control over them whatever." Globe, at 794. 
Representative Burchard agreed : 
" [T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the 
United States, or usually by State laws, upon a county to 
protect the people of that county against the commission 
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of 
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to 
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as 
corporations ; they are conferred upon cities that have 
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities are con-
'Cerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded 
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by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps 
the United States courts could enforce its perform-
ance. But counties ... do not have any control of the 
police ... . " !d., at 795. 
See also the views of Rep. Willard. discussed at n. 30, supra. 
Second, the doctrine of dual sovereignty apparently put no 
limit on the power of federal courts to enforce the Constitution 
against municipalities that violated it. Under the theory of 
dual sovereignty set out in Prigg, this is quite understandable. 
So long as federal courts were vindicating the Federal Consti-
tution, they were providing the "positive'' government action 
required to protect federal constitutional rights and no ques-
tion was raised of enlisting the States in "positive" action. 
The limits of the principles announced in Dennison and Day 
are not so well defined in logic, but are clear as a matter of 
history. It must be remembered that the same Court which 
rendered Day also vigorously enforced the Contracts Clause 
against municipalities-an enforcement effort which included 
various forms of "positive" relief, such as ordering that taxes 
be levied and collected to discharge federal court judgments, 
once a constitutional infraction was found.40 Thus, federal 
49 See cases cited at n. 28, supm. Since this Court granted unques-
tionably "positive" relief in ContractR Clausr cases, it appears that the 
distinction between the Shrrman amendmrnt and those cases was not that 
the former creatrd a positive obligation wherras the latt.rr imposed only 
a negative restraint. Instrad, the distinction must have been that a viola-
tion of the Constitution was the predicntr for "positive" rrlief in the Con-
tracts Clause cases, whereas t·llP Shrrman amrndment imposrd damages 
wit.hout. regard to whether a loc::tl governmrnt was in any wa,y at fault 
for the breach of the peace for which it was to l>e hrld for damages. See 
p 8, supm. While no one stated this distinction E'XJ)ressly during the 
debates, the inference is st.rong that Congrrssmen in 1871 would have 
drawn this distinction since it rxplainA why Rrprcsentatives Poland, 
Burchard, and Willard, srr pp . 20-21, supra, conlcl oppo~e the amendment 
while at the same time saying that the Frdrral Governmrnt might impose 
damage,' on a local government that had defaulted in a state-imposed d1.1ty 
75-1914-0PINION 
22 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
judicial enforcement of the Constitution's express limits on 
state power, since it was done so frequently, must notwith-
standing anything said in Dennison or Day have been permis-
sible, at least so long as the interpretation of the Constitution 
was left in the hands of the judiciary. Since § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act simply conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts 
to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation 
precisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under 
which the Contract Clause was enforced against munici-
palities-there is no reason to suppose tha.t opponents of the 
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional 
barrier to § 1 suits against municipalities. 
Finally, the very votes of those Members of Congress, who 
opposed the Sherman amendment but who had voted for § 1, 
confirm that the liability imposed by § 1 was something very 
different from that imposed by the amendment. Section 1 
without question could be used to obtain a damage judgment 
against state or municipal officials who violated federal consti-
tutional rights while acting under color of la:w.41 However, for 
Prigg-Dennison-Day purposes, as Blair and others recognized/ 2 
there was no distinction of coustitutional magnitude between 
officers and a.gents-includiug corporate agents-of the State: 
both were state instrumentalities and the State could be 
impeded no matter over which sort of instrumentality the 
to keep the pracr and it al~o rxplain~ why rveryone agreed that. a state 
or municipal offiCPr could con::;titutionall~· be held liable under § 1 for 
violation::; of thr Con~titution. Srr pp. 22-2:3, infra. 
41 See, e. g., Globe, at 334 (Rep. Hoar); id., at 365 (Rep. Arthur); id., 
at 367-368 (Rep. Sheldon); id., at 385 (Rep. Lewis); Globe App., at 217 
(Sen. Thurman) . In addition, officers were included among those who 
could be sued under the ~econd conference substitute for the Sherman 
Amendment. See Globe, at 805 (exchange between Rep. Willard and Rep. 
Shellabarger) . There were no constitutional objections to the second 
report. 
42 See Globe, at 795 (Rep. Blair); id., at 788 (Rep. Kerr); id., at 795 
(Rep. Burchard) ; id., at 799 (Rep. Farm;worth) . 
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Federal Government sought to assert its power. Dennison 
and Day, after all, were not suits against municipalities but 
against officers and Blair was quite conscious that he was 
extending these cases by applying them to municipal cor-
porations. •:• Nonetheless, Senator Thurman. who gave the 
most exhaustive critique of § l-inter alia complaining that it 
would be applied to state officers, see Globe, at 217-and who 
opposed both § 1 and the Sherman amendment, the latter on 
Prigg grounds, agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitu-
tional.44 Those who voted for § 1 must similarly have believed 
in its constitutionality despite Prigg, Dennison, and Day. 
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill 
From the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that 
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would 
have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question remains, however, whether the 
general language describing those to be liable under § 1-"any 
person"-covers more than natural persons. An examination 
of the debate on § 1 and application of appropriate rules of 
construction shows unequivocally that § 1 was intended to 
cover legal as well as natural persons. 
Representative Shellabarger was the first to explain the 
function of § 1: 
"[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons 
43 " LWJ e cannot command a State officer to do any duty whatever, as 
such; and I ask ... the difference between that and commanding a munic-
tpahty . . " Globe, at 795. 
44 Sec Glohr App., at 216-217, quoted, infra, at n. 45. In 1879, more-
OV('r, when the question of the limits of the Prigg principle was squarely 
prrscntcd in Ex part!' Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), this Court held that 
Demnson and Day and the principle of fedrralism for which they stand 
did not prohibit federal enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
t hrough Rtti ts directed to state oflicers. See 100 U. S., at 345-34 . 
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whose former condition may have been that of slaves, 
but also to al1 people where, under color of State law, 
they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which 
they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and 
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68. 
By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1 
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sectionR 
of the 1871 Act were addressed. Representative Shellabarger 
also stated without reservation that the constitutionality of 
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitu-
tionality of § 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been 
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of 
this Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit, who 
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of 
every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to 
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1: 
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of 
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and con-
stitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are lib-
erally and beneficently construed. It would be most 
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the 
rule of interpretation. As has been again and again de-
cided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, 
and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpre-
tation, the largest latitude consistent with the words 
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes 
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and 
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the 
people. . . . Chief Justice Jay and also Story say: 
" 'Where a power is remedial in its nature there is 
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed 
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation 
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 429.'' Globe App., 
at 68. 
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's. 
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opening speech were echoed by Senator Edmunds, the man-
ager of H. R. 320 in the Senate: 
"The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, 
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the 
United States when they are assailed by any State law or 
under color of any State law. and it is merely carrying 
out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866], which 
have since become a part of the Constitution." Globe, at 
568. 
"[Section 1 is] so very simple and really reenacting the 
Constitution." ld., at 569. 
And he agreed that the bill "secure[ed] the rights of white 
men as much as of colored men." ld., at 696. 
In both Houses, statements of the supporters of § 1 corrob-
orated that Congress, in enacting § 1, intended to give a 
broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil 
rights.45 Moreover, since municipalities through their official 
45 Representative Bi11gham, the author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, for example, declared the bill's purpose to be "the enforcement .. . 
of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic .. . 
to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe 
App., at 81. He continued: 
"The States never had the right, though they had 1 he power, to inflict 
wrongs upon free citizens by a denial of thr full protection of the laws .... 
rAnd] the Stat('S did deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws, they 
did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the 
extent of the express limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the 
ciltzen had no remedy. . . . They took property without compensntion, 
and he had no remedy. They rr::;trictcd the freedom of the press, and he 
had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no 
remedy. They restricted the t;gh1s of con1'cienre, and he had no rem-
edy.. . . . Who dare say, now that. the Constitution has been amended, 
tha.t the nation cannot by la.w provide against all such abuses and denials 
of nght as these in the State,-; and by States, or combinations of persons?" 
!d., at 85 
Representative Perry, commenting on Congress' action in passing the civil 
rights bill also sk'ttcd : 
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acts, could equally with natural persons create the harms 
intended to be remedied by § 1, and, further, since Congress 
intended § 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to 
suppose that municipal corporations would have been excluded 
from the sweep of § 1. Cf.,, e. g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 
" Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can 
assert the mischief intended to be remedied. We have asserted as clearly 
as we can assert our belief that it is the duty of Congress to redress that 
mischief. We have also asserted as. fu lly as we can assert the constitutional 
right of Congress 1o legislate." Globe, at 800. 
Sec also id., at 376 (Rep. Lowe); id., at 428-429 (Rep. Beatty); id., 
at 4<J8 (Rep. Butler); id., at 475-477 (Hep. Da.wcs); id., at; 57&-579 (Sen. 
Trumbull); id., at. 609 (Sen. Pool); Globe App., at 182 (Rep. Mercur) . 
Other supporters were quite clear that § 1 of the act extended a remedy 
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also 
where officers of the State were deliberately indifferent, to the rights of 
black cit.izens : 
"But the chief compla.int is [that] by a. systematic maladministration of 
[state bw], or a neglect or refusal to enforce the.ir provisions, a portion of 
the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state 
of facts is clearly made out, I believe [§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those 
persons who are thus denied equal protection." Globe App., at 153 (Mr. 
Garfield). See also Monroe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 171-187. 
Importantly for our inquiry, even the opponents of § 1 agreed that it was 
constitutionnl and, furt,her, that it swept. very broadly. T·hus, Senator 
Thurman, who gave the mo:st exhaustive critique of § 1, said: 
"This section relates wholly to civil suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give 
to the F·ederal Judiciary thaL which now does not belong to it--a jurisdic-
tion that may be constitutionally conferred upon it, I g1·ant, but that has 
never yet been conferred upon it. It authorizes any person who is deprived 
of any right, privilege, or immunity serured to him by the Constitution of 
the United States, to bring an action a.gainst the wrongdoer in the Federal 
courts, and that without aJJY limit whatsoever as to the amount .in 
controversy ...• 
"['l']here is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that m·e employed 
{in the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be used." Globe App., 
at 216-217 (emphasis added). 
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339, 346~347 (1880); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Anqeles, 
227 U.S. 278, 286-287,294-296 (1913). One need not rely on 
this inference alone, however, for the debates show that Mem-
bers of Congress understood "persons" to include municipal 
corporations. 
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of 
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 
(1834), especially in mind. "In [that] case the city had taken 
private property for public use, without compensation ... , 
and there wa.s no redress for the wrong .... " Globe App., 
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly 
indicate his view that such takings by cities, as had occurred 
in Barron, would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See 
id., at 85. More generally, and as Bingham's remarks confirm, 
§ 1 of the bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress 
provided redress for takings, since that section provided the 
only civil remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations and 
that Amendment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated 
takings:w Given this purpose, it beggars reason to suppose 
that Congress would have exempted municipalities from suit, 
insisting instead that compensation for a taking come from an 
officer in his individual capa.city rather than from the govern-
ment unit that had the benefit of the property taken.47 
In addition, by 1871, it was well understood that corpora-
tions should be treated as natural persons for virtually all pur-
poses of constitutional and statutory analysis. This had not 
always been so. When this Court first considered the question 
of the status of corporations, Chief Just,ice Marshall, writing 
for the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons 
·40 See Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
§ 1956 (Cooley ed . 1873) . 
11 Indeed the federal courts found no obstacle to awards of damages 
again t municipalities for common-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadel-
phia, 23 F. Cas. 392 (CCED Pa. 1873) (No. 13,611) (awarding damages; 
•Q( $2~4(3.3& and costs Qf $346,.35 again&t the city of Philadelphia.). 
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as that term was used in Art. Il J and the Judiciary Act of 
1789. See Bank of the United States v. Devea'UX, 5 Cranch 61, 
86 (1809). 48 By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was 
unhesitatingly abandoned 
"[A] corporation created by and doing business in a par-
ticular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes 
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of 
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a 
natural person." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 
558 (1844) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 752. 
And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights 
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), the 
Letson principle was automatically and without discussion 
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doctrine, 
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal 
courts 49 and this fact was well known to Members of 
Congress. Go 
That the "u, ual" meaning of the word person would extend 
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of 
Congress which had been passed only months before the Civil 
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided that 
"in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may 
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corpo-
rate ... unless the context shows that such words were 
intended to be used in a more limited sense[]." Act of 
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. 
18 Nonetheless, suits could be brought in federal court if the natural 
per on. who were member-s of the corporation were of diverse citizenship 
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Cranch, at 91. 
49 See n. 2 , supra. 
(•O See, e. g., Globe, nt ·777 (Sen. Sherman); id., at 752 (He11. Shella-
barger) ("count.ies, ciliPs, and corpornlions of all sorts, after yenrs of 
judicial conflict, have become thoroughly established to be an individual or 
person or entity of the personal existence, of which, as a citizen, individ-
1Jrtl , or inhabitant, the United States 'Constitution does take note and endow 
wtth faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States:"). 
75-1914-0PINlON 
MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 29 
Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the 
phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the 
"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were 
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be 
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, a Circuit 
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported 
case under § 1, read the Dictionary Act in precisely this way 
in a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal 
defendant.52 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336).53 
~1 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394 
(CC D Ill. 1 73) (No. 10,336); 2 Kent's Commentaries *2783279 (12th 
0. W. Holme· ed. 1873). See also United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 
109 (CC Va. 1823) (Marshall, C. J.) ("The United States is a government, 
and, consequently, a body politic and corporate"); Brief for Petitioner in 
Monroe v. Pape, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, App's. D and E (collecting state 
st1ttutes which, in 1871, defined municipal corporations as bodies politic 
nnd corporate). 
r. 2 The court also noted that there was no discernible reason why persons 
injured by municipal corporations should not be able to recover. See 18 
F. Cas., at 394. 
53 In considering the effect of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871 in Monroe, how-
ever, Justice Douglas, apparently focu ing on the word "may," stated: "this 
definition [of person] is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." 365 
U. S., at 191. A review of the legi lative history of the Dictionary Act 
hows thi conclusion to be incorrect. 
There is no express reference in the legislative history to the definition of 
pPrson, but Senator Trumbull, the Act's sponsor, discussed thP phrase 
"words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females," 
( Pmphasis added), which immediately precedes the definition of person, and 
stated: 
"The only object [of the Act] is to get rid of R great deal of verbosity 
in our statutes by providing that when the words 'he' is used it shall 
in('lude females as well as males[]." Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 3d 
, css., 775 (Jan. 27, 1871) (emphasis added). 
Tlms, in Trumbull's view the word "may" meant "shall." Such a matJda-
tory use of the extended meanings of the words definPd by the Act 
is abo required for it to perform its intended function-to be A guide 
to "nJlQs Qf const!1lction" of Acts of Congress. See id., a.t 775 (Remark& 
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II 
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend 
municipalities and other local government units to be included 
among those persons to whon1 § 1983 applies."'1 Local govern-
ing bodies,"" therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the 
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or 
executes a policy statement, ordinru1ce, regulation, or decision 
of Sen. Trumbull) . Were the defined words "allowable, [but] not manda-
tory" constructions, as Monroe suggests, there would be no "rules" at all. 
Instead, Congress must have intended the definitions of the Act to apply 
across-the-board except. where the Act by its terms called for a devia.tion 
from this practice-"[ where] the context shows that [ dcfincdl words 
were to be used in a more limited sense." Certainly this is how t.he 
Northwestern Fertilizing court viewed the matter. Since there is nothing 
in the ·'context" of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. calling for a restricted 
interpretation of the word "person," the language of that section should 
prima facie be construed to include "bodies politic" among the entities that 
could be sued. 
5 J Then' is certainly no constitutional impediment to municipal liability. 
"The Tenth Amrndment'~ re~:<Prvation of nondPirgated powrr::: to the States 
i:; not implicated by a frdpra]-court judgnwnt enforcing thP exprp~,; prohibi-
tions of unlawful Htate conduct. ('llttetPd b~· tlw Fourtrenth Amendment.n 
Milliken v. Bradley. 4:~;3 1i. S. 2!i7, 291 (1977); ~e<· Ex parte Viroinia. 100 
U. S. 339, 347-34R (1HXO) . For thi:; rra::<on, National League of Cities v. 
Usery. 426 U . S. x;);~ (197!)) , i,; irrrlrvant to our l'Oil~ideration of thiR case. 
or is thrre :my bn~i~ for eonrludiug that the Elrvent h Amrn<imrnt is a 
bar to muniripa.l liability. Ser, e. y .. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445, 
456 (1976); Ll:uco/n ('ount!f v. Luning. 1:{;~ lT. S. 529, 5:30 (1R90). Our 
holding today i~:~. of rourtie, limited to local govPrnmrnt units which arc not 
considrrrd part of thr State for Elcv('Ilth Amendment purposr;;. 
Go Since official capacity ~uits grnrrally rrpre:;ent only anothrr way of 
pleading an net ion agnin.,;t an t>nt.it y of which an offirrr i~ an agPnt-at 
least wherr Elrwnth AmPndtm•nt con~ideration~ do not control analysis-
our holding today that local govl'rnment~ can lw Hurd unclrr § 19R3 nec-
cssnrily drcide~ that local govrrmnent official~ ~urd iu thPir official capaci-
ties nre '·per;:;ons" under § 19~:3 in thoi<r ca~s in which , a:-; hPrr, a local 
·~overlJ.ment would I><' Htllthlr in it" own name, 
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officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. 
Moreover. although the touchstone of the~ 1983 action against 
a government body is an allegation that official policy is 
responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Con-
stitution, local governments, like every other ~ 1983 "person," 
by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitu-
tional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "cus-
tom" even though such a custom has not received formal 
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels. 
As Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court. said in Adickes 
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144. 167- 168 ( 1970): "Congress 
included custom and usage [in ~ 1H83J because of persistent 
and widespread discrimiHatory practices of State officials .... 
Although not authorized by written law. such practices of state 
officials could well be so perma11ent and well settled as to 
constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." fiG 
On the other hand, the language of § 1983, read against 
the background of the same legislative history, compels the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be 
held liable unless actioll pursua11t to official municipal policy 
of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we 
conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely 
because it employs a tortfeasor-or. in other words, a munici-
pality cannot br held liable under ~ 1983 on a respondeat 
superior theory. 
We begin with the language of § 1983 as passed: 
" [A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, 
' ' 6 SrP al~o .luHflrP Fmnkfmfpr'~ ~tatrnwnt for tlw Court in Nashville, 
C. & St. L . ll . Co. v. Browning, :no U. S. :~6:2, :~69 (1940): 
" It would be a narrow roncpption of jnri~prucience to confine the notion of 
'laws' to what. is found writtPn on the statute books, and to disregard the 
gloss which life has writt<'n upon it. S<'t!led :state practice ... can 
r;;tabh~h what is state lnw. The Equal Protection Clause did not write an 
empty f01malism into tlw Corh;titution. D<'eply embedded traditional ways 
of carrying out state policy, such a:s those of which JWtitioner complains,, 
·:&rQ oft~1 tougher and truer law tlwn the dead word~ of the written texL'" 
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall 
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person ... to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the 
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... " Globe App., at 335 
(emphasis added) . 
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a govern-
ment that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an 
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the 
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose 
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of 
the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a 
tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically 
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B "caused" A to 
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend 
~ 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent."7 
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370--371 (1976). 
r. 7 Support for such a conclusion ran be found in the legislative history. 
As we h!tve indicated, there is virtually no discussion of § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act. Again, however, Congress' treH.tment of the Sherman amend-
ment gives a clue to whether it would have desired to impose respondeat 
superior liability. 
The primary con~titutional justification for the Sherman amendment was 
that it was a necessary and proper remedy for the failure of localities to 
TJrotert cllizrns a:; the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amrndment required . See pp. 10-13, supra. And according to Sherman, 
Shellabarger, and Edmunds, thr amendment ramr into play only when a 
locality was at fault or had knowing!~· neglrctecl its duty to provide pro-
tection . See Globe, at 761 (Sen. Shrrman); id., at 756 (Sen. Edmunds); 
ul., at 751-752 (Rep. Shrllabargrr). But other proponents of the amend-
ment ttpparently viewed it as a form of virariou:; liabilit~· for the unln.wful 
arts of thr citizen~ of the locality . Ser id., at 792 (Rrp. Butler). And 
whether mtrndrd or not, the amendment as drafted did impose a sprcies of 
vic<lriou.<> liability on municipalities since it could be construed to impose· 
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat I · 
superior would have raisrd all the constitutional problems 0)\11 ,·JfJPill 
associated with the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation 
Congress chose not to imposr because it thought imposition 
of such an obligation unconstitutional. To this day, there is 
disagreement about the basis for imposing liability on an 
employer for the torts of an employee when the sole nexus 
between the employer and the tort is the fact of the employer-
employee relationship. Sec W. Prosser, Law of Torts, ~ 69, 
at 569 (4th ed. 1971). Nonetheless, two justifications tend to 
stand out. First is the commonsense notion that no matter 
how blameless an employrr appears to be in an individual case, 
accidents might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to 
bear the cost of accidents. See. e. g., ibid,; 2 F. Harper & 
F. James, The Law of Torts, § 26.3, at 1368-1369 (1956). 
Iiabihty even if a municipality did not know of an impending or ensuing 
riot or did not. have the wherrwithall to do anything about it. Indeed, the· 
statute held a municipality liable rven if it had done everything in its 
power to curb thr riot . Seep. 8, supra; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Stevens); id., 
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id .. nt 788 (Rep. Krrr); id., at 791 (Rep. Willard). 
While the fir:;t conference o;ubstitute wao; rrjrcted principally on constitu-
tional grounds , ~ee id., at 804 (Rrp. Poland), it is plain from the text of 
the srcond conference substitute-which limited liability to those who, 
having tho power to intervene ngain~t Ku Klux violence, "neglect[ed] or 
refu;,;e[d] ~o to do," see Appendix, infra, at 41, and which was enacted as 
§ 6 of the 1871 Act and Ill now cod1fied as 42 U.S. C.§ 1986-that Congress 
also rejected those element~ of vicarious liability contained in the first 
ronf<'r<'nce sub:st.itute even while accepting the bal':ic principle that the 
inhabiianto; of a community w0re bound to provide prot•ection against the 
Ku Klux Klan . Strictly speaking, of coursr, the fact that Congress refused 
to Impo:;e v1canou:s hability for th0 wron11:t< of a f0w privatr cit izens doe 
not concllll:nvely establish that it would ~imilarly have refu~ed to impose 
vicanous liabi lity for the tortR of a municipality's employ('('s. Nonethe-
lct<-~, when Congre~;s' rejection of the only form of vica,riou~ liability 
presentro to it. io; combined w1th the ab~<'nce of any language in § 1983 
wh1ch can rat<ily be construed to cr0ate respondeat superior liabili ty, the 
mference that Congress did not mtrnd to Impose such liability is quite· 
'iitrong.. 
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~ econcl is tlw argument that the cost of accidents should hi:' 
spread to tlw community as a whole on an insurance theory. 
R<'('. e. y., id., ~ 26.5; "\Y. Pross<'r. supra, at 459."" 
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for 
statutes like the Rherman amendment: "The obligation to 
make com])('nsation for injury resulting from riot is, by arbi-
tra~·y enactment of statutes; affirmatory law, and the reason 
of ]tassing the statute is to secure a more perfect police 
rcgula·tion." Globe, at 777 (Sen. Prelinghuysen). This justi-
fication was obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment 
against [)erceived constitutional difficulties and there is no ._ 
reason to suppose that a more general liability imposed for a 
similar reason would have been thought less constitutionally 
objectionable. The second ,iustification was similarly put 
forward as a justification for the Sherman amendment: "we 
do not look upon [the Sherman amendment] as a punish-
mE'nt . . . . It is a mutual insurance." !d., at 792 (Rep. 
Butler). Again, this justification was insufficient to sustain 
tl10 amendment. 
"\Ve conclude. therefore, that a local government may 11ot be 
sued for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 
Instead, it is when execution of a governme11t's policy or 
custom , whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, 
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsi-
ble under ~ 1983. Since this case unquestionably involves 
official policy as the moving force of the constitutional viola-
fiB A thtrd justtfica llon, often ctted but which on examination is appar-
enUy insufficient to JUstify the doctrine of respondeat superior, sec, e. g., 
2 F . Harper & F . James, supra, n. rn, § 26.il , is that liability follows the 
right to control the actionR of a tort fenRor. B~· our decision in Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), W<' would npp<>ar to have d<'cided that th<' 
mt• re right to con trol wtthout nny control or clnwtion having b<>en exercised 
and wtthout any fatlure to o:llp<'rvt ~(' ts not enough to ~trPl){)l't § 1983 
boNli ty. See id., at 37()...:37 L 
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tion found by the District Court, see pp. 1-2, and n. 2. supra, 
we must reverse the judgment below. In so doing, we have 110 
occasion to address. and do not address. what the full contours 
of municipal liability under ~ 1983 may be. We have at-
tempted only to sketch so much of the ~ 1983 cause of action 
against a local government as is apparent from the history of 
the 1871 Act and our prior cases and we expressly leave further 
development of this action to another day. 
III 
Although we have stated that stare decisis has more force in 
statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, 
in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistakes 
through legislation, see, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
671, and n. 14 (1974), we have never applied stare decisis 
mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions deter-
mining the meaning of statutes. See, e. g., Continental T. V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 47-49 (1977); Burnet 
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 n. 1 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Nor is this a case 
where we should "place on the shoulders of Congress the 
burden of the Court's own error." Girouard v. United States, 
328 u.s. 61,70 (1946). 
First, Monroe v. Pape, supra, insofar as it completely 
immunizes municipalities from suit under § 1983, was a depar-
ture from prior practice. See, e. g., Northwestern Fertilizing 
Co. v. Hyde Park, supra; City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 
F. 2d 661 (CAl 1941); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F. 2d 
87 (CAl 1941); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 
(1943); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955), in 
each of which municipalities were defendants in § 1983 suits.50 
59 Each case cited by Monroe, see 356 U. S., nt. 191 n. 50, as consistent. 
with the position thnt locnl governments were not § 1983 "persons" 
reached its conclusion by assuming thnt state-law immunities overrode the 
§ 198a c:_nuse of action . This ha~ never heen the L'tw. 
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Moreover, the constitutional defect that led to the rejection 
of the Sherman arnendment would not have distinguished 
between municipalities and school boards, each of which is an 
instrumentality of state administration. See pp. 14-22, supra. 
For this reason, our cases-decided both before and after 
Monroe, seen. 5, supra-holding school boards liable in § 1983 
actions are inconsistent with Monroe, especially as M onme's 
immunizing principle was extended to suits for injunctive relief 
in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973).r.o And 
although in many of these cases jurisdiction was not ques-
tioned, we ought not "disregard the implications of an exercise 
of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [ 100] years." 
Brown Shoe Co. v. Unded States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962); 
see Banlc of the United Sta.tes v. Deveaux, supra, at 88 
(Marshall, C. J.) ("Those decisions are not cited as author-
ity . .. but they have much weight, as they show that this 
point neither occurred to the bar or the bench"). Thus, while 
we have reaffirmed Monroe without further examination on 
three occasions, at it can scarcely be said that Monroe is so 
consistent with the warp and woof of civil rights law as to be 
beyond question. 
Second, the principle of blanket immunity established in 
Monroe cannot be cabin eel short of school boa.rds. Yet such 
an extensiou would itself be inconsistent with recent expres-
sions of congressional intent. In the wake of our decisions, 
Congress not only has shown no hostility to federal court 
decisions against school boards, but it has indeed rejected 
efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over school 
boards.a2 Moreover, recognizing that school boards are often 
uo Although many s\llt~ agam~t ~ehool board~ abo incluclr private indi-
VIduals as pnr1JP~, the ''prmripal clrfendan1 iH uHually thr local board of 
rducation or sehool board ." Milliken v. Bradley, supra.. n. 4, at 292-298 
(POWELL, J., f'Onrmring) . 
<n Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 093 (1973); Cit!! of Kenosha. v . 
Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (197a); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976). 
u2 During the hPyday of' tlw furor ovrr huHing, both the House a.nd the 
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defendants in school desegregation suits, which have almost 
without exception been § 1983 suits, Congress has twice 
passed legislation authorizing grants to school boards to assist 
them in complying with federal court decrees."'1 Finally, in 
Srnato rrfusrd lo adopt bills that would h:wc removed from the frderal 
courts juri~dict10n 
"to make any decision, enter any judgment, or issur any orc!Pr requiring 
any school board to make any change in the rnrial compo;;ition of the 
studrnt hod~· at any public school or in any class at. any public school to 
which r:<tudrnt;;: arP assigned in conformity with a. frrrdom of choicr system, 
or rrquiring any school board to transport any studrnt~< from public school 
to anothrr public ,;chool or from one place to another place or from one 
school dt:-;trict. to another ~;chool district or denying t.o any studmt the 
right. or privtlegr of attending any public school or cia::;.,; at any public 
school rho»en by the j)Hrent. of such student in conformity with a freedom 
of rhoire s~·stcm, or rPquiring any school board to close any school and 
transfer t.he studPnt;.; from the clo ·eel school to any other school for the 
purpo~ of altrring the racial composition of the studrnt body at any 
public :orhool, or precluding nny school board from carrying into effect any 
provision of any rontract between it and any member of the fa.culty of any 
puhlir ~chool it operate;; ~;pecifying the public school where the member of 
t.lw facult~r i:; to perform hi~; or her duties under the contract." S. 179, 
93d Cong., 1::;t Se~s., § 1207 (1971) (emphasis added). 
Other bills clc~<igned either completely to remove the federal courts from 
the t<thool de;;<:>grrgation cont.rover::;y, S. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Ses:;. (1973), or 
to linllt the ability of federnl courts to subject. school boards to remedial 
order,; 111 dr:;egrrgation cal:!e~. S. 619, 93d Cong., 1st Ses:;. (1973); S. 179, 
9:3d Cong., M Sr~"·• § 2 (a) (1973); H. H. 13534, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 
§ 2922 (1972), haw ~;imilarly failed. 
0 '1 In 1972, ~pmrcd by a finding "that. thr proress of elimina.t.ing or 
preventmg minority group isolation and imr)roving the quality of education 
for all children oftpn mvolves the expenditur<:> of additional funds to which 
local educational agencies do not. havr accc;;s," 20 U. S. C. § 1601 (a) 
(Supp. V, 1975), Congres~ IJ:tl:!sed the 1972 Emergency School Act. Section 
64:3 (a.)(l)(A)(i) of that Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1605 (a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V, 
1975), authorizr::; the Assistant Secretary 
" to makr 11 grant to, or a contract with, a local educational agency [whichJ 
i<S implementing a plan which has been unde1·taken Jntrsuant to a final order 
issued b.ll a court of the United Stntes .. . which requires the desegregn-
lion of minorit · group :;egrrgated childrrn or faculty in the elementary and 
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the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 
2641, which allows prevailing parties (in the discretion of the 
secondary schools of such agency, or otherwise requires the elimination or 
reduction of minortty group t::;olation in Ruch schools." (Emphasis added.) 
A "local educational agrncy" 1::; defined by 20 U.S. C.§ 1619 (8) (Supp. 
V, l 975), a::; "a public board of education or other public authority lega lly 
constituted within a Stat'e for either administrative control or direction of, 
public elementary or <:rcondary schools in a city, county, township, school, 
or other political subdivil:lion of a State, or a federally recognized Indian 
reservation, or such combination of school districts, or counties as are 
recognized in a Statr as an administrative agency for its public elementary 
or secondary schools, or a combination of local educational agencies .... " 
Congre::;s thus clrarly rccogni21ed that school boards were often parties to 
federal school desegregation suits. In § 718 of the Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1617 
(Supp. V, 1975), Congress gave its explicit approval to thr institution of 
federal desegregation suits against school boards-presumably under § 1983. 
That section provtdes : 
"Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a 
local education agency ... for discrimination on tJH' basis of race, color, or 
national origin in violation of . . . the fourteenth amrndment to the 
Constttut10n of the United Statrs ... the court may allow t.IH• prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasomtble attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." (Emphasis addrd.) 
Two year::; later, Congress found that "the implrmentation of desegrega~ 
t10n plans that require extensive studrnt transportation has, in many cases, 
required local educational agencies to expand [sic] large amounts of funds, 
thereby depleting their financial re~ources . . . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a) 
(3) (Emphasis added .) Congress did not re~pond by declaring that 
school boards wrre not. subJrct lo Ruit undrr § 1983 or any other federal 
statute, "but :sunply [Irgislated] revJS<'d evidentiary standards and remedial 
pnoritieH to be <'ffiJ11oyecl by the court" in deciding ~uch cm;es." Brief for 
Natwnal Education A;,;;;n., at 15-16. Indred, Congre::;s expressly reiterated 
thnL a cause of aet ton, cogmzable in thl' federal court~;, exists for discrimina~ 
tton 111 the public school context. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1703, 1706, 1708, 1710, 
1718 ·The Act. a~:<:-cumes that school boards will u8ually be the defendants 
m such stuts. For example, § 211 of the Aet, 20 U. S. C. § 1710 provides: 
"Tiw Attorney Genrral ·hall not inHtitute a civil action under section 
1706 of tht::; tttlr I whtch nllowl' for suit by both privatr parties and t.lte 
Attorn<' Gl'Jlf'ral to redr<'i:ii:i dNrimmat ion in public education] before he--
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court) in ~ 1983 suits to obta.in a.ttorneys fees from the losing 
party, the Senate stated: 
"[D]efendants in these cases are often State or local 
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is 
.intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, 
will be collected either directly from the official, in his 
official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his 
control, or from the State or local government (whether 
or not the agency or government -is named as a party). 
S. Rep. No. 94-1101, at 5 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted). 
Far from showing that Congress has relied on Monroe, there-
fore, events since 1961 show that Congress has refused to 
extend the benefits of Monroe to school boards and has 
attempted to allow awards of attorneys' fees against local 
governments even though Monroe, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 
supra, and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I (1976), have made 
the joinder of such governments impossible.64 
Third, municipalities can assert no reliance claim which can 
support an absolute immunity. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
said in Monroe, "ft]his is not an area of commercial law in 
which, presumably, individuals may have arranged their affairs 
in reliance on the expected stability of decision." 365 U. S., 
" (a.) gives to the appropriate educational ngency notice of the condition 
·or conditions which, in his judgment, constitu1r a. violation of part rthe 
prohibitions against discrimination in public. rdura.tion] ." Section 219 of 
the Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1718, provides for t.he termination of court ordered 
busing "if t.he court finds the defendant educational agency has satisfied the 
requirements of t.he fifth or fourtf'cnth mnrndments to the Constitution, 
whichever is applicable, and will continue to be in compliance with the 
requirements thereof." 
04 Wllf'ther Congrr~~ · atlrmpl is iu fact. f'ffrctive is the subjrct of Hutto 
v. Finney, 1977 Term, No. 76-1660, and thrrefore we express no view olll 
i~ here:, 
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at 221-222 (dissent). llldecd, municipalities simply cannot 
"arrange their affairs" on an assumption that they can violate 
constitutional rights indcfinitrly since injunctive suits a.gainst 
I ' 
local officials under § 1983 would prohibit any such arrange-
ment. And it scarcely need b0 mentioned that nothing in 
Monroe encourages municipalities to violate constitutional 
rights or even suggests that such violations are anything other 
than completely wrong. 
Finally, even under the most stringent test for the propriety 
of overruling a statutory decision proposed by Mr. Justice 
Harlan in Monroe nr._"that it must appear beyond doubt from 
the legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe l mis-
apprehended the meaning of the [section l ," Monroe v. Pape, 
supra, at 192 (concurring opinion)-the overruling of Monroe 
insofar as it holds that local governments are not "persons" 
who may be defendants in § 1983 suits is clearly proper. It 
is simply beyond doubt that, under the 1871 Congress' view 
of the law, were § 1983 liability unconstitutional as to local 
governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as 
to state officers. Yet everyone-proponents and opponents 
alike-knew§ 1983 would be applied to state officers and none-
theless stated that § 1983 was constitutional. See pp. 21-22, 
supra. And, moreover. there can be no doubt that ~ 1 of J . , 
the Civil Rights Act was in tended to provid0 a remedy. to 0 /Vl J S" S I <i J\... 
be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation 
of federally protected rights. Therefore, absent a clear state-
ment in the legislative history supporting the conclusion that 
§ 1 was not to apply to the official acts of a municipal corpora-
65 We note , how<'vH, that 1\Ir. Justice Harlan 's test has not been 
~~xpres!;]y adopted uy tins Court. Moreover, that teHt js ba;;ed on two 
factors: stare dectbis and "indications of congressionJ1l acceptance of this 
C'ourt's earlit>r interprrtatiOn I of the statute in que~tionJ :" 365 U. S., at 
192. As we have explamed, the :;econd C'OilBideration is not, pre:seni .in this 
'l':-t. r . 
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tion-which simply is not present-there is no justification for 
excluding municipalities from the "persons" covered by § 1. 
For the reasons stated above, therefore, we hold that stare 
decisis does not bar our overruling of Monroe insofar as it is 
inconsistent with Parts I and II of this opinion.66 
IV 
Since the question whether local government bodies should 
be afforded some form of official immunity was not presented 
as a question to be decided on this petition and was not 
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we 
express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity 
beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 can-
not be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that 
such bodies are subject to suit under § 1983 "be drained of 
meaning," Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974). Cf. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 
389, 397-398 (1971). 
v 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is 
Reversed. 
oo No useful purpose would be served by an attempt at this late date to 
detennine whether M (Jn1'0e was correct on its facts. Similarly, since this 
case clea.rly involves official policy and does not involve respondeat superior, 
we do n0 t, assay a view on how our cases which have relied on that aspect 
of Monroe that is overrulrd today-Moor v. County of Alameda, S'Upm, 
n . 9, City of Kenosha v Bruno, supra, n. 9, a11d Aldinger v. Howm·d, 
supra, n . 63-should have been decided on a. correct view of § 1983. 
Not.hmg we sny today affects the conclusion reached in Moor, see 411 
U . S., at 708-704, thaL 42 U. S. C. § 1988 cannot be used to crrate a 
f<'rl(·r;d ca11~P of ndion wlwrt· § 1\:JH:~ doe;; not othrrwi~P provide OJlP or tlw 
conclusion rPachrd m Cdy of Kenosha, sre 412 U. S., at 513, that 
" nothing .. . :suggPHt I Hj ! hat the generic word 'per:son' in § 1983 was 
intended to havp a bifurcated application to municipal corporations de-
pending on the naLure of the relief ,.;oughL against them." 
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APPENDIX 
As proposed, the Sherman amendment was as follows: 
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, 
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demol-
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in 
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with 
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; and if such offense was committed to 
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to 
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by 
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or 
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be com-
mitted shall be liable to pay full compensation to the 
person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to 
his widow or legal representative if dead; and such com-
pensation may be recovered by such person or his repre-
entative by a suit in any court of the United States of 
competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense 
was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, 
or his legal representative, and against said county, city, 
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment 
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any prop-
erty, real or personal, of any person in said county, city, 
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover 
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest, 
from any person or persons engaged as principal or 
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663. 
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the 
herman amendment is : 
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, hop, buildin~, 
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barn, or granary sha11 be unlawfully or feloniously demol-
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, who1ly or in 
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with 
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or 
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem-
bled together, with intent to deprive any person of any 
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for 
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or 
previous condition of servitudr. in every such case the 
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses 
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensa-
tion to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if 
living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and 
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the 
case by such person or his representative in any court of 
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district 
in which the offense was committed, such action to be in 
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, 
and against said county, city, or parish, and in which 
action any of the parties committing such acts may be 
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judg-
ment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plain-
tiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual 
defendant therein within two months next after the 
recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued 
against such individual defendant in such judgment, and 
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced 
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attach-
ment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding 
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of 
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judg-
ment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys in the 
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other 
property thereof. And the court in any such action may 
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on motion cause additional parties to be made therein 
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done. 
And the said county, city, or parish may recover the 
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and 
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal 
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish, 
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's 
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755. 
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the 
herman amendment is as follows: 
" [A lny person or persons having knowledge that any of 
the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the 
second section of this act are about to be committed, and 
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, 
shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act 
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be li-
able to the person injured, or his legal representatives." 
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MR. JusTICE PoWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional 
VIews. 
Few cases in the history of the Court have been cited more 
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) , de-
cided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42 
U. S. C. ~ 1983. that decision widened access to the federal 
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach of 
the 1871 measure. But Monroe exetnptecl local governments 
from liability at the same time iL opPnecl wick the courthouse 
door to suits against officers a11d employees of those entities-
even when they act pursuant to Pxpress authorization. The 
oddness of this result , ancl the weakness of tlw historical 
evidence relied on by the JI!I onroe Court in support of it. are 
well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today. Yet the 
gravity of overruling a part of so important a decision prompts 
me to write. 
I 
In addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police 
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under 
state la-vv/ the Monroe Court treated the 42cl Congress' re-
1 The gmvarnpn of the complaint in "~[on me wa.~ that Chicago police 
offirers acting "under color of" ,.,J ,ate law hnd conducted it warrantless, 
<:>nrly morning raid ancl ntnHacking of a private home. Although at 
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jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence 
of an intention to immunize local governments from all lia-
bility under the statute for COilStitutional injury. That read-
iug, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative 
history, clearly "misapprehended the meaning of the con-
trolling provision." Momoe, supra, at 192 (Harlan. J., con-
curring). In this case. involving formal. written policies of 
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Educa-
tion of the C'ity of N'ew York that arc alleged to conflict 
with the con1mand of the Due Process Clause. cf. Cleveland 
Board of Educatio11 v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974). the 
Court decides "not to reject l wisdom] merely because it comes 
too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 
(1949) (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting). 
As the Court demonstrates. the Sherman Amendment pre-
sented an extreme example of "riot act" legislation that sought 
to impose vicarious liability on government subdivisions for 
the consequences of private lawlessness. As such. it implicated 
concerns that are of marginal pertine11ce to the operative 
principle of ~ 1 of the 1871 legislation-now ~ 1983-that 
"[ejvery person" acting "undC'r color of" state law may be held 
liable for affirmative conduct that "subjects, or causes to be 
subjected. any person to the deprivation of any" federal 
constitutional or statutory right. Of the many reasons for the 
!Pa~t one of tlw nllrgation~ in thr romplaint ronld hn.vr brrn construrd 
to charge a. cu:stom or usagr of thr Polirl' Dl'parlm<'nt of tbr City of 
Chicago that did not Yiolatr statr law, ~<Pr :~()51'. IS., at 25f\-259 (Frank-
fnrtrr, J., di~<~rnting in part), aud thrre j,., ;t hint of such n theory in 
petitioner::;' brirf, 0. T. 19ti0, No. 39, pp. 41--+2. that fratmr of the rase 
wa,; not highlightrd in thi~ Court .. Thl' disputr that divided the Court. 
was over whether a complaint. ai!Pging polirr miscondnct in violation of 
Hla.tr law, for which ~tall' jndi<"ial n'lll<'die,; wl'!"e availablr, ;;tntrd a § 1983 
claim. in light of tlw ~tatntor.Y reqnin•mrnt. that tbr conduct working 
injmy be "undrr color of" <>tat!' law. Comparr :365 U. S., at 172-183' 
(opinion of thr Court), and id .. :1l Hl:3-202 (Harlan, J., concurring), 
wilh id" at. 202-259 (FrankfurlN, .T., di;;~pntin~~: in pnrt) . 
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defeat of the Sherman proposal. none supports Monroe's 
observation that the 42d Congress was fundamentally «antag-
onistic," 365 U. S .. at 1\ll. to tlw propositio11 that government 
entities and natural persons alike should bf' held accountable 
for the consequences of COilduct dir0ctly working a constitu-
tional violation . Oppon0nts in tlw Rf'natc app<•ar to have 
been troubled primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien 
provision , which would have exposed f'ven property held for 
public purposes to tlw drmands of ~ 1983 judgment lienors. 
Opinion of thr Court, ante, at 14 n. 30. The opposition in the 
House of Representatives focusPcl largely on the Sherman 
Ameudment's attempt to impose a peacekc0ping obligation on 
municipalities when thC' Constitution itself imposed no such 
affirmative duty and wlwn many municipalities were not even 
empowered under state Jaw to maintain police forces. Ante, 
at 20-22.2 
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history 
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local 
government units frolll monetary liability for action directly 
causing a constitutional dPprivation. even though such actions 
may be fully consistent with. and thus uot remediable under, 
state law. No conduct of govcrnnwnt comes more clearly 
within the «under color of" state law languagf' of ~ 1983. It 
is most unlikely that CongrPss in tended puhlic officials acting 
under the command or the SJWCific authorization of the gov-
" If in tlw viPw of Uou~C' oppon<·tit~ , ~urh m> Hrprr~rntativ(·~ Polund, 
Burchard, and Willard,"<'<' opinion of tlw Court, ante, at 20-21, a munici-
pa.lit~· obligatrd hy ~tnt<' law to kt•Pp t.lw ]Ware could be held liablr for a 
failurr to proYiclr rqunl protl'rtiou a~ain,.;t priYat(' violl'nre , it ~eem:-; im-
wobable thnt tlw~ · would han· oppo~<'d impo~ition of Jiabilit~· on a 
111\111iCi]lHJit~· for thr affinnatiV<' impiPI11<'11tatiOll of polirir,.; JlfOITilllgated 
w1t hin it:; propPr splwr<' of OJWra.t ion undrr ~ tat(' Ia w. Such I ia bili t .~· is 
prrmi:-;c·d not on <1 f<1ilmt' to take• affirmntivr action in nn art>a ont:oidr the 
contrmplation of thr stntP-!aw t'hartrr, but on thr con~rquenccs of act.ivi-
tir,; actua!l~ · unclertnk<·n within thr :>COP<' of the powrr:o conferred by 
-tate Jaw, 
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('l'lllllent C:'Jll ploypr to be e:rclusively liable for resulting con-
-stitutional injury.:: 
As elaboratNI in Part l I of today's opinion. the rejection 
of the Sherman Amendment ca.tl best be understood llOt as 
<.'vidt'nce of Congress' acceptance of a rulr of absolute municipa.J 
immunity. hut as a limitation of the statutory ambit to actual 
wrongdoers. i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any 
other principle of vicarious liability. Thus, it has been clear 
that a public official may bP held liable in damages when his 
actions are found to violate a constitutional right and there is 
no qualified immunity. see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 208 
(1975); Procunier Y. Xavarette , No. 76-446. - U. S. -
( Hm~). Today the Court recogniz<:>s that this principle also 
applies to a local government when implementation of its 
official policies or established customs inflicts the constitu-
tional injury. 
II 
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior 
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law 
rules. "Stare decisis is usually the \Vise policy,' ' Burnet v. 
Coro~tado Uil & Gas Co., 285 r. S. 393. 406 ( 1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). but this cautionary principle must give way 
to coUJitervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.'' 
a The virw 1nkrn todny i ~ < ' Oil >' i~tt·nt with tlH' undrr:'tanding of til(' 
42d Congrr:<;; 1 hat unJp,.;,.; the t•ont <'XI l'l"VPaiPd a morf' limit<•d definition, 
•·tJw word ']wr,.;on' ma~· Pxtrnd nnd hl' applil'd 1o hodiP>' politil' nnd ror-
ponlt P .. . .. , Art of FPh . :25, li-:71, rh . 71, § 2. J(i Stat . .t:n. It nbo 
nrconl ~ with thr intPrprrta1iou gil'l'll till' ,.;amP word whrn it wa~ u~Pd by 
8Pnntor SlwmJHll in thr autitrtl>'l IPgi>'lation of 11-<UO lll'aring hi>' namr. 
8r<' Lafayette \' . IAJuisiana fJotcer (t· [,lflht Cu., :\o. 7H-~o4 , - l1. S.-
( 1971') (pluralitY opiuion): Chattauouyo Foundry v. Atlanta , 2():3 lJ. S. 
:l90, :mn (l!:JO(i) : cf. Pfizer. Inc. , .. Oot>ernment of ludio. :\o. /(i-7+9 , -
P R -- (197~) 
I Srr, e. ~f . , rontlll l' lltal '!'\'. 1111' . \'. 0'/'B ~y/Nwia hu·., ,n:l r . S. 3() 
(1977) ; Machin ists 1. Wisco11 .~111 I<:mp He/. Co111111 .. . J-:27 l'. ::-> . 1:3:.1 (JHiti): 
Hradeu v . .3Uth Judil'iu/ C'ircuit ('ollrt of /(!/ .. .J.JO l'. ::-> . .J./-:4 (197:~) ~ 
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I concur in the ( 'ourt's view that this is not a case where we 
should "place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the 
Court's OWII error." Girouard\', Cnited States, 328 r. S. 61, 
70 (1946) . 
Nor is this thf' usual case in which the Court is asked to 
overrule a precedent. Hero considerations of stare decisis cut 
in both directions. On the om' hand. wf' havf' a series of 
rulings that municipalities and counties are not "persons'' for 
purpos<>s of ~ 1983. On the other hand. many decisions of 
this Court havP been prcmisPd on the amenability of school 
boards and similar elltities to ~ 1983 suits. 
Jn Monroe and its progrny. we have answered a question 
that was never actually briefed 01· argued in this Court-
whether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries that 
are the cl1rect result of its official policies. "The theory of the 
complaint [in Monroe wasj that under the circumstances 
[t_lhere alleged the City fv,:asj liable for the acts of its police 
officers. by virtue of respondeat superior." Brief for Petition-
ers. 0. T. 1960. No. 39. p. 21.'' Respondents answered that 
adoption of petitioners' position would expose "Chicago and 
every other municipality in the l:nited States ... to Civil 
Rights liability through no action of its own and based on 
Griffiu v. Breckenridge. 403 U. S. X8 (1971); Boys Market v. Retail 
('/erks Unum, :39~ U. S. 2:35 (1970); Burnet "· Corouadu Oil & Gas Co., 
:!~5 P. 8. a9:~. 406-407 n. 1 (19:32) (BrandPi~, .T., di><:;f'nting). 
r. Thr Di;;t rici Court in Monrm· rulrd in thr municipalit.y'R favor, <;tat-
mg: "Hille<• t hr liabilit~· of thr City of Chicago i::; ba:;ecl on thc dort rine 
of re8pondeat superior. and ~inrr I havc alrrnd~· hclcl thai thr complaint 
fail~ to ~tat<' a rlaim for relicf ngain~t thr ng(•nt:; of the city, thrrr i::; no 
el:iim for rPlirf agHin:;t the city it~clf." Rreord, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30. 
Thc Comt. of Appr<tl:-: affirmed for thr ~amr rca;;o11. 272 F. 2d 365-366 
(CA7 105\l) . 
l'PtitioiH'l'" in thi~ Court al;,;o offrrcd an alternativ<' argumcnt that. the 
<'tl.1· of C'lneago wa>' a ··per;;on" for piii'JlOH<'~ of § 19S:3. Brief for Prti-
ttom·r~, 0 . T. 1960, Xo. 39, p. 25, but thr undrrlying theory of munici1>al 
hahtliiy n·mainrd <mr of respondeat superior. 
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action contrary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state 
it is a part of I .sic] .. , BriE>f for Respondents, supra, p. 26. 
Th ns the ground of decision in Monroe was not advanced by 
cithcr party and was broader than necessary to resolve the 
COlltcntions 1nade in that casP.0 
flimilarly. in Jfvor v. County of Ala.meda, 411 F. S. 693 
(107:3). petitioners asserted that "the County was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff." id., at 696. under 
42 r. R. C. ~ 1DRR. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim, 
id., at 710. and n. 27, vYe reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the 
statute. but therr was no challenge in that case to "the holding 
in i1fo11me conceming the status under ~ 1983 of public entities 
such as the County." id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 
1D72. No. 72- 10, p. 9. 
Only i11 City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973), 
did the Court confront a ~ 1983 claim based on conduct that 
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of 
thc claimed constitutional injury. In Kenosha, however. we 
raised the issue of the City's amenability to suit under § 1983 
on our own initiative.7 
This line of cases-from Monroe to Kenosha-is difficult 
to reconcile on a principlrcl basis with a parallel series of cases 
in which the Court has assumed sub silentio that some local 
''We· ow<' :;:onH•what lr"" d<'frr<•JH'<' to n dre•JHion thnt wnf' rrndPrPd with-
out. hPll<'fit or a full airing of all tiH' rrl<·,·ant con~idPmtion::< ThP fact that 
uutll thi::: <'H~'f' thr Court ha:s not had to confront ~qunr<'l.'· thr e·on~Nturncr:; 
or holdlllg § 191{:) inapplicable- to oJli!'inl munieipal policir~ mn~· be ron-
tiidN!'d 111 a::;~r~~ing thr quality of the pn·t·Pdent that we• nrr ask<'d to 
rr-Pxaminr . 
7 ln Aldin(le1' v. Tfo!l'ard, 42i LT. S. 1 (Hlif1), \\'<' rraffinnrd Monroe, 
hut pt't1tionrr did not !'ontr~t tlw propo~ition that, rountir::< wrrr !'Xcluded 
from tlw n•arh of§ 19ttl und<'r .11onroe. id .. at JG, and ilw qll<'Stion brforc 
11s coJH'<'l'll<'d lhr ~eopr of P<'IHl<'nl-part.\· .imi"'dirt ion wiU1 rr::;pe•e·t to a 
Htatr-Jaw claim. Simil;lrl~·. tht• partie·~ in ,1ft. Ilea/thy City Boa'l'd of Ed. v. 
Doyle. 429 l . S. 274 ( 1977) , did not >'<'Pk n rr-examination of our ruling 
111 Monme. 
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govC'fnment entities could be sued UJlder ~ 1983. If now. after 
full consideration of the qu<'stion, we continue to adhere to 
Monroe, grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's exercise 
of ~ 1983 jurisdiction ov<'r school boards. See opinion of the 
Court. ante, at 3 n. 5. Since "tlw principle of blanket immu-
nity established in Monroe cannot be cabined short of school 
boards," ante, at 36. the conflict is squarely presented. 
Although there' was an inclepC'udent basis of jurisdiction in 
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of 
individual public officials as nominal parties. the opinions of 
this Court make explicit reference to the school board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded. see, 
e. g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430. 437-439, 
441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267. 292-293 
(1977) (PowELL. J.. concurring in the judgment). And, as 
the Court points out. a11te, at 36-39. Congress has focused 
specifically on this Court's school board decisions in several 
statutes. Thus the exercise of ~ 1983 jurisdiction over school 
boards, while perhaps 110t premised 011 considered holdings, has 
been longstanding. Tndecd. it predated Monroe. 
Even if one attempts to explain away the school board 
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against 
board members in their official capacities for injunctive relief 
under either~ 1083 or Ex parte 1"ou11g, 209 U. ~. 123 (1908)," 
dissenting opinion of MR. Jl'S'l'ICE REHNQUlST, post, at 3 n. 2, 
some difficulty remains in rationalizing the relevant body of 
precedents. At least two of the school board cases in valved 
claims for monetary relic-f. Cohen v. Chesterfield County 
School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159. 1161 (ED Va. 1971). rev'd, 
474 F. 2d 395 ( CA4 1973). rev' d. 414 U. S. 632 ( 1974); Tinker 
v. Des Moi11es School Dist., 393 U. S. 503. 504 (1969). See 
also Vland1:s v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441.445 (1973). Although the 
point was not squarely presented in this Court, these claims 
for damages could not have been maintained in official-
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C'f. Bdel111a11 v . .Jordan, 415 l r . 8. ('jt)l ( Hl74).' Moreover, the 
ratio11ak of Ke11osha \\'Ould have to be disturhed. to avoicl 
closing all avcnuPs UIH!Pr ~ 108:3 to injunctive relief against 
constitutional violatio11S by local govE:'rlllnent. The Court of 
Appeals in this case suggPsted that \H' import. by analogy. the 
Eleventh Anwndnwnt "fiction" of E:r parte }'ouny into~ 1983. 
532 F. 2d 250. 2()4--:26() ( CA2 H)7(i). That approach. however, 
would cn'atP tension with Ke11osha lweause it would require "a 
bifurcated application'' of "tlw generic word 'person' in ~ 1983" 
to public officials "depending on the nature of the relief sought 
against tlwm.'' 412 U. S .. at 513. A public official sued in 
his official capacity for carrying out official policy would be a 
"pt-rson" for purposes of injunctive relief. but a non-"person" 
in an action for damages. The Court's holding avoids this 
difficulty. Ree ante, at 30 11. 55. 
Finally. if we continued to adhere to a rule of absolute 
municipal immunity under~ 1983. we could not long avoid the 
quPstion whPth<'r "we should. hy analogy to our decision in 
Bive11s v. S1:-r l'11known Ji'ed. Xarcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 
(1971 ). imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth 
Amendnwnt "·hich would not be subject to the limitations 
contained in ~ 1983 ... . n M t. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 1T. f.i. 274. 278 (1977). One aspect of that inquiry 
would be whether there arc any "special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 
Bivens, supra, at 396. such as an "explicit congressional 
declaration that persons injured by a [municipality] may not 
reeovcr money damages .... but must instead be remitted 
to another remedy. equally effective in the view of Congress," 
1'd. , at 397. fn light of the C'ourt's persuasive re-examination in 
' To thr r xfrnf that thr romplaint~ in tho~e ra:;e,; assertrd rluims 
Hga tn~t, tlw indi,·idual def<>Jtdunt:,: in tlwir prr~onal caparit~·, a.~ wrll as 
ofli<'ial eapa<·it~· . thr Court would haw had authorit~· to award the rrlicf 
r<·qu<·:-;1<'<1. ThrrP iH no suggeHtion in tlw opinion:;, howrver, that t·hr 
praet ir<':; at i~:;ur wrrr anything other thn11 official, duly authorized policirs. 
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toclay's decision of the 1871 debates, I would have difficulty 
inferring from ~ 1983 "an explicit congressional <.leclaration" 
a!!:ainst municipal liability for the implementation of official 
policies in violation of the Constitution. Rather than consti-
tutio11alize a cause of action against local government that 
Congress in tended to create in 1871, the better course is to 
coufess error and set the record straight, as the Court does 
today.u 
III 
Difficult questions nevertheless remain for another day. 
There arc substantial line-drawing problems in determining 
"wheu execution of a government's policy or custom" can be 
said to inflict constitutional injury such that "government as 
an entity is responsible under § 1983." Opinion for the Court. 
ante, at 34. This case. however, involves formal, written 
policies of a municipal department and school board; it is the 
clear case. The Court also reserves decision 011 the availability 
of a qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. l11itial reso-
lution of the question whether the protection available at 
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion 
of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles 
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the 
§ Hl83 damages action, is left to the lower federal courts. 
9 l\TR . .lu::;'l'lCJ~ REHNQUJ~>'l'':s di~~>cnt makes a strong argument that 
'T~>Jince Monroe, mnnicipalitic>:s have had the right. to expert that they 
would not bC' liable rctroa.ctivel~· for thc>ir oflicer:-;' failure to predict this 
Court'~ recognition of new constitutional rightH." Post, at 4. But it 
rea~>OJHI.bly rna~· br <l:;snmC'd tha.t. moHt municipa.liti<'i:' already indemnify 
oflleiab surd for conduct within thr HCOJlC of thPir authorit~·, a policy that 
furl h!'r:; the important. intPN':>t of attracting and retaining competent 
officrr~, board mrmbcrs and employers. In an~- event, thr pos:sibility of 
a qu:-tlifird immunity, aH to which the Court re~rrvrH dPci~ion, may remove 
somr of the> h:-trshnps:-; of Jiabilit.y for good-faith failmr 1o predict the 
ofteu uncntaiu cour:-;e of conHtitutional adjudication. 
t l 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional 
views. 
Few cases in the history of the Court have been cited more 
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), de-
cided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42 
U. S. C. § 1983, that decision widened access to the federal 
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach of 
the 1871 measure. But Monroe exempted local governments 
from liability at the same time it opened wide the courthouse 
door to suits against officers and employees of those entities-
even when they act pursuant to express authorization. The 
oddness of this result, and the weakness of the historical 
evidence relied on by the Monroe Court in support of it, are 
well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today. Yet the 
gravity of overruling a part of so important a decision prompts 
me to write. 
I 
In addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police 
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under 
state law/ the Monroe Court treated the 42d Congress' re-
J The gravamen of the complaint in Monme was that Chicago police 
officers acting "under color of" state law had conducted n warrantless, 
early morning raid and ransaeking of a private home. Although at 
.. 
75-1914-CONCUR (A) 
2 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence 
of an intention to immunize local governments from all lia-
bility under the statute for constitutional injury. That read-
ing, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative 
history, clearly "misapprehended the meaning of the con-
trolling provision," Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J., con-
curring). In this case, involving formal, written policies of 
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Educa-
tion of the City of New York that are alleged to conflict 
with the command of the Due Process Clause, cf. Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), the 
Court decides "not to reject [wisdom] merely because it comes 
too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 
(1949) (Frankfurter, J .. dissenting). 
As the Court demonstrates, the Sherman Amendment pre-
sented an extreme example of "riot act" legislation that sought 
to impose vicarious liability on government subdivisions for 
the consequences of private lawlessness. As such, it implicated 
concerns that are of marginal pertinence to the opera.tive 
principle of § 1 of the 1871 legislation-now § 1983-that 
" [ e] very person" acting "under color of" state law may be held 
liable for affirmative conduct that "subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any person to the deprivation of any" federal 
constitutional or statutory right. Of the many reasons for the 
least one of the allegationR in the complaint could h:wr bern construed 
t o charge a custom or usage or the Police Department of the City of 
Chicago that did not. violate state law, r:;cr 365 U . S., a.t. 258-259 (Frank-
furter, J ., dissenting in part), and there is a hint of such a theory in 
petitioner:;' brief , 0 . T . 1960, No. 39, pp. 41-42 , that featurr of the case 
was not highlighted in this Court . The dispute that divided the Court 
was over whether a complaint all eging police misconduct in violation of 
sta te la.w, for which state judicial remedi l'l:i were a.vailablc, sta ted a § 1983 
claim in light of t he statutory re4uirement, that the conduct working 
injury be " under color of" state law. Compare 365 U. S., at 172- 183' 
(opinion of the Court), nnd id., at 193-202 (Harlan , J ., concurring) . 
with id., at 202-259 (Frankfurtrr, ,J;., dis;;enting in part) . 
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defeat of the Sherman proposal, none supports Monroe's 
observation that the 42d C'ongress was fundamentally "antag-
onistic," 365 U. S., at 191, to the proposition that government 
entities and natural persons alike should be held accountable 
for the consequences of conduct directly working a constitu-
tional violation. Opponents in the Senate appear to have 
been troubled primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien 
provision, which would have exposed even property held for 
public purposes to the demands of § 1983 judgment lienors. 
Opinion of the Court, ante, at 14 11. 30. The opposition in the 
House of Representatives focused largely on the Sherman 
Amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on 
municipalities when the Constitution itself imposed no such 
affirmative duty and when many municipalities were not even 
empowered under state law to maintain police forces. Ante, 
at 20--22.2 
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history 
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local 
government units from monetary liability for action directly 
causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such actions 
may be fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under, 
state law. No conduct of government comes more clearly 
within the "under color of" state law langua.ge of § 1983. It 
is most unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting 
under the command or the specific authorization of the gov-
2 If in the view of House opponent~, such as Representatives Poland, 
13urrhard, and Willard, see opinion of the Court, ante, at 20-21, a munici-
pality obligated by state law to keep t.he peace could be held liable for a 
failure to provide equal protection against privat~ violence, it seems im-
probable that they would have oppoRecl imposition of liability on a 
municipality for the affirmative implementation of policies promulgated 
withm its proper ~phere of operation under stat~ law. Such liability is 
prem1secl not on a failure to t<tke aflirmative action in an area outside the 
eontemplation of thr :;tate-law rhartpr-the ~ort. of liability that would 
ha vr been imposed by tlw Shennan Amendment-but on the consequence;; 
of aetJvJtJr~ actual!~· undertaken within the scopr of the power:; conferred. 
hy ti l <tiP law. 
75-1914-CONCUR (A} 
4 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
ernment employer to be exclusively liable for resulting con-
stitutional injury.8 
As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the rejection 
of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood not as 
evidence of Congress' acceptance of a rule of absolute municipal 
immunity, but as a limitation of the statutory ambit to actual 
wrongdoers. i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any 
other principle of vicarious liability. Thus, it has been clear 
that a public official may be held liable in damages when his 
actions are fouud to violate a constitutional right and there is 
no qualified immunity, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 208 
(1975); Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446. - U. S. -
(1978). Today the Court recognizes that this principle also· 
applies to a local government when implementation of its 
official policies or established customs inflicts the constitu-
tional injury. 
II 
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior 
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law 
rules. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy," Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). but this cautionary principle must give way 
to coUJitervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.~· 
8 The view taken toda~· i,; ron;;i~t Pn t with the undNf'tanding of the 
42d Congres:; that unlrss the contpx(. revealed H more limited definition, 
" the word 'j)erson' may extend and be aPJlliecl to bodie~:< politic and cor-
porate . .. . " Art of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2. 16 Stat. 431. It also 
accord~ with the interpretation givrn thP ~>ame word when it was used by 
Senator ShPrman in the ant it ru~:~t Jegi::;lat ion of 1X90 bra ring his name. 
Sre Lafayette \' , Louisiana Power & Li(Jht Co., l'\o. 76-l:lH4, - U. S.-
(1978) (pluralit~· opinion); Chattanoooa Poundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 
:390, 396 (1906); rf. Pfizer, lnr. v. Govemmeut of India. ~o. 76-749,-
P . S. -- (197R) . 
1 Se<', e. (} .. Continental TV, Inc. \'. GTE Sylvauia Inc., 43:3 U. S. 36 
(1977); Machinists"· Wisconsiu Ernp. Rei. Comm., 427 U.S. 132 (1971i}; 
Braden . 30th J'udir·ial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973); 
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I concur in tiH• Court's vi<'w that this is not a case where we 
should "place on the shoulc!Prs of ( 'ongrcss tlw burden of the 
Court's own error." Girouard Y. Cnited States, 328 U. S. 61, 
70 (1946). 
Nor is this the usual case in which the Court is asked to 
overrule a precedent. Here considerations of stare decisis cut 
in both directions. On the one hand. we have a series of 
rulings that municipalities and counties are not "persons" for 
purposes of ~ 1983. On the other hand. many decisions of 
this Court havr been prrmised 011 the amenability of school 
boards and similar elltities to § H)83 suits. 
In Monroe and its progeny. we havr answered a question 
that \Vas never actually briPfPd or argued in this Court-
vvhethcr a municipality is liable in damages for injuries that 
are the direct result of its official policies. "Tlw theory of the 
complaint rin Mol!roe \VaS I that under tlw circumstances 
rtJhere alleged the City lvvaslliablt> for the acts of its police 
officers, by virtue of respondeat superior... Brief for Petition-
ers, 0. T. 1960. No. 39. p. 21.'' Respondents ansvvered that 
adoption of pPtitioncrs' position would expose "Chicago and 
every other municipality in the 'Cnitect Rtates ... to Civil 
Rights liability through no action of its own and bas<'d on 
Gri/fiu v. Breckenridge, 40:3 U. S. /-1?' (1971): Boys Market v. Retail 
('lerks Uuion, :39R U. S. 2:3.5 (1970); Bunwl v. C'orouado Oil & Gas Co., 
2 5 P. S. :393, 40()-407 n. 1 (1932) (BrandPis, .1., dis:'<<·nting). 
" Thr Dis( rirt Court in :\[onro<' ru!Pd in tlw municip:tlit ,y'~ favor, stat-
ing: "sincr the liability of the Cit~· of Chicago i~ hasrd on thr doctrinr 
of respoudeal superior, nnd sincP 1 h:tvr nln•ad~· hrld t hnt thr complaint, 
fnil.- to f.-tate a rlaim for relil?f against tiH' agent;; of thE' <'it~·, thPrr i::; no 
f'laim for rrlid against the cit~· it,rlf." Ureord, 0. T. 1960. ~o. 89, p. ~0. 
The Court. of Appenls affirmed for the samP rm"on. 272 F. 2d :365-:~66 
(CA7 Hl50) . 
Petitiorwr~ in thi,.: Court nlso offrrrd an :tltrrnative arp:umrnt that the 
cit~· of Chicago wnH a "person" for Jlllrpo"r" of § 198:~. Brirf for Peti-
i.iouer,.:, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the undrrl~·ing theory of mnnirip:1.Y 
linhility remained one of res]J01ldeal superiot. 
75-1914--CONCUR (A) 
6 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
action conkary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state 
it is a part of [sic]." Brief for Respondents, supra, p. 26. 
Thus the ground of decision in Monroe was not advanced by 
either party and was broader than necessary to resolve the 
contentions made in that case.6 
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 
(1973), petitioners asserted that "the County was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., at 696, under 
6 The docrine of stare decisis advances two important values of a ra· 
tionnl ~yt>tem of law: (i) the certainty of legal principles and (ii) the 
wi~dom of the conservative vision, that existing rules should be presumed 
mtiOJllll and not :;ubject to modification "at any time a new thought seems 
appealing," di~;:;enting opinion of Mn. Jus'l'JCE REHNQUIST, post, at 5; cf. 
0. Holmes, The Common Law 36 (1881). But , at the same time, the Jaw 
has recognized the necessity of change, lest rules "simply persi~t . . . 
from blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
Harv. L. Hev. 457, 469 (1897). Any overruling of prior precedent, 
whether of a constitutional decision or otherwise, disserves to some extent 
the value of certainty. But I think we owe &"Omewhat less deference to a 
decision that. wa:; rendered without bem•fit of a full airing of all the rele-
vant. co11Hidf>rations. That is the premise of the canon of interpretation 
that language in a decision not necessar~· to the holding may be accorded 
lP::;s weight. in subsequent cases . I also would recognize the fact that 
until thi:; case the Court has not had to confront square!~· the consequences 
of holding § 1983 inapplicable to official municipal policies. 
Of cour:;e, the mere fact. that Rn issuf> was not argued or briefed does 
not. undermine the precedenti::ll forrt' of a considered holding. M arburu 
v Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), cit<•d by the dissent, post, at 5, is a case 
in point. But the Court's recognition of its power to invalidate legisla-
tion not. in conformity with constitutional command was essC"ntial to its 
judgment in Marbury . And on numerous subsequt>nt occasions, the Court 
has been required t.o apply thr full brt>adt.h of the Marbury holding. In 
Monroe, on the otht>r hand, the Court'i:l rationale was broader than neces-
:;ary to meet, the contentions of the parties and to decide the case in a 
principled manner. The lnnguage in Monroe cannot be dismissed as dicta , 
but. we may take account of the fact. that the Court simply was not con-
fronted with the implicat-ions of holding § 1983 inapplicable to official 
municipal policies. It i~ an appreciation of those implications that ha:t 
prompted today's rc-examimLtion of the legislative history of the 1871 
measurE'. 
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42 U. S. C. § 1988. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim, 
id., at 710, and 11. 27, we reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the 
statute, but there was no challenge in that case to "the holding 
in Monroe concerning the status under§ 1983 of public entities 
such as the County," id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 
1972, No. 72-10, p. 9. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973), 
did the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that 
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of 
the claimed constitutional injur-y. In Kenosha, however, we 
raised the issue of the City's amenability to suit under § 1983 
on our own initiative.7 
This line of cases-from Monroe to Kenosha-is difficult 
to reconcile on a principled basis with a para.llel series of cases 
in which the Court has assumed sub silentio that some local 
government entities could be sued under§ 1983. If now, after 
full consideration of the question, we continued to adhere to 
Monroe, grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's exercise 
of ~ 1983 jurisdictiou over school boards. Sec opinion of the 
Court, ante, at 3 n. 5. Since "the principle of blanket immu-
nity established in Monroe cannot be cabined short of school 
boards," ante, at 36, the conflict is squarely presented. 
Although there was an indepcnden t basis of jurisdiction in 
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of 
individual public officials as nominal parties, the opinions of 
this Court makr explicit refrrencc to the school board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, see, 
e. g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-439, 
441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 292-293 
r rn Aldinger v. Iloward, 427 U. S. J (1976), we reaffirmed Monme, 
1)ut petitioner did not contest thr proposition that. counties were excluded 
from the reach of § 1983 undrr Monroe, id., at 16, and the quest.ion before 
111-l ronrrrnrd t·he scopr of prndrnt .-party jurisdiction with respect to a 
,.;tate-la.w claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt . HeaLthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), did not seek a re-examination of our ruling 
m Monroe. 
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(1977) (PowELL . .T .• concurring in thr judgment). And. as 
thr Court points out. ante, at 36-3!1, Congress has focused 
specifically on this Court's school board decisions in several 
statutrs. Thus thr Pxercisr of ~ 1983 jurisdiction over school 
boards. whil<' perhaps not premised on considered holdings, has 
been longstanding. Indeed. it predated Monroe. 
Rven if one attempts to explain away the school board 
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against 
board membPrs in their official capacities for injunctive relief 
under either~ Hl83 or E:r parte Young, 209 V. S. 123 (1908)," 
dissenting opinion of MH. JrH'l'lCE REHNQUIST, post, at 3-4 
n. 2. sonl<' difficulty remains in rationalizing the relevant body 
of prrcr<lents. At least two of thr school board cases involved 
claims for monetary relief. Cohen v. Chesterfield County 
School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159. 1161 (ED Va. 1971), rev'd, 
474 F. 2rl 395 (C'A4 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker 
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503. 504 (1969). See 
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973). Although the 
point was not squarely presented in this Court, these claims 
for damages could not have been maintained in official-
capacity suits if the government entity were not itself suable. 
Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).R Moreover, the 
rationale of Kenosha would have to be disturbed, to avoid 
closing all avenues under § 1983 to injunctive relief against 
constitutional violati~ms by local government. The Court of 
Appeals in this case suggested that we import, by analogy, the 
Ekventh Amendment fiction of Ex parte Young into ~ 1983, 
532 F. 2d 259, 264-266 (C'A2 1976). That approach, however, 
would create tension with Kenosha because it would require "a 
bifurcated application" of "the generic 'Nord 'person' in § 1983" 
" To tlw rxtrnt that thr complaints in tho:;e cases aSHerted claims 
agam~t. 1 he mdiv1dual defE'ndant~ in their personal capacity, Hil well as 
official capaeit~·, the Court would have had authority to award the relief 
reqne8ted. There i ~ no ::;uggeHtion in the opinionH, however, that the 
practice~; at J&me were anything other than official, duly aut·hori:zed policies. 
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to public officials "depending on the nature of the relief sought 
against them." 412 U. S., at 513. A public official sued in 
his official capacity for carrying out official policy would be a 
"person" for purposes of injunctive relief, but a non-"person" 
in an action for damages. The Court's holding avoids this 
difficulty. See ante, at 30 n. 55. 
Finally. if we continued to adhere to a rule of absolute 
municipal immunity under § 1983. we could not long avoid the 
question whether "we should, by analogy to our decision in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 
(1971) , imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth 
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations 
contained in § 1983 .... " Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). One aspect of that inquiry 
would be whether there are any "special factors counselling 
hesitation iu the absence of affirmative action by Congress," 
Bivens, supra, at 396, such as an "explicit congressional 
declaration that persons injured by a [municipality] may not 
recover money damages .. . . but must instead be remitted 
to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress,'' 
id., at 397. In light of the Court's persuasive re-examination in 
today's decision of the 1871 debates, I would have difficulty 
inferring from § 1983 "an explicit congressional declaration" 
against municipal liability for the implementation of official 
policies in violation of the Constitution. Rather than consti-
tutionalize a cause of action against local government that 
Congress intended to crea.te in 1871, the better course is to 
confess error and set the record straight, as the Court does 
today.u 
u MH. JusTICE REHNQUisT's dissent makes a strong argument that 
" [s]ince Monro e, municipalities have had the right. to expect tha t they 
would not, bE' liable retroactively for th E>ir officers' fa ilure to predict this 
Court 's recognition of new constitutional rights." Post, at 4. But it 
rE>ao;onably may hE' assumed that most municipalitiE's already ind E>mnify 
offirials sued for conduct within the scope of their authority , a policy that 
. '· 
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III 
Difficult questio11s nevertheless remain for another day. 
There are substantial line-drawing llroblems in determining 
11when execution of a government's polic·y or custom" can be 
said to inflict constitutional injury such that "governnwnt as 
an entity is responsible under ~ 1983." Opinion for the Court. 
ante, at 34. This case, however, involves formal, written 
policies of a municipal department and school board; it is the 
clear case. The Court also reserves decision on the availability 
of a qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. Initial reso-
lution of the question whether the protection available at 
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion 
of MH.. JusTICE REHNQUlST. post, at 8, or other principles 
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the 
§ 1983 damages action, is left to the lower federal courts, 
fllrt hers tho important interest of attracting and retaining competent 
•officers, boa.rd mf'mbers aml employees. In any event, the possibility of 
:it qualified immunity, as to which the Court reserves decision, may remove 
Homr of the harshnrs~ of liability for good-faith failure to predict the 
•oftrn nncrrtn,in course of constitutional adjudication. 
lfp/ss 5/9/78 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept of Social Services 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these 
0 I additional views. 
cJ-)o"}3 
Few cases in the history of the Court have been 
cited more frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961) , decided less than two decades ago. Focusing new 
light on 42 u.s.c. § 1983, that decision widened access to 
the federal courts and permitted expansive interpretations 
of the reach of the 1871 measure. But curiously Monroe ~ 
I 
exempted local governments from liability at the same time 
it opened wide the courthouse door to suits against 
officers and employees of those entities - presumably, even 
when they act pursuant to express authorization. The 
oddness of this result, and the weakness of the historical 
~~~~)"~A,.; 
evidence 1~e~e.u by the Monroe Court in support of it, are 
" 
well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today. Yet, the 
gravity of overruling a portion of so important a decision 
prompts me to write. 
2 • 
I 
Addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional 
police conduct that probably was unauthorized and 
actionable under state law, !/ the Monroe Court treated 
the 42d Congress' re jection of the Sherman Amendment as 
conclusive .evidence of an intention to immunize local 
governments from all liability for constitutional injury 
under the statute. That reading, in light of today's 
thorough canvass of the legislative history, clearly 
"misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision," 
Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring). In this 
case, involving formal, written policies of the Department 
of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City 
of New York that are alleged to conflict with the command 
of the Due Process Clause. Cf. Cleveland Board of Education 
v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Court correctly 
decides "not to reject [wisdom] merely because it comes too 
late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 
(1949) (Franfurter, J., dissenting). 
As the Court demonstrates, the ill-conceived 
Sherman Amendment presented an extreme example of "riot 
act" legislation that sought to impose vicarious liability 
on government subdivisions for the consequences of private 
3 • 
lawlessness. As such, it implicated concerns that are of 
marginal pertinence to the operative principle of § 1 of 
the 1871 legislation-- now§ 1983 --that "[a]ny person" 
acting "under color of" state law may be held liable for 
affirmative conduct that "subject[s], or cause[s] to be 
subjected, any person to the deprivation of any" 
constitutional or federal statutory right. Of the many 
reasons for the defeat of the Sherman proposal, none 
supports Monroe's observation that the 42d Congress was 
fundamentally "antagonistic," 371 U.S., at 191, to the 
proEosition that government entities and natural persons 
alike should be held accountable for the consequences of 
conduct directly working a constitutional violation. 
t 
Opponents in the Senate appear to have been troubled 
primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien provision, 
which would have exposed even property held for public 
purposes to the demands of §1983 judgment lienors. Opinion 
of the Court, ante, at 14 n.30. The opposition in the 
House of Representatives focused largely on the Sherman 
Amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on 
muncipalities when the Constitution itself imposed no such 
affirmative duty and when many municipalities were not even 




The Court correctly rejects a view of the 
legislative history that would produce the anomalous result 
of immunizing local government units from monetary 
liability for actions directly causing a constitutional 
deprivation, even though such actions may be fully 
consistent with, and thus not remediable under, state law. 
No conduct of government comes more clearly within the 
"under color of" state law language of §1983. It is most 
unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting 
under the command or the specific authorization of the 
government employer to be exclusively liable for resulting 
constitutional injury. ~/ 
As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood 
not as evidencing acceptance of a rule of absolute 
municipal immunity, but as limiting the statutory ambit to 
actual wrongdoers, i.e., a rejection of respondeat superior 
or any other principle of vicarious liability. Thus, a 
public official may be held liable in damages when his 
actions are found to violate constitutional right and there 
is no qualified immunity under Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 
308 (1975); Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446, u.s. 
(1978). Similarly, local government may have to answer in 
5 • 
damages "when execution of [its] policy or custom, whether 
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may 
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the 
[constitutional] injury •••• " Opinion of the Court, ante, at 
33-34. 
II 
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to 
overrule prior constructions of statutes or interpretations 
of common- law rules. Stare decisis is "usually the wise 
policy," Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 u.s. 393, 
406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), but this cautionary 
principle must give way to countervailing considerations in 
appropriate circumstances. !/ I concur in the 
Court's view that this is not a case where we should "place 
on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court's own 
- ~ 
error." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946). 
It is important to note that considerations of 
stare decisis cut in both directions in this case. On the 
one hand, we have a series of rulings that municipalities 
and counties are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983. In 
the somewhat accidental manner that characterizes some of 
the Court's decisions in this area, cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 
tL 
6 . 
427 U.S. 160, 186* (1976), we have answered a question that 
;\ 
was never actually briefed or argued in this Court. In 
Monroe -- which announced the principle of absolute 
municipal immunity- "[t]he theory of the complaint [was] 
that under the circumstances [t]here alleged the City [was] 
liable for the acts of its police officers, by virtue of 
1 
respondeat superior." Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, 
No. 39, p. 21. ~/ Respondents answered that adoption 
of petitioners' position would expose "Chicago and every 
other municipality in the United States ••. to Civil Rights 
liability through no action of its own and based on action 
contrary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state it 
is a part of." Brief for Respondents, supra, p.26. Thus 
the decision in Monroe went beyond the issue as viewed and 
argued by the parties themselves. 6 
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 
693 (1973) - the only other relevant case presenting a 
substantial discussion of the legislative history of §1983 
- petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., at 
696, under 42 u.s.c. § 1988. In rejecting this 
vicarious-liability claim, id., at 710 & n. 27, we 
reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the statute, but there was 
7. 
no challenge in that case to "the holding in Monroe 
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such 
as the County," id., at 700~ Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 
1972, No. 72-10, p. 9. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 
(1973), did the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on 
conduct that was both authorized under state law and the 
direct cause of the claimed constitutional injury. But in 
Kenosha we raised the jurisdictional question on our own 
initiative. 11 
Continued adherence to Monroe's account of the 
legislative debates, h,o\}~Ver, would require upsetting other 
lines of decision. We would have to reject this Court's 
sub silentio exercise of jurisdiction over school boards. 
See Opinion for the Court, ante, at 3 n.5. Since "the 
principle of blanket immunity established in Monroe cannot 
be cabined short of school boards," ~nte, at 36, the 
conflict is squarely presented. Although there was an 
independent basis of jurisdiction in many of the 
school-board cases because of the inclusion of individual 
public officials as nominal parties, the joinder of the 
school board itself was a question of jurisdictional 
8. 
magnitude. See City of Kenoshav. Bruno, supra, at 
511-514; Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274' 278-279 (1977). Moroever, the opinions of this Court 
make explicit reference to the school-board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, 
see, ~' Green v. County School Board, 391 u.s. 430, 
437-439, 441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 
292-293 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
And, as the Court points out, ante, at 36-39, Congress has 
focused specifically on this Court's school-board decisions 
in several statutes. Thus the exercise of § 1983 
jurisdiction over school boards, 
while perhaps not premised on considered holdings, has been 
longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe. 
Even if one attempts to exp~ain away the 
''~}~,, 
school-board decisions as involving suits which "may be 
maintained against board members in their official 
capacities for injunctive relief either under § 1983 or Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ," Dissenting/ pinion of 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 3 n.2, there remains some 
difficulty in rationalizing the relevant body of 
precedents. First, at least two of the school-board cases 
involved claims for monetary relief. Cohen v. 
{ 
I 
Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 
(ED Va. 1971), rev'd, 474 F. 2d 395 (CA4 1973), rev'd, 414 
U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 504 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 
445 (1973). Although our decisions did not focus on the 
point, these claims could not be asserted in 
official-capacity suits if the government entity was not 
otherwise suable. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
8 
(1974). Second, and more importantly, the 
9. 
rationale of Kenosha would have to be disturbed, unless all 
avenues under §1983 to injunctive relief against 
constitutional violations by local government were to be 
closed. The Court of Appeals in this case suggested that 
we import the Eleventh Amendment "fiction" of Ex parte 
Young into § 1983, 532 F.2d 259, 
264-266 (CA2 1976). That approach, however, would create 
tension with Kenosha because it would require "a bifurcated 
application" of "the generic word 'person' in §1983" to 
public officials "depending on the nature of the relief 
sought against them." 412 u.s., at 513. A public official 
sued in his official capacity would be a "person" for 
purposes of injunctive relief, but a non-"person" in an 
action for damages. 
10. 
Finally, if we continue to adhere to a rule of 
absolute municipal immunity under §1983, we cannot long 
avoid the question whether "we should, by analogy to our 
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 u.s. 388 (1971), imply a cause of action directly from 
the Fourteenth Amendment which would not be subject to the 
limitations contained in§ 1983 •••• " Mt. Healthy City 
Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 u.s., at 278. One aspect of 
that inquiry would be whether there are any "special 
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress," Bivens, supra, at 396, 
such as an "explicit congressional declaration that persons 
injured by a [municipality] may not recover money 
damages •.. , but must instead be remitted to another remedy, 
equally effective in the view of Congress," id., at 397. 
In light of the Court's persuasive reexamination of the 
1871 debates in today's decision, I would have difficulty 
inferring from §1983 "an explicit congressional 
declaration" against municipal liability for the 
implementation of official policies lin violation of the 
Constitution. Rather than constitutionalize a cause of 
action that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better 
course is to confess error and set the record straight, as 
the Court does today.~/ 
11. 
III 
Difficult questions remain for another day. There 
are substantial line-drawing problems in determining "when 
execution of a government's policy or custom" can be said 
to inflict con~titutional injury such that "government as 
an entity is responsible under §1983." Opinion for the 
Court, ante, at 33-34. This case, however, involves 
formal, written policies of a municipal department and 
school board; it is the clear case. The Court also 
reserves decision on the availability of any qualified 
municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. Initial resolution of the 
question whether the protection available at common law for 
municipal corporations, see Dissenting Opinion of MR. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles . ... 
• I ·f~ •' 
support ··a ·qt1a1.ff1-ed munic.ipal immunity in the context of 
the § 1983 damages action, is left for the lower federal 
courts. 
. ' .. .. .· 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The gravamen of the complaint in Monroe was 
that Chicago police officers acting "under color of" state 
law had conducted a warrantless, early morning raid and 
ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although at least one 
of the allegations in the complaint could have been 
construed to charge a custom or usage of the Police 
Department of the City of Chicago that did not violate 
state law, see 365 u.s., at 258-259 (Frankfurter J., 
dissenting in part) , and there is a hint of such a theory 
in petitioners' brief, O.T. 1960, No. 39, pp. 41-42, that 
feature of the case was not highlighted in this Court. The 
dispute that divided the Court was over whether a complaint 
alleging police misconduct in violation of state law, for 
which state judicial remedies were available, stated a 
§ 1983 claim in light of the statutory requirement that the 
conduct working injury be "under color of" state law. 
Compare 365 U.S., at 172-183 ;£pinion of the Court), and 
id., at 193-202 (Harlan, J., concurring), with id., at 
202-259, (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part). 
2. If, in the view of these Representatives, a 
municipality obligated by state law to keep the peace could 
be held liable for a failure to provide equal protection 
against private violence, it seems improbable that they 
N-2 
would have opposed imposition of liability on a 
municipality for the affirmative implementation of policies 
promulgated within its proper sphere of operation under 
state law. Such liability is premised not on a failure to 
take affirmative action in an area outside the 
contemplation of the state-law charter, but on the 
consequences of activities actually undertaken within the 
scope of the powers conferred by state law. 
3. The view taken today is consistent with the 
understanding of the 42d Congress that unless the context 
revealed a more limited definition, "the word 'person' may 
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate •..• " 
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. It also 
accords with the interpretation given the same word, used 
by Senator Sherman in the antitrust legislation of 1890 
bearing his name. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power 
& Light Co., No. 76-864, u.s. (1978) (plurality 
opinion); Chatanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of 
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906); cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, No. 76-749 u.s. (1978). See 
also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, No. 
76-1172, p. 14 n. 13, ___ U.S. n. 15 (1978). 
N-3 
4. See, ~' Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Machinists v. 
Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm., 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Braden v. 
30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 u.s. 484 (1973); 
Griffin v. Breckenrid~, 403 u.s. 88 (1971); Boy's Market, 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 u.s. 235 
(1970); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 406 n.l. 
5. The District Court in Monroe ruled against 
municipal liability, stating: "since the liability of the 
City of Chicago is based on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, and since I have already held that the complaint 
fails to state a claim for relief against the agents of the 
city, there is no claim for relief against the city 
~ itself." RecordA 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed for the same reason. 272 F.2d 365-366 
(CA 7 1959) . 
Petitioners in this Court also offered an 
alternative argument that the dity of Chicago was a 
"person" for purposes of § 1983, Brief for Petitioners, 
O.T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the underlying theory of 
municipal liability remained one of respondeat superior. 
6. We owe somewhat less deference to a decision 
that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of all 
~ ... 
N-4 
the relevant considerations. The fact that until this case 
the Court has not had to confront squarely the consequences 
of a ruling holding § 1983 inapplicable to official 
municipal policies may be considered in assessing the 
quality of the precedent that we are being asked to 
reexamine. 
7. In Aldinger v. Howard, 427 u.s. 1 (1976), we 
reaffirmed Monroe, but petitioner did not contest the 
proposition that counties were excluded from § 1983 as a 
result of Monroe, id., at 16, and the question before us 
concerned the scope of pendent-party jurisdiction with 
respect to a state-law claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt. 
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), 
did not seek a reexamination of our ruling in Monroe. 
8. To the extent that the complaints in those 
cases asserted claims of personal liability, as well as 
official capacity, the Court had jurisdiction to render 
decision. There is no suggestion in the opinions, however, 
that the practices at issue were anything other than 
official, duly authorized policies. 
9. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent makes a strong 
argument that "[s]ince Monroe, municipalities have had the 
N-5 
right to expect that they would not be liable retroactively 
for their officers' failure to predict this Court's 
recognition of new constitutional rights." Post, at 4. But 
it reasonably may be assumed that most municipalities 
already indemnify officials sued for conduct within the 
scope of their authority, a policy that furthers the 
important interest of attracting and retaining competent 
officers, board members and employees. In any event, the 
possibility of a qualified immunity, as to which we reserve 
decision for another day, may remove some of the harshness 
of liability for good-faith failure to predict the often 
uncertain course of constitutional adjudication. 
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Department of Social Services of of Appeals for the Sec-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional 
VIews. 
Few cases in the history of the Court ha.ve been cited more 
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), de-
cided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42 
U. S. C. § 1983, that decision widened access to the federal 
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach 
of the 1871 measure. But@ rio:§!jTM onroe2exempted local 
governments from liability at the same time it opened wide 
the courthouse door to suits against officers and employees of 
t ose ent1 1es- even when they a,ct pursuant to 
express authorization. The oddness of this result, and the 
weakness of the historical evidence relied on by the Monroe 
Court in support of it, are well demonstrated by the Court's 
opinion today. Yet, the gravity of overruling a portion of so 
important a decision prompts me to write. 
I 
Addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police 
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under 
state law/ the Monroe Court treated the 42d Congress' re-
1 The gravamen of the complaint in Monroe was that Chicago police 
officers acting "under color of" state law had conducted a warrantless, 
early morning raid and ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although 
75-1914-CONCUR (A) 
2 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence 
of an intention to immunize local governments from all lia-
bility for constitutional injury under the statute. That read-
ing, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative 
history, clea.rly "misapprehended the meaning of the con-
trolling provision," Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J. , con-
curring). In this case, involving formal, written policies of 
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Educa-
tion of the City of New York that are allegtf to conflict 
with the command of the Due Process ClausEb f. Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 6i'2 (1974), the 
Court~oFFeetl¥ decides "not to reject ·[wisdom] merely be-
cause it comes too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 
335 U. S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
As the Court demonstrates, the ill-conceived Sherman 
Amendment presented an extreme example of "riot act" legis-
lation that sought to impose vicarious liability on govern-
ment subdivisions for the consequences of private lawlessness. 
As such, it implicated concerns that are of marginal pertinence 
to the operative principle of § 1 of the 1871 legislation-now 
§ 1983-tha t " [a] ny person" acting "under color of" state 
law may be held liable for affirmative conduct that "sub-
ject[s] , or cause[s] to be subjected, any person to the depri-
vation of any" constitutional or federal statutory right. Of 
the many reasons for the defeat of the Sherman proposal, 
at least one of the allegations in the complaint could have been construed 
to charge a custom or usage of the Police Department of the City of 
Chicago that did not violate state law, see 365 U. S., at 258-259 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting in part), and there is a hint of such a theory in 
petitioners' brief, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, pp. 41-42, that feature of the case 
was not highlighted in this Court. The dispute that divided the Court 
was over whether a complaint alleging police misconduct in violation of 
state law, for which state judicial remedies were available, stated a § 1983 
claim in light of the statutory requirement that the conduct working 
injury be '"under color of" state la.w. Compare 365 U. S., at 172-183 
(opinion of the Court), and id., at 193-202 (Harlan, J., concurring), 
with id., at 202-259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part). 
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none supports Monroe's observation that the 42d Congress 
was fundamentally "antagonistic," 371 U. S., at 191, to the 
proposition that government entities and natural persons alike 
should be held accountable for the consequences of conduct 
directly working a constitutional violation. Opponents in the 
Senate appear to have been troubled primarily by the pro-
posal's unprecedented lien provision , which would have ex-
posed even property held for public purposes to the demands 
of § 1983 judgment lienors. Opinion of the Court, ante, at 
14 n. 30. The opposition in the House of Representatives 
focused largely on the Sherman Amendment's attempt to im-
pose a peacekeeping obligation on muncipalities when the 
Constitution itself imposed no such affirmative duty and when 
many municipalities were not even empowered under state 
law to maintain police forces. Ante, at 20--22. 2 
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history 
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local 
government units from monetary liability for action directly 
causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such actions 
may be fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under, 
state law. No conduct of government comes more clearly 
within the "under color of" state law language of § 1983. It 
is most unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting 
under the command or the specific authorization of the gov-
ernment employer to be exclusively liable for resulting con-
stitutional injury.8 
2 If, in the view of these ReprE'sentatiVJes, a municipality obligated by 
state law to keep the peace could be held liable for a failure to provide 
equal protection against private violence, it seems improbable that they 
would have opposed imposition of liability on a municipality for the 
affirmative Imp entation of policies promulgated within its proper 
sphere of operation under state Jaw. Such liability is premised not on a 
failure to take affirmative action in an area outside the contemplation of 
the state-law charter, but on the consequences of artivitics actually under-
taken within the scope of the powers conferred by state law. 
s The view taken today is consistent with the understanding of the 
42d Congress that unless the context revealed a more limited definition, 
75-1914-CONCUR (A) 
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As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the rejection 
of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood not as 
evidencing acceptance of a rule of absolute municipal im-
munity, but as limiting the statutory ambit to actual wrong-
doers, i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any other 
principle of vicarious liability. Thus, a public official may be 
held liable in damages when his actions are found to violate 
constitutional right and there is no qualified immunity under 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 208 (1975); Procunier v. Nav-
arette, No. 76-446, - U. S. - (1978). Similarly, local 
government may have to answer in damages ..,.,when ~•eeHtlOn 
II 
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior 
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law 
rules. Stare decisis is "usually the wise policy," Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting), but this cautionary principle must give way 
to countervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.4 
"the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and cor-
porate .... " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. It also 
accords with the interpretat-ion given the same word, used by Senator 
Sherman in the antitrust legislation of 1890 bearing his name. Sec City 
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., No. 76-864, - U. S. -
(1978) (plurality opinion); Chata.nooga Foundry & Pipe W arks v. City of 
Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906); cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 
No. 76-749,- U.S.- (1978). See also First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti, No. 76-1172, p. 4 n. 13,- U. S. -,- n. 15 (1978). 
4 See, e. g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U. S. 36 
(1977); Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp Rel. Comm., 427 U.S. 132 (1976); 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973); 
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Boy's Market, Inc. v. Retail 
~~.,~~~Ht..-t.- ~ ~ ~ ~~ 
Uu-  i4.... ~ >-0 a...-
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I concur in the Court's view that this is not a case where we 
should "place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the 
Court's own error." Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 
Lis i.mporhwt t.Q. ~e Mutt onsiderations of stare decisis 
cut in both directions i.P- thiil Qt;:BC," On the one hand, we 
have a series of rulmg"S.lhat municipalities and counties are 
not "persons" for purposes of § 1983. In the somewhat acci-
dental manner that characterizes some of the Court's decisions 
in this area, cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 186 n. * 
(1976), we have answered a questioin that was never actually 
briefed or argued in this Court. In Monroe-which announced 
the principle of absolute municipal immunity-" [ t] he theory 
of the complaint [was] that under the circumstances [t]here 
alleged the City [was] liable for the acts of its police officers, 
by virtue of respondeat superior." Brief for Petitioners, 0. T . 
1960, No. 39, p. 21.5 Respondents answered that adoption of 
petitioners' position would expose "Chicago and every other 
municipality in the United States ... to Civil Rights lia-
bility through no action of its own and based on action 
contrary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state it 
is a part of." Brief for Respondents, supra, p. 26. Thus the 
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Burnet v. Coronado Oil 
& Gas Co., supra, at 406 n. 1. 
5 The District Court in Monroe ruled against. municipal liability, stat-
ing: "since the liability of the City of Chicago is based on the doctrine 
of respondeat superior, and since I have already held that the complaint 
fails to state a claim for relief against the agents of the city, there is no 
cla.im for relief against the city itself." Record, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed for the same reason. 272 F. 2d 365-366 
(CA7 1959). 
Petitioners in this Court also offered an alternative argument that the 
city of Chicago was a "person" for purposes of § 1983, Brief for Peti-
tioners, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the underlying theory of municipal 
liability remained one of respondeat superior. 
-:;::, ~ ~ ~ .t! ... ~o/&.r--..e-c.J -~~  
;H>I ._~-~~ -~.a~~ 
t:l-~~~~~~ 
4lf ~LeA./~ Xu-~~~ 
~~~w~
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decision in Monroe went beyond the issue as viewed and 
argued by the pa.rties themselves.6 
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 
(1973)-the only other relevant case presenting a substan-
tial discussion of the legislative history of § 1983-petitioners 
asserted that "the county was vicariously liable for the acts 
of its deputies and sheriff," id., at 696, under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1988. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim, id·., at 710, 
and n. 27, we rea.ffirmed Monroe's reading of the statute, but · 
there was no challenge in that case to "the holding in Monroe 
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such as 
the County," id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 1972, 
No. 72-10, p. 9. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973), 
did the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that 
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of 
the claimed constitutional injury. But in Kenosha we raised 
the jurisdictional question on our own initiative.7 
·G We owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered with-
out benefit of a full airing of nll the relevant considerations The fact that 
until this case the Court has not had 1 o confront squarely the consequences 
of a ruling holding § 1983 inapplicable to offtcial municipal policies may 
be considered in assessing the quality of the precedent that we are being 
asked to re-examine. 
7 In Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976), we reaffirmed Monro e, 
but petitioner did not contest til(' propm~ition that couniies were excluded 
from § 1983 as a result of Monroe, id., at 16, and ihe qucsiion before us 
concerned the scope of pendent-party jurisdiction with respect to a state-
law claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), did not seck a re-examination of our n1ling 
in Monroe. 
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!though there was a.n independent basis of jurisdiction in 
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of 
individual public officials as nominal parties, the joinder of the 
school board itself was a question of jurisdictional magnitude. 
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, at 511-514; Mt. Healthy 
City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278- 279 (1977). 
Moreover, the opinions of this Court make explicit reference 
to the school board party, particularly in discussions of the 
relief to be awarded, see, e. g., Green v. County School Board, 
391 U. S. 430, 437-439, 441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 
433 U. S. 267, 292-293 (1977) (PowELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment). And, as the Court points out, ante, at 36-39, 
Congress has focused specifically on this Court's school board 
decisions in several statutes. Thus the exercise of § 1983 
jurisdiction over school boards, while perhaps not premised on 
considered holdings, has been longstanding. Indeed, it pre-
dated Monroe. 
T}J ~ 1' 
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Even if one attempts to explain away the school board 
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against 
board members in their official capacities for injunctive relief 
either under§ 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209, U.S. 123 (1908);'' 
dissenting opinion of MR. JusTICE .REHNQUIST, post, at 3 n. 2, .J:~ 1 1 I"L 
there remams difficulty in rationalizing the rel.;pq~,~od W ...J:. "'-
of precedents. ~ ltt least two of the school board cases ~ "\V'T 
involved claims for m~netary relief. Cohen v. Chesterfield ruff f 
County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (ED Va. 1971), .f-~ ( 1(,":1 
rev'd, 474 F. 2d 395 (CA4 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); a)rou.f-
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); '' f,.Jc, 
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,445 (1973). Although our (r.oclt ~ of 
decisions did not focus on the point, these claims could not be r-recdem. f:s' ~ 1 
asserted in official-capacity suits if the government entity was f c.J() tA. LJ. 
not otherwise suable. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 rOt fl.t..-r 
u > e., f1,. c:. 
.so~ 
, 1\ t'"A-.S-<.. 
( .., h, c:;, 
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(1974) .8 _ · , the rationale of 
Kenosha would have to Br disturbed, unless all avenues under 
§ 1983 to injunctive relief against constitutional violations by 
ocal governmen to be closed. The Court of Appeals in 
this case suggested that we import the Eleventh Amendment 
"fiction" of Ex parte Young into~ 1983, 532 F. 2d 259,264-266 
(CA2 1!)76). That approach, however, would create tension 
with Kenosha because it would require "a bifurcated applica- • 
tion" of "the generic word 'person' in § 1983" to public officials ~~ 
"depending on the nature of the relief sought against them." / ft!Y;_ ~L-.~.~~ 
412 U. S., at 513. A public official sued iH his effi:sisl eaf-Jaeity0 PJ4A 
would be a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief, but a ~ 
non-"person" in an action for damages. 
Finally, if we continue to adhere to a rule of absolute 
municipal immunity under § 1983, we cannot long avoid the 
question whether "we should, by analogy to our decision in 
Bivens v. Si.rc Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 
(1971), imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth 
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations 
contained in § 1983 .... " Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U. S. , at 278. One aspect of that inquiry would be 
whether there are any "special factors counselling hesitation in 
the absence of affirmative action by Congress," Bivens, supra, 
at 396, such as an "explicit congressional declaration that 
persons injured by a [municipality] may not recover money 
damages ... , but must instead be remitted to anoth_...;.e._r __ 
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress," id., at S97. 
In light of the Court's persuasive re-examination of the 1871 
debates in today's decision, I would have difficulty inferring 
from § 1983 "an explicit congressional declaration" against 
municipal liability for the implementation of official policies 
8 To the extent that the complaints in those cases asserted claims of 
personal liability, as well as official capacity, the Court had jurisdiction 
to render derision. There is no suggestion in thP opinions, however, that 
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in violation of th Constitution. Rather than constitutionalize 
a cause of action hat Congress intended to create in 1871~ 
better course is to confess error and set the record straigh1, as 
the Court does today .9 
III 
'Jb.-1?' _ ,~/ ~AA/ rDifficult questionS)emain for another day. There are sub-
~~ stantialline-drawing problems in determining "when execution 
of a government's policy or custom" can be said to inflict 
constitutional injury such that "government as an entity is 
responsible under § 1983." Opinion for the Court, ante, at 
33-34. This case, however, involves formal, written policies 
of a municipal department and school board; it is the clear 
case. The Court also reserves decision on the availability of 
~ qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. Initial reso-
lution of the question whether the protection available at 
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion 
of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles 
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the 
§ 1983 damages action, is left for the lower federal courts. 
~I • • 
9 MR. JusncE REHNQUIST's dissent makes a strong argument that 
"[s]ince Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that they 
would not be liable retroactively for their officers' failure to predict this 
Court's recognition of new constitutional rights." Post, at 4. But it 
reasonably may be assumed that most municipalities already indemnify 
officials sued for conduct within the scope of their authority, a policy that, 
furthers the important intevest of attracting and retaining competent 
officers, board members and employees. In any event, the possibility of 
a qualified immunity, as to which we reserve decision for another day, 
may remove some of the harshness of liability for good-faith failure to 
predict the often uncertain course of constitutional adjudication. 
4 a, A222h-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional 
views. 
Few cases in the history of the Court have been cited more 
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), de-
cided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42 
U. S. C. § 1983, that decision widened access to the federal 
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach of 
the 1871 measure. But Monroe exempted local governments 
from liability at the same time it opened wide the courthouse 
door to suits against officers and employees of those entities-
even when they act pursuant to express authorization. The 
oddness of this result, and the weakness of the historical 
evidence relied on by the Monroe Court in support of it, are 
well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today. Yet the 
gravity of overruling a part of so important a decision prompts 
me to write. 
I 
In addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police 
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under 
state law/ the Monroe Court treated the 42d Congress' re-
1 The gravamen of the complaint in Monroe was that Chicago police 
officers acting "under color of" state law had conducted a warrantless, 
early morning raid and ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although 
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jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence 
of an intention to immunize local governments from all lia-
bility under the statute for constitutional injury. That read-
ing, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative 
history, clearly "misapprehended the meaning of the con-
trolling provision," Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J., con-
curring). In this case, involving formal, written policies of 
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Educa-
tion of the City of New York that are alleged to conflict 
with the command of the Due Process Clause, cf. Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), the 
Court decides "not to reject [wisdom] merely because it comes 
too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U. S. 595, 600 
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
As the Court demonstrates, the Sherman Amendment pre-
sented an extreme example of "riot act" legislation that sought 
to impose vicarious liability on government subdivisions for 
the consequences of private lawlessness. As such, it implicated 
concerns that are of marginal pertinence to the operative 
principle of § 1 of the 1871 legislation-now § 1983-that 
"[e]very person" acting "under color of" state law may be held 
liable for affirmative conduct that "subjects, or causes to be 
subj-ected, any person to the deprivation of any" federal 
constitutional or statutory right. Of the many reasons for the 
at least one of the a.Ilegations in the compla.int could have been construed 
to charge a custom or usage of the Police Department of the City of 
Chicago that did not violate state law, see 365 U. S., at 258-259 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting in part), and there is a hint of such a theory in 
petitioners' brief, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, pp. 41-42, that feature of the case 
was not highlighted in this Court. The dispute that divided the Court 
was over whether a complaint alleging police misconduct in violation of 
state law, for which state judicial remedies were available, stated a § 1983 
claim in light of the statutory requirement that the conduct working 
injury be "under color of" state law. Compare 365 U. S., at 172-183 
(opinion of the Court), and id., at 193-202 (Harlan, J., concurring), 
with id., at 202-259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part). 
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defeat of the Sherman proposal, none supports Monroe's 
observation that the 42d Congress was fundamentally "antag-
onistic," 365 U. S., at 191, to the proposition that government 
entities and natural persons alike should be held accountable 
for the consequences of conduct directly working a constitu-
tional violation. Opponents in the Senate appear to have 
been troubled primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien 
provision, which would have exposed even property held for 
public purposes to the demands of § 1983 judgment lienors. 
Opinion of the Court, ante, at 14 n. 30. The opposition in the 
House of Representatives focused largely on the Sherman 
Amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on 
municipalities when the Constitution itself imposed no such 
affirmative duty and when many municipalities were not even 
empowered under state law to maintain police forces. Ante, 
at 20-22.2 
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history 
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local 
government units from monetary liability for action directly 
causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such actions 
may be fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under, 
state law. No conduct of government comes more clearly 
within the "under color of" state law language of § 1983. It 
is most unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting 
under the command or the specific authorization of the gov-
2 If, in the view of House opponents, such as Representatives Poland, 
Burchard and Willard, sec opinion of the Court, ante, at 20-21, a munici-
pality obligated by state law to keep t.he pE'acr could be held liable for a 
failure to provide equal protE'ction against private violE'ncc, it serms im-
probable that they would have opposed imposition of liability on a 
municipality for the affirmative implementation of policies promulgated 
within its proper sphere of operation under state law. Such liability is 
premised not on a failure to take affirmative action in an area outside the 
contemplation of the state-law charter, but on the consequences of activi-
ties actually undertaken within the scope of the powers conferred by 
fj,tate law. 
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ernment employer to be exclusively liable for resulting con-
stitutional injury.8 
As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the rejection 
of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood not as 
evidence of Congress' acceptance of a rule of absolute municipal 
immunity, but as a limitation of the statutory ambit to actual 
wrongdoers, i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any 
other principle of vicarious liability. Thus, a public official 
may be held liable in damages when his actions are found to 
violate a constitutional right and there is no qualified immu-
nity, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 208 (1975); Procunier 
v. Navarette, No. 76- 446, - U. S. - (1978). Similarly, 
local government may have to answer in damages when 
implementation of its official policies or established customs 
inflicts the constitutional injury. 
II 
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior 
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law 
rules. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy," Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting), but this cautionary principle must give way 
to comitervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.4 
8 The view taken today is consistent with the understanding of the 
42d Congress that unless the context revealed a more limited definition, 
"the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and cor-
porate .... " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. It also 
accords with the interpretation given the same word when it was used by 
Senator Sherman in the antitrust legislation of 1890 bearing his name. 
See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., No. 76-864, - U. S. -
(1978) (plurality opinion); Chatanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 
396 (1906); cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, No. 76-749,- U.S. 
- (1978). 
4 See, e. g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 
(1977); Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. R el. Cornm., 427 U.S. 132 (1976); 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky ., 410 U. S. 484 (1973); 
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I concur in the Court's view that this is not a case where we 
should "place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the 
Court's own error." Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 
70 (1946). 
Nor is this the usual case in which the Court is asked to 
overrule a precedent. Here considerations of stare decisis cut 
in both directions. On the one hand, we have a series of 
rulings that municipalities and counties are not "persons" for 
purposes of § 1983. In Monroe and its progeny, we have 
answered a question that was never actually briefed or argued 
in this Court--whether a municipality is liable in damages for 
injuries that are the direct result of its official policies. "The 
theory of the complaint [in Monroe was] that under the 
circumstances [t]here alleged the City [was] liable for the acts 
of its police officers, by virtue of respondeat superior." Brief 
for Petitioners, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 21. 5 Respondents 
answered that adoption of petitioners' position would expose 
"Chicago and every other municipality in the United 
States ... to Civil Rights liability through no action of its 
own and based on action contrary to its own ordinances and 
the laws of the state it is a part of [sic]." Brief for Respond-
ents, supra, p. 26. Thus the ground of decision in Monroe 
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971); Boy's Market v. Retail 
Clerics Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 
285 U. S. 393, 406-407 n. 1 (1932) (Brandeis, J., di, enting). 
5 The District Court in Monroe ruled in the municipalit.y's favor, stat-
ing: "since the liability of the City of Chicago is based on the doctrine 
of respondeat superior, and since I have already held that the complaint 
fails to state a claim for relief against the agents of the city, there is no 
claim for relief against the city itself." Record, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed for the same reason. 272 F. 2d 365-366 
(CA7 1959). 
Petitioners in this Court also offered an alternative argument that the 
city of Chicago was a "person" for purposes of § 1983, Brief for Peti-
tioners, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the underlying theory of municipal 
liability remained one of respondeat superior. 
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was not advanced by either party and was broader than 
necessary to resolve the contentions made in that case.6 
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 
(1973), petitioners asserted that "the County was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., at 696, under 
42 U. S. C. § 1988. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim, 
id., at 710, and n. 27, we reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the 
statute, but there was no challenge in that case to "the holding 
in Monroe concerning the status under§ 1983 of public entities 
such as the County," id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 
1972,~0. 72-10,p.9. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973), 
did the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that 
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of 
the claimed constitutiohal injury. But in Kenosha we raised 
the issue of the city>s am~nability to suit under § 1983 on our 
own initiative.7 
But this line of cases-from Monroe to Kenoshar-is difficult 
to reconcile on a principled basis with a parallel series of cases 
in which the Court ·has assumed sub silentio that some local 
government entities could be sued under § 1983. If now, after 
full consideration of the question, we continue to adhere to 
Monroe, grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's exercise 
of § 1983 jurisdiction. Since "the principle of blanket immu-
'6 We owe somewhat less de!ere'tlce to a decision that was rendered with-
out benefit of a full airing of a'!! t1Ie relevant considerations The fact that 
until this case the Court has not had to confront squarely the consequences 
''of holding § 1983 inapplicable to official municipal policies may be con-
sidered in assessing the quality of the precedent that we are asked to 
re-examine. 
7 In Alainger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976), we reaffirmed Monroe, 
but petitioner did not contest the proposition that counties were excluded 
from the reach of § 1983 under Monroe, id., at 16, and thr question before 
us concerned the scope of pendent-party jurisdiction with respect to a 
state-law claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt. Ilealthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), did not seek a re-examination of our ruling 
in Monroe. 
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nity established in Monroe cannot be cabined short of school 
boards," ante, at 36, the conflict is squarely presented. 
Although there was an independent basis of jurisdiction in 
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of 
individual public officials as nominal parties, the opinions of 
this Court make explicit reference to the school board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, see, 
e. g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-439, 
441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 292-29·3 
(1977) (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). And, as 
the Court points out, ante, at 3&--39, Congress has focused 
specifically on this Court's school board decisions in several 
statutes. Thus the exercise of § 1983 jurisdiction over school 
boards, while perhaps not premised on considered holdings, has 
been longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe. 
Even if one attempts to explain away the school board 
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against 
board members in their official capacities for injunctive relief 
vnder either§ 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)," 
Hissenting opinion of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 3 n. 2, 
some difficulty remains in rationalizing the relevant body of 
precedents. At least two of the school board cases involved 
claims for monetary relief. Cohen v. Chesterfield County 
School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (ED Va. 1971) , rev'd, 
474 F. 2d 395 (CA4 1973) , rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker 
v. Des Moines School Dist. , 393 U. S. 503, 504 (1969). See 
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,445 (1973). Although the 
point was not squarely presented in this Court, these claims 
for damages could not have been maintained in official-
capacity suits if the government entity were not itself suable. 
Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).8 Moreover, the 
8 To the extent that the complaints in those cases asserted claims 
against the individual defendants in their personal capacity, as well as 
official capacity, the Court would have had authority to award the relief 
requested. There is no suggestion in the opinions, however, that the 
practices at issue were anything other than official, duly authorized policies. 
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rationale of Kenosha would have to be disturbed, to avoid 
closing all avenues under § 1983 to injunctive relief against 
constitutional violations by local government. The Court of 
Appeals in this case suggested that we import, by analogy, the 
Eleventh Amendment "fiction" of Ex parte Young into§ 1983, 
532 F. 2d 259,264-266 (CA2 1976). That approach, however, 
would create tension with Kenosha because it would require "a 
bifurcated application" of "the generic word 'person' in§ 1983" 
to public officials "depending on the nature of the relief sought 
against them." 412 U. S., at 513. A public official sued in 
his official capacity for carrying out official policy would be a 
"person" for purposes of injunctive relief, but a non-"person" 
in an action for damages. The Court's holding avoids this 
difficulty. See ante, at 30 n. 55. 
Finally, if we continued to adhere to a rule of absolute 
municipal immunity under § 1983, we could not long avoid the 
question whether "we should, by analogy to our decision in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 
(1971), imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth 
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations 
contained in § 1983 .... " Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 
Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278 (1977). One aspect of that inquiry 
would be whether there are any "special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress," 
Bivens, supra, at 396, such as an "explicit congressional 
declaration that persons injured by a [municipality] may not 
recover money damages ... , but must instead be remitted 
to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress," 
id., at 397. In light of the Court's persuasive re-examination in 
today's decision of the 1871 debates, I would have difficulty 
inferring from § 1983 "an explicit congressional declaration" 
against municipal liability for the implementation of official 
policies in violation of the Constitution. Rather than consti-
tutionalize a cause of action against local government entities 
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that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better course is to 
confess error and set the record straight, as the Court does 
today.9 
III 
Difficult questions nevertheless remain for another day. 
There are substantial line-drawing problems in determining 
"when execution of a government's policy or custom" can be 
said to inflict constitutional injury such that "government as 
an entity is responsible under § 1983." Opinion for the Court, 
ante, at 34. This case, however, involves formal, written 
policies of a municipal department and school board; it is the 
clear case. The Court also reserves decision on the availability 
of a qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. Initial reso-
lution of the question whether the protection available at 
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion 
of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles 
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the 
_§ 1983 damages action, is left to the lower federal courts. 
ll MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissent makes a strong argument that 
· "[s]ince Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that they 
would not be liable retroactively for their officers' failure to predict this 
Court's recognition of new constitutional rights ." Post, at 4. But it 
reasonably may be assumed that most municipalities already indemnify 
officials sued for conduct within the scope of their authority, a policy that 
furthers the important interest of attracting and retaining competent 
officers, board members anct employees. In any event, the possibility of 
a qualified immunity, as to which we reserve decision, may remove some of 
,the harshness of liability for good-faith failure to predict the often uncer-
,tain course of constitutional adjudication. 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Seventeen years ago, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 
(1961), this Court held that the 42d Congress did not intend 
to subject a municipal corporation to liability as a "person" 
within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Since then, the 
Congress has remained silent, but this Court has reaffirmed 
that holding on at least three separate occasions. Aldinger v. 
Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 
(1973). See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 
U. S. 274, 277-279 (1977). Today, the Court abandons this 
loug and consistent line of precedents. offering in justification 
only an elaborate canvass of the same legislative history which 
was before the Court in 1961. and a single footnote, ante, at 
31 u. 57, brushing aside the doctrine of stare decisis. Because 
I cannot agree that this Court is "free to disregard these 
precedents," which have been "considered maturely and re-
cently" by this Court, Runyon v. McCrary, 426 U.S. 160. 186 
(1976) (PoWELL, J., concurring), I am compelled to dissent. 
I 
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, Runyon, supra, at 
175 n. 12; Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 671 n. 14 (1974), 
considerations of stare decis1.c; are at their strongest when this 
Court confronts its previous constructions of legislation. In 
all cases, private parties shape their conduct according to this 
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Court's settled construction of the law. but the Congress is at 
liberty to correct our mistak('s of statutory construction. unlike 
our constitutional interpretations, whenever it sees fit. The 
controlling principles were best stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis: 
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is 
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious 
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. 
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution. where 
correction through legislative action is practically impos-
sible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions." 
Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 39a, 406-
407 (1932) (dissentiug opinion) (footnotes omitted). 
Only the most compelling circumstances can justify this 
Court's abandonment of such firmly established statutory 
precedents. The best exposition of the proper burden of per-
suasion was delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan in Monroe itself: 
"From my point of view. the policy of stare decisis, as 
it should be applied in matters of statutory construction, 
and, to a lesser extent, the indications of congressional 
acceptance of this Court's earlier interpretation. require 
that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history 
of the 1871 statute that Classic [v. United States, 313 
U. S. 299 (1941)] and Screws [ v. United States, 325 U. S. 
91 ( 1945)] misapprehended the meaning of the control-
ling provision, before a departure from what was decided 
in those cases would be justified." Monroe, supra, at 192 
(concurring opinion) (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
The Court does not suggest that this standard has been 
satisfied. but rather implies that in certain circumstances it 
need not be applied. Ante, at 31 n. 57. The cases relied upon 
by the Court are manifestly inapposite. In Girouard v. United 
>' 
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States, 328 U. S. 61. 70 (1946), the Court explicitly noted that 
"the affirmative action taken by Congress in 1942 negatives 
any inference that might otherwise be drawn from its silence." 
By contrast, the Court today points to no affirmative action of 
the Congress which is in any way inconsistent with the holding 
in Monroe. Likewise, in Continental T. V., Inc. v. G. 'P. E. 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977), the Court overruled a 
recent precedent which was inconsistent with an established 
line of earlier cases. The Court acknowledged that it need not 
adhere "to the latest decision, however recent or questionable, 
when such adherence involves co'llision with a prior doctrine 
more embracing in its scope. intrinsically sounder, and verified 
by experience." /d., at 58 11. 30, quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 
'309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940). The Court today does not, and 
indeed cannot, suggest that Monroe is in any way inconsistent 
with previously established authority. 
Most disturbing. howevf'r, is the Court's suggestion that it 
has some special competence to devise principles of law in the 
field of civil rights legislation. As the'Court's citations sug-
gest. ante, at 31 n. 57, we have exercised such authority in the 
fields of admiralty and labor law. In admiralty. such a practice 
is appropriate. because "the Judiciary has traditionally taken 
the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law 
maritime, and 'Congress has largely left to this Court the 
responsibility for fashioniug the controlling rules of admiralty 
law.' " United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 
409 (1975), quoting Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, Co., 374 
U. S. 16, 20 (1963). Even in this field. the will of Congres~, 
where expressed. is controlling. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, No. 76-1726. Likewise, this Court has undertaken 
to fashion substantive principles of labor law only because 
"Congress has indicated by § 301 (a) [29 U. S. C. § 185 (a)] 
the purpose to follow that course." Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448.457 (1957). 
:It is simply impossible to maintain that the 42d Congres! 
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indicated any purpose to follow such a course in the construc-
tion of § 1983. It beggars the imagination to suppose that 
the same Reconstruction legislators who had proposed the 
Fourteenth Amendment for the purpose of overturning this 
Court's decision in 'Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), see 
Afroyim v. 'Rusk, 387 U. S. 253, 284-285 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting), and who truncated this Court's jurisdiction for the 
purpose of protecting their own legislative authority, Ex parte 
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869), ever intended that we "take[] 
.upon ourselves, without guidance from Congress, to construe 
the broad language of § 1983 in light of its history, reason, and 
purpose." Ante, at 31 n. 57. The 42d Congress intended this 
Court to implement the congressional will, and nothing else. 
Indeed, in all of our cases defining the scope of immunity 
under § 1983, we ha.ve explicitly ende;:tvored to be guided by 
the intent of that Congress. In our earliest effort, Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), we examined the state of the 
common law of legislative immunity as it existed in 1871, 
and concluded, "We cannot believe that Congress-itself a 
staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a 
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert 
inclusion in the general language before us." I d., at 376. 
Likewise, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967), we 
observed, "The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial 
role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress 
would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish 
the doctrine." We went on to recognize a defense of good 
faith and probable cause in favor of police officers making an 
arrest because it was " [ p] art of the background of tort lia-
bility" in the context of which the 42d Congress had legislated. 
!d., at 556. The Court later recognized a similar defense for 
other executive officers in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 
(1974), without any suggestion that we were exercising any 
special competence of our own to shape the substantive law. 
Indeed, we have Qnly recently rejected such an invitation t,o, 
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fashion a federal common law of civil rights remedies m 
Robertson v. Wegmann, No. 77-178. 
Thus, our only task is to discern the intent of the 42d 
Congress. That intent was first expounded in Monroe, and it 
has been followed consistently ever since. This is not some 
esoteric branch of the law in which congressional silence might 
reasonably be equated with congressional indifference. In-
deed, this very year, the Senate has been holding hearings on 
a bill, S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which would remove 
the municipal immunity recognized by Monroe. 124 Cong . 
.Rec. Dl17 (daily ed. Feb. 8. 1978). In these circumstances, it 
cannot be disputed that established principles of stare decisis 
require this Court to pay the highest degree of deference to its 
prior holdings. Monroe may not be overruled unless it has 
been demonstrated "beyond doubt from the legislative history 
of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the mean-
ing of the controlling provision." Monroe, supra, at 192 
(Harlan, J., concurring). [am satisfied that no such showing 
has been made .. 
II 
Any analysis of the meaning of the word "person" in ~ 1983, 
which was originally enacted as '§ 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 1'3, must begin, not with the Sher-
mau Amendment, but with the Dictionary Act. The latter 
Act. which supplied rules of construction for all legislation, 
provided: 
"That in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' 
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and cor-
porate . . . unless the context shows that such words 
were intended to be used in a more limited sense .... " 
Act of Feb. 25, 1871. ch. 71, ~ 2, 16 Stat. 431. 
The Act expressly provided that corporations need not be in-
cluded within the scope of the word "person" where the con-
text suggests a more limited reach. Not a word in the legis-
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lative history of the Act gives any indication of the contexts 
in which Congress· felt it appropriate to include a corporation 
as a person. Indeed, the chief cause of concern was that the 
Act's provision that "words importing the masculine gender 
may be applied to females," might lead to an inadvertent 
·extension of the suffrage to women. C01ig. Globe, 41st Cong., 
3d Sess., 777 (remarks of Sen. Sawyer). 
There are other factors , however, which suggest that the 
Congress which enacted § 1983 may well have intended the 
word "person" "to be used in a more. limited sense," as Monroe 
concluded. It is true that this 'Court had held that both 
commercial corporations, Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2. How. 
497, 558 ( 1844), and municipal corporations, Cowles v. Mercer 
·County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), were "citizens" of a State 
within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of Art. III. 
Congress, however, also knew that this label did not apply 
. in all contexts, since this Court, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 
168 ( 1868), had held commercial corporations not to be "citi-
zens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, U. S. COnst., Art. IV, § 2. Thus, the Congress surely 
knew that, for constitutional purposes, corporations generally 
enjoyed a different status in different contexts. Indeed, it 
may be presumed that Congress intended that a corporation 
should enjoy the same status under the Ku Klux Act as it 
did under the Fourteenth Amendment, since it had been as-
sured that § 1 "was so very simple and really reenacting the 
Constitution." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (re-
marks of Sen. Edmunds). At the time § 1983 was enacted 
the only federal case to consider the status of corporations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment had concluded, with im-
peccable logic, that a corporation was neither a "citizen" nor 
a "person." Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67 
(C. C. D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052) . 
Furthermore, the state courts did not speak with a single 
voice with regard to the tort liability of municipal corpora-
tions. Although many Members of Congress represented 
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States which had retained absolute municipal tort immunity, 
see, e. g., Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 
228 (1911) (collecting earlier cases), other States had adopted 
the currently predominant distinction imposing liability for 
proprietary acts, see generally 2 F. ~arper & F. James, The 
Law of Torts§ 29.6 (1956), as early as 1842. Bailey v. City of 
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842). Nevertheless, no state 
court had ever held that municipal corporations were always 
liable in tort in precisely the same manner as other persons. 
Thus. it ought not lightly to be presumed, as the Court 
does today. ante, at 28 n. 53. that § 1983 "should prima facie 
be construed to include 'bodies politic' among the entities 
that could be sued." Neither the Dictionary Act, the ambi-
valent state of judicial decisions, nor the floor debate on § 1 
of the Act give any indication that any Member of Congress 
h~:~-cl any inkling that § 1 could be u'sed to impose liability on 
municipalities. Although Senator Thurman, as the Court 
emphasizes, ante, at 25 n. 45. expressed his belief that the 
terms of § 1 "are as comprehensive as can be used,"* Cong. 
Globe. 42d Cong.. 1st Sess., App .. 217. an examination of 
his lengthy remarks demonstrates that it never occurred to 
him that § 1 did impose or could have imposed any liability 
upon municipal corporations. In an extended parade of hor-
ribles, this "old Roman," \vho was one of the Act's most im-
placable opponeuts. suggested that state legislatures, Members 
of Congress, and state judges might be held liable under the 
*Senator Thurmnn'b fear,.; notwith~tanding, this Court has squarely 
rrjrrted thr virw that ·'f'onp;n•;;;: in rnacting § 1 intended to exercise the 
entirrty of its powrr to rnforrr § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante, 
at 24. We have prrYiou,.;[~· !wid in Fitzpat1·ick , .. Bitze1', 427 U. S. 445 
(l97o). th:1t Congrr"" ha;: the powrr to authorize ;;nits for damages again.\lt 
the Stntr,.;, but wr haw likP\\'I,:r }l('kl, in Edelnum v. Jol'dan, 415 U.S. 651, 
67..J.-677 (1974), tlwt Congrr,.;,: rh([ not intPnd to rxerci;;r that power in 
Pnacting § 1983. SeP Fitzpatrick. supm, at 451-452. The~c recent prece-
de'qt,.; rlr~rribing t \tr limited rrneh of § 1983 further undermine today's 
J':H'iiP a:,;sumption that the tl'l'm " per,.;on '' wa::; intended to include "bodies 
politic." 
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Act. Ibid. lf, at that point in the debate, he had any idea 
that ~ 1 was desiglled to impose tort liability upon cities and 
counties, he would surely have raised an additional outraged 
objection. Only once was that possibility placed squarely 
before the Congress-in its cousideration of the Sherman 
Amendment-and the Congress squarely rejected it. 
The Court is probably correct that the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment does not lead ineluctably to the conclu-
sion that Congress intended municipalities to be immune from 
liability under all circumstances. Nevertheless. it cannot be 
denied that the debate on that Amendment, the only explicit 
consideration of municipal tort liability. sheds considerable 
light on the Congress' understanding of the status of municipal 
corporations in that context. Opponents of the Amendment 
were well aware that municipalities had been subjected to the 
.iurisdiction of the federal courts in the context of suits to 
enforce their contracts. Cong. Globe. 42d Cong .. 1st Sess., 789 
(remarks of Rep. Kerr), but they expressed their skepticism ~ l 
that such jurisdiction should be exercised in cases sounding in ~~G.r A~ cA 
tort : ?to bf'~ \G.J f\<\( 
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this section, and v4d.~~t 1\ of -t ,J~ 
no property can be found to levy upon except the court- ) 
10
-J \ srO p,,..t 
house, can we levy on the court-house and sell it? So ~ S ~er.-A' ~ 
this section provides, and that too in an action of tort, in 
an action ex delicto, where the county has never entered l e \ 1 A b• /, + 7 
into any contract, where the State has never authorized · ' 1 f~ 
the county to assume any___liability of the sort, or imposed -for- p ('I" A 
any liability upon it. It is in my opinion simply absurd." J 1 0 I e ~ 
I d., at 799 (remarks of Rep. 'Farnsworth). 
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments raised 
against it, the fact remains that Congress rejected the concept 
of municipal tort liability on the only occasion in which the 
'qUestion was explicitly prese11ted.. Admittedly this fact is not 
conclusive as to whether Congress intended ~ 1 to embrace a. 
municipal corporation within the meaning of "person," and 
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thus the reasoning of Monroe on this point is subject to chal-
lenge. The meaning of ~ 1 of the Act of 1871 has been 
subjected in this case to a more searching and careful analysis 
than it was in Monroe, and it ma.y well be that on the basis of 
this closer analysis of the legislative debates a conclusion 
contrary to the Monroe holding could have been reached 
when that case was decided 17 years ago. But the rejection 
of the Sherman Amendment remains instructive in that here 
alone did the legislative debates squarely focus on the liability 
of municipal corporatio11s. and that liability was rejected. 
Any inference which might be drawn from the Dictionary Act 
or from general expressious of benevolence in the debate on 
§ 1 that the word "persou'' was intended to include municipal 
corporations falls far short of showing "beyond doubt'' that 
this Court in Monroe "misapprehended the meaning of the 
controlling provision." Errors such as the Court may have 
fallen in to in Monroe do not end the inquiry as to stare decisis; 
they merely begin it. I would adhere to the holding of Monroe 
as to the liability of a muuicipal corporation § 1983. 
III 
The Court is quite correct that we need not determine today 
whether municipalities enjoy a more limited immunity under 
§ 1983 now that the absolute immunity recognized by Monroe 
has been abrogated. The Court of Appeals, however, will be 
required to face this issue squarely on remand. Since the 
Court has offered gratuitous guidance in this regard, I feel 
obliged to point out the manner in which its approach differs 
from that of our earlier cases. 
As I ha.ve already pointed out, supra, at 4-5, this Court has 
consistently recognized that its task in considering claims of 
official immunity is "one essentially of statutory construction." 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308. 316 (1975). The Court of 
Appeals must examine the congressional debates and reach its 
conclusion on the basis of "the background of tort liability." 
PiersarD. gupra;, at 556, as it existed at the time § 1983 was 
r 
75-1914-DISSENT 
10 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
enacted. Thus, it is utterly irrelevant that the doctrine of 
municipal immunity" '[flor well over a century ... has been 
subjected to vigorous criticism,'" Ante, at 37 (citation 
omitted) . The Court of Appeals ought not to consider "'the 
trend of judicial decisions,' " ante, at 37 n. 65 (citation 
omitted) , but must direct its attention to the intent of the 
Congress in 1871. In this regard. the Court's conclusion today l 
tha.t the Congress drew no distinction between a municipal gov-
ernment and its officers, ante, at 21, should not escape notice. 
IV 
The decision in Monroe v. Pape, was the fountainhead of 
the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years. Using 
§ 1983 as a vehicle, the courts have articulated new and previ-
ously unforseeable interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ments. · At the same time, the doctrine of municipal immunity 
enunciated in Monroe has protected municipalities and their 
limited treasuries from the consequences of their officials' 
failure to predict the course of this Court's constitutional 
jurisprudence. None of the Members of this Court can fore-
see the practical consequences of today's removal of that 
protection. Only the Congress. which has the benefit of the 
advice of every segment of this diverse Nation, is equipped to 
consider the results of such a drastic change in the law. It 
seems all but inevitable that it will find it necessary to do so1 
after today's decision . 
l. wQuld affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeala. 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Seventeen years ago, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 
(1961), this Court held that the 42d Congress did not intend 
to subject a municipal corporation to liability as a "person" 
within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Since then , the 
Congress has remained silent, but this Court has rea.ffirmed 
that holding on at least three separate occasions. Aldinger v. 
Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 
(1973). See also Mt. Hea.lthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 
U. S. 274, 277- 279 (1977). Today, the Court abandons this 
long ru1d consistent line of precedents, offering in justification 
0nly an elaborate canvass of the same legislative history which 
was before the Court in 1961~ and a iiiugle £Qotnote, B;nte, at--
81 n. 57, br~::~shiog aside tfie dedt iJJe ef...stare decisis.. Because 
I cannot agree that this Court is "free to disregard these 
precedents," which have been "considered maturely and re-
cently" by this Court, Runyon v. McCrary, 426 U.S. 160, 186 
(1976) (PowELL, J. , concurring), I am compelled to dissent. 
I 
As this Court has repeatedly recognized. Runyon, supra, at 
175 n. 12; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,671 n. 14 (1974), 
considerations of stare decisis are at their strongest when this 
Court confronts its previous constructions of legislation. In 
all cases, private parties shape their conduct according to this 
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Court's settled construction of the law, but the Congress is at 
liberty to correct our mistakes of statutory construction, unlike 
our constitutional interpretations, whenever it sees fit. The 
controlling principles were best stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis: 
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is 
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious 
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. 
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where 
correction through legislative action is practically impos-
sible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions." 
Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-
407 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted). 
Only the most compelling circumstances can justify this 
Court's abandonment of such firmly established statutory 
precedents. The best exposition of the proper burden of per-
suasion was delivered by Mr. Justice Ha.rlan in ·Monroe itself: 
"From my point of view, the policy of stare decisis, as 
it should be applied in matters of statutory construction, 
and, to a lesser extent, the indications of congressional 
acceptance of this Court's earlier interpretation. require 
that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history 
of the 1871 statute that Classic [ v. United States, 313 
U. S. 299 (1941)] and Screws [v. United States, 325 U.S. 
91 (1945)] misapprehended the meaning of the control-
ling provision, before a departure from what was decided 
in those cases would be justified." Monroe, supra, at 192 
(concurring opinion) (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added) . 
The Court does not demonstrate that any exception to this 
general rule is properly applicable here. The Court's first 
assertion , that Monroe "was a departure from prior practice," 
<;tnte, at 35, is patently ~rroneous. Neither in Douglas v. City 
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of Jea.nnette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), nor in Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 ( 1955), nor in any of the school board 
cases cited by the Court, ante, at 3-4, n. 5, was the question 
now before us raised by any of the litigants or addressed by 
this Court. As recently as four Terms a.go, we said in Hagans 
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974): 
"Moreover, when questions ,of jurisdiction have been 
passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has 
never considered itself bound when the case finally brings 
the jurisdictional issue before us." I d., at 535 n. 5. 
The source of this doctrine that jurisdictional issues decided 
sub silentio are not binding in other cases seems to be Chief 
Justice Marshall's remark in United States v. More, 3 Cranch 
159, 172 (1805).1 While the Chief Justice also said that such 
decisions may "have much weight, as they show that this point 
neither occurred to the bar or the bench," Bank of the United 
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61. 88 (1809), unconsidered 
assumptions of jurisdiction simply cannot outweigh four con-
sistent decisions of this Court, explicitly considering and 
rejecting that jurisdiction. 
Nor is there any indication that any later Congress has ever 
approved suit against any municipal corporation under § 1983. 
Of all its recent enactments, only the Civil Rights Attorneys' 
Fees Act, Pub. L. 94-559, ~ 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), codified 
at 42 U. S. C. § 1988. explicitly deals with the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871.2 The Act provides that attorneys' fees may be 
1 As we pointed out in Mt. Healthy, the existence of n claim for relief 
under § 1983 is "jurisdictional" for purposes of invoking 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
even though the exi~tencP of a meritorious constitutional claim is not 
~imilarly required in order to invokP jurisdiction under 28 U, S. C. § 1331. 
Seo Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 67H, 682 (1946); Mt. Healthy, supra, at 
278-279 . • 
2 The other statutes cited by thr Court, at 37-38, n. 65 make no mention 
of § 1983, but refer general!~· to ::<uit::; against "a local educational agency." 
A::; noted by the Court of A]lJ)('al:;, 532 F. 2d 259, 264-266, such suits may 
be maintained against board membrr::; in tht>ir official capacitirs for 
', 
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awarded to the prevailing party "[i] n any action or proceeding 
to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983. 1985. and 
1986 of this title." There is plainly no language in the 1976 
Act which would enlarge the parties suable under those sub-
stantive sections; it simply provides that parties who are 
already suable may be made liable for attorneys' fees. As the 
Court admits, ante, at 39, the language in the Senate report 
stating that liability may be imposed "whether or not the ~ 
agency or government is named as a party," S. Rep. No, 
94-1101, at 5, suggests that Congress did not view its purpose 
as being in any way inconsistent with the well-known holding 
of Monroe. 
The Court's assertion that municipalities have no right to 
act "on an assumption that they can violate constitutional 
rights indefinitely, ante, at 39, is simply beside the point. 
Since Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that 
they would not be held liable retroactively for their officer£ 
failure to predict th1s Court's recogmtwn of new constitutional 
ri~s. No doubt mnumera.ble mumCipal msurance pohc1es 
at1aindemnity ordinances have been founded on this assump-
tion, which is wholly justifiable under established principles of 
stare decisis. To obliterate those legitimate expectations 
without more compelling justification than those advanced 
by the Court is a significant departure from our prior practice. 
Thus, our only task is to discern the intent of the 42d 
Congress. That intent was first expounded in Monroe, and it 
has been followed consistently ' ever since. This is not some 
esoteric branch of the law in which congressional silence might 
reasonably be equated with congressional indifference. In-
deed, this very year, the Senate has been holding hearings on 
'injunctive relief under either § 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 
( 1908). Congress did not stop to consider the technically propN avenue 
of relief, but merely responded to the fact that relief was being granted. 
The practical result of choof;ing the avenue suggested by petitioners would 
br thr subjection of srhool corporations to liability in damages. Nothin~ 
)n rrcent congressional 'hj~a,ry even remotely supports such a result. 
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a bill, S. 35, 95th Con g. , 1st Sess. ( 1977) , which would remove 
the municipal immunity recognized by Monroe. 124 Cong. 
Rec. D117 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1978). In these circumstances, it 
cannot be disputed that established principles of stare decisis 
require this Court to pay the highest degree of deference to its 
prior holdings. Monroe may not be overruled unless it has 
been demonstrated "beyond doubt from the legislative history 
of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the mean-
ing of the controlling provision." Monroe, supra, at 192 
(Harlan , J. , concurring). The Court must show not only that 
Congress, in rejecting the Sherman Amendment, concluded 
that municipal liability was not unconstitutional, but also that, 
in enacting § 1, it intended to impose that liability. I am 
satisfied that no such showing has been made. 
II 
Any analysis of the meaning of the word "person" in § 1983, 
which was originally enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, must begin, not with the Sher-
man Amendment, but with the Dictionary Act. The latter 
Act, which supplied n,J.les of construction for all legislation, 
provided : 
"That in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word 'person' 
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and cor-
porate . . . unless the context shows that such words 
were intended to be used in a more limited sense .... " 
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. 
The Act expressly provided that corporations need not be in-
cluded within the scope of tbe word "person" where the con-
text suggests a more limited reach. Not a word in the legis-
lative history of the Act gives any indication of the contexts 
in which Congress felt it appropriate to include a corporation 
as a person. Indeed, the chief cause of concern was that the 
Act's provision that "words importing the masculine gender 
may be applied to females," might lead to an inadvertent 
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extension of the suffrage to women. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 
3d Sess., 777 (remarks of Sen. Sawyer). 
There are other factors, however, which suggest that the 
Congress which enacted § 1983 may well have intended the 
word "person" "to be used in a more limited sense," as Monroe 
concluded. It is true that this Court had held that both 
commercial corporations, Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2. How. 
497, 558 (1844), and municipal corporations, Cowles v. Mercer 
County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), were "citizens" of a State 
within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of Art. III. 
Congress, however, also knew that this label did not apply 
in all contexts, since this Court, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 
168 (1868), had held commercial corporations not to be "citi-
zens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Imrrrunities 
Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2. Thus, the Congress surely 
knew that, for constitutional purposes, corporations generally 
enjoyed a different status in different contexts. Indeed, it 
may be presumed that Congress intended that a corporation 
should enjoy the same status under the Ku Klux Act as it 
did under the Fourteenth Amendment, since it had been as-
sured that § 1 "was so very simple and really reenacting the 
Constitution." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (re-
marks of Sen. Edmunds). At the time § 1983 was enacted 
the only federal case to consider the status of corporations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment had concluded, with im-
peccable logic, that a corporation was neither a "citizen" nor 
a "person." Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67 
(C. C. D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052). 
Furthermore, the state courts did not speak with a single 
voice with regard to the tort liability of municipal corpora-
tions. Although many Members of Congress represented 
States which had retained absolute municipal tort immunity, 
see, e. g., Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 
228 ( 1911) (collecting earlier cases), other States had adopted 
the currently predominant distinction imposing liability for 
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proprietary acts, see generally 2 F. Harper & F. James, The 
Law of Torts§ 29.6 (1956), as early as 1842, Bailey v. City of 
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842). Nevertheless, no state 
court had ever held that municipal corporations were always 
liable in tort in precisely the same manner as other persons. 
The general remarks from the floor on the libeml purposes 
of § 1 offer no explicit guidance as to the parties against whom 
the remedy could be enforced. As the Court concedes, only 
Representative Bingham raised a concern which could be 
satisfied only by relief against governmental bodies. Yet he 
never directly related this concern to § 1 of the Act. Indeed, 
Bingham sta.ted at the outset, "I do not propose now to discuss 
the provisions of the bill in detail," Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 
1st Sess., App. 82, and, true to his word, he launched into an 
extended discourse on tl1e beneficent purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. While Bingham clearly stated that Con-
gress could "provide that no citizen in a.ny State should be 
deprived of his property by State law or the judgment of a 
State court without just compensation therefor," id., at 85, he 
never suggested that such a power was exercised in § 1.3 
Finally, while Bingham has often been advanced as the chief 
expositor of the Fourteenth Amendment, Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145. 165 (1968) (Black, J .. concurring); Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46. 73-74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), 
there is nothing to indicate that his colleagues placed a.ny 
an has not b('{'ll genrrally thought, before todny, that§ 1983 provided an 
nvennc of relief from uncon:;titnt.iona.l takings. Thot<f' f<'deral courts which 
have granted romprnsation against ,·tate and local governments have 
I'!'.~ort rd i o an implied right. of action under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amrndments. Richmond Elks Hall Assn. v. Richmond Redevelopment 
AgPnry, 561 F . 2d 1:~27 (CA9 1977) , aff'g 389 F. Supp. 486 (ND Cal. 
1975) ; Fostn v. City of Detroit, 405 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA6 1968). Since 
i 
thr C'ourt t.odity abandons the holding of Monroe chiefly on the strength 
of Bingham '~ argumPnt~, it is indef'd anomalou::; thnt § Hl8:1 will provide 
tPlief only when n local government, not the State itself, seizes private 
propcrt.y. S<'C ante, at 29 n, 54, citing Edelman, supra .. 
b"ow~"' 
af -f1oC.. 1 L W~ u ~ ~~,....-.r. +c + ~.-t4+ 
().. o0 " c rH • c 
~e-+ r"J of 
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greater credence in his theories than has this Court. See I 
Duncan, supra, at 174-176 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson, 
supra, at 64 (Frankfurter. J., concurring). 
Thus. it ought not lightly to be presumed, as the Court 
does today, ante, at 29 n. 53, that § 1983 "should prima facie 
be construed to include 'bodies politic' among the entities 
that could be sued." Neither the Dictionary Act. the ambi-
valent state of judicial decisions, nor the floor debate 011 § 1 
of the Act give any indication that any Member of Congress 
had any inkling that § 1 could be used to impose liability on 
municipalities. Although Senator Thurman, as the Court 
emphasizes, ante, at 25 n. 45, expressed his belief that the 
terms of § 1 "are as comprehensive as can be used," Cong. 
Globe. 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., 217, an examination of 
his lengthy remarks demonstrates that it never occurred to 
him that § 1 did impose or could ha.ve imposed any liability 
upon municipal corporations. In an extended parade of hor-
ribles, this "old Roman." who was one of the Act's most im-
placable opponents. suggested that state legislatures, Members 
of Congress, and state judges might be held liable under the 
Act. Ibid. If, at that point in the debate. he had any idea 
that § 1 was designed to impose tort liability upon cities and 
counties, he would surely ha.ve raised an additional outraged 
objection. Only once was that possibility placed squarely 
before the Congress-in its consideration of the Sherman 
Amendment-and the Congress squarely rejected it. 
The Court is probably correct that the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment does not lead ineluctably to the conclu-
sion that Congress intended municipalities to be immune from 
liability under all circumstances. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
denied that the debate on that Amendment, the only explicit 
consideration of municipal tort liability. sheds considerable 
light on the Congress' understanding of the status of municipal 
corporations in that context. Opponents of the Amendment 
were well aware that municipalities had be n subjected to the 
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jurisdiction of the federal courts in the context of suits to 
enforce their contracts. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong .. 1st Sess., 789 
(remarks of Rep. Kerr), but they expressed their skepticism 
that such jurisdiction should be exercised in cases sounding in 
tort: 
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this section, and 
no property' can be found to levy upon except the court-
house, can we levy on the court-house and sell it? So 
this section provides, and that too in an action of tort, in 
an action ex delicto, where the county has never entered 
into any contract, where the State has never authorized 
the county to assume any liability of the sort, or imposed 
any liability upon it. It is in my opinion simply absurd." 
!d., a.t 799 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth). 
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments raised 
against it, the fact rema.ins that Congress rejected the concept 
of municipal tort liability on the only occasion in which the 
question was explicitly presented. Admittedly this fact is not 
conclusive as to whether Congress intended § 1 to embra.ce a 
municipal corporation within the meaning of "person." and 
thus the reasoning of Monroe on this point is subject to chal-
lenge. The meaning of § 1 of the Act of 1871 has been 
subjected in this case to a more searching and careful analysis 
than it was in Monroe, and it ma.y well be that on the basis of 
this closer analysis of the legislative debates a conclusion 
contrary to the Monroe holding could have been reached 
when that case was decided 17 years ago. But the rejection 
of the Sherman Amendment remains instructive in that here 
alone did the legislative debates squarely focus on the liability 
of municipal corporations, and that liability was rejected. 
Any inference which might be drawn from the Dictionary Act 
or from general expressions of benevolence in the debate on 
§ 1 that the word "person" was intended to include municipal 
corporations falls far short of showing "beyond doubt'' that 
this Court in Monro~ "misapprehended the mea11ing of the 
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~ontrolling provisig!~Y Errors such as the Court may have 
fallen into in Monroe do not end the inquiry as to stare decisis; 
they merely begin it. I would adhere to the holding of Monroe 
as to the liability of a municipal corporation § 1983. 
III 
The decision in Monroe v. Pape, was the fountainhead of 
the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years. Using 
§ 1983 as a vehicle, the courts have articulated new and previ-
()usly unforseeable interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ments. At the same time, the doctrine of municipal immunity 
enunciated in Monroe has protected municipalities and their 
limited treasuries from the consequences of their officials' 
failure to predict the course of this Court's constitutional 
jurisprudence. None of the Members of this Court can fore-
see the practical consequences of today's removal of that 
protection. Only the Congress, which has the benefit of the 
advice of every segment of this diverse Nation, is equipped to 
consider the results of such a drastic change in the law. It 
seems all but inevitable that it will find it necessary to do so 
after today's decision. 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Seventeen years ago, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 
(1961), this Court held that the 42d Congress did not intend 
to subject a municipal corporation to liability as a "person" 
within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Since then, the 
Congress has remained silent, but this Court has rea.ffirmed 
that holding on at least three separate occasions. Aldinger v. 
Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 
(1973). See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 
U. S. 274, 277-279 (1977). Today, the Court abandons this 
long and consistent line of precedents, offering in justification 
only an elaborate canvass of the same legislative history which 
was before the Court in 1961. Because I cannot agree that 
this Court is "free to disregard these precedents," which have 
been "considered maturely and recently" by this Court. 
Runyon v. McCrary, 426 U. S. 160, 186 (1976) (PowELL, J .• 
concurring), I am compelled to dissent. 
I 
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, Runyon, supra, at 
175 n. 12; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n. 14 (1974), 
considerations of stare decisis are at their strongest when this· 
Court confronts its previous constructions of legislation. In 
wl cases, private parties shape their conduct according to this 
79 
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Court's settled construction of the law, but the Congress is at 
liberty to correct our mistakes of statutory construction, unlike 
our constitutional interpretations, whenever it sees fit. The 
controlling principles were best stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis: 
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than tha.t it be settled right. . . . ·This is 
·commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious 
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. 
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where 
correction through legislative action is practically impos-
sible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions." 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393. 406-
407 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted). 
Only the most compelling circumstances can justify this 
Court's abandonment of such firmly established statutory 
precedents. The best exposition of the proper burden of per~ 
suasion was delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan in Monroe itself: 
"From my point of view, the policy of stare decisis, as 
it should be applied in matters of statutory construction, 
and, to a lesser extent, the indications of congressional 
acceptance of this Court's earlier interpretation, require 
that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history 
of the 1871 statute that Classic [ v. United States, 313 
U.S. 299 (1941)] and Screws [v. ·United States, 325 U.S. 
91 (1945)] misapprehended the meaning of the control-
ling provision, before a departure from what was decided 
in those cases would be ·justified." Monroe, supra., at 19·2 
(concurring opinion) (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added) . 
The Court does not demonstrate that any exception to this· 
general rule is properly applicable here. The Court's first 
·assertion. that Monroe "was a departure from prior practice,'" 
ante, at 35, is· patently erro11eous. Neither in Douglas v. Citw 
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of Jea.nnette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), nor in Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). nor in any of the school board 
cases cited by the Court, ante, at 3-4, n. 5, was the question 
now before us raised by any of the litigants or addressed by 
this Court. As recently as four Terms ago, we said in Hagans 
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 ( 1974) : 
"Moreover, when questions of jurisdiction have been 
passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has 
never considered itself bound when the case finally brings 
the jurisdictional issue before us." I d., at 535 n. 5. 
The source of this doctrine that jurisdictional issues decided 
sub silentio are not binding in other cases seems to be Chief 
Justice Marshall's remark in United States v. More, 3 Cranch 
159, 172 (1805).1 While the Chief Justice also said that such 
decisions may "have much weight, as they show that this point 
neither occurred to the bar or the bench." Bank of the United 
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 88 (1809). unconsidered 
assumptions of jurisdiction simply cannot outweigh four con-
sistent decisions of this Court, explicitly considering and 
rejecting that jurisdiction. 
Nor is there any indication that any later Congress has ever 
approved suit against any municipal corporation under § 1983. 
Of all its recent enactments. only the Civil Rights Attorneys' 
Fees Act. Pub. L. 94-559. § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). codified 
at 42 U. S. C. § 1988, explicitly deals with the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871.2 The Act provides that attorneys' fees may be 
1 A;; we pointed out in Mt. Healthy. tlw rxi;;tencr of a claim for relief 
under § 1983 i,.; "juri~dictional" for purpm;e:-; of invoking 2g U.S. C. § 1343, 
even though the existencr of a meritoriom: constitutional daim i:;; not 
similnrly required in or<ler to invokr juri~dirtion under 2S U. S. C. § 1331. 
SeEI Bell v. Hood, :l27 U. S. 678, 682 (1946) ; }ft. Healthy, supra, a.t 
278-279. 
2 The other statutes e1ted hy thE' Court, at 37-39, n. 63 make no mention 
of § 1983, but rE-fer generally to suit~ against "a local educational ngrncy.'' 
A::; notE'd by the Court of Appeal~, 5:32 F. 2d 25H, 264-266, ;;uch ;;uit;; ma.y 
be maintained agninf't board uwmher:; in their official CllllacitiE>s for 
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awarded to the prevailing party ''[i]n any action or proceeding 
to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 
1986 of this title." There is plainly no language in the 1976 
Act which would enlarge the parties suable under those sub-
stantive sections; it simply provides that parties who are 
already suable may be made liable for attorneys' fees. As the 
'Court admits, ante, at 39, the language in the Senate report 
stating that liability may be imposed "whether or not the 
agency or government is named as a. party," S. Rep. No. 
94-1101, at 5, suggests that Congress did not view its purpose 
as being in any way inconsistent with the well-known holding 
of Monroe. 
The Court's assertion that municipalities have no right to 
act "on an assumption that they can violate constitutional 
rights indefinitely," ante, a.t 40, is simply beside the point. 
Since Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that 
they would not be held liable retroactively for their officers 
failure to predict this Court's recognition of new constitutional 
rights. No doubt innumerable municipal insurance policies 
arid indemnity ordinances have been founded on this assump-
tion, which is wholly justifiable under established principles of 
stare decisis. To obliterate those legitimate expectations 
without more compe1ling justification than those advanced 
by the Court is a significant departure from our prior practice. 
I cannot agree with MR. Jus'l'ICE PowELL's view tha.t "[w]e 
owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered 
without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considera-
tions." Ante, at 6 n. 6 (PowELL, J., concurring). Private 
parties must be able to rely upon explicitly stated holdings 
of this Court, without being obliged to peruse the briefs of 
injunctive relief under either § 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 
{1908). Congress did not stop to consider the technicaiiy proper avenue 
of relief, but merely responded io the faet thnt. relief was being granted. 
The practical result of choosing the nvcnue suggested by petitioners would 
be the subjection of school corporn.t.ions to liability in damages. Nothing: 
in recent congressional· history 1even remotely supports such a result. 
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the litigants to predict the likelihood that this Court might 
change its mind. To cast such doubt upon each of our cases, 
from Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 ( 1803) , forward, in 
which the explicit ground r;i decision "was never actually of 
briefed or argued." ante, at~ (PowELL. J., concurring), would 
introduce intolerable uncertainty into the law. Indeed, in 
Marbury itself, the argument of Charles Lee on behalf of the 
applicants-which, unlike the arguments in Monroe, is repro-
duced in the Reports of this Court where anyone can see it-
devotes not a word to the question of whether this Court 
has the power to invalidate a statute duly enacted by the 
Congress. Neither this ground of decision nor any other was 
advanced by Secretary of State Madison, who evidently made 
no appeara11ce. 1 Cranch, at 153-154. That Marbury and 
countless other decisions retain their vitality despite their 
obvious flaws is a necessa:ry by-product of the adversary sys-
tem, in which both judges and the general public rely upon 
litigants to present "all the relevant considerations." Ante, 
at 6 n. 6 (PowELL, J., concurring). More recent landmark 
decisions of this Court would appear to be likewise vulnerable 
under my Brother PowELL's a.nalysis. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961) , none of the parties requested the Court to 
overrule Wolf v. Colorado, 335 U. S. 25 ( 1949) ; it did so only 
at the request of an a.rnicus curiae. 367 U. S .. at 646 n. 3. 
While it undoubtedly has more latitude in the field of con-
stitutional interpretation, this Court is surely not free to 
abandon settled statutory interpretation at any time a new 
thought seems appealing.8 
Thus, our only task is to discern the intent of the 42d 
Congress. That intent was first expounded in Monroe, and it 
3 T find it ~orne what ir·onic thnt, in abandoning the supposedly ill-
ronsiderecl holding of Monroe, m:v Brother PowELL relies hrnvily up oil 
cases involving school boards, although he admits thnt " the exerci~;e of 
§ 1983 juri ~;dietion ... [was] perhaps not. premil:ied on con;,;idered hold-
ing:;." Ante, at 7 (PowEt.r., J ., concurring) . 
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has been followed consistently ever since. This is not some 
~soteric branch of the law in which congressional silence might 
t'easonably be equated with congressional indifference. In-
deed, this very year, the Senate has been holding hearings on 
a bill, S. 35, 95th Gong., 1st Sess. (1977), which would remove 
the municipal immunity recognized by Monroe. 124 Cong. 
Rec. D117 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1978). In these circumstances, it 
cannot be disputed that established principles of stare decisis 
require this Court to pay the highest degree of deference to its 
prior holdings. Monroe may not be overruled unless it has 
been demonstrated "beyond doubt from the legislative history 
of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the mean-
ing of the controlling provision." Monroe, supra, at 192 
(Harlan, J. , concurring). The Court must show not only that 
Congress, in rejecting the Sherman Amendment, concluded 
that municipal liability was not unconstitutional, but also that, 
in enacting § 1, it intended to impose that liability. I am 
satisfied that no such showing has been made. 
II 
Any analysis of the meaning of the word "person" in § 1983, 
which was originally enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, must begin, not with the Sher-
man Amendment, but with the Dictionary Act. The latter 
Act, which supplied rules of construction for all legislation, 
provided: 
"That in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' 
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and cor-
porate . . . unless the context shows that such words 
were intended to be used -in a more limited sense .•.. " 
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. 
'l'he Act expressly provided that corporations need not be in-
cluded within the scope of the word "person" where the con-
text suggests a more limited reach. Not a word in the legis-
lative history of the Act gives any indication of the contexts 
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in which Congress felt it appropriate to include a corporation 
as a person. Indeed, the chief cause of concern was that the 
Act's provision that "words importing the masculine gender 
may be applied to females," might lead to an inadvertent 
extension of the suffrage to women. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 
3d Sess., 777 (remarks of Sen. Sawyer) . 
There are other factors, however, which suggest that the 
Congress which enacted § 1983 may well have intended the 
word "person" "to be used in a more limited sense," as Monroe 
concluded. It is true that this Court had held that both 
commercial corporations, Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2. How. 
497, 558 (1844), and municipal corporations, Cowles v. Mercer 
County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), were "citizens" of a State 
within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of Art. III. 
Congress, however, also knew that this label did not apply 
in all contexts, silice this Court, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 
168 (1868), had held commercial corporations not to be "citi-
zens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2. Thus, the Congress surely 
knew that, for constitutional purposes, corporations generally 
enjoyed a different status in different contexts. Indeed, it 
may be presumed that Congress intended that a corporation 
should enjoy the same status under the Ku Klux Act as it 
did under the Fourteenth Amendment, since it had been as-
sured that § 1 "was so very simple and really reenacting the 
Constitution." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (re-
marks of Sen. Edmunds) . At the time § 1983 was enacted 
the only federal case to consider the status of corporations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment had concluded, with im-
peccable logic, that a corpora.tion was neither a "citizen" nor 
a "person." Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67 
(C. C. D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052). 
Furthermore, the state courts did not speak with a single 
voice with regard to the tort liability of municipal corpora-
tions. Although many Members of Congress represented 
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States which had retained absolute municipal tort immunity, 
see, e. g., Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 
228 ( 1911) (collecting earlier cases), other States had adopted 
the currently predominant distinction imposing liability for 
proprietary acts, see generally 2 F. Harper & F. James, The 
Law of Torts§ 29.6 (1956), as early as 1842, Bailey v. City of 
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842). Nevertheless, no state 
court had ever held that municipal corporations were always 
liable in tort in precisely the same manner as other persons. 
The general rema.rks from the floor on the liberal purposes 
. of § 1 offer no explicit guidance as to the parties against whom 
the remedy could be enforced. As the Court concedes, only 
Representative Bingham raised a concern which could be 
satisfied only by relief against governmental bodies. Yet he 
·never directly related this concern to § 1 of the Act. Indeed, 
Bingham stated at the outset, "I do not propose now to discuss 
the provisions of the bill in detail," Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 
1st Sess., App. 82, and, true to his word, he launched into an 
extended discourse on the beneficent purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. While Bingham clearly sta.ted that Con-
gress could "provide that no citizen in any State should be 
deprived of his property by State law or the judgment of a 
State court without just compensation therefor," id., at 85, he 
never suggested that such a power was exercised in ~ 1.' 
Finally, while Bingham has often been advanced as the chief 
4 It ha~ not been generally thought, before tcday, that§ 1980 provided an 
avenue of relief from unconstitut.iona.l takings. Those federal courts which 
have granted compensation agaim;t. state and local governments have 
rrsortrd to an implied right of action under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Richmond Elks Hall Assn. v. Richmond Redevelopme71t 
Agenq;, 561 F. 2d 1327 (CA9 1977), a.ff'g 389 F. Supp. 486 (ND Cal. 
1975); Foster v. City of Detrcrit, 405 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA6 1968). Since 
the Court today abandons the holding of Monroe chiefly on the ::;trength 
of Bingham's arguments, it is indeed anomalous that § 1983 will provide 
relief only when a local government, not the State itself, seizes private 
vropcrty. See ante, at 30 n. 54; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 / 
{1976); Edelman, supra, n.t 674--677. 
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expositor of the Fourteenth Amendment, Duncan v. Louisia,na, 
391 U.S. 145, 165 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46, 73-74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), 
there is nothing to indicate that his colleagues placed any 
greater credence in his theories than has this Court. See 
Duncan, supra, at 174--176 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson, 
supra, at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Thus, it ought not lightly to be presumed, as the Court 
does today. ante, at 30 n. 53, that ~ 1983 "should prima facie 
be construed to include 'bodies politic' among the entities 
that could be sued." Neither the Dictionary Act, the ambi-
va.lent state of judicial decisions, nor the floor debate on § 1 
of the Act give any indication that any Member of Congress 
had any inkling that § 1 could be used to impose liability on 
municipalities. Although Senator Thurman, as the Court 
emphasizes, ante, at 26 n. 45. expressed his belief tha.t the 
terms of § 1 "are as comprehensive as can be used," Cong. 
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., 217, an examination of 
his lengthy remarks demonstrates that it never occurred to 
him that § 1 did impose or could have imposed any liability 
upon municipal corporations. In an extended parade of hor-
ribles, this "old Roman," who was one of the Act's most im-
placable opponents, suggested that state legislatures, Members 
of Congress, and state judges might be held liable under the 
Act. Ibid. If, at that point in the debate, he had any idea 
that § 1 was designed to impose tort liability upon cities and 
counties, he would surely have raised an additional outraged 
objection. Only once was that possibility placed squarely 
before the Congress-in its consideration of the Sherman 
Amendment--and the Congress squarely rejected it. 
The Court is probably correct that the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment does not lead ineluctably to the conclu-
sion that Congress intended municipalities to be immune from 
liability under all circumstances. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
deJ1ied that the debate on that Amendment, the only explicit 
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consideration of municipal tort liability, sheds considerable 
light on the Congress' understanding of the status of municipal 
corporations in that context. Oppon.ents of the' Amendment 
were well aware that munici.palities h.ad been subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts in the context of suits to 
enf0rce their contracts, Cong.· Globe: 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 789 
(remarks of Rep. Kerr), but they expressed their skepticism 
that such jurisdiction should be exercised in cases sounding in 
' tort : 
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this section, and 
, no property can be found to levy upon except the court-
house, can we levy on the court-house and sell it? So 
this section 'provides, and that too in an action of tort, in 
an action ex delicto, where the county has never entered 
into any contract, where the State has never authorized 
the county to assume any liability of the sort, or imposed 
any liability upon it. It is in my ·opinion simply absurd." 
ld., at 799 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth). 
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments raised 
against it, the fact remains that Congress rejected the concept 
of municipal tort liability on the only occasion in which the 
question was explicitly presented. Admittedly this fact is not 
conclusive as to whether Congress intended § 1 to embrace a 
municipal corporation within the meaning of "person," and 
thus the reasoning of Monroe on this point is subject to chal-
lenge. 'The meaning of § 1 of the Act of 1871 has been 
subjected in this case to a more searching and careful analysis 
than it was in Monroe, and it may well be that on the basis of 
this closer analysis of the legislative debates a conclusion 
contrary to the Monroe holding could have been reached· 
when that case was decided 17 years ago. But the rejection 
of the Sherman Amendment remains instructive in that here· 
alone did the legislative debates squarely focus on the liability 
of municipal corporations, and that liability was rejected. 
Any inference which might be drawn from the Dictionary AcL 
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or from general expressions of benevolence in the debate on 
§ 1 that the word "person" was intended to include municipal 
corporations falls far short of showing "beyond doubt" that 
this Court in M ()11,roe "misapprehended the meaning of the 
controlling provision." Errors such as the Court may have 
fallen into in Monroe do not end the inquiry as to stare decisis; 
they merely begin it. I would adhere to the holding of Monroe 
as to the liability of a municipal corporation § 1983. 
III 
The decision in Monroe v. Pape, was the fountainhead of 
the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years. Using 
§ 1983 as a vehicle, the courts have articulated new and previ-
ously unforseeable interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ments. At the same time, the doctrine of municipal immunity 
enunciated in Monroe has protected municipalities and their 
limited treasuries from the consequences of their officials' 
failure to predict the course of this Court's constitutional 
jurisprudence. None of the Members of this Court can fore-
see the practical consequences of today's removal of that 
protection. Only the Congress, which has the benefit of the 
advice of every segment of this diverse Nation, is equipped to 
consider the results of such a drastic change in the law. It 
seems all but inevitable that it will find it necessary to do so 
after today's decision. 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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Memora.ndum of Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST.1 
While petitioners in my view tender only two bases for 
reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in this case, the Conference discussion ranged • I' little more extensively than the limits of the questions on 
which we granted cortiorari. This memorandum will there-
72 fore address what seem to me to be three seemin 1 se arate, 
-;.,... u4a.., ~ but nonetheless related, grounds for reversa : 1) Overrule the 
~ _ ,t£ .L,.~ conclusion reached in MOttroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187 
._.....__ (1961). that "Congress did not undertake a bring municipal 
a.-,. ~ A••1-c..... corporations within the ambit of§ 1979 [§ 1983]"; (2) Allow 
that conclusion in Prfonroe to stand as a matter of form. but 
1-.J (!;c.c,_ ~~~~..._.... permit federal courts who have individual municipal officials 
before them as defendants to require those officials to use their 
statutory authority to draw checks upon the bank account of 
the municipal corporation in order to satisfy a judgment for 
damages; (3) conclude that the "school board" in this case 
is not the sort of "municipal corporation" exempted from 
liability under Jlrfonroe v. Pape, and therefore is a "person'1 
1 Sinre only tJ~e Chief and Hnrry joined me in my vote to affirm at 
conference, I have not felt w1~rnmted in !Structuring this memornndum as 
a pole11t ial Court opinion in all but name. Should I persuade Potter and 
Lewis of ihe eorrectner:s of my view, I will obviously rearra.ng; the form 
~t the l:!nbstanre of'this memomndum. 
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within the metwing of ~ 1983 and suable as a defendant tplC}er 
28 U. S. C. § 1~3. Contentions two and three. though nomi-
nally separate, both depend to a greater or lesser extent on the 
conclusion that the Court's rea4ing of the legislative history 
in connection with the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 was so plainly erroneous as to warrf_\nt abandonment of 
the principle of stare deaisis in connection with it and with 
subsequent cases which have reaffirmed it. This memo there~ 
fore addresses tha.t question first. 
I 
Are municipal corporations persons under § 1983? Bill 
Douglas' opinion for the Court in M onroe sets forth relevant 
portions of the debates at pp. 18(-192 of 365 U.S. It seems to 
me worth noting tha.t although f.\n elabor~te canvass of the 
history surrounding the adoption of · the Act of 1871 for the 
purpose of determining the m~t:lning of the phrase "under 
color of law" produced a Co'!lrt opinion written by Biil 
Douglas, a concurring opinion written by ·John Harlan in 
which Potter concurred, and a dissenting opinion by Felix 
Frankfurter, the ' Court was unanimous in the conclusion that ~ 
the word "persot1" in the Act d id not incl\}de a municipal 
corporation. 
Johtl Harlan's opinion; whicp Potter joil)ed, commented, 
"Were this case· here as one of ·first impression. I would find 
the 'under color of any statute' issue yery close indeed." 36,5 
U. S .. at 192. He went on to say ·that because of previous 
' h1terpretations of the phtase in Classic V.' United Sta.tes, 313' 
U. S. 299 (1911), and Screws y. United States, 32q U. S. 91 
(1945), the policy of stare decisis should govern , even though 
the previous interpretations hqd involveq different though 
substai1tially identical phraseology, unless it were to 11appear· 
beyond doubt from the legislative history of the 1871 statute 
that Classic and Screws misapprehended the meaning of the 
l CQntrollin~ ,provision .. " 3Q5 U. S., 3-t. 192.. A simi tar· burdeDJ 
75-1914-MEMO 
MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEIYf. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 3 
of persuasion must rest upon those who submit that Monroe 
incorrectly respJved the question of municipal liability. 
The best stf!temm~t of the argument against the Monroe 
Court's copstructioq of § 1983 with respect to the meltl1ing of 
"person" appears in the Appendix to the brief of the National 
Education 4ssociation in this case. pp. 1a-31a, Unquestion· 
ably "ffieb nef malres out a very plausible case for the proposi-
tion that the rejection of the so-called "Sherman Amendment," 
which was in fact proposed as a new section to the bill which 
would become the Civil ~ights Act of 1871, did not require 
the limitation' which the M anroe Court placed upon the wc;.rd 
"person" in the first sec~ion of the Act. The first section was 
never amended in either House. 
While I have said ~ think the case made out by the brief is 
plausible, it is quite understalldably a very good piece of 
advocacr.!ather than an Qbjective discussion of what Congress 
intended in 1871. The brief repeats argumeqts raised in law 
review criticism of the Monroe Court's treatrpent of the mean-
ing of the word ('person" as del}ned in § 1983. Law review 
comm~nt at the time Monroe was decided paid little attention 
to this point. The Supreme Court, 1960 '.ferm, 75 Harv. L. 
Rev. 40, ,213 (1961), simply mentions the holding as to 
municipal liability in passing; a more extenf:live trea.trnent of 
the issue is containeq in 49 Calif. L. Rev. 145, 153-1M' (1961), 
but the result reached py tpe Court is not criticized there, 
either. Four years later, in an otherwise exhaustive discussion 
of the possible import of Monroe; Professor Shapo merely 
mentions the municipal ~xclusion without offering any dif:!CUS• 
sion or criticism of it. · Shapo, Constitqtional Tort, Monroe v. 
Pape and the Frontiers ~eyond, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 277, 
295-296 (1965) . 
I do not find any law review criticism of the Monroe Ooqrt's 
treatment of rpunicipal liability until eight yea.rs after the 
decision, in a comment in 57 Calif. L. Rev. 1142, 1164-1172 
(1969). 'Two years ~ter, ~ note in 55 Miqn. L. Rev. 12014 
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1205-1207 (1971), was likewise critical of the Court's use of 
le~islative history with respect to this question. A third arti-
cle that same year, Suing Publtc Entities under the Feqeral 
Civil Rights Act: Monroe v. P~pe neconsiqered, 43 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 105, 118-1~0 (1971), echoed the objections made in 
the other two articles. The · most e~t~nsive atfack on , the 
I Court's reasoning is found in Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities 'under § 1983 of· the Civil Rights Act, 45 S . . C~tlif. L. Rev. i31 (1972). 
The ye~r jftet this last article appeareq, we decided City of 
l(enoshii v. rur;o, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), ~nd Moor v. County 
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). -Bruno held that Congress 
coula not have intended to 'allow a municipal corporation to 
be a "person" within the meaning of§ 1983 where the relief 
sought Wf!S equitable.~ and still have intended to exclude it 
from the definition of "person" when moneta.ry dama.ges were 
sought. Moor held that a county as well as a city was a 
11municipal corporation" for purppses of § 1983, and therefore 
not suable as a defendant uridef' § 1343. 
I I 
While Bru,no ma.de no effort to do 111ore than rely upon the 
holding of Monroe for its interpretation o.f the word "person;" 
I Moor went back into ·the q~estio~~ arid, ·it seems to me, r~rmed the reasoning of Monrof3 on the is8ue: , ~ ~ . 
"In effect, petitioners are arguing that their particular 
actions may be properly brought ag~inst this County on 
the basis of § J983. nut whatever the factual premises of 
Monroe, we find the COllStructi~n which petitioners seek 
to impose l.J.pon § 1983 cohcerning the status of munici-
: palities as 'persons' to be simply untenable. 
"In Monroe, the Court, in examining the legislative 
evolution of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 
which is the source of § 1983, pointed out that Senator 
Sherman introduced an l\Jflendment which would have 
added to the Act a new section providing expressly for 
'-trtunicipal liabUity in civil ~tctiQns~ QQSed-; on the depriva ... 
I ,. , 
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tioil of civil rights. Although the amendment was passed 
by the Sena.re, it w&s rejected by the House, as wa,s 
another version included in the first Conference Commit-
tee report. Th~ propos~l for municipal liability encount ... 
ered strongly held views in the House on the part of both 
its supporters and opponents, hut the root of the pro-
posa-l's qifficulties stemmed from serious legislative con-
cern as to Congress' corstitution11l power to impose 
liability on poUtical s-qbdiyisions of the Sta.tes. 
"As ir Monrqe, we h~.ve no occasion here to 'reach the 
constitutional questi~n w~ether Congre13s ha,s the power 
to make municipalities liable for acts of its officers that 
violate the civil rights of individuals.' 365 U. 8., at 191. 
For in in~erpreting the statute it is not our task to consider 
whether Congress was mistaken in 1871 in its view of the 
limits of its 'power pver •nunicipalities; rather, we must 
construe the ~tatute in ljght of the impressions under 
which Copgress did i~ facf act, see ~ies v. Lynskey, 452 
F. 2d, at 175. In this respept, it ca1mot be doubted th&t 
the House a.rrived at the firm conclusion that Congress 
lacked the constitutional power to impose liability upon 
municipa-lities, and thus, accord,ing to Repres~ntative 
Poland, the Senate Conferees were informed by th,e House 
Conferees that the '~ection imposing liability upon towns 
I ' 
and counties must gq out or w~ should fail to agree.' To 
save the Act, the propos11l for municipal liability w~ 
given up. It Ipay qe thl:lt EJven in 1871 municip11lities 
which were subject to suit under state law did not pose 
in the minds of the legisla.torli! tpe constitutio11al problems 
that caused the defea.t ~f the proposal. Yet nevertheless 
the proposal' was 'rejected in toto, and from this action we 
cannot infer any congressional intent other than to ex-
clude all municipa.lities-regardless of whether or not 
their immunity has been lifted by state la.w-from the 
civil liability created in the Act of April 20, 1871, and 
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§ 1983. Thus, § 1983 is unavftilable to these petitioners 
insofar as they seek to sue the County. And § 1988, in 
1ight of the express limitation contained within it, cannot 
be used to accomplisq what Congress clearly refused to 
do in enacting § 1983." 411 U. S .. at 707- 710 (1972) . 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
It is especially noteworthy that eight Members of this Court 
subscribed to the holdin s in Moor and ifruno m tfie fMe of 
dissents by ill Dougl~s ·w llC essentui..ly agreed with these 
petitioners that ¥ onroe should be limited to its peculiar 
·circumstances. Sipce the ~ssue now presented "has been con-. 1 
· sideted J'natur~ly ~nd recently" in these two cases, the Court 
should "not feel fq~e to qisregard these precedents." R'l(,nyon 
v. McCrary, 427 U. 8. 160, 186 (1976) (PowE~~, J., 
' -· concurril)g). -
Bill Brenn11n's 1nemoqmdum makes a yery comprehen!3ive 
~ndi>y riOrt'~eans unpers9asive'a.rgument that, for severa-l clif ... 
ferent but related reasons, Congress intended the worq '"per-
son" as used in ~ 1083 to include a mupicipal corporfttion. 
He draws the conclusion , as do the law review pieces referred 
tO SUpra, at 3-4, fllat the re~f1Qn for COJ1gfl'JSSion~J l'fjectiqn of 
the Sherman Amenqment WI¥ not l}n Ullwillh1guess to impose 
liability on municipal corporations for their ow11 viol~tions of 
constitutional gqaranu~es. bqt only au unwillingness to· 
impose liability l!pqn such corpor~ttion~ when tpey fail~ to 
protect private lpdividuals within their boundaries from 
actions which they should I,aye prevented in the exercise of 
their police power. Undpubtedly mal1Y of the quotfttions 
that he cites do SI.Jpport this. line of re&.soniug. But it seems 
to me that in view of the holcling iu M onPoe,. and st~.tements 
such as those contain.ed iu ·Johu l{arla11's concurrence in that ~~ ~ 
case and in Lewis' concurrence in Run on v. McCrary, the -___, 
burden uHon qse w o WIS to overrule &. demsion of this ~ ·• .(... 
(joQrt involving only a matter of statutory construction is ~• ,., .. ., 
lw\ me):'ely th~ civil burqen of a preponderance of .the evi.. 1Z,. """-
~~"""-
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de~ce, but more nearly the ~urdeu in a priminal case: to show, 
as John Harlan said that it appeared "beyond doubt from the 
legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] mfsap-
prehended th~ meaning of the controlling provision." I 365 
U. S., at 192. This I do not think he has done. 
The legislative deb~ttes are there in the Congressio~1al Globe 
for anyo~1e to reaq; they went ou over a pe'riod of three w~eks, 
al1d, in mi1dng terminology, ope must pan a good deal of sand 
in order to get a~ty gold from them. It seems to me th~tt 
there are pontions of the debates. not cited by the NEA · ef 
or 1 r rn n s memo. w IC tend to unc ercut t eir view 
of the limitefl import of the ~e.iectiou of the Sherman Amend-
ment. Congressman Bingham, for example, said: 
"Everybpdy knows an honest jury in such a case, when 
the rioters are implcacled with the county &nd an innocent 
person is slain in th~ street, will find, and no m~tn can 
find fault with them, damages perhaps to the extent qf 
$50,000 or $100,000. The counti~s to be held liable with 
the rioters, and all 1no•wy in its treasury and all its 
prop~rty charged with the payment thereof. Such a pro-
ceeding would deprive the county qf the means of admin-
istering justice." Congressionfll Globe, 42d Cong., 1st 
Sess., Pt. 2, p. 798. 
In a similttr vein arf} thesp remar·ks of Representative 
Farnsworth: 
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this sectiop, and 
no property can be found to levy u.pon except the 'court-
house, can we leyy on the court-pouse and sell i~? So 
this section provides. and that too in an action of tort, in 
an action e:~.· delicto, where the county has never entered 
into any contract, where the State has never authorized 
the county to assume any liability of the sort OJ' imposed 
any liability upon it. {tis in my opinion sitnply ~tbsur£t'~ 
I d., :at 799. 
( 
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Finally, see the comments of Representative Kerr: 
"How are they to perform their necessary and customary 
function~ if you may send a Feder11l officer to put his 
arms into the tre&sury of the county, or parish, or city in 
this way and withdraw therefrom all the · revenues, or if 
you cau authorize the sale of a cou11ty court-house, or 
county jail, or the co1.1nty schools, or any other of the 
property of the people? l ask you, if that pan be done, 
where is the · security that h~s hitherto been supposed to 
exist in this country for self-government in the States of 
the Uniop ?'' J d., a.t 789. 
These stfl,tements can leav~ no doubt that these Members 
of Congress were troubled · by something deeper than doubts 
about their authority to prescribe a federal form of execution 
in place of the ordinarily applicable state procedures. ·They 
wished to )reserve the financial capacity of municipalities to 
carry ou asic governmen a unctions an , as i Brepnan 
points out, at 20, to insure the security of businessmen who 
traded with them. These purposes would be seriously 
impaired by a tort judgment against the municipa.lity regard-
less of the form of execution which followed such a judgment. 
The tort remedy created by the Act would have seriously 
compromised these concerns in a way which the contract cases, 
familiar to Congress and cited by Bill Brennan, at 18, and n .. 
32, did not. The a.vailability of a federal forum for the 
enforcement of contracts, strictly according to the terms dic-
tated by the State, see. e. g., Yon Hoffman v. City of Qu·incy, 
4 Wall. 535,554-555 (1866), insured the continued a.vailability 
of municipal credit by providiug creditors with a sure means 
of enforcement. Couversely, the ordinary business affairs of 
a municipality wQuld be seriously impaired by the threat of 
massive and unpredictable tort judgments under this Act. 
·This concern ~ith the solvency of municipalities, and not 
only doubts about federal power to impose affirmative obliga.-
tions upon them, underlay the complete rejection of municipat 
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tort liability. Even if Bill Brennan is correct that Congress 
never doubted its power to impose liability on municipalities 
for their owu violations of civil rights." the debates suggest 
that it chose not to impose such liability out of solicitude for 
municipal financial stability. The continuing validity of thftt 
concern is confirmed by the 11otoriously insecure position of 
the creditors of these respoudents. 
Furthermore, it is readily apparent that at least some Mem-
bers of Congress concluded. though incorrectly, "that Congress 
lacked the constitqtiona] power to impose liability on munici-
palities." Moor, supra, at 709. Representative Shellabarger 
felt it necessary to rebut the contention "that it is incompetent 
to authorize a judgment for a tort to be rendered under Fed .. 
eral law against any municipal corporation." Globe, supra, 
at 752. After the Shermau Amendment had been rejected 
by the Hoqse. Senator Sherman himself took the floor to 
explain its defeat: "Sir, we are told, by some mystic process, 
by some mode of reasoning. which I ca11not comprehend, 
I ' 
which seems to me so absurd that I cannot even fashion its 
face, that the Constitution of the United States does not 
allow a county to pe sued in the courts of the United States." 
Id:, at 820. If th&t was the belief upon which Congress f1Cted, 
as we have previously concluded, we 11re bound thereby, for 
"we must construe the statute in light of the impression under 
which Congress did in fa~t ac~." Moor, supra, at 709. 
2 The adoption of his suggested interpretation of § 1983 would insert 
into every case the qut>:Stion of whethrr the art of an official wus author-
ized so as to be attributable to the corporation it:self. j\s Bill notes, at 46, 
those cases involving duly enacted ordinanres will be " [ t] he m0i>1 clear-
cut," but. as all the mejllbers of our litigious profession know, it it> not. just 
"[t]he most. clear-cut" of cases that will be brought. The inrvitab)(' result 
of the litigation of marginal cnst>:S will be to plagu(' the froeral courts with 
the nice distinctions which prt>:Sently Hbound in the 1'espondeat supet·im· 
law of every State in th(' Union. If the good-faith defense were not ex-
tended to municipnliti('S, the lure of the relatively deep public pocket 
would make f)'uch 1$Uits Rll the rnoreJtttrnctiv'e. 
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The basis of this impression emerges from a brief ·exjlmiila-
tion of the constitutional and judicial world in which the 
Coqgress of 1871 lived and acted. It should be recalled that 
the Dictionary Act did not include "bodies politic and cor-
porate" withhj the definition of the word f'person" where "the 
context show[ed] that such words were intended to be used 
in a more limited sense[]." Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 
16 Stat. 431. Before 1871, municipal corporations had been 
sued in the federal co1.1rts in only a single "context." Citi-
zens of differeut States were permitted to enforce a municipal 
corporation's contractual obligations under state law through 
the ordinary diversity jurisdiction of tpe federal courts. 3 
Representative Kerr described this context in some det~l: 
"[T]he Federal courts in the exercise of this grant of judi-
cial powers may, where they ha.ve the jurisdiction undet· 
the Constitution, compel these municil)a}ities to execute 
their contracts. a.nd that is all. To execute their con-
tracts; but let it be remembered that no dj.'loree of a Fed-
eral court ha-S gone to -the extent of saying that any ope 
of these divisions should execute its own contracts except 
in pr(')cise com})liimce with the law of the State. in precise 
accordancp with its own contract and the law upon which 
it was b~tsed, and not in pursuance of any l~tw dictated to 
it by Congress." Globe, supra, at 789. 
In these years-before the establishment of federal question 
jurisdictio11 of the federa1 courts in 1875--it is pardly surpris-
ing that some Members of Congress should have doubted their 
authority to h'ale state
1 
instrl.Jment~lities ~nto the feder~tl 
8 And it sePms too well known to bf' worth f'lauorating in any detail that 
the reason for conferring divPr~ity jurit<diction upon the federal courts 
was not a concern that municipal corporation~ would violntp the constitu-
tional rights of private individual~:;, hnt that state judges fl!ld r>tate juries 
would not deal evenhandedly with citizen~ of another State stting or 
defending upon a. claim based upon state la.w. The r.ontrart eases arising 
under tbis jur~dkqon are cqnsider!;Xi fu1iher~ infrfZt pt 16 n • .). ' 
I 
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courts. Indeed, although Rrnator 'l"hurman. as Bill Brennan 
notes. at 33. expressed his belief that the terms of ~ 1 "are 
as comprehensive as can be usPd.'' Globe, supra, App .. at 217, 
an examination of his lengthy rrmarks demonstrates that it 
never occurred to him that ~ 1 did impose or could have 
imposed any liability upon municipal corporations. Tn an 
extended parade of horribles, thP Senator suggested that state 
legislators. Members of f'ongress. and state j uclges might be 
held liable under th(' a.ct. Ibid. lf. at that point in the 
debate. hP had any inkli1!g that ~ 1 was designed to imposr 
tort liability upon cities and counties. he would surely have 
raised on outraged objection. "\Yhm tlw spectre of munici-
pal liability "··as unmistakably raised for the first time by the 
Sherman Amendment. Thurman. Krrr. and their a1lies struck 
it down. 
I think as good a summary of the balance that would lead 
me to reaffirm the construction adopted in Monroe aud fol-
lowed in Bruno and };f oor is contained in The Supreme Court. 
1972 Term, 87l{arv. L. Rev. 1. 257 (Hl73) (a publication not 
known for its lack of s;;;:pathy for civil rights plaintiffs): 
"Critics of the Monroe decision stress that rejection of .:.. ~ _...__1 
the broad liability proposed by the Sherman Amend- ~~ 
ment is 110t at all incousistent with holding municipali- ;L~wA" 
ties liablP for the acts of their own officers. On the other ·~ _ .t:;;:. 
hand. the debates on the amendment do reveal that some ,..,~ 
members of Congress opposed thP amendment on grounds 
which would apply to any municipal liability. More- , 
over, while the debates do not center on the meaning of ( Y, W H-~ i:"' 
the word 'person,' they do provide evidence that Congress ~ ) 
did not i11teud that the word encompass municipalities: 
if that had been the understanding, the debates surely 
would include some reference to the municipal liability 
being created by the statute even without the addition of 
the Shermatl Amendment. Thus, although Monroe can 
be critici;.~ed for relyin_g so heavily on a.mbiguous legisla.. 
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live histor·y ancl ignoring policy consid{'mtiolls. its resulL 
docs not seem so plainly wrong that th<• Bruno Comt 
could havP ov<'rTukd Monroe's intNpl"<'tation of sectio11 
1983 without a sharp dPparturP from traditional notions 
of stam decisis JJl statutory con~<tructio11.'' CF'ootnotes 
omitted.) 
II 
May board rneml>ers as individuals be required to e:tercise 
their o tcwl a.ut wnty o roll' funds for payment of damaye~? 
PetitiOners argll<'. t 1at. <'V<'Il 1 t lP hoard itst•lf is not subjpct 
to ~.uit. a board nwmh<'r rnay lJ<' r<'quirP<l "to pxerci&• the 
powpr·s of his officp" to <'xp<•ncl publie funds for the pay111ent 
of damagPs. PPiitiorH•rs Bri<·f. at 32. Tlw probkm with 
this theory is that school board m<'mbPrs may not ordinarily 
hav<• tlw a11thoritY: to on1 c·r·~, rxpPnditur<' of funds. As we ..- ,_ -
w<>re trt'visrcl at oral argtlllH'nt. lhPsP n'spon ch'rJts can only 
submit a vouclwr· to t.lw ( 'omptroll<•r of the city. who may 
l'C'fUR<' to pay it if lw 8l'<'8 fit. In my vi('W. tlw Co~nptroller 
could not be requin•d to satisfy tlw judgnwnt of the Court, 
sine<' lw could not l)(' mach' an individual dPfrndant. having 
don<' rtothing to violate th<> cunstitutional rights of these. 
petition<'rs. 
That condusion is consist.(•nt with tlw ordinary rule that 
a corporation may not h<' sub.iP<'t<•<l to 1iahility in damagC'S 
llwrely by a suit agalllst ttH olfiepr·g or shan•holders. As this 
Court lwld in St~Ylll Land & enttl( eo. '· Pmnk, 148 U. S. 
()0:3. 610 (180~): 
"Kow. it is too ekar to admit of discussion that; th<' vari-
ous eorporations ehargPd with thP fraud \\ hich has· 
r·c>sul t<'d in damag<• to tlw com plai nan t ar'<' 1 wcessary all(] 
indispensahiP partit•s to auy suit !;o Pstablish the allrged' 
fr·aud and to delPrrnim' tlw damag<•s ar·ising from them. 
rnless mad<• pat·ties to t)w pl'OC<'Pdillg in which tfH'SC 
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they nor tlwir other stockholders would be concluded by 
the decree." 
This same rule has been applied in determining indispensable 
parties under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19. "Unless the corpora-
tion is defunct, the debtor corporation is ~m indispensable 
party to an action by a creditor to establish his claim .... " 
3A Moore's Federal Practice ~ 1'9.13 (1), at 2377. Thus, in 
order to require payment from the funds of a municipal 
corporation, whether that corporat,ion be a city or a school 
district, the corporation as well as its officers must be made 
parties to the suit. 
More importantly. to adopt the fiction advanced by peti-
tioners would totally frustrate the intent of Congress as 
perceived in our earlier opinions. Rightly or wrongly, Con-
gress believed it lacked the power to impose tort liability on 
municipalities. The relief sought by petitioners would negate 
the congressional intent to protf'ct municipal treasuries when-
ever named defendants have au~hority to draw funds. Where, 
as here. the defendants lack such authority, the court's decree 
could provide no relief. To remain COJlsistent with the 
principles of Monroe, the fiction lll\]St be rejected. 
UJ 
Are school boards municipa,l corporations under the holdinq 
in 'A1onr~e! L ast yPar, in Lhe o}nmon for a unanimous C'our't 
which I wrote in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. 
Doyle, 42911. S. 274 (1977). we treah•d the question of exclu-
sion of municipal corporations from tlw definition of 1'persou'r 
in ~ 1983 as settled. Ree id., at '277- 278. Siuce what was 
involved therr was a 10school board,'' to use the term collo-
quially. we stated that the proper mode of analysis was to 
determine awhether petit,ionpr· Board in this case is sufficiently ) 
likt• thr municipal corporations iu lM onroe and Bruno] so 
that it. too, is excluded fr-om § H>83 liability." ld., at 278. 
Althuugh that qu(•stion uiu not need to be answered iu Me. 
---~ ~ =---.,__. ,_. ,.-. 
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Healthy, I believe that it states the pt•oper approa.ch to the 
question before us. As will be seen, nothing in our prior 
decisions or in recent cotlgressional pronouncements suggests 
that this approach was incort·ect. 
1\ 
Before turning to tl1c merits of this question, I think ·it 
appropriate to point out a confusion of terminology which 
makes it difficult to generalize about entities coiloquially 
referred to as 1'school boards." It is impossible to decide { 
whether a "school board'' is a municipal corporation unless T ~ 
one knows the law of the State where it exists. "School 
board" may be simply a shorthand term for the aggregate of 
the members of the board who manage the affiairs of a muni~ 
cipal corporation charged with the administration of schools. 
Ip Pasadmw C1:ty Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 
424 (1976), the "Pasadena City Board of Education." which 
was a named party to the case, operated the Pasaden11 Unified 
School District. Td., at 427. So far as can be told from 
the opinion. the "Pasadena City Board of Education" is sim~ 
ply a name for the aggregate of elected officials \Vho manage 
the affairs · o·r the Pasadena tT nified School District. That 
aggregate is no more a "mt~nicipal corporation" than would 
I 
the entire membership of the Board ' of Directors of a private 
corporation be itself a. "corporation." A fortiori, where a 
school board does not govern a separate school corporation 
but merely admiuisters the ' eclucationfil facilities of a city. or 
a county, it cannot be considere(1 a "corporation" in itself.4 
Thus even if municipal corporations concerned solely with 
school affairs are not "persons" within § 1983. it is by no means 
4 "A school distt·ict m11~· bP a ~rparatP and di~tinct corporation from the 
local governnwntal unit in whicl1 l'itnatP. r . g .. the municipal corporation, 
county or town~hip. Pven though thr trrritorial extPnt of the twq is ihe 
satne. On tlw other hand, it may br ::;imply onr of the ngmcies of .the 
municip11l corporation or thr ~tate." (Footnotes omitted.) 16 E . McQ1jiJ.. 
~i~ =Law ·6r :Monir(pal Cor.por:.~tion~ .j 'lf\.03, !!It 652 (3\1 ed. 1972 •. 
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possible to tell simply from the fact that a "school board" 
appears as It party defend~nt in the name of It case which this 
Court has deciqed that su~h a defendant was a "municjpal 
corporation" a.nd therefOffl not s4able upder § 1983. Only 
where the partifls h~tve e~plored these issues of state law, as 
they have done in this case and as they did h1 Mt. Healthy, 
supra, can It court say thf\t the entity named as a deffln~ant 
is or is 11ot a "municipal c6rpor11-tion" sufficiently an11logou~ to 
a city or county to be exclud~d from the definition of person 
in§ 1983. 
B 
Petitioners rel upon ei ht decisions of this Court in which 
§ 1983 was the sole sis sserted for re Ie ainst a school 
board. Petitioners' Brief, at n. n none o t ese cases, 
however, was th~ question now before us raised ·by any of 
the litigants or addressed by th~s Court. As recflntly flS four 
Terms ago, we saiq in Hagans v. Lavine, 4115 U.S. 528 (1974); 
"Moreover, when questions of jurjsqiction tuwe been 
passed on in prior qecisions sub silentio, this Co1.1rt has 
never considered itseH bound when the case finally brings 
the jurisqictional isslle pefor~ us." ld., at 535 n. 5. 
'The source · of this doctri11e tl~!lt jurisdictional issQes qecided 
sub sifentio llre not bit1dipg in other cases seep1s to be Chief 
Justice Marshall's remark in United States v. ¥ore, 3 Cranch 
159, 17'2 (1805). As we poipted OtJt in · Mt. Healthy, 
the existence of a claim for relief ~nder § 1983 is "jurisdic· 
tiona!" for purposes of invokipg 28 U. S. C. § 1343, ~ven 
though the existence of & meritorious constitutional c~a.im i~ 
not similar1y requjred in order to invoke jl.lrisdictioq under 28 
U.S. C. ~ 1331. See Bell v. Hopd, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946); 
.Aft. Healthy, supra, at 278-279. 
Although the cases relied upon by petitioner failed t(} 
address the suability of a. schoo1 district which is a municipal 
corporation &nd are therf)fore not binding as precedents on 
~thlt't point, I wmdd not at all favor disposit~g of them in :-a 
~··~  ,.,._. ••• 4 
"""- s-I~ 
~ ... ,-1 -
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footnote on that basis. As important as school desegregation 
litigation has been in this Court's history in the past gener_a,. 
tipn. one is enti~led to,Jtsk whether the s~rne substantive ,.con-
stitutional law winci les decided m those cases could have 
been deCI e un er the doctrine that a s hool district n y be 
a "muntci ~ cor >m·ati n w nc 1s no suable uquer § 1983. 
111k ere Is more t an m1e answer to this concern. In 
the first place, it is not clear from the c~se names alone fhat 
true municipal corporations were even involved. The school 
boards named as defendants, like ~he one in P~adenCL City 
Board of Education, .supra, at 427, may have been mere col-
1ections of individual persons, clearly su~tble under § 1983." 
5 In this respect., I ngrce with .Tuqge Gurfein's view expressed in his 
opinion for t)1e Court of Appenl~ in this cnsc thnt tlwrc> is an analogy, 
albeit nn incomplete ope, bet,vee~ the balnpce struck in Ex pm·te Young, 
209 U, S. 1~:3 (1908), betwf'en the Eleventh t)nc:l Fourteenth Amend-
ments, nnd that. strt;ck by Monroe because of ~he conflicting con~iderat.ions 
which went. into congressionnl ennctment of the Civil Rights Act of .1871. 
01.Jr conclusion tl1nt individnnl officials !pay 110t bc> compelled to pa.y 
clamages from the public treasury nuder § 198:~ does not mean that they 
may not be stibjecteq to prospective eqtiita.ble decrees. 
The cases cited by Bill ~renqan, at ~7, dq npt establish that suits 
against officers in their ' o~clai capacities were invariably treated aa 
suits n.gainst their corporations. Each of thoiSC suits w11s n mere coptract 
action, brought under the ordinary diversity jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. See, e. (J., Cowles v. Mercer Cou71ty, 7 Willi. 118, 122 (18(!8). 
CoJltrolling statc> law was regq.rded as n. part of the cont.ract, see, e. g., 
Von ll of! man, sunm. at 554-555. and officinls were subject to mandamus 
only to the extent oT tl1eir 'duties under state ln.w, see, e. g .. Edwards v, 
United States, IOq U. S. 471 0880). Unqer such circumstances1 it is 
hardly surprisiqg that the Court woulq consider the corporation and 1ts 
officers interchangeable, &1nce the oblig1ttions of both hnd been defined by 
t~e State under the same contract. ' 
It cnnnot be StJpposec.l that Congress would have expected the s.ame 
principle to fjpply in actim1s rounding in tort.. lndeed, the very novelty 
of the tort rl'!medy was one of the chief objectiors rnjsed by opponents 
of the Shetmatl Atnendnwnt. See. e. g., Cong. Glpbe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 
789 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id., at 799 (I{ep. Farnsworth). It 
was not. ~ntil l!J;r; '.,far~e Yo:~Jn.g thQ..t .it bec~e liiVPa4'ent that ;relief coukl 
~J-tA. 
J,.J...:..t.-u 
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In the second place, in six of these cases relied upon by 
petitioners, East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 
U. S. 636 (1976); Keyes v. School District No. 1, ~13 U. S. 
189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. Board of Education, 
397 U. S. 232 (l970); School District of A~ington v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1963); and McNeese v. Bop,rd of Educq,tion, 373 
U. S. 668 (1963), <2,nly equitable rel~f was sought by the plain-
tiffs. As Judge Gurfein pointed out. in each of these cases 
and in the remaining two discussed infra, individual defend-
·ants were named 1at? well as the school entit . The equitable 
relief actual1y a.war e ran against t em as well as the school 
entity, and certah1ly a long line of our cases following Ex parte 
Young, 209 U. 8. 123 (1908), attest to the fact that such reHef 
against indiviclual · public officials, even in the absence of 
§ 1983, can effectuate the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment without requiring that the State be named as a 
defendant. 
In two of the ei ht cases cited by petitioners. Cleveland 
Boar o 1 UC(Ltion v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), and 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
be gmnted in tort. again~t public officials without endangering to the same 
extent the public treasury whieh Congress sought to protect by relieving 
·mtmicipalitiPR thrm~rlvrf:l' of liabijit~'· Since officials a.re clearly "per~o11~·" 
under § 198a, injuuctivr relief hat" quite propNly bern availa.blr against 
them, in ordrr to carry out the librral purposes of the Act. Sre The 
Supreme Coqrt., 1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 259-260 (1973). 
Becansc we have allowrd >turh prospective relirf rrquiring future rXJWil-
diture~; of public funds, E(lelmmi v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); 
Millil>en v. Bradley, - U. S.- (1977), the question is obviously not 
one of aJI or nothing. But petitionrr~· arc qttitt> crmdid about thr fact t.ljat 
they would not ask us to ovrrrule Monroe if it werP not for the pro~pcct 
that damage judgmpnt:< in thrir favor would thrreby bf more easily ~atit-:­
:fied. And if we Wf'l'e to accpde to thrir t·rqurst, we would unqurstionably 
saddle municipal trPa.surirs with liabijiti i'S to which they arr JWt now sub-
ject and about whieh Members of t.he Congre:-;R were genuinely concennc.d 
in 18.71. 
.,• 
l ~ I I I 
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trict, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the plaintiffs did seek d~WJ.ages as 
well as equitable relief in the Dist~ict Court. Vnder my 
vi~w of § 1983, the damages remedy could be award e<L,onh 
against individual defendan £s 0 a.nd not agamst a municipal 
corporif,io'fi"'; ft'"fs'Only in such a case that it m~kes a practical 
difference whether a school district which is a mu~1icipal cor-
poration is suable uuder ~ 1983. But in neither LaFleur nor J 
in Tinker did this Court address th~ prop~iety of an aw~rd 
of damages against a11Y of the parties defepdant. In Tinker, 
after deciding th,at complaint stateq a claim for relief, the 
Court remanded the case for further proceedings, aJJ.d con-
cluded, ''We express no opinion as to the form of relief which 
should be granted. this being a matter for lower courts to 
determine." 393 U. S .. at 514. · Likewise, in · LaFleur, the 
Court's opinion held that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit had peen wrong in ruling against the constitutio11al 
claims of the tea.chers in the compftnion case of Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Boa.rd, 474 :F'. 2d 395 (CA4 1973), 
rev'g 326 F. Sqpp. 1150 (ED Va .. 1971). but. it did not go 'so 
far as to reinstate the judgment for damages awarded against 
· the school board by the District Court in the first i11stance. · It 
merely remanded the case "for fmther proceedings consistent 
with this opinion," 414 U.S .. at 651. 
Thus it seems to me that all of the substantive constitu-
tional questions decided in the cases cited £ )etitioner, and 
a o t e re 1e approvel y this Court in those ca.ses, are 
entirely consist ,nt with the holdin tha.t respondent in w~ 
present case is a mumc1 )a cor . orat101 Immune rom smt 
un( er s 1. 8< ,7 even thoug t1ere may hA>ve been in son~e · of 
0 Thos(' drfendnnts are, of rourst>, entitled to a qualified immunity. 
See, e. g., Wood v. St1'ickland, .:po U. S. 30S (1975). 
7 Evrn if the matter wer<' othrrwi~e , iher<' is obviously no possibility of 
t•eopening those cases sincr 'Tt]hc principle;; of 1·es judicata apply to ques-
tion:; of jnri:;diction as wrll ail to other issues." Ame1'icm~ S-q,rety Co. v. 
fJaldwin, 28'7 u.s. 156, 166 (1932) . ' 
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the cases a municipal corporation cha.rged with the adminis-
tration of school matters which was not suable under § 1983. 
c 
There is no indication that any later Congress has ever 
a ed suit"""" ;m aiil~t any tn Wti"Cipal corpora.hon vnaer §1YST. 
Of all its recent enactments. ou y e /IVI 1ghts ttorneys' 
fees Act, fub. L. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stfl.t. 2641 ( 1976), codified 
at 42 U. S. C. § 1988, explicitly deals with thp Civil Rights Act 
of 187I.s The Act provides that attorneys' fees may be 
awarded to the prevailing party "[i]n any' f.\Ction or proceeding 
to enforc1:1 a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, anq 
1986 of this title." There is plainly ~o laugua.ge in tpe 1976 
Act which ould en large the parties suable under those 
su stantive sections; 1 s.unply prov1 es at partjes who 
are already suable lna.y be made liable for attorneys' fees. 
Although the Senate re;cort states that "defendants in these 
ca~ses are qften state or· local bo_Qjes." R. ltep. No. 94-lOll, at 
5,lt can l 1araly be inferred from this brief refereuce that the 
Congress believed that municipal corporatioilS were p~qper 
defendants under every section coven'd by the Act. Certp,infy 
Congress knew by virtue of Monroe v. Pape that most state 
~tnd local bodies were I1ot subject to suit Ul1der § 1983 Jtst:llf, as 
demonstraj!ed by the report's co11clusiqn that fees cotJld be 
awarded "whether or 11ot the age11cy or government is a nameq 
pa.rty." Ibid." 
8 The oihrr sta tutr~ f'itf'd by Bill nrenna-!J, :1t 41-43, make no men-
t,ion <if § 191\:3 , but n·f<'r gf'nrrall~· to ;.;uit,; ag:Linst ''rt looa.l f'ducatioral 
agency." As already notPd, supm. at 16 n. 5, -·spch suits may be ma.in-
t:rincd agn im~t board members in their ollirial oa.pacitie::~ for injupctive 
rPliof undrr either § 19~:~ or Ex parte YoWI(f . Congres,; did Hot stop to 
C011tiidor the teehnif'nlly proprr 1\Yelll\0 of relief, but l()('rely responded 
to tho faet. thnt I'PliPI' wn~ I>Ping gmutt'<l. The practlcalre~:~ult. of choosing 
tho a\·rnue ~~~~gl'~tt•d b~· petitimwr:> would be tht;> subjection of school 
corporation,; to liability in dmnagP~. Nothing in IW<'Ilt f'Ougre~sjonal his~ 
tory evrn remotely support :; ~:~ uch a re;.;ult . 
.!l Sjnce fc<:s are to .be awa,rded " likr other jt<'llls of costl:l," Cong~·~ 
'I 
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Certainly, nothing in this 1976 congressional discussion of 
the recent uses of § 1983 sheds any light on the intent of an 
earlier Congress in 1871. 'fhat Congress realized that munic-
ipal corporations were creature~ of the State, and had only 
~l.Jch powers as the State granted to them. The Congress WP.-S 
relucta.nt to hnpose liability upon these coq)orations for car-
rying out duties thrust upon them by the State .or for f~tiling 
to protect constitutional rights which thr State had giyen 
them no power to protect. See Bruno1 supra, at 5l8-5HI 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Because of this copcern. this Court 
has properly excluded cities and counties, municipal corpora-
tions having broa.q and varied government~] authority, from 
liability under § 1983. It c~n hardly be supposed that the 
Congress would have wished to subject school districts, which 
are burdened with exactly those limitatim1s on their authority 
and their du.ties which ga.ve rise to the original congressional 
concern, to liability under the Act.1n , See The Supreme Oout:t, 
1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 258, and n. ~4 (1973). 
D 
Thus, nothing in our previous cases or in congressional pro-
nouncements undermines t~e sug~estion in ·Mt.Bealthy, su~~a~ 
explicitly recognized that thry conld be assetiSed only against named par· 
ties, but made no effort to rnlarge the class of proper defrndants. 
1° For this reason, I cannot nrcPpt Bill Brennan'~ distinction, at 38-39, 
betwrrn municipal corporations and "quasi-mllnicipal bodi('S." Spf'cial cor-
poratiom; crontro by the Statr, ~'IH'h as scl10ol district,; or water districts,. 
are oftrn descrihrd Hs "qna~i-municipal" because they lack "many of the 
power~ rommonly and urerst<nril~· characteristic- of municipal corporations." 
1. E. :\JcQuillin, supra, § 2.28. A Congres.;, concerned by the limjted 
powrrs of citil:'s and rouutirs surely would not. havl:' imposrd liability upon 
creat.urrs of t.jw St~lt(' having rvcn mm'(' limited authority. Further, the 
congrr&<ional purposr of protPcting municipal tren:;uries applies with equal 
force to financially prel>.\'!'d school districts. Cf. San A-ntonio Independent 
School D£st1ict v. Rodriauet, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). Thus, an affir~pance 
here of the dccibion of the Conrt of Appeals rcpreseuts, not an extensiou. 
~f Yon1·oe, but [L simllle fll1l1licat~on of th~ bn~s of it~ ;J1olding. ' 
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that a "school board" whh:~h is a municipal corporation may 
not be sued under ~ 1983. Ot~r analysis recognized only two 
alternatives: Either "the Mt. Healthy Board of Education is 
to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is h1stef!.d to be treated 
a~S a municip~l corporation or other political subdivision to 
which the Eleventh Amendment does not e~tend." 42Q U. S., 
at 280. lf the New York City Board of Education is an arm 
of the State of New York, it may not be sued for damages, 
even though its individual members may pe sued for equit&ble 
I 
relief. Edelrnq.n v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). If the 
Bo&rd is an arm of the city of New York, it must partake of 
the city's immunity frorp suit under § 1983. If, on the other 
hand, as petitioners contend, the board is the governing body 
of an incorpor&ted school qistrict separate from the city, that 
district must be a "political subdivision" of the State. Mt. 
Healthy, supra, at 280. 
Since this Court has a1l'f:lady concluded that the limited 
definition of "p~rson" qnder § 1983 "stemmed from serious 
legislative concern as to Congress' constitutional power to 
impose liability on politjcal subdivisions of the States," Moor, 
S'f.tpra, at 708, I ca11 see 110 reason for concluding that Congress 
would not have entert&ined the same doubts about school 
districts as it did about cities &nd counties. Accordingly, any 
school board, to 'the extent that it is not mer(lly an a.nn of the 
State or of tpe city or county, is the governing body of a 
· sepa.rate municipal corporation which is not itself subject te 
· suit under § 1983. 
IV 
Thus, it appears to me that none of the three suggested 
grounds for reversal is consistent with the basis of our holding 
in Monroe, as amplified by Moor. Accordingly, only a rejec-
tion of that holding can support a reversal of the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. l c~mwt conclude that such a r~je~tion 
ca-n be justified. 
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Sixteen ye~trs have gol\e by since this Court l.lnanimously 
held"m 114 onrae ifi ~tf a rnumdp~tl corpor~.tion was nqt a pe~son 
for p\lrposes of § ~983. Oply two years h~tve gone by sinc!l 
. fotter, sptutki~g for .the .9gl;fvt iQ ~unyqn, ~ supra, ~tt 175 n. l2, 
re~tffirrned tlb.e ,ation~tJe of stare deoisi:s ItS enunciated py J'\1~" 
tice l3ranqej~ and citfld by my opinion for th~ Court in 
Edelman: 
"Th~ Cpurt in J!Jdelman ~tated a~ follows: 
"'I~1 tpe \vords of Mr .. Justfce Br~tpdeis: "Stare decisis 
is usu~ly the wise policy, because h1 most matters it is 
more iq1porta11t th~tt the appllc~tbl~ rule of law be settled 
than that it be settle~:F righ( . . . This is compwnly true 
·I . 
even where the error is fL lflatter of serious copcerq, pro-. 
vided corr~ption Cflll be pad by legislatfon .... "' 415 
U. S., at 67ln. 14 (citation o~ittrd)." 
I • 
As counsel for respondent pointed ot~t, Congress h~s presently 
pending b~forp it ·s. 35 and fl H. R COl.lnterpa.rt whic4 would 
· substantially lllodifyt he immunity 8f m~.nic\pal corporations 
which h!is rflsulteq frofll the· MotfrOf! holding. Ordinary l>rin-
ciples ofstare decisis dictf\.te that we shoqld leave the pepision 
to them. . ....- . 
If fhe f6 years that had passed between the tiPle of the 
Screws de~ision iJil 1945 and the ti:rne of the Monro~ qecis+on 
in 1961 wa,s sufficient to move John fla,rlan and Potwr to 
require "Hu1-t it appear peyond do11bt from the legislative his-
tory of th~ ' 1871 statute yhflt Classic p,nd Screws misa:ppre. 
hended th'e Inf:!!Lning Of thf:l contrplling provisi011," 365 U. S., 
at 192, tpe same test 'should be pa.Fticu~!LrlY applicable h~re 
, ! , I 
where prep~~ly the s~me n~mber of ye~try; have elapsed since 
tl)e M onrae decision. 'fhere is no way of eJlcapsUlf1ting th~se 
1871 debAte~ that wel)t Of1 o'ver three 'Yeeks into a few para-
grij.phs. The "revisionists" who have criticiz~d the Monroe 
opinion htwe shown tJlttt the excl11sion of ' municip~J corpora-
tions was a closer Q'4f:lstion than that opinion treated it as 
being. But iri my view l~ey have f~l~en tar slwrt of showi~g 
·' 
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"beyond doubt from the legislative history of the 1871 stat-
ute," Harlan, J., co11c4rripg~ 365 U. S., ~tf 192, tQ!l't Monroe 
"misapprependfld the me~tning of the controlling provi~iq:p." 
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment pf tGf:l Co4rt of 
Appe~tls. 




DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
1. SUMMARY: The petn presents three issues: (1) whether 
the 1972 amendments extending Title VII coverage to state and 
local officials and educational institutions should be applied 
in an action brought prior to the effective date of the 1972 
amendments; (2) v1hether a local independent school board is a 
"person" within the meaning of § 1983; and (3) whether govGrnment 
officials are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 when 
~ 
2. 
"equitable relief'.' in the nature of baclfay is sought aga.~nst 
them in their official capacities. 
Petitioners are female employees of the New York City 
Dept. of Social Services and of the NYC Board of Education suing 
on behalf of themselves and other female employees incity 
1 
agencies similarly situated. The c~mplaint alleg?d that rules 
I( "' and regulations of the city agencies compelled pregnant employees 
to take unpaid leaves of absence before medical reasons required 
them to do so, and that such rules and regulations were 
unconstitutional. The defendants are the Dept., the Board, the 
former Commission of the Dept., the former Chancellor of the 
City School District of NYC, and the former Mayor. [The individuals 
were sued in their official capacities.] Jurisdiction is alleged 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 
U.S.C. 1343(3), as well as under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
Petrs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages 
for "the deprivation of their right to be employed, including 
but not limited to ~mges lost." No amount of damages was 
alleged. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, or in the 
alternative, for an order granting summary judgment. The 
plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment. 
SDNY (Metzner) dismissed the complaint. With respect to 
the requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, the DC 
1. SDNY determined that the action could be maintained 
as a class action. 
3. ' 
noted that in the fall of 1971, the Dept. had changed its 
maternity leave policy to provide that no woman need report 
her pregnancy or take maternity leave as long as she is able 
to continue to perform her job and desires to do so. The policy 
change became effective on January 29, 1972. The Board similarly 
changed its bylaws effective September 1, 1973. The DC therefore 
dismissed as moot the claims for equitable relief by way of 
injunction or declaratory judgment. CA2 affirmed dismissal of 
these claims as moot and no review is sought with respect to that 
action. 
The DC also dismissed the claims for back pay covering the 
periods for which plaintiffs allege they could have worked after 
they were forced to take maternity leave on the ground that there 
was no subject matter jurisdiction for the award of back pay 
either under Title VII or under § 1983. The DC concluded that 
--~------~~--~-~~-------------
the 1972 amendment to Title VII which broadened the definition 
of "person" under the Act to include "governments, gov-2rnmental 
agencies [and] political subdivisions," could not be applied 
retroactively. Since all the alleged acts of discrimination 
occurred before the 1972 amendment to Title VII, the DC dismissed 
the Title VII claim. The DC also concluded that any attempt to 
use 1983 as a basis of obtaining monetary relief against the 
named city officials in their official capacities would circumvent 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167. 
CA2 affirmed. With respect to the Title VII claim, CA2 
held that Title VII does not apply retroactively so as to permit 
an award of back pay under the circumstances of this case. 
With respect to the 1983 claim, CA2 held that the Board (an 
independent agency) is not a ':,Pers.:;.n". [Petrs had conceded 
that the Dept. of Social Services, as an agency of the city, 
was not a "person".] Finally, CA2 ruled that it was without -
4. 
jurisdiction to entertain the claim for monetary relief against 
the named individuals in their official capacities since such --- --------------------a' suit was actually one against the Board, which is not a "person". 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs first contend that the CA2 ruling 
w ith respect to the re~ctivity of Title VII conflicts with a 
subsequent decision of this Court. They cite Brown v. GSA, 96 
S.Ct. 1961, 1964 n. 4, for the proposition that § 717(c) of the 
1972 amendments applies to claims of federal employment 
discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the 
amendments if the employee's complaint was the subject of 
administrative proceedings on that date or if a judicial 
proceeding had been timely commenced after final administrative 
action and was pending on the Act's effective date. They also 
refer to Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (CA6), cert. granted, 
-
judgment vacated, and remanded "for further consideration in 
light of Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. __ , slip op. 3 n. 4 (1976). 11 
[CA6 had been the only CA to rule that § 717(c) was not retro-
active with respect to claims of employment discrimination by 
federal employees.] Petrs suggest that the instant case, like 
Place v. Weinberger, should be remanded for further consideration 
in light of Brown. 
: 
s. 
Petrs next contend that CA2's ruling that the Board is not 
a "person" for purposes of 1983 conflicts with decisions of 
other CAs and with decisions of this Court. Petr notes that 
( 
CA4 and CAS have held that a school board is not a person, while 
CAB has ruled that a school board is a person. CA7 has ruled 
that a school board established under one statute was a person, ~~d 
subsequently found that a school board established under a 
different statute was not a person. Petr also refers to Mount 
Healthy City School District, in which cert has already been 
case 
granted, No. 7S-1278. Petr notes that in that/CA6 "apparently" 
ruled that a school board is a person. Finally, petr suggests 
~~ CA2's decision is inconsistent wi~ :? 
~ this Court's decision in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 
414 u.s. 632. 
Petrs also contend that there is a circuit conflict over 
whether local officials are liable in 1983 suits for monetary 
relief in their official capacities. Petrs note that CAS, 
sitting en bane, recently reached the same conclusion as that 
reached by CA2 in the instant case. Muzguiz v. ~an Antonio School 
District, S28 F.2d 499, petn for cert filed, see summer list S, 
sheet 4, No. 7S-1723. 
As noted above, petrs \vould prefer to have the case 
remanded to consider the retroactivity question in light of 
Brown. Alternatively, petrs ask that the petn for cert be 
granted for consideration of all the issues, or that considera-
tion of the petn be deferred pending a decision in Mt. Healthy. 
6. ' 
4. DISCUSSION: With respect to the retroactivity issue, 
the decision of CA2 does not conflict with this Court's footnote 
(number 4) in Brown or with its disposition of Place v. Weinberger. 
Both the Brown footnote and Place concern § 717(c) of the 1972 
amendments, which grants federal ·employees the right to file 
employment discrimination claims against the Government in 
federal district court. At the time of this Court's decision 
in Brown a number of CA's had considered the question whether 
§ 717(c) applied to proceedings already pending at the time of 
its effective data. With the exception of the decision of CA6 
in Place, every CA faced with the issue held that § 717(c) 
applied to claims of fuderal employment discrimination if the 
employee's complaint was the subject of administrative proceedings 
on that date or if a judicial proceeding had been timely 
commenced after final administrative action and was pending on 
the Act's effective date. The retroactivity ruling was based 
on the view that § 717(c) was merely a procedural statute that 
remedies available to federal employees suffering 
their right to be free of such 
discrimination had been assured for yea.rs under a number of 
Executive Orders. The legislative history of § 717(c) indicated ~ 
that § 717(c) did not grant a new substantive right to federal 
employees, but merely created a new remedy for the enforcement 
of existing rights. 
In the instant case CA2 concluded that the § 717(c) cases 
were not directly on point. With respect to state and local 
officials, CA2 concluded that the 1972 amendments were intended 
\ .... ..__ 
7. 
to create a new substantive right thus barring retroactive 
application. See Weise v. Syracuse University, S22 F.2d 397, 
410-411 (CA2)(Title VII inapplicable to discrimination occurring 
before the lifting in 1972 of the exemption for educational 
institutions). 
Petr's assertion that the decision of CA2 is in conflict 
with a subsequent decision of this Court is thus inaccurate. 
Petr cites no other federal decision concerning the precise 
retroactivity question at issue. In any event, it would be 
silly to remand the case to CA2 for further consideration in 
light of Brown, since the prevailing law in that circuit at 
the time the instant case was decided was that § 717(c) was ~ 
. .. .. 
retroactive. Brown v. GSA, S07 F.2d 1300, 1304-06, aff'd, 
96 S. Ct . 1961. 
As to the issue ot whether a school board is a "person" 
for purposes of 1983, it is not at all clear that this case 
is a hold for Mount Healthy insofar as the Court may not reach 
the "person" issue in that case. Muzguiz v. San Antonio School 
District, su~ner list S, sheet 4, No. 7S-1723 may present another 
opportunity to consider the parameters of the "person" require-
ment. CAS held en bane in that case that the Board of Trustees 
of a city's Firemen's and Policemen's Pension Fund was not a 
"person" for purposes of 1983. S28 F.2d at SOO, adopting as 
the opinion of the court en bane the panel dissent of Judge 
Godbold, S20 F.2d 1003-06 . The pool memo in Muzquiz indicates, 
. the 
however, that/petr does not challenge CAS's ruling in that regard. 
\.,..-~ . ' .. , .... 
8. 
Thus a grant in Muztuiz would not assure consideration of the 
:P l 
¥A~ 
/ \ '.{" Trustees in Muzquiz) when they are sued 
.kG.,\ \1'\Y ~: ::::r c::: ~c:::r:a::ci ties . Both courts cone ludedJ~~er such 
AT' '~- , 1 section 1983 action§/ . 
·; ;· ~ circumstances~aa to be considered as if they had been brought 
~ ~/. tp'f ·~J' ~~ directly against the entity, and consequently there was a lack 





The main issue in Muzguiz, and the remaining issue in the 
instant case as well, is whether monetary relief is appropriate 
against the individual members of the entity (Board of Educ. 
ruled to the contrary. See Burt v. Board of Trustees of 
Edgefield City School District, 521 F.2d 1201 (CA4)(to the extent 
-
that plaintiff seeks equitable relief [including back pay] 
under 1983 against the members of the Board in their official 
("< . ,..s;.., 
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officers are "persons" within the meaning of 1983). 
There is no response. 
8/18/76 Corney Op in petn. 
ly 
-
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington , D.C. 2054 3 
Attn : Frank Lors.on 
RE:CIZIVEC 
JAN 5 19n 
January 5, 19 77 
RE : Monell v. Department of Socia l 
Servlces, No. 75-1914 __ __ _ 
Dear Mr. Lor son : ( s;._ C._ C, _.,... f' ,.,... • 4' ~ • 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation , I r~~~~o\ 
bring this letter to the attention of the Justices s o that t~ 
may consider it at the conference of the above-named case 
scheduled for Friday , January 7, 1977. 
In Int~rnatiq_nal Un-"!:_q_r_l v. Robbins and Myers , 45 U.S.L.W. 
4068 (No. 75-1264, December 20 , 1976 ) the Court h e ld that the 
1972 amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act should 
be applied to cases pending as of their effec·tive date , id. a t 
45 U.S.L.W. 407 1. This is one of the two grounds on which 
certiorar i was sought in the instant case (see Petition at 14 -2 2). 
The Second Circuit had held that such applicationO.f the amendment s 
was not warranted and had accordingly affirmed a dismissal. Peti-
tioner urges, there fore , that this case should be remanded to th) • / 
Second Circuit for reconsideration in the light of International ~tO 
Union. 
Thank you fo r your courtesy and assist: a.nce. 
OGC/ jc 
cc : Corporation Counsel of 
·the City of New York 
Counsel for Respondents 
Sincerely , 
0-o..c.Q/\.. "" · c.~cv.u. laL(~-
Oscar G. Chase 
Counsel for Petitioner 
JAN 7 1977 -CA - 2 Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ........ ... ..... . .. , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 75-1914 
Submitted ............... . , 19 . . . Announced . ... .... ....... . , 19 .. . 
JANE MONELL, ET AL., Petitioners 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL. 
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MOTION 
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
G D 
Gene: 
Dave and I agree that the Court should 
to the 1983 question~ Justice Powell 
i 
14th Amendment cause of action issue. 
take MMKMHII Monell limited 
a.l&o 
is Ainterested in the 
The only case ~~KKIMXMJ 
possibly raising that question is MuzquizJ but CAS MXK~MXH discussed 
that question only long enough to say that there was insufficient 
amount in controversy to satisfy 1331. Some rather far-fetched 
issues concerning 1331 and 1343(3) are raised in the petn, but, 
KH given the minimal treatment below and the far-fetched nature of 
them, I consider this case to be a bad vehicle for the 14th Amendment 




~ ~ w.~ :f If 1 'n...JL EC(Jc_ r· 
11J- 0 rf7J...) ~ v.....R: "~ 
A~ ,_.k_ 8 '"(1M.. 11 ... 1- -to ,p. J..~ 
7 0 6 1 -f1.D C: ~,./ ,( 2J t.i; AeJ· 1 !'16 Y 
~k~ .. ~,, ~~~0 
(1.1.'~ ~ C....._.,..-ss·•-.. -. 'tW-- ~ t 
~~ t; t'I?J- ~~-[c ... ~ 
~]. ~ ~ h-. VIA-~ '1-e ~ >--' 
r,:(No._ ~ ~ /'17J. ~ . 
w--lv:.L oJ.U_ } 717_ ft.iv& ... J;.,~ ~ 
~b d.v~-- ~~ i-o 
{f7J__ ~~ . :D:, No 1- 6..-J( 
i/Ja .,~~-
~. . . . • ?t--. if' X. r{ . ....:..;4~ 
~ '1-~ ~ ... ~~~ ·~  
~ -
. -, r ~·~ r-v ~·~ ~.....,_.....~~~~ 
, ( ~ 1- ..,_ ....... .., /'•'.,) . ~ 
C4 z... /.-.cd~ J& ·;~2:S ·~ ~ 




- 77:_ _ . - \ 





.§uprnn.e Q):omi of tlp~~b" j;tlilis 
)'rzwJrittgfo-n, 1@. ~· 21T2J!.~ 
January 18, 1977 
Memorandum for the Conference 
Subject: No. 75-1723, Muzquiz v. City of Antonio 
page ten. 
No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of 
City of New York 
No. 76-5224, Thurston v. Dekle 
These cases appear on the January 21 Conference List, 
Introduction: The common question presented in these cases is 
whether a USD~ has _subjec~matter jurisdiction over a suit for 
monetary relief brought under 42- u.s.c; § 1983 against- individual 
members- of a municipal entity - in their official capacities. 
In each of the cases, petitioners are aggrieved former employees. 
In Muzquiz and Monell, CA - S and CA 2 each held that - the 
municipal agency itself was not a "person" within the contem-
plation of § 1983; in Thurston, the suit was brought against 
individuals only. The question whether the municipal entity 
5 is a "person" under § 1983 is raised in this Court only in _ 
l Monell. 
This memorandum attempt~ a brief sketch of each of ~ these ·­
cases in aid of a determination as to which, if any, is most 
appropriate for plenary consideration. 
No. 75-1723, Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio 
Petitioners, former San Antonio- police and firemen, brought 
a class action to challenge the constitutionality of a Texas 
statute declaring that no member of the City's Firemen's and 
Policemen's Pension Fund (Pension Fund) "shall ever be entitled 
to any refund from said Fund on account of the money deducted 
from that amount of their pay . • . which money is in itself 
declared to be public money ••. " Petitioners, alleging juris-
diction under 28 U.S.G. §§ - 1343 - and 1331, claimed that the no-
refund provision violated their rights to due process and equal 
protection, the right to travel, the Supremacy Clause and con-
stituted a bill of attainder. The suit named as defendants 
- 2 -
the City, the Pension Fund, and the Fund's board members and 
asked for damages, restitution, declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The DC granted summary judgment for defendants. 
On appeal, petitioners abandoned their claim against the 
City. CA 5, like the DC, considered and rejected petitioners' 
claims on the merits. The CA majority also found that the 
Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund was not "like a munic-
ipality" and did not possess broad governmental pow~rs. 
Rather, the trustees served an e ssentially private function which 
might have b e en discharged by a bank or insurance company 
without the ne c e ssity for naming public officials as trustees. 
Thus, the Pension Fund and its me mbers were amenable to suit 
under § 1983. The dissent took another view. Criticizing the 
"essentially private" function of the Fund as a "dubious 
distinction," the dissent saw the Fund and its members as an 
"~y." The dissent found no jurisdiction fn - a 
suit against the Fund nor against its members for relief 
other than declaratory and injunctive relief. 
C (f ?" '~ Sitting en bane, CA 5 a roved the_ dissenting view as to 
~ the Fund. As to its individual members, _the CA took- the 
~u ~iew that the suit was-, - in effect, not one- against - the nominal 
v.lvr_~,l ~ defendants, but, instead, one - against the Fund. Under the 
1 v~- particular facts of the case, the CA found that equitable 
lt4~ relief-- petitioners' claim for damages had been withdrawn--
ct' ~~ was tantamount to a money judgment for restitution (directed 
AA-~~ at the assets_of the Fund) and held that all claims were barred 
~>_lr~ under § 1983y TheCA also found that there was no - jurisdiction H 
~~~ under § 1331 for lack of the requisite amount. . 
~~ ~ In - this Court,- petitioners 1:1rge not only that the individual 
16t members of the Fund are "persons" under § 1983 in a suit for 
equitable relief which includ~s restitution, but also, that 
jurisdiction lies for equitable relief against the Fund and its 
~
members directly under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
pursuant to § 1331 without regard to the jurisdictional amount, 
and pursuant to § 1343 without regard to § 1983. 
~ No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of 
New York 
Petitioners ,-- alleging- :i uris diction under § 19 83, (§ 134 3) 
and Title VII, brought a class action against the _Dept. of 
Social Services, the NYC Board of Education and certain individ-
u 1n e1r officiaT capacities. T eir complaint challenged 
certain rules and regulations of city agencies making mandatory 
- 3 -
unpaid leave for pregnant employees at a specified point in 
their pregnancies without regard to medical reasons. By 1973, 
the challenged city policy had been discontinued. Accordingly, 
the DC dismissed as moot petitioners' claims for declaratory 
and i~~eT.'--~.tt1oners prayer for an award of 
b-ack~a~alned-in the case. However, the DC, noting that in 
the l1tst analysis any award would be paid by the City --
petitioners ultimate y onceaea-th~ t e Dept., as~n agency 
of the City, was not a "person" -- refused to find jurisdiction 
to support an award of backpay in light of Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961). The DC also rejected petitioner~itle 
VII claim because the alleged acts of discrimination occurred 
before the effective date of the 1972 Amendment which broadened 
the definition of "person." Accordingly, the DC dismissed the 
complaint without reaching the merits. 
The~ rejected petitioners' claim that the Board of 
Education constitutes an independent body and not an arm of 
the city. It held that the Board was not a "person'! under 
§ 1983 and that no jurisdiciion existed to support a suit to 
recover money from the city treasury.- A different result would 
allow a subterfuge wher~by -a suit against the Board itself 
could be maintained- in the guise -of a -suit against its members 
in their official capacities and, -thus, contravene the intended 
jurisdictional bar to suits against municipalities. The CA 
agreed with the DC that Title VII does not apply retroactively to 
permit an award of backpay in these circumstances. 
In -this Court; petitioners raise their Tit~e VII-- claim in 
addition to the questions whether a local independent - school -
board is a "person" under § 1983 and whethe~ municipal officials 
are "persons" when relief in the form of backpay is sought 
against them -in their official capacities. ~ ~~
No. 76-5224, Thurston v. Dekle ~M ~ 13sj 7 
Petitioner commenced a class action under § 1983 against 
individual members of the Jacksonville Civil Service Board 
(Board) and the Director of the Jacksonville DepG of Housing 
and Urban Development. The suit challenged on due process 
grounds certain Board regulations authorizing suspension of 
an_employee without pay. The DC granted summary judgment for 
petitioner - and declaratory - and injunctive relief, including _ 
backpay. 
CA 5 agreed with the DC that the challenged suspension and 
dismissal rules provided constitutionally inadequate pre-
termination procedures and sustained the relief granted by the 
DC except for the backpay award. The CA found that, insofar 
- 4 -
as petitioner sought restitution, the practical effect, as in 
Muzquiz, would be to use the individual members of the Board 
as conduits to the City treasury. Accordingly, the backpay 
award was reversed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The sole question presented for review in this Court re-
lates to the availability of subject matter jurisdiction under 
§ 1983 in a suit for equitable relief, including backpay, 
against individual members of a local civil service board and 
the director of a municipal housing agency. 
Discussion: The petitioners in Muzquiz do not rely exclusively 
on § 1983 as a basis for jurisdiction. Nor do they challenge 
the CA's ruling that the Pension Fund itself is not a "person" 
for § 1983 purposes. 
In Muzquiz, both the nature of the municipal entity (a 
pension fund) and the nature of the monetary relief sought 
(restitution in the - form of a refund of deductions from pay) 
are sufficiently unusual to raise some doubts about . the appro-
priateness of this case as the one in which to decide the common __ 
question presented. _ For example, _to the extent that the Court 
weighs the argument that the public officials -- defendants 
serve an essentially private function as opposed to exercising 
governmental powers, trustees of a pension fund may be distin~ ­
guishable from school board members - or other more typical 
municipal officials. - Also, equitable relief in the form of a ~ 
"refund" may be distinguishable from _ the more commonly _ _reques-=--
ted relief in the form of backpay. Howeve~, insofar as the 
equitable relief sought here is tantamount to awar~ing a money 
judgment, theCA- opinion in Muzquiz does raise -the ~ "subterfuge" 
argument, i.e., whether aggrieved _parties may reach~he 
municipal coffers in a suit naming as defendants individuals 
in their official capacities, but not in a suit naming as 
defendant the agency -itself. 
On the merits, the Muzquiz petitioners' claims are weak 
and have already been considered and rejected in the courts 
below. 
In Monell, the Court may wish _to limit plenary consideration 
to the § 1983 questions and let stand the CA holding barring 
I 
petitioners' claims - under-- Title - VII. Monell is - the =.only -one 
of these cases to present the question whether a municipal 
entity, here a school board, is itself a "person" within the 
meaning of § 1983. CA 2, while reaching the same result as 
CA 5, analogized the case to the Eleventh Amendment and 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In - its current posture, 
the relief sought in Monell is limited to backpay. 
- 5 -
Monell is the one case of the three in which the courts 
below did not reach the merits. Respondents argue that they 
are not liable for a policy adopted and maintained in good 
faith and without discriminatory motive before this Court 
announced its decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Parenthetically, petitioners 
rely in part on La Fleur itself as authority for the propriety 
of awarding backpay in this case. 
Thurston is the narrowest of the cases. It presents the 
quest1on whether jurisdiction lies for a § 1983 suit for backpay 
against individual municipal officials acting in their official 
capacities. In deciding the question, the CA relied on Muzquiz. 
Non-monetary equitable relief was granted in the DC and affirmed 
by the CA; there is no cross petition. 
Petitioner Thurston's constitutional claims were sustained 
on the merits in both courts below~ 
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January 24, 1977 
983 Actions (Who are Persons, and when 
may they be sued?) 
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York 
___ F. 2d ___ (CA2, March 8, 1976)* 
The plaintiffs (petitioners) were female employees of the 
New York City Department of Social Services (department) and 
of the New York City Board of Education (board). They brought 
suit under § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts attacking 
rules of these city agencies that compelled pregnant employees 
to take unpaid leaves of absence before medical reasons required 
them to do so. CA2 held that the 1972 amendment to Title VII 
(applicable to municipal employees) was not retroactive. I am 
not interested in this issue. 
The remaining tissue (whether these city agencies, and the 
members thereof), are "persons"within the meaning of § 1983, is 
a question of considerable importance. My guess is that the 
Court will grant certiorari on this issue. 
I dictate this memorandum not because of the probability 
of a "grant" , but primarily to record - for my memorandum file 
on § 1983 - some of the statements by CA2 (Judge Gurfein). 
*As of the date of this memorandum this case is pending on 
petition for cert No. 75-1914, and the case may well be granted 
at our Conference today. 
2. 
Municipal Boards and ~encies 
CA2 held that "the Board of Education is no more a 'person' 
than the state university, the city employees' retirement system 
or the city transit authority (all of which have been held by the 
New York federal courts not to be "persons")." See petition for 
cert at p. A48. The Court noted that "all funds for use of the 
board must be appropriated by the city • • • the funds are public 
funds appropriated for [the board's) use as if it were a department 
of the city government." 
Officials Sued in "Official Capacities" 
This is the more interesting issue. Judge Gurfein's opinion 
is interesting: 
~ 
"We must, however, considr appellants' claim that 
the officia~named in their complaint may be sued in 
their official capacities under §1983 for damages, 
even though the money would have to come out of the 
city treasury. 
"There is no doubt that municipal and state 
officials, sued in their official capacities, are 
'persons' !Nithin ~he meaning of §1983 when they are 
sued for (:!njunctiv~ or declaratory relief. See 
Wri~ht N.~~ Transit Police, slip op. 1561, 
156 -63 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1976); Gresham v. Chambers, 
501 F.2d 687, 690 (2d Cir. 1974); Er&mann v. Stevens, 
458 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
u.s. 889 (1972). It is also true that individual 
officials who violate the civil rights of plaintiffs 
may be required to respond to damages for their tortious 
conduct out of their own pockets. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 u.s. 232, 238 (1974). 
t'\ 
"In this case, unlike Scheuer, there are no \", _\ 
al~e. gations that the individual defendants acted o~~e 
th icope of their offices or in an arbitrary manner. 
Th ~ividual defendants are sued here solely in their 
official capacities. 
"Appellants would have us merge two discrete 
conceptions to award relief. They would have us 
entertain suit against the official who committed an 
unconstitutional act, without malice, solely ex officio, 
even though from the nature of th~ relief sought - back 
pay - an award must come out of the public treasury of 
the Board of Education." A 53- A 55 of Pet for Cert 
3. 
The court reached the foregoing conclusion by analogy to 
the 11th Amendment, and our decision Edelman v. Jordan. When 
damages which are sought in a 1983 action have to be paid by the 
city, it is ~e ._re~-~-~rty_ in i~~e:~s:._ _ nd is not a ''person" 
under § 1983. 
Implication that 1983 lies only for "arbitrary" or "malicious" 
conduct. 
Judge Gurfein recognized, in the language quoted above, 
that 1983 authorizes suit against officials who violate the 
civil rights of plaintiffs by their "tortious conduct". But 
the situation is different where the individual defendants are 
acting within the scope of their official duties. Judge Gurfein 
held that in the latter case, where they are sued "solely in 
their official capacities'', 1983 does ·not lie because a money 
judgment would be paid by the city or state agency. 
But Judge Gurfein noted that there was no allegation in 
this case of defendants having acted "in an arbitrary manner" 
or with "malice''. Does this language suggest that something 
more than mere negligence must be shown in a 1983 suit even 
where the defendant is a "person" for jurisdictional purposes? 
. -
4. 
To be sure Judge Gurfein was not addressing this question , 
and his language is hardly "on point 11 directly. One also could 
construe his language as saying that if the individual defendant 
had acted in an arbitrary manner or with malice, a 1983 suit 
would like even if the official were acting within the scope 
of his official duties . 
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Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
Date: November 4, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services 
Because I have heard through the "grapevine" that 
some of the other Justices may be receptive to a 
reexamination of Monroe v. Pape along the lines that I 
have suggested to you, I thought it might prove useful to 
offer a relatively brief restatement of my approach. 
I propose a reexamination of the meaning of the 
1871 Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment. In my 
view, the measure was rejected because (1) it sought to 
impose liability for failure to prevent or take action 
against lawlessness when many municipalities lacked 
general police powers under the law of their states, and 
(2) it imposed vicarious, indeed strict, liability for the 
conduct of private individuals. Contrary to the language 
of some of our prior decisions, I doubt where there was 
any general intention to shield municipal and county 
treasuries or whether the Republican legislators 
entertained serious doubts as to congressional power to 
legislate with respect to political subdivisions of a 
state. 
The legislative history can best be understood as 
a limiting the statutory ambit to actual wrongdoers, i.e., 
a rejection of respondeat superior or other principle of 
vicarious liability. There is no dispute, after Monroe at 
least, that a public official can be held personally 
2. 
answerable in damages for his own conduct in violation of 
the Constitution. The question is when can a governmental 
entity be held liable for its wrongdoing. Of course, the 
argument can be made that all action "under color of law" 
is attributable to the governmental entity which can be 
said to have authorized the conduct by clothing the 
wrongdoer with public office. This position was rejected 
in Monroe. And I would argue that the preclusion of 
governmental liability for the tortious conduct of 
individual officials which was not mandated or 
specifically authorized, and indeed may be violative of 
state or local law, is consistent with the rejection of 
vicarious liability as an operative principle of the 
statute. Since the claims in Monroe and Moor v. County of 
Alameda were expressly founded on the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, they would not be maintainable under 
my theory. 
At the other extreme, local ordinances, school 
board regulations and consciously adopted policies or 
practices, in the Rizzo v. Goode sense, constitute conduct 
by the governmental entity qua entity. It would be absurd 
to hold public officials personally liable for 
implementing such laws or policies, unless, of course, the 
laws were patently unconstitutional. If there is any 
wrongdoing, it is in the policy itself, not in the 
implementation. If there is a "wrongdoer," it is the 
promulgator of the law or policy. 
3. 
City of Kenosha v. Bruno involved the rejection 
of liquor licenses by the governing bodies of the 
municipality. Under my view, that case was wrongly 
decided. It was the first case to apply Monroe to conduct 
which was both authorized under state law and directly 
rather than vicariously -- responsible for the claimed 
constitutional injury. The legislative history of the 
Sherman Amendment, and the possibility that the approach 
taken in Monroe might not apply outside of the respondeat 
superior context, was neither briefed nor argued, for the 
Court raised the jurisidictional question on its own 
motion. My view, however, does not require overruling City 
of Kenosha, for no individual public officials were made 
party to that litigation at the outset. The Attorney 
General of Wisconsin intervened as party defendant, but 
the lower court had not addressed "whether the 
intervention of the Attorney General as a party would cure 
the jurisdictional defect which we now find to exist in 
appellees' complaint." 412 U.S. at 513-14. The Court 
remanded on this point. In all frankness, it should be 
noted that City of Kenosha involved a claim for equitable 
relief only. 
One further point about City of Kenosha. That 
decision will have to be disturbed no matter what the 
Court does in the Monell case. Petrs have asserted a 
theory that is consistent with the language of City~ 
Kenosha: resp public officials are indisputably "persons" 
4. 
for purposes of § 1983, and City of Kenosha counsels 
against a "bifurcated application" of that term "depending 
on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412 U.S. 
at 513. From resps' point of view, however, the answer is 
that affirmance of CA 2's decision does not mean that 
public officials are not "persons" in § 1983 damages 
actions, but rather that such relief is not available 
against them. 
In all likelihood, Aldinger v. Howard is also at 
odds with my approach. In that case, a county appointing 
officer, acting pursuant to a state statute which 
authorized him to "revoke each appointment at pleasure," 
discharged a clerk. Since the defendant was acting 
pursuant to express state authorization, there would ~ 
public entity liability for the consequences of this 
express policy of the public entity. It should be noted 
that plaintiffs in that case conceded that the county was 
not suable under the Act. 
The difficult cases lie in the middle, where the 
public official is exercising delegated authority in a 
manner fully consistent with state and local law. I would 
break these cases down into two categories. First, there 
is the situation exemplified by a police chief who 
announces a policy to all field officers that they are to 
stop and frisk anyone they please without worrying about 
"articulable suspicion" or other legal mumbo-jumbo 
the type of police practice contemplated in the Rizzo 
decision. The police chief would be individually liable, I 
5. 
would think. But is the city liable simply because it has 
not acted to curb this particular exercise of the 
authority delegated to the police chief? My tentative 
answer would be in the affirmative. The city has allocated 
its policy-making power in such a way that the police 
chief acts for the city in making policy on police 
matters. Accordingly, the city is responsible for its 
policy, even though promulgated by a delegatee. 
Second, I would distinguish the case of a police 
chief who dismisses his secretary without a hearing or 
because of her first amendment activity. In sucha case, 
the police chief, while acting "under color of law," is 
not making policy for the city. The police chief may be 
personally liable, barring any defenses, but he cannot be 
held liable in his official capacity. 
One final note. No prior decision need be 
overruled if the Court holds that while governmental 
entities are not "persons" under the Act, the policies 
behind the rejection of the Sherman Amendment do not 
prevent retroactive or restitutionary relief against 
public officials in their official capacity where the 
governmental entity qua entity can be said to have worked 
the constitutional injury in question. 
* * * * 
I am not sure this discussion will persuade you 
to my view, but I thought you would appreciate a more 
coherent statement of this approach than is contained in 








As you wil l' recall, my vote to reverse in the 
above case was about as tentative as a vote can be. 
Since the Conference, I have devoted further time 
to the case with the hope of firming up a position one way 
or the other. I find this area of the law {1983 and the 
related issues of immunity) to be wholly unsatisfactory. 
In any event, I am not at rest, and wanted you - and 
members of the Conference - to know this before assignments 
are made. ~ '· 
~ ~~~;, t;;~r~-:~ ~:~.~~-.JV·.··"~,)~ ..• .. ., 
,i,.·~ ' "' 
My notes indicate that you and Potter also 
passed. This suggests the absence of a Court at 
time. If any Justice is disposed to circulate a 
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November 11, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of NYC 
As I indicated at the Conference on the above 
case, tomorrow I will assign for the writing of a memorandum, 
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JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
November 14, 1977 
RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services 
of New York City 
Dear Chief: 
I'll undertake to prepare a memorandum along the lines 
Byron, Thurgood, John and I advanced at conference. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
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Mr. Justice Powell Date: October 18, 1977 
Sam Estreicher 
(~!,..~~) 
75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
of the City of New York 
The petition presents the following question: 
Whether local governmental officials 
and/or local independent school boards 
are "persons" within the meaning of 42 
u.s.c. § 1983 when equitable relief in 
the nature of back pay is sought 
against them in their official 
capacities? 
The "school board" half of the question was reserved in 
~!_._Heal!EY_School District v. Doyle, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572 (1977). 
At the outset, I would like to identify my general 
outlook on this case. In my view, Monroe's exclusion of 
municipalities from the coverage of § 1 of the 1871 Civil 
Rights Act, now 42 u.s.c. § 1983, is a judicial redefinition 
of the statute not supported by its text or legislative 
history. 
The Monroe Court premised its holding on the House's 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment, an unprecedented measure 
which sought to impose vicarious liability on governmental 
'II ............... ~~,.....twz:A tw= 
subdivisions for riots and conspiracies of private citizens. 
There was no attempt to examine the specific legislative 
intent behind passage of § 1 of the Act, which in terms admits 
of no exceptions and which passed both houses without 
significant difficulty. Amici in this case argue, 
persuasively that the sponsors of Section 1 intended the 
measure to be coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment and 
"nowhere indicated an intention to rein in its sweep short of 
the minicipal treasury. They knew that the prohibitions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment •.. applied to municipalities, and 
they knew that municipalities did not enjoy the protection of 
the Eleventh Amendment." (Amici Br., App. 15a-16a) 
Only a month before the civil rights bill was 
introduced, Congress enacted a "dictionary act," which 
provided in pertinent part: 
That in all Acts hereafter passed 
• the word 'person' may extend and be 
applied to bodies politic and corporate, 
and the reference to any officer shall 
include any person authorized by law to 
perform the duties of such office, unless 
the context shows that such words were 
intended to be used in a much more 
limited sense 
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. J. Douglas 
in Monroe dismissed the "dictionary act" definition of 
"person" as "merely an allowable, not a mandatory one." 365 
u.s. 167, 191. 
The Court's reading of the Sherman Amendment debates 
displayed little sensitivity to the context in which the 
remarks were made. The statements of opposition were 
addressed to a particular proposal, one involving the feature 
2. 
of vicarious liability, the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
reach private conduct, and the imposition of police-power 
responsibilities on local governments which may not have been 
·. 
3. 
so endowed by their state legislatures. Given the 
unrestricted sweep of § 1, and the virtual absence of debate 
over a measure which sought to make actionable the broad 
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress' 
contemporaneous awareness that the term "person" cou l d be 
given a special meaning to encompass "bodies politic and 
corporate," the Sherman Amendment debates provide but marginal 
support for any generalized intention to exclude state 
government subdivisions from the reach of § 1983. ~~ 
..e_~ 
~f
. My predisposition is to limit Monroe, rather than 
extend it as far as logic will permit. But if Monroe and its 
progeny stand for the proposition that the 42d Congress 
intended a broad exclusion for political subdivisions of a 
state, whether because of a perceived constitutional barrier 
to federal power or a desire to shield municipal and county 
treasuries, I doubt whether a principled stopping point can be 
found. 
The logic of Monroe and its progeny leads to certain 
ironical results. First, § 1983 does not authorize ' ~ ............ 
restitutionary or retroactive relief for the actions of state 
and local governmental units working a constitutional 
deprivation, even though such actions are fully consistent 
with, or indeed mandated by~ state law. The "under color of" 
~state law debate in Monroe is stood on its head. Section 1983 
~ provides a monetary recovery only for unauthorized state 
action, the very conduct that J. Frankfurter argued was not 
encompassed by the "under color" language of § 1983. Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, the absence of any remedy --
outside of the types of employment discrimination proscribed 
by the 1972 amendments to Title VII -- for authorized state 
action in violation of constitutional requirements may very 
well pressure the Court to recognize a Bivens. remedy for all 
constitutional rights made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Reexamination of Monroe's 
interpretation of § 1983 would seem preferable to the 
predictable alternative of judicial implication of a 
monetary cause of action for all constitutional vioJ.ations 
working a compensable harm. 
I. Prior Decisions of this Court 
Before discussing the question presented, I think it 
would be useful to set out the Court's previous rulings in 
this area. 
Addressing a claim that the City of Chicago "is 
liable for the acts of its police officers, by virtue of 
respondeat superior" (Petrs' Br. 21), namely, a warrantless, 
early morning raid and ransacking of a black family's home, 
the Court in Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 189 (1961), held 
that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal 
corportions with the ambit of [§1983] ." In the Court's view, 
4. 
the defeat of the Sherman Amendment stemmed from Congress' uncertainty 
that ·· it had the constitutional power to impose "any 
obligation upon county and town organizations, the 
5. 
mere instrumentality for the administration of state law." 
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess 804 (Rep. Poland). The 
Court's ultimate conclusion was that "[t]he response of the 
Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for 
certain actions being brought within federal purview by the 
Act of April 20, 1971, was so antagonistic that we cannot 
believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act 
to include them." 365 u.s. at 191..!/ 
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 u.s. 693 (1973), 
involved a claim of vicarious liability against a county for 
injuries allegedly suffered as a result of a wrongful 
discharge of a shotgun by a county deputy sheriff engaged in 
quelling a civil disturbance. Petitioners in Moor did not 
challenge "the holding in Monroe concerning the status under § 
1983 of public entities such as the County." Id. at 700. 
Their argument was that since the county was vicariously 
liable for the sheriff's actions under state law, 42 u.s.c. § 
1988, the general civil rights "borrowing statute," 
"authorizes the adoption of such state law into federal law in 
order to render the Civil Rights Acts fully effective, thereby 
creating a federal cause of action against the County. Id. at 
698-99. 
J. Marshall, for the Court, declined the invitation. 
He reasoned that the 1871 Congress' doubts as to "its 
constitutional power to impose liability on political 
subdivisions of the States," 411 U.S. at 708, led it to reject 
6. 
in toto the Sherman Amendment although "even in 1871 
municipalities which were subject to suit under state law did 
not pose in the minds of the legislators the constitutional 
problem that caused the defeat of the proposal," id. at 710. 
The Moor Court refused to permit § 1988, particularly in light 
of its requirement of conformity with federal law, to be used 
"to accomplish what Congress clearly refused to do in enacting 
§ 19 8 3 • " I d . , at 71 0 }I 
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 u.s. 507 (1973), for 
the first time, the Court applied Monroe to conduct which was 
both authorized under state law and directly - rather than 
vicariously - responsible for the claimed constitutional 
injury. Appellee owners of retail liquor establishments 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the cities of 
Racine and Kenosha because their governing bodies had denied 
renewal of appellees' one-year liquor licenses without holding 
a full-blown advisory hearing and because the local licensing 
scheme was unconstitutional. 
Raising the jurisdictional question as its own 
motion, the Kenosha Court held that a municipality is not a 
"person" under the Act regardless of the nature of the relief 
sought. J. Rehnquist stated: 
We find nothing in the legislative 
history discussed in Monroe, or in the 
language actually used by Congress, to 
suggest that the generic word "person" in 
§ 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated 
application to municipal corporations 
depending on the nature of the relief 
sought against them. 
412 U.S. at 513. ll 
7 . 
The Court's fourth and last encounter with the 
question was Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Aldinger 
involved a discharge of a clerk pursuant to a state statute 
authorizing the appointing county officer to "revoke each 
appointment at pleasure." The disappointed ex-clerk brought 
suit against the appointing county officer, his wife, the 
named county commissioners, and the county. While conceding 
that counties were not "persons" under § 1983, petitioners 
argued that the DC could exercise "pendent party" jurisdiction 
with respect to a claim brought under§§ 1343(3) and 1983. 
The Aldinger Court rejected this new effort to 
circumvent Monroe because "Congress has by implication 
declined to extend federal jurisdiction over a party such as 
Spokane County." 427 u.s. at 19. J. Rehnquist recognized 
that the 1871 Congress was aware of the exercise of federal 
diversity jurisdiction over municipal corporations, but found 
that "the refusal of Congress to authorize suits against 
municipal corporations under the cognate provisions of 
§1983 is sufficient to defeat the asserted claim of 
pendent-party jurisdiction." Id. at 17-18 n. 12. 
8. 
II. Resolution Consistent With Monroe And Its Progeny 
A. School Boards 
1. Considerations of Stare Decisis. 
This Court has entertained a great many actions 
ag~nst scho_2~oa .. rds, and petitioners identify at least eight L•~J.,.~ •. J.IJ 
- w--4-t~-"-
which wer e EJ~mised_solely_ o__.!2J.. l ?J 3 and 28 u.s. § 1343 (see ~-Ar ~ 
Petrs' Br. 15 fn.**). However, petitioners do not dispute ~ 
CA 2's assumption that individual public officials were 
co-defendants in every one of the cases (id. at 17; CA op., p. 
A51) .!/ Thus, there may have been an independent basis 
for subject matter jurisdiction in each case. Admittedly, at 
least after Aldinger, there can be no pendent party 
jurisdiction over a non-"person" for purposes of § 1983. 
Misjoinder of the school board, however, would not defeat the 
Court's jurisdiction over the case. In some of the decisions, 
the Court's language is addressed to the school board - - --~------... ---... ---------------
defendant, qua school board.~/ This language does not 
constitute an explicit determination of jurisdiction, and can 
be reinterpreted as simply a directive to the individual 
defendants, the individuals who would have been responsible 
for ensuring compliance with the Court's mandate in any event. 
Of course, even if there were no independent basis of 
jurisdiction, the Court is "not bound by previous exercises of 
jurisdiction in cases in which our power to act was not 
questioned but was passed sub silentio . " Brown Shoe Co. 
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307 (1962). Both in Monroe, 
9. 
365 u.s. at 191 n. 50 and Kenosha, 412 u.s. at 512, the Court 
felt no compulsion to adhere to the unreflective exercise of 
jurisdiction in prior decisions. Accord, Califano v. Sanders, 
No. 75-1443 (decided February 23, 1977), slip op. 6; Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); United States v. 
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 u.s. 33, 38 (1952). 
Petitioners counter that here, as in Brown Shoe Co., 
370 U.S. at 306-07, the exercise of jurisdiction over school 
boards has been longstanding and notorious. The likelihood of 
an independent basis of jurisdiction undercuts the argument 
that the Court may not lightly "disregard the implications of 
an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper for 
over" 20 years. 
The notoreity contention enjoys somewhat more force. 
Congress has not only been aware of, but has specifically 
focused on, this Court's school board decisions on a number of 
occasions (see Petrs' Br. 21-23; Amici Br. 15-16). Here, too, 
the absence of an explicit prior ruling, compare Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 u.s. 258 (1972), and the likely presence of an 
independent basis of jurisdiction in the school board cases 
cut against considerations of stare decisis. Of course, the 
Court can take the position that § 1983 jurisdiction over 
school boards has been implicitly ratified by the prevailing 
sense of justice today. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 
(1976) (Stevens, J., 
10. 
concurring). However, there are no "considered holdings" of 
recent vintage, id. at 186-87 (Powell, J., concurring) 
counseling against reexamination of precedents. 
2. Non-independent School Boards. 
The Court, if it wishes to, can pretermit the 
question of whether a truly independent school board, enjoying 
the taxing and spending powers of an independent government 
entity, is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. In this ~ 
case, however, the New York City Board of Education must be 
considered an adjunct, a department of, the municipality, and 
~ 
1!-,1_ 
... ........... ... ~ ~w 
thus within the express holding of Monroe.~/ ~~~~~ 
Although it enjoys an independent corporate ~~-~ 
existence, N. Y. Educ. Law § 2551, and has some discretio~·~· ~ 
over spending, Davisich v. Marshall, 281 N.Y. 170, 173-74 
(1939), the New York City Board of Educ. lacks requisite 
independence because the city controls the purse strings. The 
Board enjoys no independent taxing or bond issuing authority. ------ -----~ --~ "-"'= ,-, ~ "'*"., ,.awa~ 
All monies appropriated to the use of the Board, regardless of 
source, are paid into the municipal treasury. N. Y. Educ. Law 
§ 2580. The Board prepares an annual estimate for the fiscal 
year which it submits to the Mayor. If the budget exceeds a 
predetermined point, the excess must be approved by the Board 
of Estimate, City Council and the Mayor. N.Y. Educ. Law 
§ 2576(5). Thus, a damages award against the Board may 
require additional, unbudgeted disbursements from the 
municipal fisc. Moreover, the Board holds title in the name 
of the City. N.Y.C. Charter § 521. Furthermore, although 
petitioners emphasize the fixed terms and day-to-day 
independence of Board members, respondents point out that 
members, who receive their appointments from the Mayor and 
11. 
borough presidents, must make yearly reports to the Mayor and 
may be removed "for cause." N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590-b(l) (a)~ 
N.Y.C. Charter §§ 522-23. 
3. Independent School Boards. 
Assuming there is requisite independence, the Court 
must decide the question left open in Mt. Healthy. The 
circuits are split over the issue.2/ 
The argument against inclusion of school boards 
within § 1983 is based largely upon this Court's recognition 
in Moor, by way of dicta, that "the root of the [Sherman] 
~ 
proposal's difficulties stemmed from serious legislative 
concern as to Congress' constitutional power to impose 
liability on political subdivisions of the States." 411 U.S. 
at 708. 
Petitioners urge the Court to limit Monroe-Kenosha to 
municipalities and counties, on the premise that 1871 Congress 
was not concerned with immunizing all governmental entities 
from liability for unconstitutional policies or practices. 
They note that public school boards were not generally in 
existence in 1871, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 u.s. 
483, 489-90 (1954), and that this Court has recognized that 
school boards are uniquely autonomous entities, Milliken v. 
12. 
v. Bradley, 418 u.s. 717, 741 (1974). 
Petitioners offer no principled basis for their 
suggested limitation, other than the factual argument that the 
Sherman Amendment addressed only municipalities, counties and 
perhaps other units with general governmental powers. Moor's 
reading of the legislative history refutes their contention. 
If the 1871 Congress believed it lacked the power to legislate 
with respect to political subdivisions of a state, it is 
unlikely that it would have drawn a distinction, relevant to 
congressional power, between subdivisions with general powers 
and special purpose governmental units. And to the extent 
Congress was concerned with protecting local treasuries, 
school boards are likely to have limited powers to borrow and 
tax, and thus are in even a less flexible position to respond 
to damage and back-pay awards. 
In essence, petrs are c~ling for a reappraisal of - ~~----~-------~------------the Sherman Amendment history. This is a call for a more -
restrictive reading of Congress' rejection of the Sherman 
proposal, as representing simply (1) a refusal to impose 
vicarious liability on governmental subdivisions, or (2) a 
refusal to interfere with a state's internal allocation of its 
general police powers. 
The first view is not tenable after Kenosha and 
Aldinger. Both cases involved claims for relief which were 
premised on the conduct of the city and county as governmental 
entities, not on a theory of respondeat superior 
or any other principle of vicarious liability. In Kenosha, 
plaintiffs sought relief from the denial of liquor licenses by 
municipal governing bodies. Similarly, in Aldinger, 
plaintiffs sought damages against the county because its 
official, acting with the authorization of a state statute, 
discharged plaintiff from his clerical position without 
providing a due process hearing. 
The second view argues that school boards are suable 
because they have no police power responsibilities, and thus 
would not have been subject to the Sherman Amendment even if 
it had become law. This view, too, does not square with the 
Court's language in Moor. 
In sum, school boards, even those enjoying -
independent taxing and spending powers, cannot be regarded as 
"~rso~th~ the m;._aning of § 19~ , unless the Court is 
willing to adopt a reading of the legislative history of the 
Sherman Amendment which focuses on the specific features of 
the Sherman proposal found odious by Congress, Monroe's 
reading, however, supports a broad principle of immunity for 
all governmental units. 
B. Public Officials Sued in Their Representative Capacity 
1. Prior Decisons. Petrs place a great deal of 
reliance on this Court's affirmance of judgments involving 
retroactive monetary awards against public officials sued in 
their representative capacity. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441, 445 (1973); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 
13, 
14. 
632, 638 (1974). However, the Court in these cases was not 
passing on the lawfulness of the relief. Thus, for example, 
the Court's reference to "appropriate relief" in LaFleur, 414 
U.S. at 638, was simply part of the statement of facts, not a 
"considered decision" on the permissibility of retroactive 
recovery in § 1983 suits against public officials sued in 
their official capacity. 
Petrs also refer to Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
677 (1974) , maintaining that the Court would not have passed 
on the Eleventh Amendment issue, had there been a dispositive 
statutory ground for denying recovery. The Edelman Court may 
have acted contrary to the Ashwander doctrine, but here, too, 
there was no "considered decision." The same must be said for 
the language in Edelman, that "[t]hough a § 1983 action may be 
instituted by public aid recipients, such as respondent, a 
federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh 
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive 
relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a 
retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the 
state treasury." 415 u.s. at 677. This language simply 
states that a § 1983 action may be brought against public 
officials in their representative capacity; it does not pass 
on the permissible scope of § 1983 relief in such a case. 
Although there is no "considered decision" on point, 
there are at least two decisionswhich touch on the issue. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232, 237-38 (1974), the Court held 
15. 
~ 
the Eleventh Amendment to be inapplicable in the context of a 
§ 1983 action against public officials in their personal 
capacity. Chief Justice Burger noted: "Analyzing the 
complaints in light of these precedents, we see that 
petitioners allege facts that demonstrate they are seeking to 
impose individual and personal liability on the ~amed 
defendants for what they claim -- but have not yet established 
by proof -- was a deprivation of federal rights by these 
defendants under color of state law." Id. at 238. The 
language suggests that the Eleventh Amendment barrier to 
monetary recovery from state officials is inapplicable only 
where the "individual and personal liability" is sought to 
imposed. 
A contrary indication signal is found in Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976). Justice Rehnquist stated: 
Respondents, in their effort to bring themselves 
within the language of Swann, ignore a critical 
factual distinction between their case and the 
desegration cases decided by this Court. In the 
latter, segregation imposed by law had been 
implemented by state authorities for varying periods 
of time, whereas in the instant case the District 
Court found that the responsible authorities had 
played no affirmative part in depriving any members 
of the two respondent classes of any constitutional 
rights. Those against whom injunctive relief was 
directed in such cases as Swann and Brown were not 
administrators and school board members who had in 
their employ a small number of individuals, which 
latter on their own deprived black students of their 
constitutional rights to a unitary school system. 
I 
They were administrators and school board members who 
were found by their own conduct in the administration 
of the school system to have denied those rights. 
Here, the District Court found that none of the 
petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of 
any rights secured under the Constitution. 
16. 
~ 
Although neither Swann nor Brown involved retroactive monetary 
awards, the public officials in those cases were sued in their 
representative capacities. Justice Rehnquist's language 
suggests that a § 1983 suit against a public official in his 
representative capacity is not a suit against the governmental 
entity which the officials represents, but is a suit against 
the official for conduct violative of the Constitution. On 
the other hand, the language is fully consistent with the 
Eleventh Amendment distinction between prospective relief 
against the individual, which is permitted, and retroactive 
monetary relief against the public fisc, which is barred. See 
Edelman v. Jordan. 
2. Petr's Position. Scheuer v. Rhodes is of little 
avail to petrs because, in all likelihood, resps could defeat 
personal liability by interposing a reasonable, good faith 
defense in the maintenance of a mandatory maternity leave 
policy prior to Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur.~/ 
Rather, petrs argue that municipal officials are indisputably 
"persons" for § 1983 purposes, and resps may be compelled "to 
exercise the power that is theirs," Griffin v. School Board of 
Prince Edward County, 377 u.s. 218, 233 (1964), to remedy 
their own unconstitutional, albeit authorized, conduct. 
approach, which they claim 
We contend only that the city official who 
committed the constitutional violation, and 
who is thus a proper party defendant in a 
section 1983 action, must use all bj s 
offic' owers to remedy tfiat violation. 
! 
Such a rule will only enta1l mone ary relief 
where the defendant who engaged in the 
violation was the chief executive or policy 
making body of the city or country, or some 
other high ranking official authorized to 
direct the expenditure of funds. The primary 
application of this construction will be in 
instances where, as here, the highest 
officials of a city or county adopt or effect 
an official policy directing, in violation of 
the constitution, that money be taken or 
withheld. 
l 
This issue, we contend, goes to the \ 
remedial authority of a court, not to its 
jurisdiction. It is not denied that the 
district court in this action had 
jurisdiction over both the persons of the 
mayor and other individual defendants, and 
over the subject matter of the action ...• 
Absent some special constraint the federal 
court would have plenary authority to order 
the individuals to take any action within 
their legal and physical abaility to remedy 
the constitutional violation which occurred. 
(Petrs' Br. 34-35). Amici add that a public official is a r "person" under the Act, and Kenosha counsels against a 
bifurcated interpretation of the statutory term depending on 
the nature of the relief sought. According to amici, CA 2's 
analogy to the Eleventh Amendment principles was inapposite. 
17. 
The Court's resolution of competing constitutional provisions 
in the line of authority beginning with Ex Parte Young and 
culminating in Edelman v. Jordan is not a line drawn from 
first principles, and has no applicability to a § 1983 action 
against municipal officials where no constitutional barrier to 
retroactive recovery is present. 
3. Resps' Position. Resps restate the position of 
CA 2, as to which there is some division among the 
circuits.~/ J. Gurfein held that retroactive recovery was 
barred because such relief necessarily implicates the 
municipal treasury. Thus, the argument goes, the municipal 
official is merely a nominal defendant, and the real 
18. 
party-in-fact is the municipality, a non-"person" for purposes 
of § 1983. 
4. Analysis. Petrs' position rests on the premise 
that Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment represents a 
refusal to impose vicarious liability on the subdivisions of a 
~~~- ..-
state, and that there was no intention to shield the 
"wrongdoer" from liability, even if the "wrongdoing" in 
question is simply a public official's execution of a statute 
or policy authorized by local law. This view, I would argue, 
is more consistent with the Congressional intent than 
Monroe-Kenosha's broad rule of exclusion of state and local 
government units. 
Section 1 of the 1871 Act passed without significant 
opposition. And the Sherman proposal itself was not 
completely discarded. In the substitute measure, now 42 
U.S.C. § 1986, Congress conditioned liability for failure to 
prevent private conspiracies to violate civil rights on proof 
of knowledge of the conspiracy and ability to prevent its 
occurrence. Even Representative Poland, whose remarks are 
quoted in Monroe for the proposition that 
19. 
Congress believed it lacked the power to impose liability for 
civil rights violations on local governments, was willing to 
impose sanctions for actual wrongdoing. Immediately following 
the very statement quoted in Monroe, 365 u.s. at 187, Rep. 
Poland cautioned: 
We would go as far as [the Senate conferees] 
chose to go in inflicting any punishment or 
imposing any liability upon any man who shall 
fail to do his duty in relation to the 
suppression to the suppression of those 
wrongs. 
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804. 
An interpretation of the legislative history to 
permit an action to recover monies withheld or appropriated in --- ~ -,.._, ............... ....... ....-....... ........ ,-, .-._...... ............... ~ 
violation of the Constitution by local officials acting under 
the specific authorization of local law would be consistent __________........... ---
with the congressional determination to rule out recovery 
premised on respondeat superior or other principles of 
vicarious liability, would not involve the unfairness of 
imposing liability on municipalities who were without legal 
authority to prevent the unconstitutional conduct, and would 
be consonant with the view of some of the Congressmen that 
congressional power extended only to individuals, not 
governments. Such a view would permit incursions into local 
treasuries. But given the undisputed availability of -
prospective relief which may involve significant expenditures 
(Amici Br. 15), I doubt whether Congress can be said to have 
intended to erect a complete shield to monetary 
liability outside of the specific context of the Sherman 
proposal. 
20. 
On the other hand, the legislative history as 
interpreted in this Court's prior rulings supports CA 2's 
Eleventh Amendment analogy. If the 42d Congress excluded 
local governments because of a perceived absence of power, CA 
2 properly relied Eleventh Amendment principles to bar suits 
where the municipality or the county is the party-in-fact. In 
sum, CA 2 should be affirmed unless the Court is willing to 
reexamine Monroe. 
III. A Call for Reexamination of Monroe's Reading of the 
Legislative History. 
The National Educational Ass'n. and Lawyers' 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as amici curiae, have 
written a very persuasive brief that Monroe's reading of the 
legislative history is in substantial measure erroneous. I 
~recommend a perusal of the 32-page appendix to that brief. 
That discussion has convinced me that Congress did not doubt 
its power to remedy "wrongdoing" by public officials, whether 
acting pursuant to explicit statutory direction or "under 
color of" local law, and there was no general intent to 
protect municipal treasuries. The expressions of doubt as to 
legislative power and of concern to limit municipal liability 
were made in response to the Sherman Amendment. That proposal 
was defeated because (1) it sought to impose vicarious 
liability; (2) it c0 ncer,1ed private conduct, not state action; 
- ----.... ~=-= =-:a:wa ~ 
(3) it was unfair because many municipalities lacked general 
police powers; and (4) it interfered with a state's internal 
delegation of police powers. Those concerns are not present 
in this case. 
I was surprised to learn that a full account of the 
legislative history of the 1871 Act has not been made 
previously to this Court. In Monroe, petrs argued that 
Chicago should be held liable "for the acts of its police 
officers, by virtue of respondeat superior." (Petrs' Br. 
21. 
21). Petrs' only reference to the legislative history was to 
the "dictionary act" and a short footnote on the Sherman 
Amendment (id. at 29, 30 n. 22). Resps, on the other hand, 
simply argued that municipalities should not be held liable 
"no matter how innocent of wrongdoing they might be, and no 
matter what ordinances they might enact, or laws that the 
state might enact to prevent." (Resps' Br. 26) . 
Moor v. County of Alameda was also a vicarious 
liability case. See 411 u.s. at 693, 694, 696, 698, 700, 710 
n. 27. Petrs did not take issue with the holding of Monroe, 
see id. at 700. Petrs' legislative history argument was to 
the effect that Congress' reluctance to impose liability on 
municipalities should not result in a conferral of an immunity 
not found in state law. (Petrs' Br. 14-15). Resps argued 
broadly that Congress intended to exclude public entities. 
(Resps' Br. 9) • 
City of Kenosha v. Bruno was the first case not to 
involve vicarious liability. But there was no one to argue 
for a limited reading of Monroe, as the Court raised the 
question of jurisdiction on its own motion. 412 U.S. at 511. 
In Aldinger v. Howard, petr did not contest Monroe's 
--.........-- -
22. 
exclusion of counties from the coverage of § 1983. 427 U.S. 
at 16. The briefs contain no discussion of legislative 
history. 
I recommend a reexamination of the legislative 
history of the 1871 Act. This would not be for the purpose of 
{ overruling the Monroe-Kenosha line of authority. The results 
in those decisions would not be disturbed by a reversal here 
on the ground that re~~oactiy~ relief is available in a suit 
against public officers in their representative capacity. ' ,......_.. ,...-.. ...... ...__, 
Rather, reexamination is needed to permit a reformulation of 
the Congressional concerns which prompted the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unless Monroe's reading of the legislative history is 
reexamined, CA 2's ruling should be affirmed. If the Court is 
willing to reexamine Monroe's exposition of the reasons why 
the Sherman proposal met defeat, I would reverse on petrs' 
second theory. Such an outcome would not require overruling 
~
any decision. However, it would remove some of the pressure 
to extend Bivens beyond the Fourth Amendment context. And it 
would ensure the availability of complete redress from 
unconstitutional conduct which violates no state or local law. 
FOOTNOTES 
!/Neither J. Harlan nor J. Frankfurter addressed 
the municipalities issue in their separate opinions. 
~/ The author of Monroe dissented, taking the 
view that a county is a "person" under § 1983 for "a narrow 
group of equity actions," 411 u.s. at 723, and that a state 
action for damages could be appended under § 1988, id. at 725. 
ll J. Douglas again dissented on the same grounds 
as in his Moor dissent. 412 u.s. 507, 516. 
!/ I have not checked all the cases cited, but 
neither petr nor amici have identified a case which was 
brought against the school board alone. It is also possible 
that some of the cases involved allegations of§ 1331, e.g., 
Horne Tel. & Telegr. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), 
but I doubt if any inquiry was made as to satisfaction of the 
jurisdictional amount requirement. 
~/See, e.g., Davis v. Board of Cornrn'rs, 402 U.S. 
33, 35 (1971); Carter v. West Feliciana School Bd., 396 U.S. 
226, 228 (1969); Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 u.s. 19, 
20 (1969); Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
430, 437-39, 441-42 (1968); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 
103 (1965). 
~/ The lower courts have uniformly held that 
state and municipal agencies are excluded from § 1983. 
FN-2. 
Municipal agencies: See, e.g., Monell, 532 F.2d 259 
(CA 2 1976) (dept of social services); Musquiz v. City of San 
Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (CA 5 1976) (en bane) (firemen and 
policemen's pension fund); Garrett v. City of Ham _tramck, 503 
F.2d 1236, 1294 (CA 6 1974) (planing comm'n); United 
Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray 
Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (CA 5 1974) (county planning board); Lehman 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 474 F.2d 21 (CA 3 1973) (civil service 
comm'n); Henschel v. Worcester Police~~, 445 F.2d 624 (CA 
1 197 4) (pol ice dep' t.) United States ex rel. Gi t tlemacker v. 
County of Phila., 413 F.2d 84, 86 n. 2 (CA 3 1969), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970) (city hospital). 
State agencies: See, e.g., Vick v. Texas Emp. 
Comm'n., 514 F.2d 734 (CA 5 1975) (employment comm'n); Sykes v. 
California, 497 F. 2d 197, 201 (CA 9 1974) (motor vehicles 
bureau); Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (CA 5) cert denied, 
419 u.s. 868 (1974) (highways dep't); Blanton v. State Univ. of 
New York, 489 F.2d 377, 382 (CA 2 1973); Curtis v. Everette, 
489 F.2d 516 (CA 3 1973), cert. denied, 416 F.2d 995 
( 197 4) (bureau of correct ions) ; Henschel v. Worcester Pol ice 
Dept., 445 F.2d 624 (CA 1 1971); Sellers v. Regents of Univ. 
of Calif., 432 F.2d 493 (CA 9 1970), cert. denied, 401 u.s. 
981 (1971); Bennett v. Calif., 406 F.2d 36 (CA 9), cert. 
denied, 394 u.s. 966 (1969) (parole board); Clark v. 
Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (CA 9 1966) (state bar ass'n). 
FN-3. 
]_/ "Persons" Within § 1983: See Keckeisen v. 
Indep. School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062, 1065 (CA 8), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 833 (1975); Aurora Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 
490 F.2d 431, 435 (CA 7), cert. denied, 416 u.s. 985 (1974); 
Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 F.2d 741, 743-44 (CA 3 1970); cf. 
Brenden v. Indep. School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (CA 8 
1973) (state high school league, a non-profit corporation 
claiming membership of state's 485 public schools. 
Excluded from § 1983: See Monell, 532 F.2d at 
262-64; Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School 
Bd., 521 F.2d 1201 (CA 4 1975) (county school bd); Adkins v. 
Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (CA 5 1975); cf. Jordan 
v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 498 F. 2d 514 (CA 8 1974). 
~/ But see Myers v. Alabama, 238 u.s. 368 (1915), 
cited in Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 237. Myers was a§ 1983 action 
against election officials who refused to allow plaintiffs to 
vote because of a state law disqualifying them according to a 
standard unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, see 
Guinn v. United States, 238 u.s. 347 (1915). 
~/ Compare ~onell, 532 F.2d 259, 264-67 (CA 2 
1976), Musquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (CA 5 
1976) (en bane), with Thomas v. Woods, 529 F.2d 916 (CA 4 
1975) (back pay); Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City 
School Bd., 521 F. 2d 1201 (CA 4 1975) (dicta), and Incarcerated 
Men of Allen County ~ Farr, 507 F. 2d 281 (CA 6 1974) (counsel 
fees) • 
Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
Date: October 29, 1977 
Re: Monell v. Dep't of Soc ial Services of the City of New York 
Petrs have filed a reply brief. Essentially, they restate 
their argument that, under state law, the Board of Education 
is a separate entity from the City of New York. Petrs point 
out that the Board has been vigorously litigating a serious 
monetary claim against the City; that a substantial portion 
of its budget comes from the state and federal governments 
(out of a $2.8b budget for fiscal year 1976, Q8llm was 
contributed by the state and$294m came from the feds; these 
figures seem awfully high, even for the Big Apple); and that 
the money to pay claims against the Board "co:me[s] out of the 
City Treasury only in the sense that the City holds the 
board's money for the latter and must pay it over upon the 
latter's order." 
pertinent 
In my view, the question is whether the Board 
has independent taxing authority; to the best of my knowledge, 
it does not. 
\A all state and 
V \ excluded from 
In any event, unless Monroe is reexamined, 
local governmental entities would seem to be 
the term "person" in § 1983. 
CHAMBERS Of" 
..JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
~ttprrnu "Jtturl ttf tlrt 'Jllnilib ~taitg 
:Wrurqmgtc-u:. ~. Qf. 20&JJI>$ 
Apri 1 21 , 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services 
Enclosed is a revision of the proposed Court opinion 
in Monell. Parts II, III and IV are almost completely 
new in an attempt to accommodate the very helpful sug-
gestions of Byron, Lewis and John. Part I(B) has also 
been substantially revised in an effort for greater 
clarity. 
w.J.B. Jr. 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher Date: April 22, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept of Social Services--WJB's 
2d Draft 
I have read WJB's revised, somewhat longer(!!) 
draft. I have annotated this draft to indicate how WJB 
responded to our suggestions. In my view, WJB has 
corrected most of the ~t1/r that we dis cerned, and - _...., 
I recommend that you join the opinion in its entirety o 
J 
However, I do want to point out the following: 
1. There are a few lingering suggestions of the 
"full power" point in the l anguage of "complete remedy" ..... .. 
(p.24) and the statement that § 1983 "provided the only 
civil remedy coextensive with the Four teenth Amendment" 
(p.26). I have pointed this out to WJB's clerks, and 
I believe that they will adopt the language you suggested 
in your memorandum to WJB: that Congress intended t he 
term "person: to include all officials and entities 
within its constitutional reach, without suggesting that 
other features of the statute are dictated either by the 
Constitution or by 1871 understandings of constitutional 
limits. 
2. The discussion on p. 19, while an improvement 
over the pr evious dr aft, does not clearly explain why 
the Sherman Amendment is different from § 1983. WJB's 
argument i s that the opponents of the Sherman Amendment 
would not have been troubled by a provision which made 
municipalities liable for a constitutional violation 
-2-
resulting from the exercise of powers they enjoyed as a 
matter of state law. By contr ast, the Sherman Amendment 
sought to impose a peace-keeping obligation on municipal i ties 
that was not derived from state law or the Federal 
Constitution . In other words, the Sherman Amendment 
sought to impose damages liability for a failure to 
take action when municipalities were under no obligation 
to take any action at all. 
3. The word on p. 30 should be "policy," not "action. 11 
4. On pp. 29-30, WJB has retained some of his "custom" 
and "deliberate indifference" discussion, but in a somewhat 
muted form. I have no objection to the "custom" discussion~ 
as it follow from Justice Harlan's decision for the Court J' 
in Adickes , but you may wish to urge WJ B to eliminate 
the treatment of Estelle v. Gamble in note 55. -
5. WJB's new Part III on stare decisis is quite 
persuasive, and may obviate the writing of a s epara te ------opinion on our part. I am troubled by the discussion 
of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976 
on p.39. I would simply say that the Act "allowed 
award of attorneys' fees" even though Monroe, Kenosha 
and Aldinger made the joinder of such governments 
impossible. I am a little puzzled, moreover, why 
Ald' nger is mentioned in th~context, for that case 
concerned a pendent state-law claim. 
6. Footnote 68 (p.40) leaves open whether Monroe 
was correctly decided on its facts, and whether Moor, 
lr 
7 
Kenosha and Aldinger remain good law to the extent they 
r l ied on the aspect of Monroe rejected in this decision . 
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Apparently JPS has insisted on this reservation, and I 
doubt we could budge WJB on this point. 
7. Part IV contains absolutely no discussion of 
the validity of the common-law immunity of municipal 
governments, other than to say that municipalities do 
not enjoy absolute immunity under § 1983. 
* * * 
Do you still want a s ~parate statement of our 
reasons for joining this opinion? 
SE 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher Date: April 13, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the 
City of New York 
1. BRW's comments should not detain you. He 
agrees with some of our points, and indicates that he 
would not be opposed to a modification or elimination of 
the Aldinger and municipal immmunity discussion. 
2. JPS' comments are somewhat more troubling. 
JPS points out that in the petitioner's brief in Monroe v. 
Pape, there are two references to an alternative theory of 
liability not based on respondeat superior: that the 
police practice in that case "was a custom or usage" under 
§ 1983, and presumably the City of Chicago should be held 
directly liable on that account. As the brief 
demonstrates, this point was simply tossed out without 
development; the brief substantially addresses only the 
respondeat superior theory. WJB's clerk, Whit Peters, has 
pointed out to be that the colloquy before the DC in 
Monroe, the DC's ruling and the CA7's decision referred 
only to respondeat superior. And that was certainly the 
premise of both the majority decision and Harlan's 
concurrence. See,~, 365 U.S., at 193: "Those aspects 
of Congress' purpose which are quite clear in the earlier 
congressional debates, as quoted by my Brothers DOUGLAS 
and FRANKFURTER in turn, seem to me to be inherently 
ambiguous when applied to the case of an isolated abuse of 
state authority by an official. One can agree with the 
2. 
Court's opinion ... without being certain that Congress 
mean to deal with anything other than abuses so recurrent 
as to amount to 'custom, or usage.'" It would certainly 
have made Douglas' task easier had he written the opinion 
for the Court as a "custom or usage" case. Frankfurter's 
dissent, however, does refer to the "custom or usage" 
allegation, but he found it a merely conclusory allegation 
in the face of state decisions holding such intrusions to 
be unlawful. Id., at 258. As to one allegation 
concerning a "custom or usage" of confinement on "open 
charges," Frankfurter indicated that he would find that 
such detention was accomplished "under color of" state 
law. Id., at 258-259. 
3. Whit also tells me that WJB is troubled by our 
intention to write separately on the question of qualified 
municipal immunity. It is WJB's view that the historical 
antecedents are not as clear cut as we think, and that it 
is the better practice to permit further percolation below 
than to have three or four members of the Court announce 
at the outset that they would recognize such a qualified 
immunity. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ltpuntt <!Jnnrlnf Hrt 2lfutU~ .§httts-
'Jlfrudri:ttghtn. IB. (!}:. 20~>1-~ 
JUSTICE w .. . J. BRENNAN, JR. April 13, 1978 / 
RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services 
Dear Byron, Lewis and John: 
Thank you very much for your memoranda. I'll under-
take revisions of the circulated opinion to accommodate 
your views as best I can. Because of the pressure on the 
Printer it may be a few days before I get it around. 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 





F. Powell, Jr. 
Monell 
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SaJly "will give you a rough draft of a propm:;ed 
~ letter to Bill Brennan. 
I found your annotation of his opinion quite 
and I am generally in accord wtth your thoughts. 
-~ I ·beJ.ieve my proposed letter to WJB j dentifi es the only 
·c~anges that are preconditions to joining. But I wouid 
appreciate your most ·c~reful advice. 
'' 
I know from 
experience th~t .. WJB lias a demonstrated abi.lity (that I 
admire) to shape future decisions by the inclusion of 
general 1anguag"' unnecessary to the pr;esent opinion but 
1 
apparently free from serious objection. 
Although Bill's revisions have substantiaJly 
reduced what I would have said in a concurring opinion, I 
would still like for you to try your hand at a draft-
perhaps no more than four or five pages. We can exp~ain 
more clearly why the Sherman Amendment is different from 
•§1983. Also, I would like to incorporate some of my 
~thoughts as to the choice of two lines of authority - in 
discussj ng sta.f~. de£iSi.§.• In addition I would like to 
include the point that we made in my original memorandum to 
the Conference with respect to incongruity of distinguishing 
' '· 
between the municipality or agency thereof and the 
individuals who implemen t policy as officers and 
employees. Recognizing this incongruity, it is now 
widespread practice for the governmental entities to 
indemnify officers and employees who suffer 1983 damage 
awards for the performance of their duties. 
Unless Bill Brennan changes what he has written 
the Attorneys Fees , Aw~ard Act, I wJ 11 want to say 
about that. 
2 . 
In gPneral, this is an h i storic case: I have given 
goad deaJ of thought an~ attention over the many 
months since we granted it, with enormously helpful 
assistance and i nsight •from you1 I think our views have 
helped shape WJB's thinking and opinion, and possibly wjll 
help put a Court together~ I would, therefore, like to say 
something if it may be useful as an additional gloss as to 
what is said in the Court opinion. 
concurring opinion, when we talk about the 
meaning of "persons " , I will want to cite !?~J). ot~,i, and 
quote WJB's statement on p . 26 . 
: 
,,; 
~u:prmtt ~mtrl of litt~~ .§fattg 
'J!l.~rurlfhtgion. ~. ~ 211~>!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF ~- d.~d:- 9f ~ 




April 24, 1978 
'~~ P.s-.~. --
75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social ~ 
Services of the City of New York 
I spent a large part of yesterday carefully reading 
your circulation of April 21. Although I hope ultimately to be 
able to join you, the present draft contains several statements 
that cause me considerable concern. My law clerk, Bob Litt, B-b has talked to Whit Peters about several of these concerns, and 
i,ttt tS this is simply to let you know, without going into all the details, 
" lft•"j that Bob is in every respect speaking for me . 
.Af; c. S•"" w I give specific emphasis to only two of my co .ft':' ,c.t"'f"l one of which may not have been conveyed by Bo -i-rs- t....... IJ!-
f" footnote 57 on page 32 seems to me a veritable · omb, 
particularly when it is read in the lighr of the last sentence in 
( 
c, the text on page 33. Although we have never decided that there 
Ajft can ever be a §1983 action based on negligence alone, it seems 
l-J1. to me that this footnote and sentence of text amount to a virtual 
.,, ~ invitation to not so ingenious lawyers to sue municipalities upon 
b•l "'+-~ the ground that the municipalities were at fault with respect to ...,.,I' I hiring, training, or directing their erring policemen or other 
.~~~~·If!• agents. Secondly, I could never agree that Estelle v. Gamble, 
~ f$ an Eighth Amendment case involving a plaintiff who was im-
~ ·-"'" prisoned by the state, can be read as announcing the broad con-
40,fe,tS stitutional rule set out in the last part of your footnote 55 on 
-f"h" page 30, and incorporated by reference in footnote 60 on page 34. 
"C.1 I !.S•-"c, 
rc,:rc~ . Sincerely yours, 
/)rtW; ) t) ' 
{ ~r. Justice Brennan I'/ 
Copies to the Conference 
Supreme Court of the Un'ited States 
Memorandum 
4/25 -------------------------------------· 19 _______ _ 
Re: Monell 
Bob Litt tells me 
that PS is still troubled 
by WJB's reference to 
Estelle v. Gamble, even 
with the disclaimer that 
the Court expresses 
no opinion one way or the 
other. I gather from Whit 
WxB that this point is 
of some importance to 
WJB. I am satisfied with 
WJB's proposed language 
on p. 3, and I would 
not condition a join on 
deletion of all reference 
to the point. 
. \ 
CHAMBERS OF 
'-'USTICE WM • .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
~ttprtntt C!Jcurlcf tit~ b ~tatt,g 
JfagJrhtghm. gt. cq. 2llbT'1~ 
' April 25, 1978 w'l f3 j 
t-Ul'i>"{c 
f-o p..s . 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Department of Social r , • ._.(,sh•".S 
Services ..,. w_._, Ld-e"f 
~~~~--------------------------- 4'C s•~r-
-to ... , . . 
Dear Potter, -r 
Thanks so much for your memorandum of April 24. 
Let me say in reply that I understand that Whit Peters 
and Bob Litt have reached agreement on all the points they 
discussed yesterday with the exception of three, which 
are: (1) footnote 57, which Whit and Bob did not discuss, 
but which your memorandum identifies as troublesome; (2) 
footnotes 55 and 60; and (3) the question of how to deal 
with the claims asserted against the Mayor of New York and 
the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services 
given that the City and the Department were dismissed and 
plaintiffs-petitioners did not appeal this dismissal. 
I confess that your reaction to note 57 as a "time 
bomb" surprises me. I think it states a well-settled 
principle of common law and I included it in the draft to 
make sure that people understood the limited nature of the 
terms "vicarious liability" and "respondeat superior" that 
are used in the text, since these terms (as indicated in 
the parts of Prosser and Harper & James cited in the 
opinion) are often used in different ways by different 
authors. Given the need for clarity, I would prefer not 
to drop footnote 57, but would prefer simply to add the 
follOwing to it: "Whether fault or negligence in hiring, 
training, or direction states a cause of action under § 
1983 is, of course, a question we have not addressed and 
we express no view on it here." Would not that meet your 
concern that the footnote might be read to imply that we 
are holding in this opinion that § 1983 would follow the 
common law with respect to negligent hiring, training, or 
direction? 
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As to the last part of note 55, it was meant to say 
only -- and I really think it says no more than -- that 
where the Constitution imposes a duty to act, § 1983 
provides an avenue of redress when officials are 
deliberately indifferent to that duty. It was not 
intended to suggest, and I thought did not decide, when 
the Constitution imposes such a duty. Moreover, I th1nk 
the reference to Estelle is faithful to the jump-cited 
material in that op1n1on, which is: 
"We therefore conclude that deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain,' Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173 {joint 
opinion), proscribed by the Eighth Amendment .••• 
Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference 
to a prisoner's serious illness or InJury states a 
cause of action under § 1983." {emphasis added). 
Since § 1983 does not distinguish between the Eighth 
Amendment and other types of constitutional violations, 
doesn't the last sentence of the quote necessarily decide 
that § 1983 goes as far as the Constitution with f espe~ 
to deli~rate indiffe}"ence?L No 1' Jt ee. e..ss•r~t't.. T 14+' 
H ~~tt ~J ,.. e ,r e t:JIII ru. 1' ,.,. , ttlt _, .be. ~ • ~~ . 
Note 55 is referenced in note 6~o allow me to keep 
Byron's language -- which I have unabashedly plagiarized 
in the text at page 34 -- as the description of the cause 
of action created by this opinion. I think Byron's 
language is particularly felicitous in describing the 
elements of the action in what is probably the more usual 
case of "positive" official policy leading to 
constitutional tort. 
I would be willing to drop the material from note 55, 
where it is somewhat cumulative of Felix's language, but 
given my view that deliberate indifference is enough to 
hold a city under § 1983, I feel that I must qualify the 
text at note 60, which would otherwise seem to foreclose a 
deliberate indifference theory. You may differ with me on 
whether whether deliberate indifference is ever enough to 
hold a city, but can't we agree not to cut off either of 
our views in this case? This may be accomplished by 
having note 60 read as follows: 
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.. .§.Q./In adopting this phrasing, we do not intend 
to foreclose the possibility that, where the 
Constitution imposes a duty on municipal officials to 
act -- as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do with 
respect to the medical needs of prisoners, see Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) -- and official pol1cy 
is one of deliberate indifference to that duty, § 1983 
provides an avenue of redress against a local 
( 
government as an entity. See id., at 104-105." 
Would this be satisfactory to you (along with dropping the 
Estelle material in note 55)? 
The third problem is one I confess I have not thought 
a great deal about. It seems to me that, at least outside 
of the Eleventh Amendment context, a suit against an 
official in his official capacity and a suit against the 
entity of which the official is an agent amount to the 
same thing: in either case the relief sought is not 
relief against the official personally, but exercise of 
the powers of his office or payment of monies from the 
entity's treasury. Therefore, since we accepted for cert. 
along with the question of the suability of school boards, 
the question "Whether local governmental officials • 
are 'persons' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when 
equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought 
against them in their official capacities?", Pet. 8, I 
suppose I should add a footnote in an appropriate place 
saying something like: "Our holding today necessarily 
decides that local government officials sued in their 
official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983 for all 
purposes in those cases where a § 1983 plaintiff could 
also maintain an action against the local government, 
since official capacity suits are simply another way of 
pleading an action against a corporate entity." 
On the other hand, the resolution proposed above 
leaves unanswered two things. First, what happens in the 
situation in which the corporate entity cannot be sued, 
i.e., the respondeat superior situation? I think the 
answer is that suit will not lie, since the equivalence 
between official capacity suits and suits against the 
entity need not be tortured here as it has been in the 
Eleventh Amendment context. Second, what should be the 
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result in this case in which petitioners-plaintiffs have 
"allowed" the City and the Department to be dismissed from 
the suit by failing to appeal their dismissal? I have no 
ready answer for this. It may be that the District Court 
can reinstate the City and Department or it may be that 
the courts below will feel they can go forward and grant 
relief without the City and the Department. Since we need 
not decide either of these issues now, my preference would 
be simply to add the footnote proposed above and leave it 
to the District Court and CA2 to sort out where this case 
goes from here. 
I would appreciate any views you and other colleagues 
might have on how to resolve the last question. I hope to 
send a third draft to the printer in the next day or two, 
which would include the first two changes set out above 
plus other corrections we have agreed to make in response 
to comments by Bob Litt and by Sam Estreicher in Lewis' 
chambers. 
t+" e,.~ (JI lt+'l 
of ~e~ p~J./ICI'I'f. 
.Sincerely, 
W.J.B., Jr. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Bill: 
,jltJTfttttt <!}curl cf Urt ~tb ,jtzdtg 
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April 25, 1978 
No. 75-1914 Monell 
~~ 
{S.e.£--~ 
Pi ~1, 1'1'7? 
I have read your revised draft (circulated April 21) 
with interest, and think it is a first-rate piece of 
scholarship. 
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points in 
my letter of April 11. The new Part III on stare decisis is 
quite persuasive, and includes much of what I would have said 
on this question in a concurring opinion. In sum, I believe 
my previously expressed concerns have now been reduced to the 
following narrowly focused suggestions: 
1. As you know, I do not view §1983 as coextensive 
with the full power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A number of scholars share this view, including Gunther and 
Monaghan. And the "fault" principle you recognize in Monell, 
with respect to the respondeat-superior liability of 
municipalities, is premised on the "cause to be subjected" 
language of the statute, rather than any limit on congressional 
power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. You have 
substantially allayed my concerns in your revisions in pages 
24-26. I would, however, suggest the following clarifications: 
(a) Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph: I would 
substitute "broad" for "complete". 
(b) Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45: Rather 
than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly to exercise 
the power conferred by §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, I would 
simply say that §1983 "represented an attempt to include all 
officials and entities within the constitutional reach of 
Congress". It is unnecessary to suggest that other features 
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of §1983 are dictated either by the Constitution or by 1871 
understandings of constitutional limits. 
(c) Page 26, middle of first full paragraph: I would 
modify the description of §1 as the only civil remedy 
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps you 
could say that the section provided a "broad" or "expansive" 
civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
2. Page 30, last sentence in footnote 55: The rather 
sweeping generalization as to "deliberate indifference" can 
be read far more broadly than my understanding of the Court's 
decision in Estelle v. Gamble. There, we were talking about 
the possibility - under the evidence in the case - that prison 
officials were deliberately indifferent to the need of a 
particular inmate for necessary medical service. There was 
no indication of an officially approved policy or custom not 
to provide necessary medical assistance. Moreover, it is 
possible to read Estelle as an Eighth Amendment prisoner 
case. The "deliberate ~ndifference" standard may be 
applicable in other contexts as well, but I think we should 
leave that question for another day. In short, I hope you 
will be willing to eliminate this sentence. 
3. Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' Award Act of 
1976: You describe this as allowing "prevailing parties in 
§1983 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the 1losing party". 
We certainly should make clear, in accord with the statutory 
language, that the Act merely confers discretion on the Court 
to allow such fees. Also I am somewhat troubled by your 
characterization of the congressional intent on page 39. I 
would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow" such 
awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit Monroe." 
4. I would have dealt with the status of Moor, Kenosha 
and Aldinger somewhat differently, but I view your-opin~on as 
leaving open the extent to which these cases remain good law. 
I can accept this. 
5. Also, your revision of Part IV as to immunity -
leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable. In 
accordance with our telephone conversation, I no longer will 
write on the immunity issue, although my previously expressed 
view remains firm. 
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6. Finally, I agree with Potter that you should delete 
footnote 57 on page 32. While the footnote does not commit 
the Court to any p,articular proposition of law, it may be 
read as a "signal' that we should avoid in light of our 
reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v. Navarette. 
* * * * 
I appreciate your efforts to accommodate my concerns. 
If you are disposed to make the modest changes suggested 
above, I will be happy to join you. 
Also, I still may write briefly to emphasize a point 
or two where we may have shades of difference that do not go 
to the essential merits of your opinion. This would not 
prevent me from joining you. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WH • ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR. 
April 25, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Department of Social 
Services 
Dear Potter, 
Thanks so much for your memorandum of April 24. 
Let me say in reply that I understand that Whit Peters 
and Bob Litt have reached agreement on all the points they 
discussed yesterday with the exception of three, which 
are: (1) footnote 57, which Whit and Bob did not discuss, 
but which your memorandum identifies as troublesome; (2) 
footnotes 55 and 60; and (3) the question of how to deal 
with the claims asserted against the Mayor of New York and 
the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services 
given that the City and the Department were dismissed and 
plaintiffs-petitioners did not appeal this dismissal. 
I confess that your reaction to note 57 as a "time 
bomb" surprises me. I think it states a well-settled 
principle of common law and I included it in the draft to 
make sure that people understood the limited nature of the 
terms "vicarious liability" and "respondeat superior" that 
are used in the text, since these terms (as indicated in 
the parts of Prosser and Harper & James cited in the 
opinion) are often used in different ways by different 
authors. Given the need for clarity, I would prefer not 
to drop footnote 57, but would prefer simply to add the 
following to it: "Whether fault or negligence in hiring, 
training, or direction states a cause of action under § 
1983 is, of course, a question we have not addressed and 
we express no view on it here." Would not that meet your 
concern that the footnote might be read to imply that we 
are holding in this opinion that § 1983 would follow the 
common law with respect to negligent hiring, training, or 
direction? 
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As to the last part of note 55, it was meant to say 
only -- and I really think it says no more than -- that 
where the Constitution imposes a duty to act, § 1983 
provides an avenue of redress when officials are 
deliberately indifferent to that duty. It was not 
intended to suggest, and I thought did not decide, when 
the Constitution imposes such a d~ty. Moreover, I think 
the reference to Estelle is faithful to the jump-cited 
material in that opinion, which is: 
"We therefore conclude that deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain,' Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173 (joint 
opinion), proscribed by the Eighth Amendment .••• 
Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference 
to a prisoner's serious illness or InJury states a 
cause of action under § 1983." (emphasis added). 
Since § 1983 does not distinguish between the Eighth 
Amendment and other types of constitutional violations, 
doesn't the last sentence of the quote necessarily decide 
that § 1983 goes as far as the Constitution with respect 
to deliberate indifference? 
Note 55 is referenced in note 60 to allow me to keep 
Byron's language -- which I have unabashedly plagiarized 
in the text at page 34 -- as the description of the cause 
of action created by this opinion. I think Byron's 
language is particularly felicitous in describing the 
elements of the action in what is probably the more usual 
case of "positive" official policy leading to 
constitutional tort. 
I would be willing to drop the material from note 55, 
where it is somewhat cumulative of Felix's language, but 
given my view that deliberate indifference is enough to 
hold a city under § 1983, I feel that I must qualify the 
text at note 60, which would otherwise seem to foreclose a 
deliberate indifference theory. You may differ with me on 
whether whether deliberate indifference is ever enough to 
hold a city, but can't we agree not to cut off either of 
our views in this case? This may be accomplished by 
having note 60 read as follows: 
-3-
.. .§_Q_/In adopting this phrasing, we do not intend 
to foreclose the possibility that, where the 
Constitution imposes a duty on municipal officials to 
act -- as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do with 
respect to the medical needs of prisoners, see Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) -- and official pol1cy 
is one of deliberate indifference to that duty, § 1983 
provides an avenue of redress against a local 
government as an entity. See id., at 104-105." 
Would this be satisfactory to you (along with dropping the 
Estelle material in note 55)? 
The third problem is one I confess I have not thought 
a great deal about. It seems to me that, at least outside 
of the Eleventh Amendment context, a suit against an 
official in his official capacity and a suit against the 
entity of which the official is an agent amount to the 
same thing: in either case the relief sought is not 
relief against the official personally, but exercise of 
the powers of his office or payment of monies from the 
entity's treasury. Therefore, since we accepted for cert. 
along with the question of the suability of school boards, 
the question "Whether local governmental officials • 
are 'persons' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when 
equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought 
against them in their official capacities?", Pet. 8, I 
suppose I should add a footnote in an appropriate place 
saying something like: "Our holding today necessarily 
decides that local government officials sued in their 
official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983 for all 
purposes in those cases where a § 1983 plaintiff could 
also maintain an action against the local government, 
since official capacity suits are simply another way of 
pleading an action against a corporate entity." 
On the other hand, the resolution proposed above 
leaves unanswered two things. First, what happens in the 
situation in which the corporate entity cannot be sued, 
i.e., the respondeat superior situation? I think the 
answer is that suit will not lie, since the equivalence 
between official capacity suits and suits against the 
entity need not be tortured here as it has been in the 
Eleventh Amendment context. Second, what should be the 
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result in this case in which petitioners-plaintiffs have 
"allowed" the City and the Department to be dismissed from 
the suit by failing to appeal their dismissal? I have no 
ready answer for this. It may be that the District Court 
can reinstate the City and Department or it may be that 
the courts below will feel they can go forward and grant 
relief without the City and the Department. Since we need 
not decide either of these issues now, my preference would 
be simply to add the footnote proposed above and leave it 
to the District Court and CA2 to sort out where this case 
goes from here. 
I would appreciate any views you and other colleagues 
might have on how to resolve the last question. I hope to 
send a third draft to the printer in the next day or two, 
which would include the first two changes set out above 
plus other corrections we have agreed to make in response 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Bill, 
~UVTtnte ~curl cf tlft 'J!lttittlt :§htftg 
',Wrur 1!1nghln.18. (.~ 21l&f'!-~ 
April 26, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914- Monell v. New York 
City Dept. of Social Services 
Your letter of April 25 convinces me that our differ-
ences are deeper than I had been willing to acknowledge, even 
to myself. In sum, I think I take a much more restrictive 
view of what we should decide or even discuss in this case 
than do you. 
Specifically, I would deCide only that, for the basic 
reasons discussed in Part I of your opinion, it now appears 
that the Court was mistaken in Monroe v. Pape: in holding 
that municipal corporations can never be within the ambit of 
§1983. I would hold that a municipal corporation is within its 
ambit in an action at law or suit in equity, when, through the 
affirmative, deliberate, knowing official action of its govern-
ing body, it is alleged to have deprived any person of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
or federal law. That, as I understand it, is the scope of the 
question presented by this case. 
I would not imply, even by W<iy of discussion that 
leaves the matter-open, that a municipal corporation could 
ever be liable under §1983 for indifference, inaction, or 
through the actions of its agents when not carrying out affirma-
ti, ly authorized municipal policy. I would not get into a 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:pr tmt (!Janrl ttf fltt ~ttlt .§hrltg 
~ait!rittghm, ~. QJ. 20~'1.;l 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 26, 1978 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social 
Services 
Dear Bill: 
Your revised opinion is really excellent . 
I particularly appreciate your full treatment of 
the stare decisis issue and the changes in your 
discussion of Monroe v. Pape. Nevertheless , I 
am still persuaded that Parts II and IV of the 
opinion are merely advisory and should not be in-
cluded in an opinion of the Court until the 
questions have been properly presented and argued. 
As presently advised , I therefore plan to join 
only Parts I, III, and V. I do not expect to 
write separately but merely to state in a sentence 
my reasons for not joining Parts II and IV. 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Con~erence 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Bill, 
~uprtntt <!Jltllrl of flrt 'Jllttitt~ .§hdtll 
Jlag~ ~. <!f. 2ll~J!.;1 
April 26, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914- Monell v. New York 
City Dept. of Social Services 
Your letter of April 25 convinces me that our differ-
ences are deeper than I had been willing to acknowledge, even 
to myself. In sum, I think I take a much more restrictive 
view of what we should decide or even discuss in this case 
than do you. 
Specifically, I would decide only that, for the basic 
reasons discussed in Part I of your opinion, it now appears 
that the Court was mistaken in Monroe v. Pape, in holding 
that municipal corporations can never be within the ambit of 
§1983. I would hold that a municipal corporation is within its 
ambit in an action at law or suit in equity, when, through the 
affirmative, deliberate, knowing official action of its govern-
ing body, it is alleged to have deprived any person of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
or federal law. That, as I understand it, is the scope of the 
question presented by this case. 
I would not imply, even by way of discussion th2.t 
leaves the matter open, that a municipal corporation could 
ever be liable under §1983 for indifference, inaction, or 
through the actions of its agents when not carrying out affirma-
tively authorized municipal policy. I would not get into a 
- 2 -
discussion of the law of respondeat superior or the law of torts. 
I would certainly not make use of the word "fault" which in the 
law of many states and in admiralty law is no more than a loose 
synonym for negligence. 
It seems to me that, in view of the very thorough and 
exhaustive opinion you have written, it would be quite unfair of 
me to keep asking you to chip away at it -- a process that might 
lead ultimately to the distortion of your views without the real 
satisfaction of mine. Accordingly, I think the true interest of 
each of us would be better served if I filed a brief statement 




P. S. -- I have just read John's note, and it may be 
that he has said more briefly what I have 
tried to say above. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
Suprem; Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
------------------------------- ------· 19--------
;U- f._ ..<._ tfl.,..(_,.._ J ~ 
""lt '""~ ~t·~ lt.-~o-•t/t,...,_ 
'"'' '"';; t.( • ~ 1" Vt {<<• t;_, ·J·7 
ff~,._:J,.._:~ j,£.,~Lu) I.,:._ f)...,.: f~-cr_ 
t.-1 , .. ~.. 11-.t.."' ~ ( 1(\ .... J ··~. i ........ t._ 
~c.tf~ ft J!. 
J ~ ~ t.:. /..' f;;t.l 
ivt"h. tJ~ 
, ... ''- f.;,~,_, '7 "'-J·u.. 
~ '-'-0--- ll._(r ~ 
~ -
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
-------------------------------------· 19 _______ _ 
~~-~--, ... ~ fLtv~-· J~t_ 
J.t-t ...._.__ ~ ~v-rv L..,,~j '"''·~-<­
II~ ;;t.4 
1 tv~, L 
{ :J~ lVI'~tc.- ,l<,,,..._,,,.... .t:_, 
hY:> Vl--s,..: ..,<-r 1(, i"'( .... (_ 
7Jt"'·- I, .;,... .. 1~ \.......c.. j I ~"'" ... c.., 
~.t. ,.,.t..:"L.. I; JV/.~ . ..,.. t,.//...vt-"" 
1.. </>-- -/, ""'I . 
t, ~ .{._. !....,_ IW-}7 ..._,.. tl..r 




To: The Chief Justice 
llr. Just1oe Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blaokmun 
Mr. Justice Powel~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquiat 
Prom: Mr. Juetioe Stevena 
Circulated~ APR 2 7 1978 
Recirculated: ________ _ 




iane Mon~ll et ~1. , Petitiop.ers, l On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the United States Court 
Dep~rtment of Soci~tl Services' of of Appe~tls for the Sec:... 
the City of New Y orl<: et ~tl. ond Circuit. 
i(May -, 1978]' 
MR. JusTICE STEVE:N"B, concurring in part. 
Since Parts II and IV of the opinion of the Court are merely 
advisory and are not necesf!a.ry to ex.pl~in the Court's decision, 
I foin only Parts I ; Ill, 1\-nd V. 
.:iu:prttttt <!fcnrt l1f t4t ~ttittb ~g 
'Jtaslyi:ttgtcn. ~. <!f. 20,?JI.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
April 27, 1978 
Re: No. 7 5-1914 - Monell v. New York City 
Department of Social Services 
Dear Bill: 
I have read with great interest the more recent writings 
in this case, and the correspondence. As of now, I a m about 
where Potter and John are in their respective letters of April 26. 
It seems to me that if Monroe v. Pape is to be overruled, the 
Court is striking off in a new direction and we should move cau-
tiously, one step at a time. There is much to be said, also, for 





Mr. Justice Brenna n 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
..§u:vuutt ~ottrl rl t!rt~ttittb ~g 
'Jltrur!rittgton.tB. ~· 2ll,?J!..;l 
April 27, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914- Monell v. New York City 
Department of Social Services 
Dear Bill: 
I have read with great interest the more recent writings 
in this case, and the correspondence. As of now, I am about 
where Potter and John are in their respective letters of April 26. 
It seems to me that if Monroe v. Pape is to be overruled, the -
Court is striking off in a new direction and we should move cau-
tiously, one step at a time. There is much to be said, also, for 
Lewis 1 approach, and I shall be interested in what he comes up 
with. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
Cl: . 
CHt...I-1P.ERS OF 
,§tqrrtmt <(onrl of t!F ~tilt~ .§taft•.s 
'J.!Ta.si1inghnt, p. <!J. ~.O~J!.2 
JUSTICE BYRON R WHITE April 29, 1978 
Re : 
Dear Bill, 
75-1914 - M?nell v. Department 
of Social Services 
of City of New York 
As I have told you, Part II is in 
general quite all right with me, and I 
now think I would include it whether 
there are five for it or not . The amend-
ments to footnotes 55 and 60 suggested in 
your letter to Potter of April 25 are 
definitely an improvement. I would also 
prefer what you orally suggested to me 
today, namely, that you drop footnote 57 . 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copie s to the Conference 
.:%iup-rtm.t <!}cud of tlrt ~i:ltti:tdt ~ti:lft.a 
'llJa.aJringtcn.lfl. <!}. 2ll,?Jt-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 5, 1978 
R.e: No. 7 5-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
Dear Bill: 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
SE 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
April 5, 1978 ~+ From: Sam Estreicher Date: 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept of Social Services --WJB 
1st Opinion Draft 
I 
I am afraid that WJB has written another weighty, 
but improved draft. In my view, you can certainly join 
the judgment of reversal~~t there are som~ -~~~ with 
the draft that may require a separate writi~~s~lful 
negotiations with WJB's chambers. The following points 
cause me the greatest concern (the relevant passages are 
sidelined in red): 
--------
1. On pp. 21-22, WJB writes that "there is no Jl~ 
basis in holdings of this Court .. to find in the ~
Constitution ... a bar to Federal Government power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the States .••. " 
The sentence, read in context, is understandable: 
Congress did not believe that it lacked the power to 
impose liability on the States for violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. My problem is that this sentence 
may be read as suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment 
presents no obstacle to § 1983 suits against the States as 
entities. The implications of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 
651, 674-676 (1974), are to the contrary: 
"But it has not heretofore been suggested that 
§1983 was intended to create a waiver of a 
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely 
because an action could be brought against state 
officers, rather than against the State itself. 
2. 
Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by 
public aid recipients, such as respondent, a 
federal court's remedial power, consistent with 
the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to 
prospective injunctive relief ••.• " 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 445, 452 (1976), makes 
clear that no effective waiver of the Eleventh Amendment 
was found in Edelman because "none of the statutes relied 
upon by plaintiffs in Edelman contained any authorization 
by Congress to join as defendant." Under Bitzer, it would 
seem that the Eleventh Amendment remains a barrier to the 
extent that the legislation does not rest on an explicit 
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment bar. The § 1983 -
attorney's fees case, No. 76-1660, Hutto v. Finney, 
presents this issue. 
Language in note 54 on p. 29 presents the same 
problem: 
"Nor is there any basis for concluding that the 
Eleventh Amendment is a bar to such liability •••• 
Our holding today is, however, limited to local 
government units which are not considered part of 
the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 
Since no one is raising the Tenth Amendment issue, and 
municipalities simply do not come within the protection of 
the Eleventh Amendment, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 
529, 530 (1890), I do not understand the need for any 
discussion that appears to deal with the general reach of 
the Eleventh Amendment. However, WJB's cite to Edelman v. 
Jordan may be sufficient to allay any fears. 
~ 2. The first sentence on page 25 states that "the .1 ~ 
____ debates show that Congress intended to exercise its full ~ 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment •... " The problem 
~! 
3. 
with this sentence, as it stands, is that it appears~o ,......,.. 
decisions, the negligence issue sidestepped in Procunier 
v. Navarette, and Carey v. Piphus, are all premised on the 
view that the scope of § 1983 and the reach of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are not necessarily coextensive. As 
P;ofeEsor Monag~an has p~inted _9ut, it is important to 
retain a flexibile view of § 1983 to avoid transforming 
every case requiring an interpretation of §1983 into an 
exercise in constitutional~xegesis. Bob Litt and I have 
spoken to WJB's clerk, Whit Peters, and Whit appears to be 
willing to modify the sentence by indicating that 
Congress' view of the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment 
may have been unduly conservative, with a citation to 
supporting language in Moor v. County of Alameda. In my 
view, WJB could simply say that Congress intended the term 
"person" to reach all officials and entities suable under 
the Constitution, without discussing whether other 
features of the statute --~, the causation 
requirement-- are dictated either by the Constitution or 
by 1871 understandings of constitutional limits. 
3. The language on pp. 29-30 & n.55 should be .· 
softened. First, there is no need to s~ in this case --
that "unwritten practices or predilections which have by 
force of time and consistent application crystallized into 
official policy can also, on an appropriate factual 
showing, provide a basis for a suit against a local 
4. 
government." The sentence is not wrong, and is supported 
by Justice Harlan's reading of the term "custom" in the 
Adickes decision cited at the top of p. 30, but it is -
unnecessary dicta. Second, I also recommend deletion 
'~ , ----
the last seven lines of note 55. WJB's point is implicit ------in the quotation from WHR's opinion in Rizzo v. Goode. 
\\ t/ And this passage can be read as bearing on the negligence 
issue "ducked" in Procunier v. Navarette. 
4. On page 31, WJB states that "[s]ince City of 
Kenosha is flatly inconsistent with the correct 
construction of § 1983, it is hereby overruled." It seems 
to be that WJB should make clear that he is simply ~~ 
overruling the holding of City of Kenosha on its facts, " ,..... 
~without disturbing the ratio decidendi, i.e., that§ 1983 
does not admit of a bifurcated reading of the term 
"person" depending on the nature of the relief sought. 
5. In note 57 on page 31, WJB advances a fairly 
\ 
unpersuasive case for ignoring the doctrine of stare -decisis. He does not make any of the points that we 
suggested in our memorandum to the Conference. Also, WJB 
is being coy in stating that "we have from time to time 
intimated that stare decisis has more force in statutory 
analysis than in constitutional adjudication .... " This 
Court's pronouncements on that point have been explicit 
and direct. <>1-~ 
6. I also do not like note 60 on pp. 33-34. In 
my view, the footnote should be substantially revised or -~ 
5. 
to undercut the force of our vicarious-liability limit on \~ 
deleted. As it stands, there is language that can be read 
the reach of § 1983: "Nonetheless, it is important to 
recognize that the legal basis for such liability was not 
some sort of respondeat superior theory but fault on the 
part of the community in its exercise of its peace-keeping 
powers." What WJB is trying to say is that the 
proponents of the Sherman Amendment viewed it as premised 
on a somewhat attenuated theory of "fault." But the 
remainder of the footnote and the discussion in the text 
at pp. 34-35 make clear that the successful opposition to 
the Sherman Amendment was based on grounds which support a 
vicarious-liability limitation on the reach of § 1983. 
The footnote can be written in a much clearer fashion to 
avoid that both Bob Litt and I experienced. 
7. The discussion of Aldinger v. Howard on pp. 
35-36 is pure dicta and should be deleted. Indeed, -although WJB introduces the section saying that "it is 
necessary to comment briefly on" Aldinger, he concludes 
that the question is not before the Court. This is a 
classic example of a WJB attempt "to up to ante." 
8. Finally, I am troubled by Part III {pp. 
~ .......... ~ ........... _.,....,_,. 
36-38). WJB spends too much time debunking the absolute 
immunity that had been available to municipalities at 
common law. I agree that municipalities cannot be said to 
enjoy an absolute immunity under § 1983, for that would 
eviscerate the import of our decision in Monell. That is 
\ 
all that need be said in this 
~· 6. 
case~ would not endorse 
WJB's language concerning "the largely repudiated - -
common-law rule of absolute municipal immunity." If we 
i¥.~ 
left for finding a qualified good-faith immunity. ~ 9 ~ 
discard the common-law rule, then, we remove one basis 
II ~~"? 
WJB's clerk tells me that his boss may be willing 
to drop some of the language discussed above, but that in ~ 
~·W.. all likelihood that will take some prompting from one of 
the Brothers. If Whit's sense is right, I would think you 1~ ~~ 
could join in substantial part and attach a separate 
opinion explaining 
p~int~ you 
your views. That opinion might make two ----may want to explain why you are willing 
to join a decision overruling a statutory interpretation. 
This discussion would track your memorandum to the 
Conference.~ you may wish to give some reasons why 
municipalities do enjoy a qualified immunity under § 1983. 
I offer a tentative list of those reasons: (a) 
municipalities enjoyed absolute immunity at common law; 
(b) the Court's rejection of the justifications for 
respondeat-superior liability (pp. 34-35) supports 
recognition of a qualified immunity; (c) at least part of 
the rationale for finding a qualified immunity for public 
officials --the reluctance to deter the exercise of 
official discretion-- argues in favor of a limitation on 
liability for the enterprise that employs the individual 
7. 
exercising discretion: and (d) BRW's opinion in Procunier 
v. Navarette offers some support for the view that 
irrespective of the common-law rule, § 1983 does not 
impose liability for adverse action taken with respect to 
a right not clearly defined at the time. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w ... ..J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
Re: 
Dear John: 
.§nprmtt Clfttnrl ttf flrt ~b .:%tai:t.i¥ 
~a,g£rhtghm. ~. C!f. 20~~~ 
April 10, 1978 
No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social 
Services of the City of New Yor~ 
Perhaps I can save you some unnecessary effort by 
responding quickly to your memo on the above. 
First, with respect to the "full power" argument, I 
agree that this argument goes farther than is necessary 
and have already planned to rewrite this section. 
Second, with respect to Part II-B, I had thought my 
footnote 58 on page 32 answered the concern you expressed 
at conference. As I indicate there, plaintiffs in Monroe 
interpreted their own complaint as stating a respondeat 
superior action. 
Finally, Parts II-C and III were at least implicit in 
1 my earlier memorandum in which I thought a majority 
joined. I therefore included them explicitly in the draft 
since each seems to follow directly from Part I. Of 
course, both are open to modification, but I 1 d be better 
able to make changes if I knew the views of my colleagues 
concerning them. Accordingly, I confirm that I 1 d welcome 




Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
~ttpr.tmt <!J111trl o-f ut~ ~h>h ~hrltS' 
Jrrurlfinghtn. ~. c.q. 2!!.;t'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 10, 1978 f>~tr..,.. II -B ~ 
I'- , .J 1 c,.~ r 1 J CIIS 
,,., •·+1 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social~ L ~ -G ~ 
Services of the City of New York T~rr ~ 
~~·~r 
Dear Bill: tJ IJ UAJSI' ~ 
1 
. . ~>~,..,.. m: ~ 
A though I expect to J01n Parts I-A, I-B, most 
of I-C, and II-A of your opinion, I do not presently 1'\ 1t ~ 
plan to join Parts II-B, II-C, or III. Ab,s-ol.-...-t 
I plan to write a separate opinion in which I f-.'"w~~~~ 
take issue with II-B and suggest that the discussion 
in Parts II-C and III is unnecessary and is not em-
braced within the question presented by the certiorari 
petition. 
With respect to I-C, I cannot accept "the full 
power" argument; if that argument were valid, there 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE w ... . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Re: 
Dear John: 
j)u:prtntt <!Jcttrl cf tfrf ~1t ~tnit~ 
:.a,glp:nghm, lfl. QJ. 2!l~Jl.~ 
April 10, 1978 
No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social 
Services of the City of N~w York 
Perhaps I can save you s ome unne c essa ry effort by 
responding quickly to your memo on the above. 
First, with respect to the "full power" argument, I 
agree that this argument goes farther than is necessary 
and have already planned to rewrite this section. 
Second, with respect to Part II-B, I had thought my 
footnote 58 on page 32 answered the concern you expressed 
at conference. As I indicate there, pla i ntiffs in Monroe 
interpreted their own complaint as stating a respondeat 
superior action. 
Finally, Parts II-C and III were at least implicit in 
my earlier memorandum in which I thought a majority 
joined. I therefore included them explicitly in the draft 
since each seems to follow directly from Part I. Of 
course, both are open to modification, but I'd be better 
able to make changes if I knew the views of my colleagues 
concerning them. Accordingly, I confi r m that I'd welcome 
expressions of such views. 
Sincerely 
~ 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
j;npumt (lf111trl qf f!r.t ~ult ~htt.ts 
JragJrittghm. ~. OJ. 20.?'1.~ 
April 10, 1978 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social 
Services of the City of New York 
Dear Bill: 
Although I expect to join Parts I-A, I-B, most 
of I-C, and II-A of your opinion, I do not presently 
plan to join Parts II-B, II-C, or III. 
I plan to write a separate opinion in which I 
take issue with II-B and suggest that the discussion 
in Parts II-C and III is unnecessary and is not em-
braced within the question presented by the certiorari 
petition. 
With respect to I-C, I cannot accept "the full l 
power" argument; if that argument were valid, there 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
75-19)4, ~ Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
Qf C_!_!::L£f_New York ., 
of Apr i 1 1. 0 to John, I 
,fi' ' 
' ' I intend to write separately at least for the 
purpose of stating the view that municipalities are 
entitled to a defense, for policies promulgated in good 
faith that affect adversely constitutional rights not 
clearly defined at .the time of violation. The absolute 
immunity accorded to governmental bodies at common 1aw 
should be modified, lest we eviscerate the import of our 
decision in this case, but I would not •abandon all 
common-law protection. ·1, While the considerations are 
somewhat different from those governing our 
qualified-immunity decisions, a rule , of strict munic·pal 
lfability imposes substantial costs in terms of the ~ 
i nhi,bi tion of,., the discretionary acti vlti es of governmental 
bodies. Moreo~er, the emphasis in your opinion on the ,~. 
"fau1 t" pr lnciple and your recognition of the 42d , · 
Congress' rejection of the justifications for vicaiious 
liability argue against the imposition of liability for 
innocent failure to predict the often uncertain course of 
consti~utional adjudication. 
; ~ ' 
. , 
Thes~ matters aside, while I would like ver~ . much 
to join your opinion, I am troubled by some of the 
language in the present draft. There are some sentences 
which can be worked out among the law clerks (who have 
conferred), and need not be stated here. But there are 
several areas that require revision before I would feel 
free to join your opinion in its entirety. 
2. 
First, I have considerable difficulty with your 
discussion in Part III. While I agree that a recognition 
of absolute municipal immunity woulc1 be inconsistent not 
only with our decision in Monell but also with the 
considerations that were controlling i. n Imbler v. 
Eachtman, Pi!"~2n- v. _g.!¥ and Brag,ley v. ~i~her, I see no 
need for an extended discussion of the wisdom, or lack 
thereof, of the common-law rule. The Chief's opinion in 
Scheuer v. Rhodes is ample authority for the proposition 
that-on occasion the absolute immunity available to a 
class of defendants at common law must give way to the 
poi icies of §1983. A discuss ion tha.t emphasizes modern 
criticisms and dismisses the doctrine of municipal 
immunity as "the largely repudiated common-law rule of 
absolute immunity" is unnecessary, does not address the 
question of the intention or the 1871 Congr~ss, and has 
the effect of removing the historical basis for finding a 
qualified municipal immunity. 
Second, I am in full agreement with John that 
Part II-C of your opinion is unnecessary. Sj nee ~lC!_.ng~.r. 
v. Howard invo1~ed a penfent state c aim, not a cause of 
action premised on § 1983 or other federal lew, I oo not 
consider it proper to cast doubt on ~l'!Jn9~! in t~is case. 
Third, I see no need to discuss in this case 
whether "unwritten practices or. pr.ed~lections wh'ch have 
by force of tfme and consistent application crysta11ized 
into official policy" may "pr.ovirie a basis for a suit 
against a loca~ government" (pp. ?9-30). I do not 
necessarily disagree with the proposition, as such, but T 
prefer to allow thene pointP to develop in a case-by-case 
fashion. In a similar vein, I hope that you wiJJ delete 
the last seven lines in ~ootnote 55 (p.30). Your quote 
from Rizzo v. Goode is quite persuasive, and I would not 
go furtherand-suggest to the reader that Rizzo ~imp . y 
invoJ ved a pl Pading ~r r .OT'. The relevance o1rE:s_!~~..1.£ v. 
Gamble to the matter at hand will be apparent to 
practitionersr ordinaT"ily it is not our. province to 
suggest legal theories for overcoming obstacles pres~nted 
by our decisions. 
Finally, I could not agree with the language on 
pp. 24 and 25 which states that Congress in S 1983 
"intended to exercise its full power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment •••• " I am opposed to any view of § 1983 which 
3 • 
. , ' ~ .. 
' ~ '~·~ . 
transforms every case requiring an inter.pretation of § 
1983 into an exercise in constitutional exegesis. The \ 
qualified immunity decisions, the negligence issue raised 
in Procunier v. Navarette, and my opinions in !Q9!.§ham v. 
!Fight and CaJ~ v. Piph~, are all premised on the 
proposition that the scope of §1983 and th'e reach of ... the 
Fourteenth Amendment are not necessarily coextensive: · 'It 
seems to me that you can accomplish your objective by •; 
simply saying that Congress intended the term "person" 
include all officials and entities within its 
constitutional reach, without suggesting that other 
features of the statute --~, the causation 
requirement-- are dictated either by the Constitution 
by 1871 understandings of constitutional limits. 
If these 'points are resoJ ved and a few additional 
word changes are made, I believe I can j'oin your, ent j re '' 
, opinion, although I also ·would wr i.te briefly to state my, · 
views on qualified munlcipal immunity, a.nd pe>rhaps my O\•m 
sep~rate reasons fo~ being wi lli..ng to · r:,each our conclusion. 
'-";t{tfl' ' ... " 
I apologize for this extended commentary, 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 12, 1978 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social 
Services of the City of New York 
Dear Bill: 
With all respect, I am persuaded that you have 
given the discussion of respondeat superior in 
petitioners' brief in Monroe v. Pape, an unwarranted 
interpretation. 
The City had argued that the complaint was properly 
dismissed because (1) it was not a "person," and (2) it 
was entitled to immunity. In an argument in the nature 
of a rebuttal, the petitioners referred to the doctrine 
of respondeat superior as an alternative basis for 
supporting the conclusion that the City is a person. 
See xeroxed page 25 attached. 
In Part II of petitioners' brief in Monroe, which 
addressed the doctrine of immunity, petitioners argued 
that "all doubts as to the liability of the City under 
the act should be resolved in petitioners' favor." In 
support of that position they specifically argued: 
"This case portrays a standard police pro-
cedure--whose victims are often innocent. 
This case is, among other things, a 'custom 
or usage' case." See xeroxed page 42 attached. 
It seems to me that the Court must either overrule 
Monroe v. Pape, or else hold that the Monroe complaint 
d1d not allege a sufficient claim for relief against the 
City. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Brennan fL 
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With all respect, I am persuaded that you have 
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dismissed because (1) it was not a "person," and (2) it 
was entitled to immunity. In an argument in the nature 
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In Part II of petitioners' brief in Monroe, which 
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that "all doubts as to the liability of the City under 
the act should be resolved in petitioners' favor." In 
support of that position they specifically argued: 
"This case portrays a standard police pro-
cedure--whose victims are often innocent. 
This case is, among other things, a 'custom 
or usage' case." See xeroxed page 42 attached. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
i'u:vrnn:t QJoud of tfrt ~nittb .§tareg 
~agfrmgtmt. ~. QJ. 2Vc?Jl..;t 
April 12, 1978 
Re: #75-1914 - Monell, et al v. Department of 
Social Services of City of New 
York, et al 
Dear Bill, 
Under your draft, as I understand it, a local govern-
mental entity may be sued under § 1983 for its own trans-
gressions but not for the fault purely of its employees or 
agents. The line between official policy for which the 
cities may be sued and vicarious responsibility for the sins 
of others is not immediately obvious. I take it, however, 
I 
that the city would not be exposed to § 1983 liability where 
under its policies, such as those expressed in ordinances, 
its officials are given general missions together with some 
or a great deal of discretion as to how to implement them 
and the executing official, in good or bad faith, then in-
vades an individual's constitutional rights. Officers 
authorized to make arrests on probable cause inevitably make 
mistakes, and it may be held in such cases that the Fourth 
Re: #75-1914 
April 12, 1978 
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Amendment has been violated. Under your draft, I would not 
think the city would be responsible in such situations since 
it was not its policy to make arrests except on probable 
cause. 
Similarly, under a city wiretap ordinance, the city 
would not be liable for an officer's mistaken view that the 
ordinance did not require his superior's consent before apply-
ing for a warrant; but if the ordinance itself is held uncon-
stitutional and it is for this reason that a citizen's pro-
tected privacy is invaded, the city would be liable unless 
otherwise immune from suits for damages under § 1983. 
Although this oversimplifies the matter, I am sure, I 
gather that a city would never be liable when its officer or 
agent exceeds his authority under statute, ordinance or regu-
lation or when he exercises discretionary authority of the 
kind given to him by the city but in good or bad faith, 
exercises it so as to invade the constitutional rights of the 
citizen. It is only when the city's policy, whether made by 
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 
said to represent official policy, itself inflicts the injury 
or itself authorizes or directs the specific act charged 
against its officer that the city is responsible under § 1983. 
Re: #75-1914 
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It is only then that it would be necessary to consider municipal 
immunity. 
You are convinced, I gather, that foreclosing suits 
against a city for the wrongful acts of its officers or em-
ployees as well as shielding the city from liability for its 
failure to curb the lawlessness of some of its citizens, is 
required by the legislative history of § 1983. I am tentatively 
prepared to go along with you but will be very interested in 
the views of others on this matter. 
I have no objection to Part III or Part II-C, but neither 
would I object if you modified or eliminated them. 
I am in agreement with Lewis Powell's remarks directed 
at indicated matters on pages 24 and 25, on pages 29-30, and 
in footnote 55. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher February 1, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services 
I 
WJB's tome may contain precious nuggets of 
wisdom, but the mode of presentation of his ideas does not 
permit of easy digestion. His essential point is that 
Monroe's holding as to municipal immunity must be 
overruled as an erroneous reading of the legislative 
history. He is willing to say that a governmental 
entity should not be vicariously liable for the 
unauthorized torts of its employees (Memorandum, pa47), 
and suggests that liability must be premised on the 
concept of fault. As in Rizzo Vo Goode, neither the 
supervisory official nor the municipal employer is 
liable --whether in an action for injunctive relief or 
one for damages-- for the tortious excess of a subordinate 
acting "under color of" his official position. But both 
the supervisory official and the municipal employer are 
subject to liability £or conduct as to which tHey bear 
a "significant responsibility for the harm suffered by 
a§ 1983 plaintiffo" (Memorandum, PPo 46-47)o WJB 
declines to pass, however, on the question of whether 
the governmental entity may assert a "good faith" 
defense (Memorandum, Po 50). 
I am not going to try to give you a "road map" 
to WJB's exhaustive and exhausting exegesiso Much of 
the discussion is unnecessary and confusing; I suggest 
that you reread the appendix to the NEA amicus brief 
and the Georgetown LoJo articleo His "bottom line" is 
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that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment, not out 
of solicitude for municipal treasuries, but because 
the proposal imposed a duty upon municipalities to curb 
private mob violence. This was deemed an unwarr~nted 
intrusion by the federal government into an area of 
primary state competence because the obligation sought 
to be imposed, addressed to state inaction in the face 
of private lawlessness, was not based on the mandate of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. There was also concern with 
the specific terms of the Sherman proposal, ~' the 
apparent imposition of liability without requiring a 
showing that the municipality knew or should have known 
of the riotous conduct; and the apparent breadth of the 
provision for execution of a judgment lien against all 
of the monies and property of the governmental subdivision, 
eve~hough the law of judgments at the time recognized 
an exception for public property and ~ade : prdvision for 
the continued functioning of government . 
II 
WHR writes a concise, persuasive piece. 
Notwithstanding his superior advocacy, I adhere to my 
original position. 
A. Legislative History 
WHR has excerpted a few passages to prove his 
point that the rejection of the Sherman Am8ndment .evidences ' 
an intent "to preserve the financial capacity of 
municipalities to carry out basic governmental functions •••• " 
(Memorandum, pp. 7-8, 10). I have xeroxed a copy of the 
pages in which these fragments appear to give you a sense 
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of context. (The remarks relied upon by WHR are 
boxed off in red squares (and other passages supportive 
of his cause are sidelined in red). Language which 
helps to place these remarks in their appropriate setting 
are sidelined in blue.) Perhaps the best spokesman 
for WHR's view is Rep. Kerr (Cong. Globe 787-789), but 
his words were addressed to the specific evils of 
imposing liability for a municipal failure to prevent 
private riots, and subjecting all of the resources of 
a municipality to a judgment lien founded on the 
nonperformance of this extra-constitutional obligation. 
The excerpted remarks of Reps. Bingham and Farnsworth 
are to the same effect. 
Almost every one of the leading Republican 
opponents to the measure expressed his opposition in 
terms of the unprecedented imposition of a duty to 
keep the peace which was without basis in the commands 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rep. Bingham opposed the 
Sherman Amendment, but he deliberat.ely:·draft:ed ~l(now 
§ 1983) to overrule Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1834), 
which he viewed as a case where "the city had taken 
private property for public use, without compensation 
• • 0 ' 
and there was no redress for the wrong •••• " Cong. Globe 
App . 84; WJB Memorandum, pp. 33-34. See also 
Rep. Burchard: 
"But there is no duty imposed by the 
Constitution of the United States, or 
usually by State laws, upon a county to 
protect the people of that county, against 
the commission of the offenses herein 
enumerated, such as the burning of buildings 
or any other injury to property or i njury to 
person." Cong. Globe 795. 
Rep. Blair: 
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11 [H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into 
effect an obligation which rests upon 
the municipality, but to create that 
obligation, and that is the provision I 
am unable to assent to. 11 Cong Globe 795. 
Rep. Poland: 
11But I do agree that if a State shall deny 
the equal protection of the laws, or if a 
State make proper laws and have proper officers 
to enforce those laws, and somebody undertakes 
to step in and clog justice by preventing the 
State authorities from carrying out this 
constitutional provision, 1 then I do claim 
that we have the right to make such inter-
ference an offense against the United States; 
that the Constitution does empower us to aid 
in carrying out this injunction, which, by our 
Constitution, we have laid upon the States, that 
they shall afford the equal protection of 
t he laws to all their citizens." Congo Globe 514. 
"We would go as far as [the Senate conferees] 
chose to go in inflicting any punishment or 
imposing any liability upon any man who 
shall fail to do his duty in relat~on to 
the suppression of those wrongs." Congo Globe 804o 
I have exercised selectivity in setting out these fragments, 
but I believe they are representative of the views of 
the oppositionistso 
B. Stare Decisis 
I agree with the general proposition that the 
Court should be hesitant to overrule prior construction 
of statutes, but this cautionary principle may be 
overriden in appropriate circumstanceso See, ~' 
.3ontinental ToVo, Inc. Vo GTE Sylvania, !nco, 97 SoCto 
2549 (1977)o This is such a caseo 
Stare decisis cuts in both directions. On 
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the one hand, we have a series of rulings holding that 
municipalities are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983. 
These were not "cons · der ed holdings," however, because 
the only discussion of the legislative history appears 
in cases where the plaintiffs sought recovery on 
a respondeat superior theory; there was no incentive 
to present a view of the legislative evidence that 
would have precluded maintenance of their claims. The 
issues ventilated in the WJB-WHR interchange were simply 
not briefed -on any previous occasion (aside from a 
short footnote in Morris Ernst's brief for Monroe) 
On the other hand, an affirmance of CA2's 
decision requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio 
exercise of jurisdiction over school boards in a great 
number of eases. WHR aonoedes that at least two decisions 
involved claims for money damageso Cleveland Bd. of Educo 
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Community School Disto, 393 U.So 503 (1969). 
Although individual defendants were named in addition 
to the school entity in several of the decisions, the 
opinions of this Court often made explicit reference 
to the school-board party, particularly in the sections 
discussing the relief to be awarded o WHR s~::.ggests that 
some of these latter decisions may have involved independent 
school districts (Memorandum, pp. 14,16), but the force 
of this point is lost because, at a later point, he makes 
clear that every school board, even one that is simply 
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"the governing body of ·an incorporated school district 
separate from the city," is immune from § 1983 liability. 
(Memorandum, p.21). 
It should be noted that the only decision that 
will have to be squarely overruled is City of Kenosha v. 
Bruno. There, the Court determined sua sponte that there 
was no § 1983 jurisdiction to issue an injunction against 
a municipality for its own failure to hold a due process 
hearing with respect to the denial of liquor licenses. 
The municipality was held to be a non- "person" under 
§ 1983 regardless of the nature of the relief being sought. 
Obviously, no discussion of the legislative history 
bearing on the distinct proposition that Congress intended 
liability for a city's own wrongdoing was advanced in that 
case. Moreover, Kenosha's rationale will have to be 
disturbed even if CA2 is affirmed. As WJB points out, 
importation of the Ex parte Young ~pproach requires 
a "bifurcated" view of the term "person" depending on 
the nature of the relief being sought. A public official 
sued in his official capacity, concededly a "person" for 
purposes of injunctive relief, becomes a non-"person" 
in a suit for damages. WHR's opinion in Kenosha purports 
to reject such "bifurcation," but he implicitly approves 
this device here, in order to preserve the possibility of 
obtaining injunctive relief from a constitutional violation 
by state officials. 
III 
We should try to encour~ge WJB to avoid 
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overruling Monroe, but rather to restrict Monroe to its 
facts. Such a tack may soften the force of WHR's 
stare decisis attack. We should say that we have 
not had occasion previously to consider the availability 
of a § 1983 damages remedy for constitutional violations 
which are the direct result of a policy of the municipality 
or school board, rather than simply its failure to curb 
the unauthorized torts of its employees. There are 
line-drawing proble s, as WHR notes, but this case involves 
a formal; written policy of the school board; it is the 
clear case. I would also try to encourage WJB to 
recognize a defense for rights not clearly defined at the 
time of violation, cf. Procunier v. Martinez. In all 
likelihood, this maternity leave case does not involve 
such a clearly defined right. I would reserve decision 
on the question of whether there is available to a municipality 
a defense for "good-faith" violations of a clearly 
defined constitutional right. 
If Monroe is not to be reexamined, I agree 
with WHR that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between 
school boards and municipalities. 
S.E. 
~ ) 
1871. THE CONGRESSION AI.J GLOBE. 
~er the ground. It seems to me the I 
to ~~nt course for !he Government is for the 
J:f,11 ,te to reject tlns report .and have a new 
::;cut ittell of couference, and see if these 
Cb1111 ~ions ~rovisions cannot be changed. 
0 .J'·\:c pHJJ.SIDENT pro tem11ore. Will. the 
Senate 11gree to the re~ort ot th~ committee 
f conference? upon whtch questton the yeas 
0 d nays have been ordered. . 
1111 Mr MOlUtiLL, of Vermont. If that is 
~,.greed to, of course the motion which I 
110 de to insist further and ask for another 
1111\rcrence will come up. 
coMr THURMAN. Is the question on the 
·woti~n of tile Senator from California, to con· 
cur? 
'fhe PRESIDE~T :pro temptJt·e. The ques· 
tion is on concurnng 111 the report. 
The question being taken by yeas and nays, 
resulted-yeas 20, nays 20; as follows: 
YEAS-Messrs. Bayn.rd. Blair, Casserly, Clayton, 
('ole. Coov~r. Davis of Kentuckyi D1wis of West 
Vir"inia .. Hn.mtlton of M:uyland, l•tchcock, John-
110; J{elly, Lewis, Nye, Prntt, ltamsey, Robertson, 
Sauisbury~SILwyer, :Sherman, Spencer, Stevenson, 
Stockton, ·.1hurman. Vickers, and Windom-26. 
NAYS-Messrs. Ames. Boreman, Cald1vell, Cam-
eron C..rpenter, Chandler, Conkling, Corbett, Ed-
01und•. Fenton, Ferry of Michigan, Frelingbuysen, 
Hilbert, Hamilton of Texas, Hnrlan, Howe, Logl\n, 
Morrill of Vermont, Osborn, l'atterson, Pomeroy, 
Scotr.. Stew,ort, 'l'rumbull, Wilson. and Wright-26. 
ABSENT-Messrs. Anthony, llrownlo.v, lluck-
ingbn.m. Crn.gi;t; Ferry of Connecticu~. l!'lnno.gan, 
]iumlin. H11l, Kellogg, Mornll of Mo.me, Morton1 }'ool. lUcc, Schurz, i::ipraguc, Sumner, Tipton, ana 
West-18. 
So the r~port was not concurred in. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Sen· 
o.tor from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] moves that 
tlie Senate further insist on its amend menta, 
and ask for a second committee of conference. 
The motion was agreed to-ayes thirty· three, 
no~s not counted. 
By unanimous consent, the President pro 
tempore was authorized to appoint the second 
coiUmittee of conference; and Messrs. CoLE, 
ScoTT, and CoNKLIKG were appointed. 
nNAL ADJOURNMENT. 
Mr. CONKLING. I offer a resolution to 
lie on the table until I call it up: 
lleaolved bv the Senate, (the House of Representa-
til·es concurring,) That on Wednesday, the 19th pf 
April insta.nt, at -o'clock, the President of the 
Scunte and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
acutatives 1\djourn their respective Houses without 
day. 
EXECUTIVE SESSION. 
Mr. CAMERON. I move that the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of executive busi-
uess. 
Mr. THURMAN. I move that the Senate 
anjourn. 
Mr. CAMERON. I have a motion before 
the Senate. 
The PHESIDENT pro tempore. The ques· 
tion is on the motion of the tienator from Ohio, 
that the Senate adjourn. 
The motton was not agreed to. 
The PRESIDENT p1·o tempore. The ques· 
tion recurs on the motion of the Senator from 
Pennsylvania. 
The motion was agreed to; and after fifteen 
minutes spent in executive session, the doors 
were reopened, and (at eleven o'clock and fifty 
minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned. . 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
WEDNESDAY, April19, 1871. 
The House met at twelve o'clock m. Prayer 
by Rev. Dr. RANKIN!.. of Washington, D. C. 
On motion of Mr. HLAIR, of Michigan, the 
reading of the Journal of yesterday was dis· 
J Ptused with. j E:SF'ORCE11ENT OF FOURn:ENTH AMEND:UENT. V The House resumed the consideration of the 
report of the committee of conference on the 
disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the 
amendmeuts of the Senate to the bill (H. lt. 
No. 820) to enforce the provisions of the four· 
teentb amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and for 'other purposes, upon 
which Mr. KERR was entitled to the floor. 
Mr1 KEt'y Mr: Speaker, it is not my 
purpose toelain the House by any very 
lengt by discussion of this report, but L will as 
briefly as 1 can state the reasons why I was un· 
able to concur with the majority of the House 
conferees. I will not stop to refer in detail to 
the disposition made by the conference com· 
mittee of the first point of disagreement be· 
tween the two Houses. I think the action of 
the committee upon that subject was not very 
material, but that the provision ofthe bill, as 
it is now reported to the House, is really an 
improvement upon the original proposition. 
From the second disagreement of the House 
the two committees require the House to recede. 
That disagreement relates to the time wheri 
the fourth section of the bill shall cease to have 
valiuity, and my objection to the action of the 
committee is th1s, that it enables the dominant 
party in Congress, by indirection, by a trick to 
continue this obnoxious section in operation 
till the first Monday ofDecember, 1872, instead 
of suffering it to expire on the 1st day of 
June, 1872. 
This result will be accomplished by the Con· 
gress, at the time of the next regular adjourn· 
ment, say in· midsummer next, taking a recess, 
eo nomine, until a day ·named, instead of an 
adjournment without day, a recess, for exam· 
ple, till'tbe 1st day of December, so that it 
cannot be said that there has yet arrived an 
end of'' the next regular session of Congress,'' 
and therefore the courts will be expected to 
hold that this obnoxious section continues in 
force until the first Monday of December, 
1872 . . 
The object of this provision is manifestly to 
enable the rnojorit.y, the present Administra· 
tion, the Republican military candidate for 
renomination and reelection to the Presidency, 
to obtain a partisan advantage, and that, too, 
in an unworthy manner. They want the power 
this section will afford in the conduct of the 
great political campaign of 1872. '!'bey want 
to retain that power, not for the public welfare, 
but for personal and selfish, if not utterly 
unlawful, ends. I could not assent to the con· 
1tinuance of such a law a day longer than by 
possibility could not be prevented. 
The third point of disagreement relates to 
the repeal of what is called the jury test· oath, 
and the result of the action of the committee 
is that they recommend the repeal of the 
first section of that law, which establishes cer· 
tain additional causes of challenge to individ· 
ual jurors in the Federal courts, gives the 
right to any suitor in those courts to require 
the application of those objections to jurors to 
enforce the cause of challenge given in that 
section, and excludes the best of men from jury 
service. It is a great point gained, I agree, to 
secure the · repeal of that section; but why 
retain in operation the second section of that 
law? Is it less obnoxious or less objectionable 
than the first? Are its purposes any less 
vicious or proscriptive or inhuman than the pur· 
poses of the first? I submit that it is in every 
sense a. mere reenactment of the first section, 
with this qualification only, that it shall not 
be enforced except at the discretion and pleas· 
ure of the judge of the court in which the jury 
is being organized. But I call attention to this 
difference: that, while under the first sec· 
tion the objection made by a suitor in any 
one of these courts to a juror on account of 
the causes alleged in this first section is per-
sonal to the single juror to whom his objection 
is made, the objection, if made at all, under 
the second section must be made to the entire 
panel, to the venire, to all the men on the 
jury, and it purges the entire box of any cit· 
izen against whom these causes of challenge 
can be t~;.u ly alleged. It is therefore, I say, 
infinitely worse than thEI first section; more 
sweepiug in its effects in the practical adrnin· 
istration of justice, and I therefore object to 
the action of the committee. That second 
section I will read, to the end that its cruel 
and offensive character may be better under· 
stood: 
SEc. 2. And be ;e further enacted, That at each 
and ~ve~y term of nny court of the United States 
the drstn~t attor"~J' •. or other person acting for and 
on behalf of the U Dltcd Stl\tes in said court, ma)' 
move, and the court, in their di•oretion, may require 
the clerk to tender to encb and every person who 
may be summoned to serve as a grand or petit juror 
or venireman or talesman in said court the follow· 
ing oat.h or nffirmat10n, namely: "You'do solemnlY 
swear (or 1\ffirm, llS the case may be) that you will 
support the Constitution of the U oited States of 
America; thnt you hnve not, without duress and 
constraint, taken up arms, or iQined any insurreo· 
tion or rebellion against the United States; thnt 
you have not adhered to any insurrection or rebel-
lion, giving it aid and comfort: that you have not, 
directly or indirectly, given any assistance, in money 
or n.ny other thing, to any person or persons whom 
you knew, or had good ground to believe, had joined, 
or wus about to join, •o.id insurrection and rebellion, 
or bad resisted, or WI\S about to resist~. with force of 
arms. tho execution of the laws of the u nitcd States; 
and that you have not counseled or advised any 
per.on or persons to join any rebellion against, or 
to resist with force of 1\rms the laws of the United 
States." Any person or persons declining to take 
said Ol\th shall be dischnrged hy the court from 
serving on the grand or petit jury, or venire, to 
which be mo.y have been summoned. 
Contemplate for a moment the practical 
effect of tbe proscription contained in this sec· 
Lion. It is true, I verily believe, that less than 
one thousand white men in the Commonwealth · 
of Virginia., under this section if enforced by 
the court, would be competent jurors. It is 
true this day that Judge l:tives, now of one of 
the district courts of the United States in that 
State, could not sit upon a jury in any Federal 
court because his own son was a rebel soldier 
and although himself loyal, it is safe to assumJ... 
that during the war the judge, directly or indi-
rectly, gave some assistance in money or some 
oth<lr thing, or in some way, to his son. So it 
is throughout the South. It is impossible, if 
this law be enforced, to organize competent, 
trustworthy, intelligent, and respectable juries 
in the South. The jury· box. must be given up 
to the sole occupancy of ignorance, vicious· 
ness, and incompetence. Can such mean and 
wretched policy promote the public peacP., in· 
terests, or harmony? Does it not do violence 
to the better imrulses of all good and humane 
men? Does it not mock the spirit ·or mag· 
nanimit.y and decent civilization? 
But it may be said that the courts will not 
enforce this section. They may not; in many 
cases now they do not; they ought never to do 
so, and t~erefore it should be repealed at. once. 
Sincerity ~n your professions demands its imme· 
diate and unconditional repeal. 
But, sir, without taking further time in refer· - ----• 
ence to that section, I pass to the fourth cause 
of disagreement between the two Houses. It 
relates to the extraordinary section attached 
by the Senate to tlie ongmar but or the House, 
usually, and I believe properly, called the 
"Sherman section." Gentlemen remember 
what that section is as it was sent to ns by the 
Senate and non·concurred in by such an em-
phatic vote of the Honse. What it is now, I 
think I can best i.ndicate by reading it as I go 
along, breaking it into paragraphs and inter· 
spersi'ng my objections to it in that way. It 
provides-
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, build-
ing, bMn, or granary shall be unlawfully or felon-
iously demolished, pulled down, burned, or de-
stroyed, \Vholly or in part, by any persons riotou•ly 
and tumultuously assembled to11ether; or if any per-
son sho.ll unlawfully and with force and violence be 
whipped, sc'our11ed. wounded, or killed by any per-
sons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, 
with intent to deprive any person of any right con-
ferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of tho 
United States or to deter him or funish bim for 
exercising such right, or by rea~on o his race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude, in every such 
case the county, city, or parish in which any of the 
said offenses shall be committed shl\lt be liable to 
pay full compensation to the person or persons dnm-
nified by such offense, if liVID&', or to his widow or 
legal represent11tivc if dead.· 
I suggest, first, that the grammatical con· 
struction of this part~graph is such that it is 
left in extreme doubt whether the intent which 
is referred to in a su bsequeut part of the sec· 
tion is at all applicable to the first paragraph, 
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which relates to the destruction of houses, ten· 
emeuts, und other property. Let any gentle· 
man read it critically and see if the intent is 
not confined in i.ts. ap_Plicatio~ to the portion 
which relates to InJUries to the person, not the 
property. I believe that the true, legal, and 
judicial. C?n~truction will entirely exempt that 
class of InJUrieS to the property from the neces· 
sity of establishing the intent stated in the sub· 
sequent words of that I have read. The offenses 
against the property will be complete without 
proof of the intent. It is, therefore, an assump· 
tion by Congress of power to go into a State 
and punish, without such an intent, any per· 
sons who riotously or tumultuously assemble 
together and commit any of these offenses. To 
that extent, therefore, it is entirely without 
the purview of anything contained in the four· 
teenth or any other amendment to the Consti· 
tution, or in the text of the Constitution itself. 
In reference to that part of the section which 
I have read, I wish to ask the attention of the 
House to the further fact that, for the first time 
in the history of the United States, it is attempt· 
ed by a law of Congress to punish criminally 
a civil division of a State of this Union for 
crimes or wrongs against the laws of the Uni· 
ted States cqm rp~led b~ the citizenR e£ t j?e 
. United States wd m tha mumc1paf sn IVIS· 
ion of the State. It is said by gentlemen that 
this is no extraordinary kind of legislation; 
that it was enforced at the common law, and 
that it baa been enforced in many of the States 
of th\s Union, in several of the New England 
States, in the State of New York and espe· 
cially in the city of New York, and in the State 
of Pennsylvania and especially in the city of 
Philadelphia. But I assure gentlemen that 
th ey will search the codes of those States in 
vain to find any example for this bill. There 
is none. There are some enactments that give 
remote analogy for it. But they are all most 
materially different in principle, altogether 
better guarded in their provisions, and infin· 
itely less liable to abuse. There is no attem t 
a re t uni h a citiz e 
commtsswn o an or mary cnme agamst the 
person ol ht s , efr·man, \{ Erans{emng the 
ott ose wmch e as comml ed t 6 ' 
pans or c1 n 1c e rest es an co · 
1 
pelm a e 
tlie u 
made it is, I agree, somewhat common to 
require the municipal organization~ created 
by those States, which are part and parcel of 
the local machinery adopted by the State gov· 
ernmenta in the execution of their reserved 
powers, to require them to perform certain 
duties which are necessary in the police regu· 
lation1 government, and protection of society, 
and to punish them where they fail to execute 
the duties thus imposed upon them, sometimes 
by fines and penalties, to be ex acted in ways 
indicated in the laws of those States. But 
there is no example of the precise character 
involved in this bill. It is not in the cases of 
ordinary crimes, or of personal wrongs and 
injuries, such as arson, murder, larceny, as· 
sault and battery, and mayhem, that counties 
or cities of the Stales are required to answer 
for the crimes of individual citizens. Those 
offenses for which the counties and other 
municipal organizations are required to an· 
swer, are failures to keep up the public high· 
ways, failures to keep the bridges of the county 
in good repair, or failures of cities to keep their 
streets in safe condition, or failures to protect 
the people a~ainst mobs, against open, nnmer· 
oua, riotous, tumultuous uprisings of the peo· 
pie, leading to the destruction of property. 
All that is generally done upon the theory, 
a.lmost always well·founded1 that all the peo· 
pie of those respective aubdtvisions are by the 
very publicity of the manner in which these 
crimes are committed put upon notice that 
they are about to be committed, and thus it is 
made their duty to interpose every means in 
their power to prevent their commission. Dut 
in such an application there is no violation by 
the States either of fundnmental principles or 
of constitutional law. It'is the exercise by the 
State of its original police jurisdiction. The 
power it obtains from that great fountain of 
undelegated authority in the States. All power 
not conferred upon the Federal Government 
abides still in the States or the people. 
It is said that this is borrowed from the com· 
roon law of England. So it may be. But why go 
there for power under a written constitution in 
cases 1 ike these? I submit, however, that even 
there, and in tho dark and curious history of the 
common law, you will find no countenance for 
some of the provisions of this section. It is 
true that the idea of unishin a comm ity 
for offenses comm1 e y 1ts c1ttzens IS or· 
rowed from t he common I3!w; but 1t ortginated 
many centuries ago, and was the result of a 
very imperfect civilization. I am sure we are 
not to-day, and under our system of govern· 
ment, called upon to go back to those a.ges for 
guidance in the interpretation of our constitn· 
tiona\ and delegated powers. 
What was the theory upon which this policy 
was originally adopted? It was the very one 
to which I have already referred-that where 
cert.ain offenses were committed with demon· 
strations of violence, noise, and tumult, they 
attracted the a.ttention of the few inha.bitanta 
of their small subdivisions, in those days 
called "hundreds," very inconsiderable ~;~.nd 
limi,ted portions of country, almost within the 
reach of a single human voice, there being 
many "hundreds" in each county, so that the 
people were all put upon notice, and it was 
made the duty of each and every one to raise 
immediate hue and cry against the felon, and, 
if possible, to arrest him. And under the 
operation of the earliest of this class of laws, 
the chief of which was called the statute of 
Winchester, (13 Edward I, chap.1,) it was pro· 
vided that if the people of the hundred, called 
the hundreders, did thus promptly rise and 
make pursuit nnd arrest the criminal, they. 
should not be held liable for the result of his 
crime. Dut it should not be forgotten that 
in all those cases the obligation or liability of 
the inhabitants rested upon the theory that by 
reason of the public and demonstrative char· , 
acter and manner of the crime, they had sub) 
stantial notice, and therefore, as good citizens, 
it was their duty to take preventive steps at 
once. The inhabitants were, in other words, 
chargeable with guilty knowledge, as in the 
cases of the riots in New York, Philadelphia, 
and Baltimore, in 1854-55, for the outrages 
of which those cities were, under their State 
Jaws, made to pay. 
The practical effect of that system in those 
very small territorial limits was to make each 
citizen a conservator of the peace, a sort of 
bailiff, to aid the public authorities in main· 
taiuing the law within those small limits. 'l'he 
operation of the statute of Winchester, I know, 
was afterward much extended, and especially 
by the statute of 9 George I, chapter 22, 
called the " black act." 
But it must be remembered, in reference to 
this attempted application of that principle in 
our country at large, and by Congress, that 
some counties of this country are almost as large 
as the whole of that island from which we get 
our common law, and that many of our conn· 
ties are very sparsely settled ; that the people 
are engaged in agricultural employments, and 
live remote from each other; that these com-
binations of two or thre·e persons to comm1t 
cr1mes naatost one ot more or the Citizens of 
a coun mo. on~rna e an execu e w1t · 
out n poss1 1 infiaE one other human be· 
in I OW nn · 
tb \n~ a ou e m en 1 n. 
I ere 1s, tberelore, a total an i! nbsolute 
absence of nouce, COriSErucbve or Hnphed, 
Wl (U ID iby decent limitS Of law Of reason. 
And the bill itself is significantly silent ou the 
subject of notice to these counties and par· 
ishee or cities. Under this section it is not 
liabilit shall attach, ~it 
sha e <nowu a 1ere was any mtent10n to 
comtm£ these cnmes, so as to !asten uabthty 
justly upon the mu J ici_pahl.y. IE IS no t reqmred 
to be proveU"!:hartliere was any previous indi· 
cation of the purpose of these wrong-doers, or 
that there were any rioters roaming over 
the country, or thr~ugh the community, that 
could put any portiOn whatever of the people 
upon notice or even upon inquiry. It is arbi-
trarily anti defiantly assumed that they know 
it, and are, therefore, guilty. Considering 
the condition of our country, the habits and 
pursuits of the people, I say this is simply 
monstrous and 'outrageous. It punishes the 
innocent for the l)uilt_y . It EKkl!s the prop· 
erty of one a~td g1ves 1t to another by mere 
force, without right, in the absence of guilt or 
knowledge, or the possibility of either. It vio-
lates all just principles of law. It is in full 
keeping with the incurably vicious character 
of this entire measure. 
I now come to in uire is it com etent for 
the 
ffiU~Il~l~C~l ~R~~O;r ~a~n~l~Z~ar.l~O~n~S~O~~l~S~~~n~Mf.~~ 
way a a , WI or WI 10u no 1 ~e , y JU g· 
ment 1s £fiat sucli power nowhere exists~ that 
it cannot be found within the limits of the 
Constitution; that its exercise cannot be 
justified by any rational construction of that 
instrument. I bold that the constitutional 
nower of the Feaeral Government to umsh the 
Clttzens o e m e ta es or any o enses 
umsbable by. 1t at all rna be exerCised and 
ex auste agams 1e m lVI ua o en er and 
!it~r~l~rty ; but when you go one mch 1be-yon 1 t you lire comvellea, by the very 
necess1bes wliJCh surround you, to invade 
powers which a.re secured to the States, whiC h' 
are a necessary and most esseottal part of the 
autonomy of State governments, without which 
there can logically be no State government. 
For it must be remembered that if you can 
impose these penalties at all upon the coun·l 
ties, paris'fies, or e~bes, and can invade their 
treasuries or control their ministerial officers 
to any extent whatever, your power is un· 
limited, it may go to any extent you please, it 
may take the entire control of all these officer!! 
of the State governments, and thus practically 
and substantially break down those govern· 
menta, putting everything and everybody under 
the sovereign will and pleasure of the Congress 
of the United States. 
It bas been declared by Chief Justice Mar· 
shall, and never questioned by the Su1Jreme 
Court since, nod it is not susceptible of sue· 
cessful denial, that wherever Congress, in the 
exercise of any granted power, elects any 
mode of execution, or adopts any instrument· 
ality by which it will carry into execution any 
of these powers, the instrumentalities selected 
become the exclusive instruments of the Fed· 
era! Government; that the power of the Fed· 
eral Government over them is above all other 
control; that in the very nature of things there 
can be in these divisions of power no partner· 
ship. The power of the Federal Government 
must be exclusive. The power of the State 
government within its limits, and as to the 
reserved powers of the States, must be exclu· 
sivc, and in an important sense sovereign. 
Such is the declaration of the Supreme Court. 
But what becomes of all this theory under the 
practical working of this bill? 
These systems of local governiD:ent by conn· 
ties and cities are adopted by the States as 
instrumentalities to aid them in the wise and 
judicious regulation and protection of the local 
and domestic interests of . their citizens. It 
will never do to say that they may be tampered 
with, impeded, or arrested in the discharge of 
their duties, as this bill proposes. It would 
be fatal to the success and very existence of 
Jocalself·government. It has many times been 
solemnly decided by the Supreme Court that 
these ngencies adopted by the States to aid in 
local administ.ration are nbove the touch or 
control of any power, nrc subject only to the 
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su m1 a 1 JS gonP. an sacn ce er, 
and it is sacrificed by gentlemen who are pur· 
suing a myth and shadow. It is sacrificed for 
an unsubstantial and supremely insufficient 
reason. lt is to me alarming that such radi· 
cal and vicious propositions should find any 
defenders in an American Congress; 
But my colleague on this committee says 
that it is a common practice for the courts of 
the United States, in the exercise of the judi· 
cial powers granted to them in the Constitu· 
tion, to enforce the performance of judgments 
against municipalities of this kind, such as 
counties and cities. I answer him that he, as 
well as any other intelligent lawyer of this 
Honse, well knows that that pro · · is 
true to this extent onl e Federa 
c a m e exerc1se o t is grant of judicial 
powers may, where they have the jurisdiction 
under the Copstitution, compel these muni· 
cipalities to execute their contracts, and that 
is all. To execute their contracts ; but let it 
be remembered that no decree of a Federal 
court bas gone to· the extent of saying that 
any one of these divisions should execute its 
own contracts except in precise compliance 
with the law of the State, in precise accordance 
with its own contract and the law upon which 
it was based, and not in pursua e of any law 
dictated t · b Con ress n o s, 
e ex ent o JU ICia p er hitherto exercised 
in that direction has been confined to the ex· 
ecution of civil contracts, such as the payment 
of corporation and municipal bonds issued 
under State authority where the courts of 
the United States bad jurisdiction, and then 
only according to the law of the State recog· 
nizing and enforcing fully and kindly, and in 
all respects within the precise letter of the 
Constitution, the right of the State to govern 
itself, to regulate its municipal interests, · to 
say whether a county or State may subscribe 
to a railroad, may issue or put out bonds 
and securities in a particular way, bow those 
securities ml\y be made payable and their 
And in which action any of the parties commit· payment made certain . If any county or city tiog suoh acts may be joined as defendants. And any 
v~>ymentofany judgment or p~>rt thereof unsatisfied, fails to perform its obligations its contracts 
recovered by tbe plaintiff in such action may, if not (can be enforced. 
satisfied by the individual defendant therein within · Any gentleman at a glance can see that the 
two months next Mter th11 recovery of such judl!-
mont, upon execution duly issued a~:ainst sucb !nd1- courts give no ground for the assumption of 
vidual defendnnt in such judgment, nnd returned my colleague on the committee, but do very 
unsatisfied in 'Thole or in part, be enforced against fully sustain me in my position. This novel such county, city, or parish, by execution. attnch-
moot, mandamus, garnishment, or any other pro- bill finds no refuge in the courts or the Con· 
ceeding in aid of execution, or applicable to the en- stitution. It is condemned by both, as well as 
forcement of judgments ngainst municipal corpora.- b · h d h · I 
lions; and such judgment 5hall be.alien as well upon Y ng t, reason, an umamty. t may read· 
all moneys in the treasury of such county, city, or ily be seen by looking into any one of ·these 
parish, as ut on the other \fo~erty tb 'q,!Ql f. And the cases in our courts (which if I bad time I 
court in kfi QUCh ifdlidfi 1£ , on mo ton, cause ad- ld r ) d 
ditional parties to be made therein J>rior to issue wou re1er to, that the court oes in all cases 
joined, to the end that justice may be dono. And · put llo mere interpl'etation on the laws of the 
the said county. city, or pari"h may recover the full States and provide for the enforcement of 
amount of said judgment by it paid, with costs and those laws under that construction. That is interest, from any person or persons engaged as 
principal or accessory in such riot, in an action in not only true, but the court goes further and 
any court of competent jurisdiction. And such says where those contracts, or charters affect· 
county, city or parish so paying shall aloo be sub- b d 
rogo.tcd to all the plaintiff's rights under such judi:- ing municipal organizations, ave ba judicial 
mont. construction by the State court of last resort, 
I would like to ask any gentleman where, that the Supreme Court of the United States 
upon the most shadowy interpretation of the will adopt and follow it and make such con· 
Constitution, you can find power, as this bill struction its rule of action. The only departure 
Mtempts to do, to declare these judgmen~s, from it worth mention is in a case which arose 
arising in tort, arising out of wrongs and lately in Iowa, where there bad been . an un· 
crimes, not out of contract, alien on all money broken series of decisions sustaining an inter· 
in the treasury of these several mu'hicipal or· pretation of a contract, and one decision after· 
ganizations, and upon all the properly of these ward reversing those decisions; 1\nd the Su· 
organizations. If you may create such a lien, pre me Court said that it would adhere to the 
nnd it is valid, what becomes of the power of J?Olicy laid down by the long line of decisions. 
the State, through the agency of its neces· (!Wallace R., 175.) 
snry subordinate organizations to carr o Bnt that was extraordinary, and has never 
self-government at all? ow are ey o per· been done by the Supreme Court except in 
!brm t6 e1r necessary an customary funchons some extraordinary cases. It is not pretended 
1f you may send a Federal officer to put his to be done for the purpose of enabling the court 
nrms into the treasury of the county, or parish, to go one inch beyond the true interpretation 
or city in this way and withdraw therefrom of the State law and the State obligation. 
all the revenues, or if you can authorize the Now, Mr. Speaker,· I will detain the House 
~~ale of a county court· house, or county jail, but a moment lange~. I will not attempt again 
or the county schools, or any other of the prop· to discuss the general provisions of this bill. 
crty of the people? I ask you, if that can be No invective, no vigor of denunciation can 
done, where is the security that has hitherto fitly describe its abominable character. It is 
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incurable and unamendable. There is no sec· 
tion or line in it that does not deserve indig· 
nant rejection. 
J;Here the hammer fell J 
. l'he SPE_AKER pro te;npore, (Mr. HAWL&Y 
m the cha1r.) The Chair announces, as re· 
quested by the gentle~an from I.lJdiana, [Mr. 
KEim,] that twenty mmutes of his time Iiave 
expired. 
Mr. KERR. I yield five minutes to the «en· 
tleman from Kentucky, [Mr. BEcK.] ., 
Mr. B~CK. Mr. §peaker, I thank my fri end 
from Ind1ana [Mr. KERR] for the five minutes 
allowed me to cuter my protest against this 
rcp~rt. f course I will not attempt to dis· 
c 1erits of this bill-I beg pardon, it baa 
e its. ~is simply o. surrender of despotic 
o ~hority to the President by. the ~Zsrn{ti s of the people, who will, I hope, 
se! o it lh.A men who have thus betrayed the 
tr s ~o!lfiM'd to them shall have no chance to 
d o any more. But argument avails nothing. 
Denunciation such as a plain man can indulge 
in is cut off, parliamentary language being 
wholly inadequate to a full expression of its 
atrocities; nothing short of vigorous and ofi· 
repeated profanity, in which, of course, I do 
not indnlge, can do justice to the subject. · 
Still the bill, as it !ell; the House, bad some 
regard for the private rights of men under the 
despotic rule established, the most valuable 
of which have been stricken out by the con· 
ference committee. When the amendment of 
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GAitFIELD] was 
adopted by the House, requiring all.military 
office·rs who arrested citizens when the writ of 
habeas co1-pus is suspended by the President 
to turn them over to the civil courts for tria.!, 
I felt that if a fair jury trial was allowed them 
a great point was gained, as the outrages of 
the President and his officials, if the arrest 
was wrongful, could be exposed and the per· 
petrators brought to justice, or at least held 
up to public condemnation ; and when the 
amendment of the gentleman from Maine, 
[Mr. HALE,] which I took more interest in 
than all else, repealing the infamous jury law 
of July 17, 1862, was passed, I felt that the 
sting was out of the bill. The restoration of 
the second section of that law by the commit· 
tee of conference is a surrender to the more 
bitter and malignant Radicala of the Senate 
and House of all that was valuable in the 
amendmqnts which the House, b,y an over· 
whelming majority, inserted into the original 
text as a sine qua non to its passaze here. 
I regard tlre right to have an honest, upright, 
impartial, and intelligent jury as the only safe· 
guard left to individual liberty and right when 
this bill becomes a law. Strike that down as 
is done in the report, and there is nothing too 
monstrous that a venal or servile judge rna>' 
not do in obedience to the orders of the Prcs1· 
dent or those who are known or believed to 
be authorized to speak for him. I care com· · 
paratively little about the Sherman amend· \ 
ment, either in its original or modified form. 
It is too grossly and palpably unconstitutional 
to receive the sanction of ,any court that even 
a Radical President or Senate ~ght organize. 
The Supreme Court, thank God, has yet n. 
decent respect for constitutional liberty n.nd 
law, and it will dismiss 'vitb th~ contempt it 
merits the first case that comes before it seek· 
ing to enforce the judgments provided for in 
this bill, and that will be an end of the Sber· 
man amendment. Therefore, I am not afraid 
of the practical effect of that piece of narrow· 
·minded, fanatical, and malicwus· legislation; 
it overleaps itself. The old Engli~h "hue and 
cry." or any other relic of barbarism, cannot 
save it. 
Our written Constitution, its limitations and 
restrictions, were intended to put an end for· 
ever to the exercise of all aucli legislative o.nd 
judicial authority by the J!'ederal Government, 
and leave all these matters to the severo.! States 
and the people thereof. I care nothinj; o.bout 






to tl:e Committee for the District of Columbia 
when appointed. 
ENFORCEllKNT OF FOURTEENTU AMEND~IENT. 
The House resumed the consideration of 
the report of the committee of conference on 
the bill (H. R. No. 320) to enforce the pro· 
visions of the fourteenth amendment, and for 
other purpotes. 
:Mr. SHELLABARGER. I now call the 
previous question. 
The previous qnestion was seconded and the 
main question ordered. 
1'he SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. SnELI..ABA.RGER] is entitled to the floor 
for one hour to close debate. 
Mr. SHELLABARGER. I do not propose 
myself t.o occupy any portion of that hour. I 
will yield t.he first ten minutes of the hour to 
my colleague, [Mr. BrNGHA.M.] 
Mr. BINGHAM. I ask the attention ofgen· 
tlemen oft e - ouse, especially those on the 
Republican side of it, to the statement which 
I make of some facts touching this bill. I 
desire, in the first place, to say that every part 
and parcel of the bill as reported from the com· 
mittee of conference meets my entire approval, 
except the section known as the Sherman 
ameudment, or the seventh section of the bill 
as reported by the conference committee- I 
am the freer to make that remark for the rea-
son that, with the exception of thin seventh 
section as reported, the bill is substantially the 
bill that received the vote of every Republican 
member of this House .. 
They voted also upon the seventh ~eclion 
now repor~ed by the conference committee not 
without due consideration. The priuciple in-
volved in that section was printed and before 
this House for a month before we received this 
measure from the Senate. ' The learned special 
committee of the House ignored it, and would 
have nothing to do with it, for manifest and 
good reasons to them appearing. They re· 
ported a bill without that section; the House 
never enter·taiued it, but proceeded to pass the 
bill as it is now substantially, without that sec· 
tion, by the vote of every H.epublican in the 
House. I stand for the bill to · day as it passed 
the House originally. I stand for it with the 
exception of the Sherman amendment, as it is 
called, in the form in. which it is reported; for 
it is substantially in law and in fact the very 
bill which received the vote of every Repub· 
lican member of the House, my own included. 
Something was due to the judgment of the 
House, under the circumstances, on the part 
of the Senate. But in utter disregard of the 
recorded judgment of the House, with full 
knowledge of the fact that the very proposi· 
tion they tender us had been presented to the 
consideration of the House for months, but 
had not been considered even by our commit-
tee, much less reported by it, and had not been 
accepted by the House, but the bill passed 
without it, the Senate ought to have consid-
ered before they undertook to throw that amend-
ment in upon us by a vote of -Eome thirty or 
thirty· two votes in the Senate against the votes 
of some one hundred and forty or more in the 
House who supported this bill without that 
amendment. A decent respect to the judgment 
of this Honse re9.uired some consideration. 
But this provisiOn was sent to ns attached to 
our bill; and what took place? The House 
rPjected it subs.tantially as it comes back to us 
lo·day; there being, on a division-118 votes 
against it, and only 25 in its favor. The yeas 
and nays were then called; and 132 votes (at 
leastsevent.y of them cast by Republicans) were 
recorded against this sectiou, and only 35 votes 
in its favor. The bill went back to the Senate, 
who insisted upon the amendment. I now ask 
the House to reject. this report for reasons 
which must be obvious to the mind of the 
House; and 1 hope that the vote of every 
"Republican will be cast against it. It is use-
less aud worse than useless to vote down this 
----· ... 
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important mea81:.re with any doubtful voice. laws of the several States of this Union with-
Let the House record its vote emphatically out_ the corpor.ate organization of counties or 
for the rights of all the p_eople of every State panshes thermo than there can be a United 
and all the States in the Union. States under the Constitution of the United 
Gehtlemen talk about finding precedents in States without organized States· because the 
the legislation of the States. With 11.1! respect, counties in the. several States are 'integral parts 
I deny it. My learned and accomplished· col- of the States, JUSt as the States of tl!e Union 
league fl\lr. SaELLA.BA.RGER] has referred this are integral parts of the nation. If you destroy 
morning to the decision pronounced in the either you destroy the whole fabric. 
State of New York by Judge Denio, than So it comes to be written in the Constitution 
whom none of the recent judges of that State that-
was superior in all the attainments of a jurist; .. Tho United States shall guarnnty to every State 
but that decision, instead of supporting an·y in this Union a republican form of government and 
. d shall protect each of them n~;ainst invasion" • • 
such legislation as this, m its very text an • • •· and domestic violence." 
philosophy condemns it. Let gentlemen read Instead of protecting the States against 
that decision. It is on a case against the city domestic violence, instead of guarantying to 
of New York, a local corporation of the State, them a republican form of government, we 
and involves the exercise of the supreme au.\ have introduced here for the first time in the 
thoritv reserved to the States themselves by history of the nation a proposition to takp it 
the express letter of the Constitution of the im ossible to maintain a re ublican orm of 
United States. There will be found under- govern men m any a e e 010n i!.,U 
lying this decision the declaration that the only hap~ens to be tile pleasure of a mob, bzt{'ot 
power to charge a municipality of a State for of t11ree or more persons, to take lrfe au urn 
the destruction of property by a mob arises property m the several counties of the several 
from the laws of the State; that it rests on States. Why, sir? Because it is provided in 
the positive statute of the State. this Senate amendment that "ud ment may 
In the case of Darlington vs. The Mayor, &c., be obtained a ainst a coun riOt-
of New York, (vol. 31, page 187,) referred to ~o t e extent o t e amages the jury 1n a 
by my colleague, [Mr. SaELLADA.UGER,] Judge V nlted States cour · 
Denio said: rio the lve 'very body knows an hon-
.. The act [of the Legi•lature of the State] pro- est jury m sue a case, when the rioters are 
J>oses to subject tl!e people of theseverallocal divis· · 1 d d · h h d · 
ions of the State, consisting of counties and cities, Imp ea e Wit t e county an an mnocent 
to thepaymentofdamnges to property in consequence person is slain in the sr.reet, will find, and no 
of any riot or mob within the county or city." rna~ can find fault with them, damages per-
Where, sir, is the law of the State to make haps to the extent of fifty or one hundred 
a whole county responsible for the killing of thonsand dollars. The count,r is to be held 
a man by three persons engaged in a riot liable with the riolers1 and arr money m its 
tnmnltuously assembled? treasury and ali lis property charged with the 
Mr. BUTLER, of Massachusetts. Will the payment thereof. Such a proceeding would 
gentleman allow me to ask him a question? deprive the coun.t! ,of t~ means of ad min it. 
Mr. BINGHAM. I have only a few min- J.ering justice. vv~((, M"er;to l f• -t 
utes; otht>rwise I w; hid yield with pleasure. 'li"'-I~I'!'I'P. the hammer fell.] 
The provision of this ~ection is: Mr. SHELLABARGEH. I now yield to the 
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop. build- geutleman from Illinois, [Mr. FARNSWORTH.] 
ing. barn. or granary shall be unlawfully or felon- l!.r· FARNSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I can-
iously demolished. pulled down. burned. or de- not gi ve my a.ssen£ to the report of the con-
strayed. wholly or in part, by any persons riotously 
and tumultuously assembled together; or if any per- fereuce committee. I dislike what they have 
son shall unlawfully and with force and violence be done, especially in two reapects. Why, sir, the 
whipped, scourged. wounded. or killed by any per- . 1 h" b 1 d d h" h · 
sons riotously and tumultuously assembled together. aw w IC we roe pea e ' an w IC requ1res 
with intent to deprive any person of any right con- jurors to take an oath substantially like the 
ferred u~on him by the Constit.ution and laws of the test· oath, would prevent any man sitting•on a 
United States, or to deter him or funish him for · h 11 l"fi d h b exercising such right. or by reason o his race, color. JUry, no matter ow we qua 1 e e may e 
or previous condition of servitnde, in every such in other respects, and no ma>tter how well qual-
case the county.city. or pariRh in which any of the ified his heart may be also, to do justice. The 
said offen~es shall be committed shalt be liable to man may .be relieved of disabilities, in pursu-
Pil.Y full compensntion to the person or persons dam-
nified by such offense. if living. or to his widow or ance of the fourteenth amendment to the Con-
legal representatives if dead.! stitution by Congress, yet he cannot take that 
I want to know where is the authority for oath as a juror. He may be ever so good a· 
making a State corporation, an integral part friend of the colored man who brings sdit, but 
of the ~'!tate, o. county, responsible in a court if he cannot take that oath he cannot sit on 
of the United States for damages wjthout Emit the jury. It seems to me to be wiser to leave 
for the destruction of the life of a citizen by it to the courts in the impanneling of the jury 
\ riOt? Tbat IS. my q uesbon. lo determine whether the juror is liable to chal-
--rhe gentleman trom :Massachusetts [Mr. lenge for cause·, or to the parties to challenge 
BuTLER] referred to what is known as the peremptorily. The courts will see to it that 
force bill, passed under the administration the rights of all parties are taken care of. 
of President .Jackson. With all respect I sub- I do ·uot think, either, that the seventh, or 
mit to the House and to the country that legis· Sherman section, has been improved by the 
lation does not touch the question involved conference committee. 
here all. The provision in that case was 1 anticipated some such work as this when 
simply as to the mode of collecting the reve· I insisted on having the yeas and nays ot;~ that 
nues of the United States and enforcing tbe section, when we voted \.'POll it and rejected i\ 
laws for that purpose a~ainst all persons and in this House. I expected there would be some 
the process of States. rhe decision to which sort of modification, and it would he sP.nt back· 
I have referred, and the same cited by my to us, and therefore I desired that the members' 
colleague, [Mr. SBELLADARGER,] condemns in of the House should be on the record, "a.r" 
toto such legislation as is proposed in the and "no," that the Senate and the couni.ry 
Senate amendment, and shows that a county, might see it. 
being the creature of the State and an mtegral What have we now presented to us for our· 
part oltt, can m no case be made res onsiblc action? We have a section which authorizes• 
for vi I · e save orce o e suits to be 6rou t a a111st count1 
law te creattn 1t. in ever: case o estruct10n o property or jo-
r. pAa er, ow can tates exist, how can jury otthe person by two or more persons in 
you enforce the provisions of the Constitution a riOtous or tumultuous manner, when 1t i1 
of the United States as to States, if you will done 111 derogatiOn of the exercrse of some con-
not maintain the corporate organizations of stitu~ional right of the person, or done on ac· 
the several counties of States"/ There can no count of color, or race, or previous condition 







" if a Chinaman should be mobbed. by 
.c or four mmers m Cahfornia or ~~vfda 
• account of bemg a Cfi1naman li ·may 
6 "1e t 1e cou11 y m m e aLes cour d 
re~over . , a e anot er case. of 
11 man mohted in lllinois on accc:iu t ace 
or co or, suppose a co ore an a · ite per· 
8011 et in 11rnel! and some of:. the oun men · 
of 1. e VI age ge · up a c arwan; not or the 
purpose of preventing any right to• vote, but 
bec11use of color, then the person claiming that 
he js injur.z2 may sue tfie county and recover 
damages. · 
The Suoreme Court of the United States has 
decided repeatedly that Congress can impose 
uo duty on a State officer. We can impose no 
duly 011 a sheriff or any other offic~rof a county 
or city. We cannot reQuire tbe she·riff to re!\d 
the riot act or call out lhe osse comitatus or 
per orm any o er ac or ut.y. or can on· 
gress confer any power or impose any duty 
upon the county or ci~y. Can we then impose 
on a county or other State municipality lia-
bility where we cannot require a dot ? Ithi 
not up pose a JU gme we un er t is 
ect.ion, a11d no property can be found to l~vy 
upon except the court· house, can we levy on 
the court· house and sell it? So this section 
provides, a11d that too in an action of tort, in 
un action ex delicto, where the county has 
never e11tered into any contract, where the 
State has never authorized the county to as-
sume at:y liability of the sort or imposed any 
liu.bility upon it. It is in m o inion sim ly 
absurd. n 1 you can o t 1s, J r. pea e , 
1 011 ress can thus regulate \be affairs of a 
county in a State, and put the hand of the 
national Goverument into its treasury, I know 
not where or to what lengths we may not go, 
even to the abolishing of counties and States. 
[Here the l:.ammer fell.) 
.Mr. SHELLABARGElt. I yield fifteen 
minutes to the gentleman from New York, 
[Mr. SMITH.) 
Mr. t:>MlTJI, of New York. I do not think 
that the construction whicl! has been put upon 
tbis act by the gentleman who has just spoken 
is a correct and legitimate construction. A 
court· house is not the property of the county 
within the meaning of this act. ft is held in 
trust for a public use. There is certain prop· 
erty within most of the counties of a State 
which is held by the county and would be sub· 
ject to levy and sale; for instance, in the city 
of New York there is cert11in real estate, &c., 
that is the property of the cit_y, which is not 
held and devoted to any specific use. And 
that sort of property would be liable to be sold 
· upon execution under the provisions of this 
act. There is a legal maxim that an act shall 
be so construed that it will stand and not full, 
and this, it seems to me, will relieve it of the 
difficulty which bas been suggested by the gen· 
tleman who has just spol<en. 
Now, sir, the objects sought by this act are 
all-important. This House bas passed itsjudg· 
ment upon that question. Certuin portions of 
this bill have been subjected to criticism by 
gentlemen on the other side of the House, on 
the alleged ground of their putting. doubtful 
powers into the hands of the President. It is 
objected by our friends upon the opposite side 
of the House that the citizens of the South are 
to be protected by military power. We have 
placed the power of redress in tb_e civil courts. 
And 1 submit to the gentlemen upon the oppo· 
site side of the House who object to our assum· 
in!t miiitary powers that, when we refer the 
inJured parties to the civil courts, they ought 
t? aid us, instead of objecting to the remedy 
which-is provided in this last proposed amend· 
meut as it bas come from the Senate. 
It is inquired where we get this power. Mr. 
Speaker, 1 desire to ask gentlemen upon this 
Bide of the House who voted for this bill if 
tbey have not declared by their votes for the 
bill that Congress has the power to suppress 
these alleged outrages in the South, that Con· 
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gress hn..s the power to . make tl:e perpetrators 
liable to a civil action for dambges. Now, sir, 
if Congress has that power-l.he power under 
the Constitution to suppress these outrages-
! submit that Congress has the incidental 
power to adopt any means which will be con· 
ducive to the end desired to be _gained, to wit, 
the suppression of these outnges. And the 
question is, whether this amendment, making 
tbe county or the parish liable for damages 
occasioned by a tumultuous assemblage, is 
legislation appropriate to the end desired to 
be attained. Then, sir, if in the decision of 
this House, in the passage of ihis bill before it 
went to the Senate, the question is foreclosed 
that Congres8 has the power ;o suppress these 
outrages, it has the power to adopt any appro· 
priate legislation to suppress them. 
Then, sir, the question remains whether 
there is any consti1utional inhibition against 
the exercise of this power provided in the 
amendment which we are discussing. If there 
be any-and the gentlemen opon the opposite 
side of the House have not pointed it out-it · 
must be that cl1mse of the Constitution which 
prohibits the taking of property without due pro-
cess of law, or that clause of the Constitution 
which prohibits the taking of private properlY. 
for public use withoutjustco111pensation. Now, 
sir, it has been adjudicated over and over again, 
in the State cou1·ts aud in the courts of ~ng · 
land, that the makinf of a county or a parish 
liable for damages caused by tumultuous asseru· 
blages is not, in our country, a violation of 
these constitutional provisions, and is no vio-
lation of the provisions of Magna Charta in the 
old country. 
I desire to call the attention of the House 
to the provisions of the act in the State of New 
York which have been subjected to the most 
rigorous criticism and examination in our 
courts of justice. The language of the act is 
as follows: 
Whenever any building or other real or personal 
property shoJI be destroyed or injured in conse-
quence of nny mob ur riot the city or county in 
wbicb such property is •ituated shalt be li:>ble to an 
action. by or in behn.lf of the party whose property 
wus thus destroyed oricjured, for damages sustained 
by reason thereof." 
Now, ·I call the attention of the distin· 
~:;uished gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Po-
LAND] and of the gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. KERR] to the fact that in this act of the 
Legislature of New York there is no provision 
that proceedings shall befirsl instituted against 
the parties doing the damage, and this act has 
been tested through to the court "Of last resort 
in our State, and has been adjudged to be 
valid and constitutional by the most _!ljstin· 
guisbed judges of our State. The acts of .the 
British Parliament, contrary to what I under· 
stood to be the sUJ.tement of the gentleman 
from Indiana, do not require that proceedings 
shall first be had against the parties wbo were 
the principals in the commission of the dam· 
age for which redress is songht. 
Now, sir, it bas been decided in my own 
State, in a case to which reference has · been 
made, that the power of the Legislature of 
the State to make a county of the State, or a 
parish, responsible-for damages occasioned by 
tumultuous assemblaglls does not make the 
county, parish, or city liable for the damages. 
done by an individual, as stated by the gen· 
tleman from Indiana. The damage must be 
done by a riotous or tumultuous assemblage. 
The courts of our State put the legislative 
right to charge these damages upou a county 
or city upon the taxation power of the Legis· 
lature. Now, if the Legislature has power to 
tax, then the Congress of the United States, 
under the principle which is stated in the 
decision in 3 Dallas, in the case of Hilton vs. 
The United States, has a power commensurate 
with the State power of tuxation. The court 
say in that case: 
•• The great object of the. Constitution was to give 
Congress the power to ht.y tax adequate to the e:ri· 
_genoies of the Government, but they were to observe 
two rules in imposin11: it. nn.n.~ly. the rule of uni-
forr.,ity. when they laid duties. impo•U!. or excises, 
nnd the rule of apportionment n.ccorilinll: tn the cen-
sus >Vhen they ln.id any direct tn.x. If thoro nre any 
other species of tf\xation that n.re nnt direct and not 
included in the,wnrds "duties, imposts. nr excises.' 
tboy may be lmd by the rule of uniformity or num-
bers. as Con~rress.slmll think proper nnd reasonJLble. 
If the fr>t.mers o! the Constitution did not contem• 
plate other ta.x~s thJLn direct tuxes. nod duties, 
HDf!OSts. an!l exm•es. there wns great innccurucy in 
thc1r l:>ngunge.. If those four species of tu.xes were 
nlt tbat were mtended, the genern.l power to lay 
taxes was unnecessary.'' · 
Now, sir, is it not the well settled law that 
the C~ngreRs ~f ~he U uited St~tes may lay 
taxes 111 the D1str1ct of Columbia which are 
not laiJ upon the Union at large? And, under 
this power of taxation, where it will be con· 
ducive to promote the general object of the 
law, to preserve the peace in the different 
localities in the Union, they have the same · 
power, which is assumed in the amendment 
which is now pending before the House, tolay 
a tax or provide for the entry of a judgment 
against the locality where the offense is com· 
mitted for which redress is sought. · 
Mr. FARNSWORTH. May I ask the gen· 
tleman a question? 
Mr. S~llTH, of New York. Certainly. 
Mr. FARNSWORTH. Do I understand 
the gentleman to claim that the power of Con· 
gress to levy taxes is only to be governed by 
the opinion of the Congress that passes the 
measure? 
.Mr. SMITH, of New York. I nm glad the 
gentleman has asked me that question. 
Mr. FARNSWORTH. Is that so? I want 
to know . 
.r.fi:. SMITH, of New York. I say this: thM 
there is no limit.ation or restriction, either on 
the taxin:_ ~ wer of a State or on the taxing 
power of the General Government. I hold in 
my band a decision of the court of last resort 
in the State of New York, made by a Demo· 
cratic jnd.e;e of high distinction, stating and 
holding that ground unqualifiedly. The right 
of eminent domain is restricted; there must be 
compensation i the power of taxation is utterly 
unrestricted, and there is no redress except by 
an appeal to the L egislature, where the power 
resides to levy those taxes. And it was decided 
in this case (in 3 Dallas) that taxes need not be 
uniform unless they come within the definition 
either of direct taxes or of imposts, duties, or 
excises. Those taxes which are levied here in 
the city of Washington, the taxes ·which are 
levied upon property upon Pennsylvania ave· 
nue, to pay for the improvement of the street, 
for the laying of pavements, are not uniform; . 
that is, they are not levied outside the District 
of Columbia. So, sir, when it is decided, a~ 
it hns been settled by the entire policy of the 
acts of Parliament from the time of Canute 
down to the time of Edward I, and from that 
tune to the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth 
years of tbe reign of Elizabeth, and down to · 
the present day, and also in the several States 
of the Union, that the public policy requires, 
at least justifies, the assessment upon the local· 
ity where tbe crime is commmed of the dam· 
age! occasioned by a tumultuous assembluge, 
without any proceedings against the principal, 
1 do not see the objection which is urged. 
[Here the ham mer felL 1 
!llr.liOAR addressed the House in remarks 
which he has withheld for revision • 
Mr. SHELLABARGER. I now yield the 
remainder of my time to my colleague. 
.Mr. PERRY, of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I find 
myself entertaining opinions concerning this 
bill which vary from the opinions of other 
gentlemen upon this floor, with whom, when 
compelled to differ, I always differ with diffi· 
dence and hesitation. It appears to me that 
many of the objections to this bill as origin· 
ally framed, and many of the objections to it 
as it now stands, are treated as unconstitu· 
tional objections, when in fact they are objec· 
tions of expediency alone. 
When the original bill was presented in thit 
I 4. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher Date: February 3, 1978 
Re: 75-1914, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services 
Forgive me for writing another memo in this 
case. The issue is an important one, and there is one 
point which did not receive adequate treatment in my 
previous effortso 
WHR places considerable emphasis on a presumed 
legislative intent, as of 1871, to protect municipal 
treasuries. It is important to note that the prior 
decisions of this Court have not identified that purpose 
as a principal reason for the rejection of the Sherman 
Amendment. It was thought by the Court in Monroe 
and its progeny that the 1871 Congress doubted it had 
constitutional power to impose civil obligations on 
municipalities. As I pointed out in my earlier memo, 
this is an overstatement. The opponents of the Sherman 
Amendment were troubled by the prospect of imposing 
a duty not derived from the Constitution on state and 
local governments, rather than by the prospect of 
attaching liabilityfornoncompliance with an acknowledged 
constitutional obligation. Repo Bingham drafted both 
the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1 of the 1871 Act with 
Barron v. Baltimore in mind, which suggests that he 
was willing to hold municipalities liable for takings 
of property without just compensation (Chief Justice 
Marshall held that the Fifth Amendment did not reach 
state and local governments)o But he opposed the 
-2-
Sherman Amendment because that proposal threatened 
an interference with state power ~tot au t horized by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Adhering closely to Monroe's understanding 
of the legis lative history, the Court has declined 
to recognize § 1983 jurisdiction even where a raid 
on the municipal treasury, not authorized by local law, 
would not result. Thus, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 
Justice Douglas, in dissent, urged that permitting 
a damages action under § 1988 would not be inconsistent 
with § 1983, where state law recognized liability in 
damages for the conduct in questionc The Court, per TM, 
declined this invitation, however, noting that "the root 
of the [Sherman] proposal's difficulties stemmed from 
serious legislative concern as to Congress 1 constitut .i.onal 
power to impose liability on political subdivisions of 
the States." 411 U c S"' at 708. 
My thesis is best illustrated by WHR's opinion 
in City of Kenosha v. Brunoc Raising the jurisdictional 
question on its own motion, the Court held that a 
municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief, 
even though no monetary recovery was soughtc Justice 
Douglas' dissent again urged that "the legislative history 
on which [Monroe's] construction of 'person' as used 
<' 
in 42 UcScCo §1983 was based related to the fear of 
mulcting municipalities with damage awards for 
unauthorized acts of its police officers." 412 U c S c, at 
516. The holding in Kenosha stands as a rejection of that 
-3-
view of the legislative ' intent. A municipality was 
simply not a "person" because the 1871 Congress thought 
it could not reach such entiti es. The question arise s 
why protection of the municipal fisc is now viewed as the 
dominant reason for rejection of the Sherman Amendment, 
when a suit seeking redress from authorized conduct is 
brought against a public official sued in his official 
capacity, whom all, including WHR, concede to be a 11 f")erson" 
under the Act . 
* * * 
My "bottom line" is that the prior decisions 
in this area do not require application of the usual 
stare decisis principle. There is no clear, coherent 
strand of authority which Congress can be said to 
have acquiesced to by its inaction . What ever the 
Court does will work an alteration of prior precedent. 
Why not decide the case on an accurate reading of 
the legislative history, rather than perpetuate the 
misconception of funroe2 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
Dear Bill: 
".:"./ 
~u:pt"tmt Qfourt of tlrt ~tb .§tattg 
Jfag!pnghm. ~. Q1. 2!lc?Jt..;t 
February 13, 1978 
I 
Re: 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social - Services 
of the City of New York 
My absence from Washington attending a series 
of Judicial Conference committee meetings has prevented 
me from acting on your memorandum in this case. 
I have now read it, and I am in general 
agreement with the position you express and would be 
prepared to join an opinion along those lines. 
Regards, 
WEB 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
.-----. 
rJ .sert--r-
1 ? ' 
lfp/ss 2/20/78 
No. 75-1914 Monell v. Depart of Social Services 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have now had an opportunity to review carefully 
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills", (\id"B and UIIR)~ 
~'~ Both are impressive and persuasive memos. A tither could 
form the basis of a principled decision, i'ilol\e t!hi!! reageion . 
f'M' ,<.c .. ~ 44 
~ieatgs HRY I have found the case ee troublesome. 
" 
In any 
event, being satisfied that further delay will not make~ 
~ 
decision any easier, I will now firm up the tentative~to 
reverse that I expressed at Conference. 
I add the following observations. As to the 
legislative history debate, I am persuaded that Bill 
Douglas' reading of i ti in Monroe was wrong. Bill 
Rehnquist' s memorandum ma kes a s t r onger argument in favor 
~t,.+.o" -oP +"'c S\1~hll·ll\ A~evttlw. 
of Monroe ' s · t I am persuaded that congressional 
concern was centered on the inequity of imposing liability 
fhe. D~tS7.S -of 
on local units of government on A respondeat 
some other principle of vicarious liability. 
)~ke.k~ 
superior or 
J~( ~ c p;e, '"'for-A 
~ ,..seemf 
~d-
form the basis of a principled decision, ~e ~hi~ F&ageion . 
J'fllttil ,(, CtM ~ 1./..( 
.l.aQieatge \lAY I have found the case eoe troublesome. In any , 
" 
event, being satisfied that further delay will not make~ 
~ 
decision any easier, I will now firm up the tentative~to 
reverse that I expressed at Conference. 
I add the following observations. As to the 
legislative history debate, I am persuaded that Bill 
Douglas' reading of i t / in Monroe was wrong. Bill 
Rehnquist' s memorandum ma kes a s t r onger argument in favor 
~t-.h-o~ -oP .f'L,( Sh~•'tlt A~e..J,._.e .. H r-
of Monroe ' s .S;istmn t I am persuaded that congressional 
concern was centered on the inequity of imposing liability 
fhe. b/\S75 -of 
on local units of government on A respondeat superior or 
1~ -t J c ~ ,,.f"A 
some other principle of vicarious liabilit Aseemf 
)~~a-v~ 
reasonably clear . .-My priAeip!t'>~ doubt .was~ether the word 
"person" was intended to include inanimate bodies. Its use 
hardly would seem 
tc ~ . 1 d .(<... way e n 1nc u ~
A 
~ 
municipalities or similar entities. Yet, I suppose ~s 
"" 




Moreover, doubts about congressional power expressed 
in the debates related to the attempted imposition of 
' ' 
e pffi~C'l' not dttty te SY.lSB private la:s;~leSS!lSSS '\~hies '\i'8:S 
deemed not ~low- :El!'em t'Ae eemmend~ o£ -the 
~ 
an extra-constitutional duty to curb private lawflessness, 
I "---' 
not from f~em eae pePee~tien a perception that 
municipalities were be~,e~e beyond the reach of &9QS~essioaer 
p tbQ~ legislative authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
' 
respect to the word "persorVr".l There is the so-called 
"Dictionary Ac;;" passed a month before the Civil Rights 
bill was introduced, that indicates a congressional • "If t( b .c. ~ p pi.~ 
understanding that "the word 'person' may 
&f ~A 4 c-o r~ ,,.f<:.. • 
Moreover, I was painfully reminded 
~ 
only a few weeks ag majority of my Brothers 'HI · !If' 
that the same word, used by the s ame Senator (Sherman), in 
included foreign governmen~ as well as municipalitiesJ ~ 
AA;J/.. J ~ ~:tz I 
With me, policy considerations weigh more heavily 
A 
trying to read meaning into ambiguous speeches by 
' 
or speculating whether the word "person" embraces 
the universe. Everyone agrees that §1983 authorizes suits 
against officials of governmental units both in their 
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against officials of governmental units both in their 
official and individual capacities. If one assumes that 
the municipality ~for examp~ will invariably indemnify an 
authority, it does not really matter which way one goes on 
this argument. The municipality pays in either event·) On 
indemnify 
...------..____ 
tl1 other hand, does not 
an of 'cial who 
authority this is a default that 
a matter of fair there should be indemnification, and a 
unit of local govern ent that fails to afford this 
f l 
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1¥n add ieisaa:l esnO! hie!'at:iea iO! ~hat: 
affirmance of thhe Second Circuit's decision means 
that § 1983 does not authorize compensatory relief 
for the actions of local government units bearing a 
direct responsibility for a constitutional violation. 
This is ~ true even though such actions are fully 
~ 
consistent with, indeed mandat ted by state law, and ....... 
individual suits against public officials are likely 
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/ protection is unlikely to attract and retain competent 
/ 
officers, board members and employees. 
. , r as 12 as; d 
In additon we have enshrined the fiction that 
allows mandatory injunctions in §1983 acti,_ons i <;I.. h 1 t/1 1-! V' 
v. Bv-1)./. '~1 ( q 1 s I C·h J 1 '-f 1 ( t 1? i ) J 
at the same time that we proscribe recovery of 
damages.-{7~ ~eY~ ~n this aspect of the matter before us, 
1 - ~J--.kk•··r 
I must say that I would find it difficult to justify ~e~ 
A 
(/")~C..,# 
dist~nctions <M!l 15e!Jeel 8PI. eitherJ expediency or principle. 
truth probably is that the local governments already 
bear the financial burden of 1983 suits, whether for 
a......,..~........., 
, damages .-.-. injunctive relief. Bill Rehnquist does make an 
A 
arguable point when he suggests that juries may be more 
likely to escalate damages if a local government itself is 
named as a defendant. I am not sure, however, that the 
average juror would view his or her local government or 
school board in the same light that jurors view insurance 
~ 
companies ~ railroads. After all, most jurors are 
taxpayers. <•"s~+ - P· 3 > 
This brings me to what I suppose is the most 
" 
probably is that the local governments already 
bear the financial burden of 1983 suits, wheeher for. 
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• damages .-... injunctive relief. Bill Rehnquist does make an 
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---- arguable point when he suggests that juries may be more 
likely to escalate damages if a local government itself is 
named as a defendant. I am not sure, however, that the 
average juror would view his or her local government or 
school board in the same light that jurors view insurance 
~ 
companies~ railroads. After all, most jurors are 
taxpayers. - P· 3 > 
This brings me to what I suppose is the most 
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case: its effect 
on the doctrine of stare~decisis. But considerations of 
~ 
stareMdecisis cut in both directions. n the one hand, we 
have a series of rulings holding that municipalities and 
counties are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983. In the 
k · i 
I I 
manner that characterizes many of our § 
1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 u.s. 160, 186* 
0~ 
wM.IAt'\tCAr ~.fd1 (1976), we have answered a question that was never briefed 
~"" v l \) l ~ h Q )\ -
0 .f. -.t\ or argued in this Court. The claim in Monroe was that the 
~' .J t \ i"'t..J ~ ..s 
~~~ q City of Chicago should be held "liable for acts of its 
&Ap)o e ~J 
police officers, by virtue of respondea t111~mper ior," Brief 
0 , T· 11 ' 0 I IJ '() . 3 ' p. 
namely, a warrantless, early morning 
raid and ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although 
Morris Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a 
footnote reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no 
incentive to present a view of the legislative history that 
would have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat 
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), 
Ye levA~+ ..SlAbs+~r,i.~t f 
the only other r~l~~ftt case presenting a iscussion of the 
legislative history of S 1983, petitioners assert~ 
A.. i 
mwfllll' sr, did not challenge "the holding in Monroe 
conce rning the status under § 1983 of public entities such 
raid and ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although. 
Morris Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a , 
footnote reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no 
incentive to present a view of the legislative history that 
would have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat 
In Moor 
Ye fev~e~+ 
the only other r~le jfftt case presenting a 
legislative history of § 1983, petitioners assert~ 
i 
m•"• sf; did not challenge "the holding in Monroe 
conce rning the status under § 1983 of public entities such 
1 
U.S. 507 (1973), did the Court confront a § 1983 claim 
,!) 
based on conduct that was both authorized under state law 
and directly -- rather than vicariously responsible for 
the claimed constitutional injury. But in Kenosha we 
raised the jurisdictional question on our own initiative. 
Thus, the issues identified in the scholarly exchange 
between Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not 
been ventilated on any previous occasion. 
On the other hand, affirmance in this case 
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise 
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases. 
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these 
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 632 (1974): Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 u.s. 632 (1974): 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969): also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 u.s. 441 
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in 
these cases because of the joinder of individual public 
officials as codefendants. B.u, the opinions of this Court 
.- _ - - - - - .L- .L'-- --t.--.- ...... 1 -h"~ .... ~ n:~~rr,, _ 
5. 
On the other hand, affirmance in this case 
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise · 
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases. 
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these 
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 632 (1974); Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 u.s. 632 (1974); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
u.s. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in 
these cases because of the joinder of individual public 
officials as codefendants. Buf'the opinions of this Court 
often made explicit reference to the school-board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, 
see, ~, Milliken v. Bradley, 97 s.ct. 2749 (1977). And 
Congress has focused specifically on this Court's 
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise of 
I 
§ 1983 jurisdiction over school boards, even if not "' .... .,_ 
premised on considered holdings, Ahas been longstanding. 
Indeed, it predated Monro~ . whieh did Re~ cite the theR 
f'ecent scho~es :-
In my view, the only decision that we would 
overrul~ s Kenosha. I would simply limit Monroe and Moor 
to their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability 
for the tortious conduct of individual officials that was 
6. 
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed 
A was violative of~state or local law, is consistent with the 
..) 
42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an 
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
I would think that the rationale of Kenosha will 
have to be disturbed in some fashion, whichever course the 
Court adopts in this case. Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's 
view would require, if I understand him correctly, 
"bifurcated application [of §1983] to municipal 
corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought 
against them." 412 u.s., at 513. A public official sued in 
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed 
A was violative of~state or local law, is consistent with the 
.) 
42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an 
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
I would think that the rationale of Kenosha will 
have to be disturbed in some fashion, whichever course the 
Court adopts in this case. Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's 
view would require, if I understand him correctly, a 
~? "{""ll\ 1o,.,~ 
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"bifurcated application [of §1983] to municipal 
corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought 
against them." 412 u.s., at 513. A public official sued in 
his official capacity, concededly a "person" for purposes 




that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment out of a 
desire to protect municipal treasuries. Kenosha held that 
a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief 
~ 
under § 1983 even though no monetary •&aa:a•y was sought, 
for a municipality was simply not a "person." The question 
arises why protection of the municipal fisc is now viewed 
as the dominant reason for rejection of the Sherman 
Amendment, when a suit seeking redress from authorized 
conduct is brought against a defendant who is conceded to 
be a "person" under the Act. 
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this 
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis 
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of 
precedents. Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in 
principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize. 
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with 
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects: 
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts, 
rather than overruled. The Court simply could say that we 
conduct is brought against a defendant who is conceded to 
be a "person" under the Act. 
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this 
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis 
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of 
precedents. Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in 
principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize. 
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with 
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects: 
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts, 
rather than overruled. The Court simply could say that we 
have had no occasion previously to consider the 
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional 
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision 
by the government entity, rather than simply its failure to 





Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) (discussi ng ~ Swann and 
Bro~ There are substantial line-drawing problems, as Bill 
Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal, written 
policy of the municipal department and school board. It is 
the clear case. 
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies 
promulgated in good faith that affect adversely 
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of 
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 (1975). We have relied on the 
common law in definining immunities under §1983. See, 
\Jl P~c-h f~,.,.., 4 ~J. '4 \A .. .l .. '-t o~ (,,,,c. ) .. 
~-~., Imbler" The absolute immunity accorded govermental 
bodies under the common law would be modified to this 
rather 
than an 
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). We have relied on the 
common law in definining immunities under §1983. See, 
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
February 21, 1978 
No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have now had an opportunity to review carefully 
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills". Both are 
impressive and persuasive memos. As I think either could 
form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the 
case particularly troublesome. In any event, being 
satisfied that further delay will not make decision any 
easier, I will now firm up the tentative vote to reverse 
that I expressed at Conference. I add the following 
observations. 
As to the legislative history debate, I am 
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in Monroe was 
wrong. Bill Rehnquist's memorandum makes a reasonable 
argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman 
Amendment's rejection. But I rather think that 
congressional concern was centered on the inequity of 
imposing liability on local units of government on the 
basis of respondeat superior or some other principle of 
vicarious liability. Moreover, doubts about congressional 
power expressed in the debates stemmed from the attempted 
imposition of an extra-constitutional duty to curb private 
lawlessness, not from a perception that municipalities ~ 
se were beyond the reach of legislative authority under §5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. These points seem reasonably 
clear. 
2. 
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was 
intended to include inanimate bodies. Its use is hardly an 
artful way to include municipalities or similar entities. 
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long 
ago. There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a 
month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which 
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word 
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and 
corporate ..•• " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16 
Stat. 431. While "an allowable not a mandatory" 
definition, Monroe, 365 u.s., at 191, it is evidence of 
special usage of the term "person". Moreover, I was 
painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of 
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman 
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided January 11, 1978), 
as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 u.s. 390, 396 (1960). 
3. 
With me, policy considerations weigh more heavily 
than any attempt to read meaning into ambiguous speeches by 
members of Congress a century ago or speculation whether 
the word "person" embraces the universe. Everyone agrees 
that §1983 authorizes suits against officials of 
governmental units both in their official and individual 
capacities. If one assumes that the municipality generally 
will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the 
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and 
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it 
really does not matter which way one goes on the 
fiscal-impact argument. The municipality pays in either 
event. 
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that 
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of 
large sums of money, in §1983 actions,~-~·' Milliken v. 
Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we 
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment 
requires application of the fiction to suits against the 
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against 
local governments. Local governments probably already bear 
the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as 
injunctive relief. Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable 
point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to 
escalate damages if a local government itself is named as a 
defendant. I am not sure, however, that the average juror 
would view his or her local government or school board in 
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and 
railroads. After all, most jurors are taxpayers. 
4. 
This brings me to what I suppose is the most 
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case: its effect 
on the doctrine of stare decisis. To my mind, 
considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions. On 
the one hand, we have a series of rulings that 
municipalities and counties are not "persons" for purposes 
of § 1983. In the somewhat accidental manner that 
characterizes many of our § 1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 u.s. 160, 186* (1976), we have answered a 
question that was never briefed or argued in this Court. 
The claim in Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be 
held "liable for acts of its police officers, by virtue of 
respondeat superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No. 
39, p. 21, namely, a warrantless, early morning raid and 
ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although Morris 
Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote 
reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive to 
present a view of the legislative history that would have 
foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior. 
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), 
the only other relevant case presenting a substantial 
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983, 
5. 
petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696, 
under § 1988. Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's 
reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in 
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe 
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such 
as the County." Id., at 700. Technically, the holding of 
Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress 
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose 
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of 
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988 
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused 
to do in enacting§ 1983." Id., at 710 & n. 27. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 
(1973}, did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on 
conduct that was both authorized under state law and 
directly -- rather than vicariously responsible for the 
claimed constitutional injury. But in Kenosha we raised 
the jurisdictional question on our own initiative. Thus, 
the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between 
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been 
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion. 
On the other hand, affirmance in this case 
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise 
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases. 
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these 
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 632 (1974); Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 u.s. 632 (1974); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 
6. 
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in 
these cases because of the joinder of individual public 
officials as codefendants. But the opinions of this Court 
often made explicit reference to the school-board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, 
see, ~' Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977). And 
Congress has focused specifically on this Court's 
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise of 
§ 1983 jurisdiction over school boards, even if not 
premised on considered holdings, thus has been 
longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe. 
In my view, reversal would require the overruling 
only of Kenosha. I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to 
their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for 
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was 
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed 
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with 
the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an 
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
7. 
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed 
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this 
case. Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require, 
if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the 
approach of Ex parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 (1908), to 
preserve the availability of injunctive relief. While this 
is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated 
application [of §1983] to municipal corporations depending 
on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412 u.s., 
at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity, 
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief, 
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary 
recovery. 
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we 
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman 
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial 
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental 
functions" and "to insure the security of businessmen who 
traded with them." Our previous decisions have not 
identified these concerns as the principal reasons for the 
defeat of the Sherman proposal. Indeed, such 
considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held 
that a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief 
under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought 
because a municipality is simply not a "person." 
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this 
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis 
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of 
precedents. Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in 
principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize. 
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with 
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respect. 
8. 
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts, 
rather than overruled. The Court simply could say that we 
have had no occasion previously to consider the 
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional 
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision 
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the 
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 u.s. 362, 377 (1976) (discussing Swann and 
Brown). There are substantial line-drawing problems, as 
Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal, 
written policy of the municipal department and school 
board. It is the clear case. 
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies 
promulgated in good faith that affect adversely 
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of 
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446~ Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 (1975). We have relied on the 
common law in definining immunities under §1983. See, 
~-~·' Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.s. 409 (1976). The 
absolute immunity accorded govermental bodies under the 
common law would be modified to this extent. But this 
would be merely a modification rather than an abandonment 
of the common law protection. 
9. 
One further thought: We see decisions 
increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state 
action. Lawyers apparently have got "the word" and 
complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We will not be able much 
longer to avoid confronting the question whether, Congress 
having provided relief (through §1983) for state action, 
parties nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely 
on federal question jurisdiction to sue municipalities for 
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. I do not know how 
I would answer this question, but I suppose we would retain 
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions 
between claims of constitutional dimension and those that 
are not, than we would if Bivens-type remedies become 
generally available in state action cases. If we continue 
to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we 
10. 
strengthen the argument for Bivens relief. I would prefer 
to avoid this pressure. 
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most 
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
~ . I. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have now had an opportunity to review carefully 
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills". Both are 
impressive and persuasive memos. As I think either could 
form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the 
case particularly troublesome. In any event, being 
satisfied that further delay will not make decision any 
easier, I will now firm up the tentative vote to reverse 
that I expressed at Conference. I add the following 
observations. 
As to the legislative history debate, I am 
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in Monroe was 
wrong. Bill Rehnquist's memorandum makes a reasonable 
argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman 
Amendment's rejection. But I rather think that 
congressional concern was centered on the inequity of 
imposing liability on local units of government on the 
basis of respondeat superior or some other principle of 
vicarious liability. Moreover, doubts about congressional 
power expressed in the debates stemmed from the attempted 
imposition of an extra-constitutional duty to curb private 
lawlessness, not from a perception that municipalities per 
se were beyond the reach of legislative authority under §5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. These points seem reasonably 
clear. 
2. 
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was 
intended to include inanimate bodies. Its use is hardly an 
artful way to include municipalities or similar entities. 
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long 
ago. There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a 
month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which 
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word 
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and 
corporate •••• " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16 
Stat. 431. While "an allowable not a mandatory" 
definition, Monroe, 365 U.S., at 191, it is evidence of 
special usage of the term "person". Moreover, I was 
painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of 
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman 
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided January 11, 1978), 
as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 u.s. 390, 396 (1960). 
3. 
With me, policy considerations weigh more heavily 
than any attempt to read meaning into ambiguous speeches by 
members of Congress a century ago or speculation whether 
the word "person" embraces the universe. Everyone agrees 
that §1983 authorizes suits against officials of 
governmental units both in their official and individual 
capacities. If one assumes that the municipality generally 
will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the 
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and 
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it 
really does not matter which way one goes on the 
fiscal-impact argument. The municipality pays in either 
event. 
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that 
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of 
large sums of money, in §1983 actions, e.~., Milliken v. 
Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we 
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment 
requires application of the fiction to suits against the 
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against 
local governments. Local governments probably already bear 
the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as 
injunctive relief. Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable 
point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to 
escalate damages if a local government itself is named as a 
defendant. I am not sure, however, that the average juror 
would view his or her local government or school board in 
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and 
railroads. After all, most jurors are taxpayers. 
4. 
This brings me to what I suppose is the most 
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case: its effect 
on the doctrine of stare decisis. To my mind, 
considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions. On 
the one hand, we have a series of rulings that 
municipalities and counties are not "persons" for purposes 
of § 1983. In the somewhat accidental manner that 
characterizes many of our § 1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186* (1976), we have answered a 
question that was never briefed or argued in this Court. 
The claim in Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be 
held "liable for acts of its police officers, by virtue of 
respondeat superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No. 
39, p. 21, namely, a warrantless, early morning raid and 
ransacking of a Negro family's horne. Although Morris 
Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote 
reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive to 
present a view of the legislative history that would have 
foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior. 
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 u.s. 693 (1973), 
the only other relevant case presenting a substantial 
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983, 
5. 
petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696, 
under § 1988. Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's 
reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in 
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe 
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such 
as the County." Id., at 700. Technically, the holding of 
Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress 
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose 
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of 
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988 
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused 
to do in enacting§ 1983." Id., at 710 & n. 27. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 
(1973), did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on 
conduct that was both authorized under state law and 
directly -- rather than vicariously responsible for the 
claimed constitutional injury. But in Kenosha we raised 
the jurisdictional question on our own initiative. Thus, 
the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between 
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been 
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion. 
On the other hand, affirmance in this case 
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise 
I t 
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases. 
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these 
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 632 (1974); Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
u.s. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 
6. 
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in 
these cases because of the joinder of individual public 
officials as codefendants. But the opinions of this Court 
often made explicit reference to the school-board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, 
see,~, Milliken v. Bradley, 97 s.ct. 2749 (1977). And 
Congress has focused specifically on this Court's 
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise of 
§ 1983 jurisdiction over school boards, even if not 
premised on considered holdings, thus has been 
longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe. 
In my view, reversal would require the overruling 
only of Kenosha. I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to 
their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for 
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was 
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed 
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with 
7. 
the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an 
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed 
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this 
case. Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require, 
if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the 
approach of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 {1908), to 
preserve the availability of injunctive relief. While this 
is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated 
application [of §1983] to municipal corporations depending 
on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412 u.s., 
at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity, 
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief, 
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary 
recovery. 
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we 
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman 
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial 
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental 
functions" and "to insure the security of businessmen who 
traded with them." Our previous decisions have not 
identified these concerns as the principal reasons for the 
defeat of the Sherman proposal. Indeed, such 
considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held 




under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought 
because a municipality is simply not a "person." 
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this 
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis 
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of 
precedents. Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in 
principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize. 
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with 
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respect. 
8. 
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts, 
rather than overruled. The Court simply could say that we 
have had no occasion previously to consider the 
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional 
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision 
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the 
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) (discussing Swann and 
Brown). There are substantial line-drawing problems, as 
Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal, 
written policy of the municipal department and school 
board. It is the clear case. 
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies 
promulgated in good faith that affect adversely 
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of 
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 (1975). We have relied on the 
common law in definining immunities under §1983. See, 
~-~·' Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The 
absolute immunity accorded govermental bodies under the 
common law would be modified to this extent. But this 
would be merely a modification rather than an abandonment 
of the common law protection. 
9. 
One further thought: We see decisions 
increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state 
action. Lawyers apparently have got "the word" and 
complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. We will not be able much 
longer to avoid confronting the question whether, Congress 
having provided relief (through §1983) for state action, 
parties nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely 
on federal question jurisdiction to sue municipalities for 
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. I do not know how 
I would answer this question, but I suppose we would retain 
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions 
between claims of constitutional dimension and those that 
are not, than we would if Bivens-type remedies become 
generally available in state action cases. If we continue 
to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we 
10. 
strengthen the argument for Bivens relief. I would prefer 
to avoid this pressure. 
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most 
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
J C HAH BERS 01" ;.JSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,..JR. 
~tmt <!fomi l!f tlft 'Pttittb ~faitg 
1lfai7lfington. I9. <!f. 202'1-.$ 
February 23, 1978 
No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have now had an opportunity to review carefully 
the me.moranda circulated by our two "Bills". Both are 
impressive and persuasive memos . As I think either could 
form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the 
case particularly troublesome. In any event, being 
satisfied that further delay will not make decision any 
easier, I will now firm up the tentative view to reverse 
that I expressed at Conference. I add the following 
observations. 
As to the legislative history debate, I am 
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in Mcn~oe w2s 
wrong. Bill Rehnquist's me morandum makes a reasonable 
argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman 
Amendment's rejection. In my view, however, the Sherman 
Amendment was an attempt to impose vicarious liability on 
government subdivisions for the consequences of ~rivate 
-....-~·---------.-- ' ·-· - • -·-.·---- --~ r ·-- --· - .. ~~ 
' ,. 
2. 
lawlessness. The legislative history can best be 
understood as limiting the statutory ambit to actual 
wrongdoers, i·~·, a rejection of respondeat superior or any 
other principle of vicarious liability. 
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was 
intended to include inanimate bodies. Its use is hardly an 
artful way to include municipalities or similar entities. 
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long 
ago. There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a 
month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which 
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word 
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and 
corporate. ••• " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16 
Stat. 431. While "an allowable not a mandatory" 
definition, Monroe, 365 U.S., at 191, it is evidence of 
special usage of the term "person". Moreover, I was 
painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of 
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman 
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided January 11, 1978), 
as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Wo~ks 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1960). 
With me, other considerations weigh more heavily 
than an attempt to read decisive meaning into speeches by 
members of Congr ess a century ago or speculation whether 
~ .. - ... . . ·· · . . - ~- -----r---·--~·~ r 
·. ~ . 
, -· . ·------ ---.... --.. -~~ ., 
3. 
the word "person" embraces the universe. Everyone agrees 
that Sl983 authorizes suits against officials of 
governmental units both in their official and individual 
capacities. If one assumes that the municipality generally 
will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the 
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and 
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it 
really does not matter which way one goes on the 
fiscal-impact argument. The municipality pays in either 
event. 
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that 
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of 
large sums of money, in §1983 actions, e.~., Milliken v. 
Bradley, 97 s.ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we 
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment 
requires applicati?n of the fiction to suits against the 
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against 
local governments. Local governments probably already bear 
the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as 
injunctive r~lief. Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable 
point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to 
escalate d amages if a local government itself is name d as a 
defendant. I am not sure, however, that the average juror 
would view his or her local government or school board in 
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and 
railroads. After all, most jurors are taxpayers. 
---~-- - ..- -··· .·· .. --:- ·-· . :"' ... . ·.· - . -~--~--- -~ . . .,_ '"' 
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4. 
This brings me to what I suppose is the most 
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case: its effect 
on the doctrine of stare decisis. To my mind, 
considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions. On 
the one hand, we have a series of rulings that 
municipalities and counties are not "p~rsons" for purposes 
of S 1983. In the somewhat accidental manner that 
characterizes many of our § 1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186* (1976), we have answered a 
question that was never briefed or argued in this Court -
whether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries 
that are the direct result of its policies. The claim in 
Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be held "liable 
for acts of its police officers, by virtue of respondeat 
superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No. 39, p. 21, 
namely, a warrantless, early mornin~ raid and ransacking of 
1 
a Negro family's home. Although Morris 
1. Respondents' brief in Monroe identified the 
implications of petitioner's position for the 
municipalities of the nation: 
"If this court ••. adopts petitioners' theory 
that the act of respondent Pape, no matter how 
wrongful and how violative of the Constitution and 
laws of Illinois and the ordinances of Chicago, 
binds Chicago and makes it directly liable -
therefor, then Chicago and every other 
municipality in the United States is open to Civil 
Rights liability through no action of its own and 
based on action contrary to its own ordinances and 
the laws of the state it is a part of." Brief for 
Respondents, supra, p. 26. 
No attempt was made, however, to relate these concerns to 
the rejection of the Sherman Amendment. 
.;.: .. - . .. -··-----~-...,.---~ 
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Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote 
discussion of the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive 
to present a view of the legislative history that would 
have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior. 
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), 
the only other relevant case presenting a substantial 
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983, 
petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696, 
under § 1988. Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's 
reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in 
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe 
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such 
as the County." !d., at 700. Technically, the holding of 
Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress 
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose 
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of 
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988 
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused 
to do in enacting§ 1983." Id., at 710 & n. 27. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 
(1973), did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on 
conduct that was both authorized under state law and 
directly -- rather than vicariously responsible for the 
cla i med cons titutional injury. But in Kenosha we raised 
the jurisdictional question on our own initiative. Thus, 
.•::· .. · ~ .. .. ..... -~_.............~-...........,._. 
~ .... · .. · . r 










the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between 
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been 
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion. 
On the other hand, affirmance in this case 
requires a rejection.of this Court's sub silentio exercise 
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases • 
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these 
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 {1974); Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 U.S. 632 {1974); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 {1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 u.s. 441 
{1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in 
these cases because of the joinder of individual public 
officials as codefendants. But the opinions of this Court 
often made explicit refe~ence to the school-board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, 
see, ~' Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 
437-439, 441-442 {1968). And Congress has focused 
specifically on this Court's school-board decisions in 
several statutes. The exercise of § 1983 jurisdiction over 
6. 
school boards, even if not premised on considered holdings, 
thus has been longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe. 
In my view, reversal would require the overruling 
only of Kenosha. I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to 
--.---:::-- . ·- -·- . - ... --.-... ·. . -- --.---·.~ 
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their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for 
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was 
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed 
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with 
the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an 
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed 
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this 
.· ·; 
case. Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require, 
if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the 
approach of Ex parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 (1908), to 
preserve the availability of injunctive relief. While this 
is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated 
application [of §1983] to municipal corporations depending 
on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412 u.s., 
at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity, 
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief, 
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary 
recovery. 
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we 
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman 
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial 
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental 
functions" and ~to insure the security of businessmen who 
traded with them." Our previous decisions have not 
identified these concerns as the principal reason~ for the 
. ' 







defeat of the Sherman proposal. Indeed, such 
considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held 
that a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief 
under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought 
because a municipality is simply not a "person." 
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this 
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis 
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of 
precedents. Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in 
principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize. 
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with 
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects. 
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts, 
rather than overruled. The Court simply could say that we 
have had no occasion previously to consider the 
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional 
violations that are the direct r e sult of a policy decision 
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the 
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 {1976) {discussing Swann and 
Brown). There are substantial line-drawing problems, as 
Bill Re hnquist note s, but this case involves a formal, 
written policy of the municipal department and school 
board. It is the clear case. 
Se cond, I would recogni ze a de f e n s e for policies 
promulgated in good faith that affect a dversely 1 
r ' 
:: ::-:-- -~- --~ ! 
\ 
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9. 
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of 
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 (1975). We have relied on the 
' 
common law in defining immunities under §1983. See,~-~·, 
~ 
' 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The absolute 
immunity accorded govermental bodies under the common law 
would be modified to this extent. But this would be merely 
a modification rather than an abandonment of the common law 
protection. 
One further thought: We see decisions 
increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state 
action. Lawyers apparently have gotten "the word" and 
complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly 
under the Fourteenth Ame ndment. See,~-~·, Lowell School 
Dist. No. 71 v. Kerr, No. 77-688, March 3, 1978, 
Conference. We will not be able _much longer to avoid 
confronting the question whether, Congress having provided 
relief (through §1983) for state action, parties 
nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely on 
federal que stion jurisdiction to sue municipalities for 
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. I do not know how 
I would answer this que stion, but I suppose we would retain 
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions 
between claims of constitutional dimensic , and those that 
are not, than we would if Bive ns - type r emedi e s be come 
generally available in state action cases. If we , continue 
··,. : .,...,- ·• 
I , or I 
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to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we 
strengthen the argument for Bivens relief. I would prefer 
-.. to avoid this pressure. 
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most 
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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Jiaslrfngton, tE. <!J. 2.0gi.>.!2 
Febr uar y 23, 1978 
/ 
No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services 
Dear Chief, 
In light of Lewis Powell's memorandum 
of t oday, might it not be a good idea to discuss 
thi s case at our Conference tomorrow? 
Sincerely yours, 
/1 ,, 
' ' ::;, • J 
I / 
/ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 0~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVE N S 
,®up:um:t ClJmtrl d tlft ~ttiu~ ~taft.&' 
~ltS"Jri:ngtcn, lE· CJJ. 2lT,?J!.~ ) 
February 23, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
Like Lewis, I found the two memoranda especially 
valuable. I am persuaded by Bill Brennan that Monroe 
misconstrued the actual intent of Congress on the 
question whether a municipality can be a person. Until 
I received Lewis' memorandum this afternoon, I was per-
suaded by Bill Rehnquist's discussion of stare decisis 
that we should probably not overrule the Monroe holding. 
Lewis now has be back in something of a quandary, and I 
would welcome further discussion of the case at Con-
ference. I thought I should let you know that my views 
are not as settled as I had thought at the time of our 
original conference. 
I should add that I do have a great deal of dif-
ficulty with Lewis' suggestion that the good faith 
defense should be extended to municipal corporations. 
Such an extension could hardly be justified on the 
rationale that we need to encourage people to accept 





.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
.hvrtntt C!fonrl of tfrt ~b ~ta!tg 
~uftington. ~. <!f. 2.0.?'"1~ 
February 23, 1978 
No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
Dear Lewis: 
I very much appreciate your helpful and welcome 
comments on the Monell memoranda. I certainly cannot 
disagree with the first reservation you voice to my 
position, namely that we need not overrule Monroe and Moor 
but might simply restrict those cases t~ their facts. See 
my Memorandum at 8. I find your second suggestion--that 
in this case we should "recognize a defense for policies 
promulgated in good faith that affect adversely 
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of 
violation"--a bit more troublesome. What particularly 
bothers me about it is that the question of what type of 
immunity should be afforded municipal or quasi-municipal 
bodies if such bodies are suable directly under § 1983 has 
not been briefed in this case. I'd not like to repeat 
here the earlier errors of rushing to decision without 
adequate briefing. The possible confusion that can arise 
from such lack of briefing is painfully evident from the 
treatment given the question of the "personhood" of 
municipalities under § 1983 in Monroe, Moor, and Kenosha. 
Although I have a good deal of sympathy for affording 
municipal bodies the type of good faith defense you 
propose, I really do believe that the lower courts should 
grapple with the issue first, so that when the issue 
returns here, it will have been fully considered and fully 
briefed. I am not adverse, however, explicitly to direct 
the attention of the lower court on remand to the 
qualified immunity question, and provide the court with 
our views on the contours of the issue. 
~- ~· ·~-.....-- ...... _ ... • ": .... ...,__,_ ... ,..,it" 
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Parenthetically, I would like to voice my agreement 
with your observation, at pp. 9-10 of your memorandum, 
that "[i]f we continue to deny § 1983 relief against local 
governmental units, we strengthen the argument for Bivens 
relief [against these bodies]." 
Sincerely, 
f3u; 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
. ~·· ... . . ; ~-. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
Re: 
.iu;trtntt Ofltltrl a{ tift ~h .§taftg 
._as!pnghtn. ~. <!f. 20~Jl.~ 
February 23, 1978 
75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social Services 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Of course Monell or any pending case can be 
discussed by anyone who desires. Since I received 
the several memos rather late today, I am prepared to 
listen but not to discuss. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.hvttmt <!fctttt of tlft ~t~ .;ibdts 
:$a:i7frington. ~. <!f. 2'll&f.1.f.$ 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
February 23, 1978 
No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have now had an opportunity to review carefully 
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills". Both are 
impressive and persuasive memos. As I think either could 
form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the 
case particularly troublesome. In any event, being 
satisfied that further delay will not make decision any 
easier, I will now firm up the tentative view to reverse 
that I expressed at Conference. I add the following 
observations. 
As to the legislative history debate, I am 
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in Monroe was 
wrong. Bill Rehnquist's memorandum makes a reasonable 
argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman 
Amendment's rejection. In my view, however, the Sherman 
Amendment was an attempt to impose vicarious liability on 
government subdivisions for the consequences of private 
2. 
lawlessness. The legislative history can best be 
understood as limiting the statutory ambit to actual 
wrongdoers, i·~·, a rejection of respondeat superior or any 
other principle of vicarious liability. 
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was 
intended to include inanimate bodies. Its use is hardly an 
artful way to include municipalities or similar entities. 
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long 
ago. There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a 
month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which 
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word 
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and 
corporate. • " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16 
Stat. 431. While "an allowable not a mandatory" 
definition, Monroe, 365 u.s., at 191, it is evidence of 
special usage of the term "person". Moreover, I was 
painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of 
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman 
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided January 11, 1978), 
as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1960). 
With me, other considerations weigh more heavily 
than an attempt to read decisive meaning into speeches by 
members of Congress a century ago or speculation whether 
3. 
the word "person" embraces the universe. Everyone agrees 
that §1983 authorizes suits against officials of 
governmental units both in their official and individual 
capacities. If one assumes that the municipality generally 
will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the 
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and 
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it 
really does not matter which way one goes on the 
fiscal-impact argument. The municipality pays in either 
event. 
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that 
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of 
large sums of money, in §1983 actions, ~.g., Milliken v. 
Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we 
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment 
requires application of the fiction to suits against the 
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against 
local governments. Local governments probably already bear 
the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as 
injunctive relief. Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable 
point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to 
escalate damages if a local government itself is named as a 
defendant. I am not sure, however, that the average juror 
would view his or her local government or school board in 
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and 
railroads. After all, most jurors are taxpayers. 
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This brings me to what I suppose is the most 
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case: its effect 
on the doctrine of stare decisis. To my mind, 
considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions. On 
the one hand, we have a series of rulings that 
municipalities and counties are not "persons" for purposes 
of § 1983. In the somewhat accidental manner that 
characterizes many of our § 1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 u.s. 160, 186* (1976}, we have answered a 
question that was never briefed or argued in this Court -
whether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries 
that are the direct result of its policies. The claim in 
Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be held "liable 
for acts of its police officers, by virtue of respondeat 
superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No. 39, p. 21, 
namely, a warrantless, early morning raid and ransacking of 
1 
a Negro family's home. Although Morris 
1. Respondents' brief in Monroe identified the 
implications of petitioner's position for the 
municipalities of the nation: 
"If this court .•• adopts petitioners' theory 
that the act of respondent Pape, no matter how 
wrongful and how violative of the Constitution and 
laws of Illinois and the ordinances of Chicago, 
binds Chicago and makes it directly liable 
therefor, then Chicago and every other 
municipality in the United States is open to Civil 
Rights liability through no action of its own and 
based on action contrary to its own ordinances and 
the laws of the state it is a part of." Brief for 
Respondents, supra, p. 26. 
No attempt was made, however, to relate these concerns to 
the rejection of the Sherman Amendment. 
5. 
Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote 
discussion of the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive 
to present a view of the legislative history that would 
have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior. 
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 u.s. 693 (1973), 
the only other relevant case presenting a substantial 
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983, 
petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously 
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696, 
under § 1988. Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's 
reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in 
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe 
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such 
as the County." rd., at 700. Technically, the holding of 
Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress 
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose 
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of 
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988 
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused 
to do in enacting§ 1983." Id., at 710 & n. 27. 
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 
(1973), did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on 
conduct that was both authorized under state law and 
directly -- rather than vicariously responsible for the 
claimed constitutional injury. But in Kenosha we raised 
the jurisdictional question on our own initiative. Thus, 
the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between 
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been 
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion. 
On the other hand, affirmance in this case 
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise 
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases. 
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these 
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 632 (1974}: Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 u.s. 632 (1974): 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 
u.s. 503 (1969): also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 u.s. 441 
6. 
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in 
these cases because of the joinder of individual public 
officials as codefendants. But the opinions of this Court 
often made explicit reference to the school-board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, 
see, ~' Green v. County School Board, 391 u.s. 430, 
437-439, 441-442 (1968). And Congress has focused 
specifically on this Court's school-board decisions in 
several statutes. The exercise of § 1983 jurisdiction over 
school boards, even if not premised on considered holdings, 
thus has been longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe. 
In my view, reversal would require the overruling 
only of Kenosha. I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to 
7. 
their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for 
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was 
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed 
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with 
the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an 
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed 
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this 
case. Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require, 
if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the 
approach of Ex parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 (1908), to 
preserve the availability of injunctive relief. While this 
is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated 
application [of §1983] to municipal corporations depending 
on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412 u.s., 
at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity, 
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief, 
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary 
recovery. 
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we 
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman 
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial 
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental 
functions" and "to insure the security of businessmen who 
traded with them." Our previous decisions have not 
identified these concerns as the principal reasons for the 
8. 
defeat of the Sherman proposal. Indeed, such 
considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held 
that a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief 
under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought 
because a municipality is simply not a "person." 
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this 
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis 
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of 
precedents. Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in 
principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize. 
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with 
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects. 
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts, 
rather than overruled. The Court simply could say that we 
have had no occasion previously to consider the 
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional 
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision 
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the 
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) (discussing Swann and 
Brown). There are substantial line-drawing problems, as 
Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal, 
written policy of the municipal department and school 
board. It is the clear case. 
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies 
promulgated in good faith that affect adversely 
9. 
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of 
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). We have relied on the 
common law in defining immunities under §1983. See, ~.g., 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.s. 409 (1976). The absolute 
immunity accorded govermental bodies under the common law 
would be modified to this extent. But this would be merely 
a modification rather than an abandonment of the common law 
protection. 
One further thought: We see decisions 
increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state 
action. Lawyers apparently have gotten "the word" and 
complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, ~.g., Lowell School 
Dist. No. 71 v. Kerr, No. 77-688, March 3, 1978, 
Conference. We will not be able much longer to avoid 
confronting the question whether, Congress having provided 
relief (through §1983) for state action, parties 
nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely on 
federal question jurisdiction to sue municipalities for 
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. I do not know how 
I would answer this question, but I suppose we would retain 
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions 
between claims of constitutional dimension and those that 
are not, than we would if Bivens-type remedies become 
generally available in state action cases. If we continue 
10. 
to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we 
strengthen the argument for Bivens relief. I would prefer 
to avoid this pressure. 
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most 
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
CHAM BERS OF 
-
j;utm>nu <lJaurl nf t4e 'J!fuitth j;ta.fts 
'Jlfaslrhtstnn, :!B. <!}. 20~J.~2 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE February 25, 197 8 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. 
of Social Services 
Dear Bill, 
As Lewis has indicated, we are indebted 
to both you and Bill Rehnquist for edu-
cating your Brethren as you have. I am 
grateful. 
I also appreciate Lewis' memorandum. I 
agree with you and with him that school 
boards are persons for the purpose of 
§1983 but share his preference for not 
overruling Monroe and Moor. At this 
juncture, however, I am not at rest as 
to the possible immunity of school boards 
and prefer not to decide the issue. At 
least, that is my tentative view. 
Sincerely, 
11~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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Who Should Pay for Civil Wrongs? 
Cities and towns received an unexpected jolt last 
week when the Supreme Court ruled that they were 
subject to lawsuits for violations of civil rights. The 
decision, which reversed a 1961 case, stripped away the 
blanket immunity long enjoyed py local governments 
in such cases . Previously, the only recourse for viet ims 
of misconduct by police officers or discrimination by 
city officials was to sue them individually. The Court's 
decision makes sense as a general principle of public 
policy. But it raises troublesome questions about mu-
nicipal liability ancl who should bear the cost- ques-
tions that Congress must now confront. 
The Supreme Court case arose from a sex discrimi-
nation charge brought by a group of women employees 
of the New York City Department of Social Services. In 
1971, they had been forced by the city's dated personnel 
policies to take unpaid pregnancy leaves before they 
were medically necessary. The women filed an action 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allowed suits 
against any "person" who, while acting in a govern-
mental capacity, violated a citizen's federally pro-
tected rights. In 1961, the Warren Court ruled that Con-
gress could not have intended a "person" to mean a 
municipality. Last week, the Burger Court announced 
that a more meticulous review of the legislative back-
ground compeJled it to reach the opposite conclusion. 
Will the 1:emoval of this shield of immunity deter 
' • I 
official lawlessness? The exposure of local treasuries 
to damage claims should certainly help to di~suade 
public officials from ordering or tolerating behavior 
that violates citizens' rights. But the trouble wi th mak-
. ing municipalities liable is that it exposes the tnxp~tyer 
to a vast array of damage claims in situations where 
public servants acted in good faith or where individual 
officials broke the Jaw entirely on their own init iative. 
Some public responsibility for the conduct of public of-
ficials is desirable; it should encourage people to moni-
tor their governments still more c!osely. But some 
limits on liability are needed to protect the ta>:payer 
when, for instance, a police unit engages secretively in 
illegal wiretapping or when a local board of education 
is found to have violated legal principles in its alloca-
tion of funds or in its disciplinary policies. 
.-
• 
Should taxpayers have to pay damage claims even 
when all reasonable precautions have been observed in 
the conduct of public business? The Supreme Court's 
latest decision is silent on this question. The categori-
.cal doctrine of municipal immunity was bad public 
policy. But the issue.cannot be allowed to rest where 
the Court left it. Federal legislation will be needed to 
define the degree of municipal liability in difierent 
situations. The nation's mayors have a strong interest 
in getting Congress-to face up to a problem that every-
one has been.only too happy to leave to the judiciary. 
J 
c 
Wide Application Seen for Ruling 
-Opening Cities to Civil Right Suits 
. By ROGER WILKINS 
When the Supreme Court decided rc- Unde r the 1961 decisio n, the only 
cently that local government bodies "'. ·ere I rer1rdy for people who s <~ id that their 
not immune from suit <; seekin;; ·non"y consti tutiOnal n ghts .ha•d been v10latrd 
damages under one of the oldes t c;v il wa~ to sue for an InJUnct ion preventmg 
rights laws in the country, r ivil rights and the unconstitutio nal behavior, . unless 
civil liberties lawyers were jubilant. Co n;::rcss had passed . special legislation 
"The limitations that e<1r- provid:ng for awards ot money. 
fier · decisions had placed on Thus. while complaioatnts in employ-
Urban that legislation were so:ne ment di scrimination cases could get back 
Affairs of the longest nails in th~ pay under Titl e VII of the Civil Ri ghts 
coffin," Drew S. Days 3d, Act of 1964, prisoners ' who had suffered ' 
the Assistant Attorney Gen- "cruel and inhuman punishment" in local 
eral for Civil Rights, said after the dccis- jai!s could get only wha tever relief the 
ion was handed down. in r,enuity of a Fcdera!l district judge could 
The history of the statute is intriguing provide under an injunction. 
and the implications of the decis·ion for "In tha t situation," Eric Schnapper of 
cities and other loC!al governing bodies the NAACP Legal Defen se and Education-
are enormous, according to lawyers who al Fund Inc. said recently, "municipali ties 
have followed the issue through the could engage in a long course of unconsti-
courts. · tutional conduct until somebody sued and 
The recent case, Monell v. Depa'rtment [!Ot a Federal judge to enjoin that con-
of Social Services, was brought by a duct. Th•en you'd still have the problem 
group of female employees of the New of the local gr: vernment being able to 
York City Department of Social Services continue a course of unconstitutional 
and the Board of Education. They alleged conduct just outside the exact borders 
that they ha4d been victims of unconst itu- of t he injun•c t ion." 
tiona! discrimination because they had Mr. Schnapper al so said that though I 
been forced to take unpaid mat~rnity the 1961 decision did perm it plaintiffs 
leaves before the leaves were med1cally to seek dama.ges against individuals act-
necessary. ing in behalf of the munici pality, tha:t 
· Statute Passed In 1871 remedy was an ineffective brake on mu-
nicipal behavior and was often an unsat-
The statute under which they sued, isfactory means of providing redress for 
passed in 1871 to enforce the 14th the victim of discrimination. 
Amendment, adopted three years earlier, 
gave people ~ whose constitutional r ights Victims Could Not Recover 
were violated the right to sue the "per- Thus, if the official who had been 
sons" who had violated those rights. responsible for the violation had no 
The plaintiffs lost at their tria'! and money, had left the jurusdiction or could 
on the first level of their appeal because not be identified, the victim couid not 
the courts followed a 1961 ' decision- recover for losses he or·Slhe had suffered. 
ironically, written by former JJustice Wil- The Monell case changes all that. Un-
Iiam 0. Douglas, who was considered by constitutiom•l harms inflicted en citizens 
civil rights forces as one of their staunch- under the official policy of a city or a 
est supporters on the Court-holding tha't oounty or other local governing body will 
municipal governing bodies were not now subject that body to financial li:lobil~ 
"persons" who could be sued for money ity. 1 
damages for violations of constitutional . Justice William J. Brennan Jr. was 
rights. careful, however; ' to distinguish be tween 1 
One of the mos.t' remarkable things conduct car rired out under the policy of 
about the judicial history of the 1871 the local government. which would sub- I 
staltute, according to civil rig~hts lawyers, ject that government to liability, and the I 
is that after its passage it remained virtu- unauthorized co'n.duct ) of a single em-
ally ·unused for almos.t three-quarttors of pioyee. · 
~ a cen~ury. An Exception Is Noted 
Purpose of Legislation In announcing the decision from the 
It wa'S pa!Ssed to enforce the rights bench, he said, that no municipality 
of newly freed slaves, but shortly after would be liable, for example, for dam ages 
its passage, the spirit of liberalism that inflicted by an ambulance driver who 
foHowed the war gave way to a long drove on the sidewalk and hit a pedes-
period C1f repression of b ~a·cks. It wa:s trian . . · 
not until the beginnring of the civil rights The deci-sion would cover, according 
movement in the 1950's that lawyers to William CaldweN of the Lawyers' 
began attempting to assert the riglhts that Committee for Civil Ri ghts :Under Law, 
the statute purported to provide. the kinds of viol ations of prisonbers' 
Wh€in a case under the s:tatute--involv- rights that forc ed the closing of the 
in~ police bruta lity in Chicago-finally Tombs :md c.f similar violations of ri r.•hts 
did reach the S'up reme- Court in 1961, that h11vc frequently been found to occur 
Justice Douglas re jecte-d a.rgumen:ts that in oublic mental inst itutions. 
would have made the statute virtually "This case w Lll be of tremendous im· 
a dead 'etter. Hcwevf:r, ·he seriously un- portamce in non:racial cases," Mr. Schnap-
. dercut its force by deciding that money per of uhe Legal Defense Fund said. ''Pea-
dama-ges could nc:t be awarded in such ple will be able to get redress for viola-
cases, according to civil rights lawyers . tion.s of the First Amendment rights or 
These latwyers argue that the 1961 for illegal searches and seizures conduct-
decision made constitutional-rights claim- ed by local po!•ice in violation of the 
ants "second-class ci tizens" before the J Fourth Amendment or for viola ti ons of ' 
common law. since money damages have the Eighth Amendment prohibition of 
been, under the common law, the estab- cruel and unusual nunishment. 
lished way for civil wron gs to be de- "And I don't think any mayor w ill 
terre d. They sa<y, for exam pl e~ th at money lightly issue the kinds of 'shoo t to kill' 
damages in contract and negligence law orders that Mayo·r Daley did dur.ng the l 
serve as powerful deterrents to behavior peace demonstrat:ions in Chicago in 
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Dear Justice Powell: 
PERSONAL 
October 13, 1980 
It is always a source of great pleasure to receive a 
letter from you. Aleta and I are particularly pleased that 
our Michael serves as the standard by which the recent products 
of the Comfort and Stephan households will be judged. In our 
modest view, you have chosen (as always) the appropriate 
standard of review. 
Susan Weiner told me that she very much enjoyed meeting 
you. Although I hoped you might select her, I anticipated 
that her clerkship on the district court might prove a barrier. 
I do wish to note that this year's editor- in-chief of the 
law review, Nancy Morawetz, who will be clerking for Pat Wald 
on the D.C. Circuit, is an impressive individual. She is in 
my constitutional law seminar, and I am delaying an official 
letter of recommendation until I see her written work. If 
her work is as impressive as her bearing and intelligence, I 
intend to bring her application to your attention. By the way, 
Eliot Polebaurn, an N.Y.Q/. graduate, is clerking for Justice 
Brennan this year, andVSohn Sexton, the Chief's clerk,will be 
joining our faculty next fall. One of our projects here is 
to enhance the N.Y.U. presence on the Court. 
I am delighted that you shared David Stewart's memorandum 
with me. I take up the gauntlet in the enclosed memorandum. 
Sometime this fall Norman Dorsen and I (perhaps accompanied 
by Bill Nelson, a former White clerk, who recently joined 
our faculty) will be making our annual pilgrimage to the 
Court. As soon as the date is firmed up, I hope to be able 
to schedule a meeting with you. Gerald Gunther beat me to it 
last year, and I do not intend to let that happen again. 
October 9, 1980 
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As always, my best wishes and warmest regards to you, 
the Powell family and the Powell chambers. Aleta and I 
miss you all. 
Sincerely, 
SE:fo 
October 15, 1980 
PERSONAL 
Monell and the Rejection of the Sherman Amendment 
Given the Court's penchant for extending the reach of 
Section 1983 far beyond the expectations of even the Radical 
Republicans, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, No. 79-838, and the 
refusal to extend a "good-faith" defense to municipalities 
in Owen v. City of Independence, No. 78-1779, I can appreciate 
your sense of disquiet on reading David Stewart's memorandum. 
As I understand David's position, it is (i) that the 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment is persuasive evidence 
of the intention of the 42nd Congress to exclude municipalities 
from the reach of §1983, and, moreover, (ii) that the use of 
the word "person" in the eventual compromise that became 
42 U.S.C. §1986 demonstrates conclusively ''that Congress in 
1871 did not think it was creating municipal liability." 
I quote from page 11 of David's memorandum: 
Thus, my argument is simple. When the 
Forty-Second Congress wished to exclude 
municipal liability for the failure to 
act, it used the phrase "any person or 
persons." The repeated references to 
"citizen," "individual," and the use 
of personal pronouns buttress the ines-
capable conclusion that "any person or 
persons" did not include local govern-
ments. Since the term "any person" 
was used in the predecessor to Section 1983, 
October 15, 1980 
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17 Stat. 13, it is logical that that phrase 
also excludes municipal liability. 
In my view, David has simply restated the argument that 
prevailed for a time in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 
but was properly overturned in Monell v. New York City 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
I deal first with David's second argument, that when 
Congress used the word "person" in what is now §1986 to 
exclude municipal immunity, it must have intended to exclude 
municipal liability when it used the word "person" in §1983. 
Aside from the surface appeal of this point, little illumina-
tion is derived from the use of the term "person" in §1986. 
One would hope that legislators drafted with greater pre-
cision, and avoided the use of words capable of several 
meanings. This was one reason for the Dictionary Act, 
passed only months before the Civil Rights Act was enacted, 
to clarify that "in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 
'person' may extned and be applied to bodies politic and 
corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were 
intended to be used in a more limited sense [ ] ." Act of 
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16 Stat. 431. I think it likely 
that members of the 42nd Congress intending to preserve 
municipal liability for municipal action under §1983, while 
excluding municipal liability for private rioting under §1986, 
agreed to the use of the word "person" without focusing on 
the effect this would have on the far less controversial pro-
vision that earlier had passed both houses with little debate. 
October 15, 1980 
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Great consequences should not attach to careless drafts-
manship, absent substantial evidence of an intention to save 
local governments from liability for their own wrongdoing 
under §1983. Thus, David's argument ultimately rests on 
his first premise. 
As David himself recognizes, there are good reasons for 
proceeding with caution before equating the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment with a decision to immunize local govern-
ments from liability for their own conduct under §1983. 
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor to 
§1983, was the subject of only limited debate and was passed 
without amendment. The purpose of the measure was to impose 
liability on those committing constitutional violations 
causing compensable injury. The literal reach of Section 1983 
is quite broad and comprehensive. The statements of its 
proponents suggest that such a reach was indeed intended. 
The Sherman Amendment, by contrast, elicited much debate 
and several revisions. The theory of the first two versions 
was that local governments should be held liable not only for 
their CMn unconstitutional wrongdoing, but for their inaction in 
failing to prevent private rioting. 
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Monell canvasses 
the arguments presented by the opponents of the Sherman 
Amendment. As you stated in your Monell concurring opinion: 
"Of the many reasons for the defeat of the Sherman proposal, 
none supports Monroe's observation that the 42d Congress was 
October 15, 1980 
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fundamentally 'antagonistic,' 365 U.S., at 191, to the 
proposition that government entities and natural persons alike 
should be held accountable for the consequences of conduct 
directly working a constitutional violation." 436 u.s., at 
706 (Powell, J., concurring). 
I suppose that fragments of the legislative history 
can be marshalled in favor of either position on the "meaning" 
of the rejection of the Sherman Amendment. What counts for 
me is that Congress in 1871 intended §1983 to serve as a 
broad remedial measure for violations of constitutional 
rights; that Congress knew municipalities were capable by 
their own conduct of committing violations causing compensable 
wrong, e.g., Representative Bingham's manifest intention 
to overrule Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1834), and make 
takings by cities without compensation redressable under the 
Fourteenth funendment and its implementing legislation, 
* Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 84-85 (1871); 
* In Barron v. Baltimore, petitioner had sued the city for 
making his wharf in Baltimore harbor useless. The trial 
court awarded petitioner $45,000, but the state appellate 
court reversed. Barron then claimed in the Supreme Court 
that his private property had been "taken for public use, 
without just compensation" in violation of the fifth 
amendment. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion held that 
no federal question was presented because the fifth amend-
ment did not apply to relations between the individual and 
a state. 
In a speech on the floor of the House, Representative 
Bingham explained that he drafted §1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with Barron in mind: 
October 15, 1980 
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and that unambiguous evidence of a legislative intention to 
save municipalities from the rule of accountability established 
in §1983 is lacking. As you observed in your Monell con-
currence, adherence to Monroe had the effect of standing the 
Douglas-Frankfurter debate on its head: 
* 
The Court correctly rejects a view of the 
legi s lative history that would produce 
the anomalous result of immunizing local 
government units from monetary liability 
for action directly causing a constitu-
tional deprivation, even though such 
actions may be fully consistent with, and 
thus not remediable under, state law. No 
conduct of government comes more clearly 
within the "under color of" state law 
language of §1983. It is most unlikely 
that Congress intended public officials 
acting under the command or the specific 
authorization of the government employer 
to be exclusively liable for resulting 
constitutional injury. 
436 U.S.,at 707. 
I had read--and that is what induced me to 
attempt to impose by constitutional amend-
ment new limitations upon the power of the 
States --the great decision of Marshall 
in Barron vs. the Mayor and City Council 
of Baltimore, wherein the Chief Justice 
said, in obedience to his official oath 
and the Constitution, as it then was: 
"The amendments [to the Consti-
tution] contain no expression 
indicating an intention to apply 
them to State governments. The 
court cannot so apply them." 
7 Peters, p. 250 
In this case the city had taken private property 
for public use, without compensation as alleged, 
and there was no redress for the wrong in the 
Supreme Court of the United States; and only 
for this reason, the first eight amendments 
were not limitations on the power of the States. 
Globe App. 84. 
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Your concluding remarks in the Monell concurrence state 
the best argument for overturning Monroe. Adherence to Monroe 
would not obviate a decision on municipal liability in the con-
text of a constitutional tort action under Bivens, and the 
"difficulty" would remain of "inferring from §1983 'an explicit 
congressional declaration' against municipal liability for --
the implementation of official policies in violation of the 
Constitution." 436 U.S., at 713. 
* * * 
As your dissent in Owen demonstrates with great force, 
the decision in Monell did not lead inexorably to the outcome 
in Owen. The force of the ~ dissent is ultimately strengthened 
by the fact that your position has never been one of reflexive 
opposition to the claims of §1983 plaintiffs. 
~ S.E. 
October 25, 1980 
Dear Sam: 
How good of you to go to the trouble of providing 
another memorandum for the Powell Chambers! 
It is, as can be said of all Estreicher products, 
well written and persuasive. Although I think David makes a 
good lawyer-like argument, I am not convinced that we were 
wrong in Monell. 
I do feel a bit like I was •taken" in some of the 
conversations that then occurred - not by you, of course. 
Even so, I continue to think Monell was decided correctly. 
You always will be welcome to use our facilities 
when you are here recruiting. I look forward to seeing you. 
Sincerely, 
Professor Samuel Esctreicher 
School of Laws 
New York University 
40 Washington Square South, Room 350 
New York, New York 10012 
lfp/ss 
The Supreme Court Rewrites A Law: 
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER § 1983 
By David 0. Stewart ~ 
The Supreme Court executed one of the most striking 
reversals in judicial history when it decided Monell v. New York 
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 u.s. 658 (1978). The decision 
in Monell held municipalities liable for damages under 42 u.s.c. 
§ 1983 for the unlawful deprivation of civil rights. But only 
seventeen years before, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 u.s. 167 (1961), 
the Supreme Court had decreed that municipalities were completely 
immune to damage actions under § 1983. The story of these two 
cases provides a fascinating illustration of the limitations of 
judicial decision-making in response to d i v e r s e 1 eg a 1 , 
intellectual and political concerns. 
In both Monroe and Monell, the Supreme Court's decision 
was based on its interpretation of the deliberations of the 
-*I J.D. Yale University, 1978; B.A. Yale University, 1973; 1\lember 
of District of Columbia bar • 
..!/ The Monell Court attempted to soften the impact of its 
reversal of Monroe v. Pape by limiting municipal liability to 
those injuries suffered due to municipal policies and thereby 
excluding liability for injuries caused by unauthorized actions 
by municipal officers. Nevertheless, Monell has had direct and 
serious consquences for local governments. Moreover, in 1980 the 
Supreme Court denied to municipalities the "good-faith" defense 
avc.lilable to individuals in S 1983 cases. See Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 u.s. 622 (1980). In response to appeals from 
local governments, Congress is considering restoration of good-
faith immunity for local governments, but has taken no such 
action yet • See S • 5 8 5 , 9 7th Con g • , 2 d S e s s • ( 19 8 2 ) ; M u n i c i p a 1 
Liability Under:-42 u.s.c. 1983, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th 
Co ng • , 1 s t s e s s • ( 1 9 81 ) • 
Forty-Second Congress in approving the Civil Rights Act of 
1871. y Monroe concluded that the Forty-Second Congress 
squarely excluded municipal liability; Monell explained that the 
Forty-Second Congress meant to create such liability. Thus, the 
Court issued, within seventeen years, diametrically opposing 
decisions based on exactly the same legislative history. That 
performance certainly weakens any claim to predictability in the 
legal system. 
A careful review of the legislative history of § 1983 
demonstrates that Monroe v. Pape was right: The Forty-Second 
Congress did not intend to subject local governments to liability 
for constitutional deprivations. But, due to apparent 
considerations beyond pure statutory construction, the Monell 
Court found it necessary to skirt, somewhat uncomfortably, the 
evident intent of Congress. In so doing, however, the Court 
raised at least as many questions as it answered. 
I. 
James Monroe, his wife Flossie, and their six children 
were awakened one evening by thirteen Chicago police officers who 
broke into their home and made them stand naked in the living 
room while the of fie ers ransacked their house for evidence of a 
recent murder. Mr. Monroe was then interrogated at the police 
station for ten hours, and ultimately was relased. The ~1onroes 
Y Section 1983 was enacted initially as Section l of the 1871 
Civil Rights Act, and was codified as § 1979 of the Revised 
Statutes. 
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sued the City of Chicago, Detective Frank Pape, and twelve 
unknown police officers, alleging that the police acted illegally 
and without either an arrest or search warrant. The suit 
demanded damages under § 1983 for the denial by the Chicago 
police of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the 
Constitution. The District Court dismissed the complaint, 
however, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
In a landmark decision announced by Justice Douglas, 
the Supreme Court reinstated the Monroes' claim under § 1983. 
The Court ruled that the alleged police actions had been 
undertaken "under color of" state law for purposes of § 1983, 
which therefore provided a rememdy for the Monroes' 
constitutional injuries even though those ilfegal acts were 
contrary to formal governmental policy. The Court then turned to 
the claim by the City of Chicago that it was immune to actions 
brought under § 1983. 
Justice Douglas's discussion of municipal immunity 
focused on an amendment proposed by Senator John Sherman of Ohio 
to the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 11 The 
Sherman Amendment, which was introduced on the floor of the 
Senate, derived from the English "riot acts." Senator Sherman 
proposed that all individuals in a locality be held liable in 
damages to anyone injured by riots or mob violence. Y The 
Senate adopted the Sherman Amendment, but the House refused to do 
11 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 663 (1871). 
4/ - Id., at 663. 
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so. A Conference Committee then reported a revised version would 
have imposed liability on "the county, city or parish in which 
any of the said offenses shall be committed" for injuries due to 
mob violence. 21 But the House refused to accept that version, 
too. 
Justice Douglas placed great weight upon the refusal of 
the House to adopt the first Conference bill. He emphasized Rep. 
Poland's assertion that the House Conferees had then told the 
Senate Conferees "that that section imposing liability upon towns 
and counties must go out or we should fail to agree." Y A 
second Conference Committee heeded Rep. Poland's advice. The 
Sherman Amendment was revised to impose liablity on any "person 
or persons" depriving an individual of his civil ·rights, and was 
en a c t ed a s § 7 of t he C i vi 1 Rig h t s Ac t of 18 71. That provision 
now is codified as 42 u.s.c. § 1986. 
Although Justice Douglas did not completely explain the 
significance of the Sherman Amendment episode for municipal 
liabilty under § 1983, the connection between the two is 
direct. Section 1983, by its terms, applies only to "persons." 
If a municipality is to be held liable under that statute, it 
must be because a local government is a "person" under that 
statute. The Sherman Amendment episode is important because 
Congress rejected municipal liability as proposed by Sen. 
Sh~rman, and because Congress expressed that rejection in the 
~ Id., at 749 (emphasis added). 
!/ 365 u.s. at 190, citing Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., lst Sess., p. 
804 (1871). 
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final legislation by using the terms "person or persons" to 
describe those parties who would be liable for damages. Thus, 
Congress excluded municipal liability by using the terms "person 
or persons" in the provision now codified as § 1986. 
Accordingly, the word "person" in the predecessor to § 1983 -- a 
provision which was drafted and enacted simultaneously by the 
same Congress -- simply cannot include local governments. The 
Forty-Second Congress could not have intended -- without any 
explanation -- that "person" would include municipalities in one 
section of the C i vi 1 Rights Act at the s arne time the identical 
term excluded local governments in another section of the bill. 
As Justice Douglas concluded in a holding that drew no 
dissenting comment on the Court, the "response of the Congress to 
the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions • 
was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word 
'person' was used in this particular Act to include them." 21 
I I. 
In several decisions after Monroe, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed or ~xtended its finding of municipal immunity under§ 
1983. Thus, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Moor v. 
County of Alameda Y reviewed the legislative history of the 
21\365 u.s. at 19. A peripheral issue in the interpretation of§ 
1983 is presented by the Dictionary Act of 1871. That statute 
stated that "the word 'person' ~ extend and be applied to 
bodies corporate and politic." 16 Stat. 431 (emphasis added). 
The provision therefore provides no firm guidance on the 
municipal liability question under § 1983. 
~ 411 u.s. 693, 709-710 (1973). 
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Sherman Amendment and concluded again that local governments 
could not be liable to ~ 1983 actions. And in City of Kenosha v. 
Bruno, .21 the Court extended municipal immunity to injunctive 
actions with the following statement: 
\ve find nothing in the legislative history 
discussed in Monroe, or in the language 
actually used by Congress, to suggest that the 
generic word 'person' in ~ 1983 was intended 
to have a bifurcated application to municipal 
corporations depending on the nature of the 
relief sought against them. 
At the same time, however, the court decided a series 
of cases brought under § 1983 in which local school boards were 
included as named defendants for injunctive relief. lO/ 
Moreover, the Court handed down at least two decisions involving 
plaintiffs who sought money damages from a school board. ll/ In 
none of those decisions, most of which concerned volatile school 
desegregation issues, did the Court consider whether Monroe v. 
Pape granted immunity from § 1983 actions to those school 
boards. The Court's failure to apply Monroe to the school board 
cases was unexplained. That failure may have been the result of 
the strong feelings surrounding the school desegregation effort, 
perhaps combined with a judicial unwillingness to cut off 
desegregation suits on a "technical" ground. But by that 
9/ ( - 412 u.s. 507 1973). 
\ 
10/ E.g. Green v. County School Board, 391 u.s. 430 (1968), 
Milliken v. Bradley. For a full listing of such cases see 
Mo n e 11 , supra, 4 3 6 U. S • a t 6 6 3, n • 5 • 
ll/ Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 414 u.s. 632 
(1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 u.s. 
503, (1969). 
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desegregation suits on a "technical" ground. 
failure, the Court painted itself into a corner. 
But by that 
There is no principled basis for distinguishing school 
boards from municipalities under § 1983. Both are local units of 
government and creatures of the State. The rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment by the Forty-Second Congress could hardly be 
interpreted as a rejection of liability for some units of local 
government but a simultaneous approval of suits against other 
units of local government. Sooner or later, the tension between 
Monroe and the school board cases had to be resolved. 
The resolution came in 1978, when the Court decided 
Monell. The case involved a class action by female employees of 
the City of New York, who challenged the requirement that they 
take an unpaid leave of absence during the last four months of 
pregnancy. The suit, brought under § 1983, demanded injunctive 
relief along with backpay for prior periods of forced leave. The 
Supreme Court used the occasion to reexamine municipal liability 
under § 1983, focussing largely on the legislative history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Justice Brennan approached the legislative history from 
an oblique ang 1 e. Rather than focus on what Congress did, 
Justice Br e:nnan concentrated on what certain congressman said. 
Several congressman opposed the Sherman Amendment on the ground 
th~t Congress could not impose liability on local governments for 
failing to control mob violence when Congress lacked the power to 
impose on local governments, as creatures of the State, the 
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obligation to keep the peace. 12/ Thus, the opposition to the 
Sherman Amendment, according to Justice Brennan, was based on 
Congress's refusal to impose liability for a municipality's 
failure to perform acts that Congress could not directly require 
it to perfonn. 
Justice Brennan reasoned that the predecessor of ~ 
1983, unlike the Sherman Amendment, did not impose liability for 
a local government's failure to act; rather, the provision made a 
"person" liable for affirmative actions denying constitutional 
rights. Because the predecessor of § 1983 imposed no affirmative 
duties on a "person," Justice Brennan wrote, the grounds 
articulated for opposing municipal liability under the Sherman 
Amendment did not apply to municipal liability under the 
predecessor to § 19 83. 
Justice Brennan's analysis of the legislative his tory 
is accurate in some respects, but it is largely irrelevant to the 
municipal immunity question. 13/ The Sherman Amendment episode 
is significant not for the theories stated by a few congressman, 
but for the use of the terms "person or persons" to exclude 
municipal liability in the final legislation, which was the 
predecessor to § 1986. Nothing in Justice Brennan's opinion 
challenges the analysis that if "person or persons" does not 
1 2( See Monell, supra, 436 u.s. at 673-683. 
131 One symptom of the weakness of Monell's statutory 
interpretation is its length. A persuasive read1ng of a statute 
and 1 egi slat ive history rarely requires twenty-five pages and 
forty-four footnotes, but Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, 
resorted to such extreme length to try to explain away Monroe. 
The effort, though resourceful, was unavailing. 
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include local governments in § 1986, the term "person" cannot 
inc 1 ud e t h em i n § 19 ~ 3 • 
Nevertheless, only two Justices dissented in 
Monell. And all of the Justices who joined the Court's 
opinion had at some point in the past joined a Court opinion that 
held municipalities immune under S 1983. What accounts for this 
remarkable mass changing of minds especially when Justice 
Brennan's view of the legislative history was so unconvincing? 
As suggested before, the most likely explanation for 
the Court's switch concentrates on the conflict between Monroe v. 
Pape and the Court's willingness since Brown v. Board of 
Education 15 / to hear § 1983 cases against school boards. 
' 
Justice Brennan's opinion cites twenty-three decisions brought 
under § 1983 in which school boards were defendants. 161 The 
Court even attempted to find support for municipal liability fro1n 
the fact that Congress had not, as a result of those decisions, 
"striplped] the federal courts of jurisdiction over school 
17/ boards," and from other congressional actions. 
The Court's dilemma, however, was most 
articulated in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell 181: 
This line of cases -- Monroe to Kenosha -- is 
difficult to reconcile on a principled basis 
14/ Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. 
15/ 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
16/ 436 u.s. at 6 63, n.5. 
17/ Id. at 696-699. 
18/ Id • at 711 (Powe 11, J. , concurring). 
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fully 
with a parallel series of cases in which the 
Court has assumed sub silentio that some local 
government entities- could be sued under § 
1983. If now, after full consideration of the 
question, we continued to adhere to Monroe, 
grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's 
exercise of ~ 1983 jurisdiction over school 
boards. See ante, at 663 n. 5 Since "the 
principle of blanket immunity established in 
Monroe cannot be cabined short of school 
boards," ante, at 696, the conflict is 
squarely presented. 
Justice Powell noted that the Court could avoid 
outright reversal of Monroe by distinguishing the school board 
cases as primarily injunctive, and not involviny monetary 
claims. He suggested that this approach would roughly follow the 
treatment by Ex Parte Young, 19/ 209 u.s. 123 (1908), of Eleventh 
Amendment issues, by allowing injunctive suits against local 
governments. But that approach, Justice Powe 11 reasoned, would 
only resurrect the "bifurcated application" of § 1983 that the 
Court had rejected in City of Kenosha v. Bruno. Justice Powell 
also suggested that municipal immunity under § 1983 would only 
result in the recognition of a direct constitutional cause of 
action against local governments under the theory of Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents. In these 
circumstances, Justice Powell concluded, "the better course" was 
to recognize municipal liability under § 1983. 
19/ 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
20/ 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
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I II. 
The choice facing the Supreme Court in Monell was a 
difficult one. To follow Monroe would indeed have "cast lJrave 
doubt" on the Court's jurisdiction in its school desegregation 
cases, a course that must have been both alanning and unappealing 
to many Justices. The political consequences of such an act 
would have been substantial. As a political institution, the 
Court could ill afford to confess that its most controversial and 
prominent line of decisions over the preceding twenty-five years 
-- insisting on desegregated education -- had occurred in cases 
over which the Court had improperly taken jurisdiction. 21 / Tt1e 
reduction of public confidence in the Court, and in public 
perceptions of the legitimacy ot the Court's actions, could have 
been substantial. 
But the course chosen by the Court, though possibly the 
"better course" as Justice Powell put it, carried real costs of 
its own. In essence, the Court proclaimed an irrational and 
intellectually insupportable interpretation of a major statute. 
The Court simply rewrote the Civil Rights Act of 1871, reversing 
the intent of the Forty-Second Congress. There can be no dispute 
that the Court exceeded its constitutional role. 
Some justification for the Monell decision may be drawn 
from the fact that it was, and remains, subject to reversal by 
211 'l'here is little question that a school desegregation suit 
could be brought directly under "federal question" juri sd ict ion 
by asserting a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
plaintiffs in the school board cases had not, however, followed 
that course for the most part, but had brought ~ 1983 suits. 
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Congress. And the Court can perhaps take some solace from the 
fact that there has been, as yet, no legislative restoration of 
municipal immunity under ~ 19 83. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why the 
Court did not adopt the middle course considered briefly in 
Justice Powell's opinion to relax municipal immunity for 
injunctive actions only, following the example in Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence of Ex Parte Young. Such a course still 
would not have recognized the true intent of the Forty-Second 
Congress, since the 1371 Act presumed complete municipal 
immunity. But the usurpation of legislative powers achieved by 
such a course surely would have been less severe than that 
accomplished by the eventual decision in Monell. 
Moreover, the legislative history of the Sherman 
Amendment more nearly supports such a "bifurcated" outcome than 
it does the decision actually reached in Monell. The Forty-
Second Congress refused to approve the imposition of Qoney 
damages on local governments as proposed by the Sherman 
Amendment. Thus, Congress plainly intended that muncipalities 
not be liable for such money damages. The legislative history 
might, however, be construed to be silent on the question whether 
equitable relief was to be avail able against local governments. 
That silence might be stretched to recognize equitable actions 
\ 
against muncipalities, since by 1871 the federal courts had 
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established their power to enforce the Contract Clause against 
municipalities. 22 / 
Although this inter~retation of the legislative history 
may not be over~owering, it is at least as plausible as Justice 
Brennan's version in Monell, and has the additional virtue of 
preserving at least some of the original congressional intent to 
exempt muncipalities from liability. Those few pre-Monel! 
decisions in which plaintiffs sought money damages against school 
boards might have been called into question, but the vast 
majority of school board cases under § 1983 would have been 
undisturbed. 
IV. 
But the Court did not adopt a middle course in 
Monell. Instead, reflecting the civil rights sensibilities of 
the late twentieth century, it boldly overrode the apparent 
intent of Congress. That decision, it may be argued, briefly 
distorted the Supreme Court's perspective on § 1983. For a short 
time, Monell seems to have cast the Court adrift from traditional 
methods of judicial decision-making in § 1983 cases. 
For example, in Owen v. City of Independence, the Court 
denied to local governments the "good-faith" immunity to ~ 1982 
actions available to individuals. The Owen Court confronted 
\ 
incontestable evidence that municipalities in the nineteenth 
century enjoyed some fonn of immunity fro10 tort actions. In view 
2 L./ See Monell, supra, 436 u.s. at 673, citing Board of 
Committees v. Aspinwald. 24 How. 376 (1861). 
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of that evidence, and the fact that Congress did not abrogate 
those pre-existing immunities Congress must be presumed to have 
intended to accord to those governments in § 1983 actions the 
legal defenses they already enjoyed. Instead of 
acknowledging this historical truth in interpreting§ 1983, the 
Court wondered which outcome, based on current economic theory, 
would best "serve as a deterrent against the future 
constitutional violations." 24 / The Court then trumpeted its 
decision as one that "properly allocates the costs" of 
constitutional 
Congress. 
25/ injuries, not as the decision mandated by 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 u.s. 1 (1980), marked the high-
water point of the Court's erratic interpretation of § 1983. In 
that decision, the Court faced the question whether the phrase 
"and laws" in § 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations 
under color of state law of any federal statutory right. The 
critical point in Thiboutot was that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
did not include the phrase "and laws" in the section that became 
42 u.s.c. § 1983. Rather, the original version provided a cause 
of action for deprivation under color of state law only of rights 
231 There is an Alice-in-~Jonderland suality to the exchange in 
Owen, since the entire case is based on a false premise: that 
local governments could be liable to ~ 1983 suits. Since the 
Forty-Second Congress did not intend to create such liability, 
discussions of partial municipal immunity are necessarily 
somewhat speculative and fanciful. 
24/ See Owen v. City of Independence, supra, 445 u.s. at 651. 
25 / Id., at 657. 
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"arising under the Co~stitution." The words "and laws" were 
inserted when the federal statutes were codified in 1874. 
In an opinion virtually devoid of analysis, the Court 
in Thiboutot ruled that the codification created a cause of 
action under § 1983 for the loss of federal statutory rights, 
even though for no such causes of action had been recognized the 
preceding 10 4 years. In so ruling, the Court ignored both the 
principle that a codification does not alter the substantive 
statutes, and the express statements in Congress in 1874 that the 
codification did not change existing law. 26/ 
There have been indications in the past two Terms of 
the Supreme Court that the disorienting impact of Monell 
evident in Owen and Thiboutot -- is wearing off. The Court has 
taken substantial steps to cut back the dramatic expansion of S 
1983 achieved by Maine v. Thiboutot. Within a year of Thiboutot, 
the Court reached out in Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l 
Sea Clammers, 27/ to restrict Thiboutot even though the parties 
had not even discussed § 1983. Justice Powell, writing for the 
Court in Sea Clammers, emphasized that a § 1983 action may not be 
maintained to vindicate fedE:ral statutory rights "(w]hen the 
remedial devices in a particular act are sufficiently 
comprehensive." 281 Because the federal statutes at issue in 
Sea Clammers had ample remedial provisions, the Court found that 
26/ Maine v. 'l'h ibou tot, supra, 4 4 8 U.S. at 17 (Powe 11, J. , 
dissenting). 
27/ 4 53 u.s. l (1981). 
28 / Id. at 20. 
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a § 1983 action was foreclosed. This analysis provides a means 
by which courts can prevent § 1983 from supplanting great chunks 
of the United States Cod e. 
Still, when legal historians review the Court's heady 
adventures with § 1983 over the past few years, they may well 
conclude that Monell was a critical turning point. In Monell, 
the Court turned its back on congressional intent as a guide to 
applying § 1983, preferring rather to consult its own perceptions 
of the proper ways to provide redress for constitutional 
rights. That decision, however well-intentioned, must be seen as 
gravely flawed and its unsettling effect on the jurisprudence of 
§ 1983 must I:Je recognized. That effect can be contained, 
perhaps, through decisions like Sea Clammers, which make clear 
tnat ~ 1983 is not some sort of super-statute, providing an all-
pur.POse federal remedy for all grievances against government 
action. 
But, realistic ally, the Supr erne Court cannot be 
expected to confess its error in Monell and restore municipal 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher DAte: March 5, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services--Reply 
to WHR Missive Dated March 6, 1978 
In the event you get into a debate with WHR over 
Monell, you might find useful the following observations. 
1. The technique of avoiding overruling by 
refashioning the rationale of a previous decision is not 
foreign to WHR. WHR's memo refers to the per curiam in 
United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 (1973), as 
"dicta" not entitled to substantial protection from the 
doctrine of stare decisis. The Court's language and the 
headnote in Indrelunas, however, make clear that the Court 
was of the view that "whatever may be the appropriate 
sanctions available in a particular case for capricious 
conduct on the part of a litigant, we do not believe that 
a case-by-case tailoring of the "separate document" 
provision of Rule 58 is one of them. That provision is, 
as Professor Moore states, a 'mechanical change' that must 
be mechanically applied in order to avoid new 
uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is 
entered." Id., at 221-222. Bob tells me that WHR's 
position in Bankers Trust v. Mallis minimizes the 
"mechanical" nature of the Rule 58 provision, in favor of 
a case-by-case approach. 
Another example is WHR's opinion in Paul v. 
Davis, 424 u.s 693 (1976). Paul altered substantially the 
2. 
rationale of Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 u.s. 433 
(1971). The headnote from Constantineau states: "The 
label or characterization given an individual by 
'posting.' though a mark of serious illness to some, is to 
others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural 
due process requires notice and an opportunity to be 
heard." That headnote is faithful to Justice Douglas' 
process of reasoning. WHR's opinion in Paul recasts the 
rationale of Constantineau to require that there be some 
"alteration of legal status which, combined with the 
injury resulting from the defamation, justified the 
invocation of procedural safeguards." 424 U.S., at 
708-709. WHR explained that he was merely interpreting 
the language in Constantineau, but it is hard to read 
Douglas' opinion other than as resting on "stigma" alone. 
WHR is quite right, as Professor Telford Taylor 
told us at Columbia, that much of the language in Marbury 
v. Madison was unnecessary. But there have been numerous 
decisions since then in which the rationale of Marbury was 
absolutely essential to justify what the Court was doing. 
In this case, City of Kenosha v. Bruno is the one decision 
which can be explained only in terms of Monroe's exclusion 
of municipalities from the reach of § 1983. And the issue 
was neither briefed nor argued in that case. 
WHR says that stare decisis should not depend on 
whether counsel in briefs and oral argument fully explored 
the issue. It is surely a factor that the Court is 
3. 
entitled to consider, and it is a factor that WHR 
considers relevant in dismissing the precedential value of 
"an unargued ~curiam .••• " (WHR Memorandum, p.6). 
2. On the school-board cases, WHR states that the 
most that can be said is that the school-board defendants 
"did not raise a possible defense which was available to 
them, and the Court therefore did not pass upon or discuss 
such a defense." (} ~ . ,, ~But as City of Kenosha v. Bruno points 
ll 
out, the inclusion of a municipality as a defendant in a ~ 
, I 
§1983 action, absent satisfaction of the ~4o'K~-e~ s1l,.~ 
---- ... a.... tilt- Ll 
amount-in-controversy requirement, is a jurisdictional ~ ~ 
question that the Court must raise on its own motion. ~ ._ 
I~of Kenosha itself is not terribly different
, ---~ 1 "' 
from the school-board cases because the Attorney General ~
of Wisconsin intervened as a party-defendant. 412 u.s., at q'-~ 
~
513-514.  
Also with respect to City of Kenosha, WHR offers 
no rebuttal to our point that whatever the Court does in 
this case, it will have to disturb the rationale of City 
of Kenosha to some extent. 
»-L 
3. I do not agree that if the Court holds that a ~ 
municipal corporation is a "person," then "it is ~v.. 
doctrinally very difficult to say they [it is] not liable 
11{~3~ 
the ~., • .. t_ d. •-v 
As we state
~ 
on a respondeat superior because Congress rejected 
Sherman Amendment" (WHR Memorandum, p. 12). 
liability on "wrongdoers." 
 
Absent authorization or the ~ 
-Wv,'YJ. ~~' 
in our memorandum, Congress was concerned with imposing 
----------~-~-------------
4. 
kind of recklessness from which one may infer 
authorization, see Rizzo v. Goode, the City of Chicago 
could not be held at fault for the tortious excess of its 
employees in Monroe. What troubled the Republican 
Congressmen about the Sherman Amendment was that it ~c~·· J-~ 
imposed liability on a municipality for private violence !~ 
'J&il6~ 
for which the municipality was simply not responsible. ~
Whatever the state of the common law of respondeat  
' ' superior in 1871, there is no difficult in holding that ~ 
even though a municipality is a "person,• Congress did no~~ 
intend respondeat-superior liability. This type of 
approach is not terribly different from WHR's opinion in 
Edelman v. Jordan, where the Court held that even though a 
state official sued in his official capacity is a 
"person," the Eleventh Amendment prevents a retroactive 
award. 
By the way, the concept of liability for 
conspiratorial violence was not entirely scrapped by the 
42d Congress. Section 1986 of Title 42, which emerged in 
response to the Sherman Amendment's rejection, imposes 
liability on "[e]very person who, having knowledge that 
any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in 
section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and 
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the 
commission of the same, neglects or refuses to do so, if 
such wrongful act be committed .••. "Unlike the Sherman 
Amendment, this measure requires a showing of knowledge of 
5. 
the wrong and power to prevent its commission. 
4. As to practical considerations, I do not 
understand WHR's point that if Monroe's reading of the 
legislative history is rejected, "those who join in that 
holding but wish to incorporate a good faith defense for 
municipal corporation have given up whatever bargaining 
chips they have when the availability of the defense 
actually comes before us in an argued case." There will 
be no need for, and no occasion to "cash in," "bargaining 
chips" if the Court votes, as WHR suggests, to retain 
Monroe's reading. Moreover, I think that Justice Brennan 
would be willing to hint strongly that municipalities 
cannot be held liable for violations of a constitutional 
right which was not clearly defined at the time of the 
deprivation. As JPS pointed out in his dissent, BRW's 
v 
opinion in Procunier v. Navarette finds such a qualified 
immunity in the case of a jailer without even attempting 
an exploration of _protection accorded to such an offical 
at common law. At the very least, this issue can be raised 
in a paragraph directing the lower court to consider it on 
remand. When the issue comes back up here, there should 
be five votes to find such a qualified immunity. 
The other practical consideration identified by 
WHR is that the Court will be removing an incentive to 
curb lawless conduct by the "head honcho." This is a 
little difficult to understand because WHR states that 
"[i]n a case like the present one, where the municipal 
6. 
corporation would probably not be liable under Monroe, 
and the officials sued have a good faith-reasonable 
immunity defense under Wood v. Strickland (until that is 
overruled) , there simply will be no judgment against 
anyone upon which plaintiffs may collect" (WHR Memorandum, 
pp. 13-14). That is precisely the problem. In the case 
of authorized conduct, a core concern of § 1983, it is 
hard to find a defendant who can be held liable in damages. 
S.E. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social Services 
This memorandum replies to Lewis' circulation of 
February 23rd; the pressures of preparation for oral argument 
and Conference have prevented me from circulating it sooner. 
As to the sense of what the Congress meant by the word "person" 
when it enacted § 1983 HH in 1971, I think issue is pretty 
well joined between Bill Brennan and me. I would quite frankly 
concede that if at the time of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
the same thorough canvass of the l e gislative history had been 
made as we have done this Term, the Court should have concluded 





corporations. But it seems to me that the exchange of memoranda 
has likewise shown that this is by no means an open and shut 
question, and that the balance is about sixty-forty -- a 
/ 
balance which I do not regard as meeting the requirement for 
overruling an issue of statutory construction stated by John 
Harlan in his concurring opinion in Monroe, supra, that "it 
appear beyond doubt frpm the legislative history ofXkX the 
statute" that previous Courts "misapprehended the meaning 
of the controlling provision II 365 u.s. 167, 192. 
But this simply brings us to the meaning and importance 
of stare decisis in statutory cases, and that is where I take 
issue with much of Lewis' memorandum. 
Some parts of his memorandum suggest that because the 
•arties may not have argued the "person" defni tional issue 
ell Monroe, the doctrine of stare decisis is less applicable 
) Monroe than it would be to a case where counsel in £ briefs 
\ 
- 3 -
and oral argument had fully explored the issue. Since only 
Bill Brennan and Potter were on the Court at the time of Monroe, 
I suppose it is idle for the rest of us to speculate as to 
what went on in Conference at that case; but I had never 
understood the principle of stare decisis to depend on how ... 
well counsel presented to the Court the issue which it undertook 
a nd did decide. 
There surely is no question but what Bill Douglas' 
opinion for the Court in Monroe does decide the question that 
• 
a municipal·corporation is not a "person" for purposes of 
§ 1983. Indeed, one need only to look at the last headnote 
to the case, on page 168, to find the holding that "the city 
of Chicago is not liable under § 1979 [predecessor to § 1983) 
because Congress -did not intend to bring municipal corporations ,· 
within the ambit of that section." The headnote indicates that 
- 4 -
five pages of the Court's opinion NNMXN were devoted to that 
point. 
There is a certain parallel here between stare decisis 
and the doctrine of immunity which we discussed at Conference 
on Friday. One does not logically reach the question of a 
defendant's immunity until one assumes or decides that the 
plaintiff has stated or proved a claim for relief. Likewise, 
one does not reach theq1estion of whether a doctrine should be 
retained because of the principle of stare decisis until 
one concludes that the case was wrongly decided in the first 
place. There is no need of a doctrine of stare decisis 
to preserve the h~ldings or the reasoning of opinions which a 
presently si~ting Court concludes were correct. In this 
connection, I recall ' sitting around the Conference table 
two years ago where several of us wished to overturn another 
- 5 -
part of the decision in Monroe v. Pape deciding that there was 
no requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under 
§ 1983. The headnote to the case lists this, too, as one of 
fue holdings, but indicates that only one page was devoted to 
its discussion; reference to that page (365 U.S., at 183) 
shows that one paragraph of very conclusionary analysis was 
devoted to the point. Nonetheless, in spite of what I thought 
~ the time a majority felt were serious practical drrficulties 
WLth the rule, a majority nonetheless refused to overturn it 
because of stare decisis. 
Lewis' memorandum says that we should not "overrule" 
Monroe but justify its result for other reasons. I think 
this represents only a semantical difference from Bill Brennan's 
approach. Here we are not being asked to disavow dicta, in 
the sense that in my memorandum in Bankers Trust v. Mallis 
- 6 -
I have urged the Court to disregard dicta in United States v. 
Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 (1973}. I think dicta, particularly 
in an unargued per curiam, have always stood on a different 
footing with respect to stare decisis than the process of 
reasoning necessary to reach the Court's result. To say that 
by now holding that a municipal corporation is a "person" 
§ 
within the meaning ofL1983 would not be to overrule that 
part of Monroe v. Pape because the same result could be 
justified ona doctrine that § 1983 does not permit imposition 
of respondeat superior liability would be somewhat arialogous 
to deciding that the doctrine of judicial review enunciated 
in Marbury v. Madison is no longer the law, but saying at the 
same time that we were not overruling Marbury becaus the rule 
/ 
- 7 -
to show cause could have been discharged on a different ground. 
I also _disagree with Lewis' statement in his memorandum 
that the cases on this subject are in confusion, and that this 
case presents an opportunity to clarify the law. In my opinion, 
the cases are in no confusion whatsoever as to whether a 
municipal corporation is a ''person" for purposes of § 1983. 
On every one of the four occasions which this Court has addressed 
that issue, it has concluded that it was not: Monroe v. Pape, 
Moor v. County of Alameda, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, and 
Mt. 
MN»K±/Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, we have said 
that it was not. The cases which Lewis'refers to as creating 
confusion, and which Bill Brennan and I both discussed at 
length in our memoranda, are the school board cases. But 
- 8 -
none of the results in these cases would have come out 
differently had the Court in them expressly addressed the 
question of whether a municipal corporation is a "person" 
under § 1983; and since the Court did not address that issue 
in any of the school board cases referred to in the memoranda, 
there is nothing in any of them that would have to be overruled. 
Thus, to my mind, there simply is no "confusion" in the cases; 
the most that can be said is that in some cases involving school 
board defendants, those defendants did not raise a possible 
defense which was available to them, and the Court therefore 
did not pass upon or discuss such a defense. This is surely 
not tantamount to a holding that if the factual elements 
necessary to establish the defense were made out, it nonetheless 
- 9 -
did not exist as a matter of law. 
Lewis also expresses greater satisfaction with the 
practical consequences that would result from adoption of 
his position than would from retaining the reasoning of 
Monroe. While there probably is a good deal to be said 
for his position if the Court in this case were willing to 
~ate that municipal corporations had the same good faith-
reasonable defense to liability as was established for municipal 
[sic] 
officials in Wood v. Sxx:i:Idd: Stricland,L42.0 U.S. 308 (1975). 
To me, that is a rather large "if". Byron, who wrote Wood 
and who recently authored Procunier v. Navarette for the Court, 
is unwilling to commit himself in this case to such a defense, 
has 
and HxLexpressly joined in circulating memoranda in that unwilling-
ness by Bill and John, I foresee some doubt as to whether 
there would be five votes to impose it. And of course, 
once the holding of Monroe as to "person" is overruled, 
- 10 -
those who join in that holding but wish to incorporate a 
good faith defense for · municipal corporations have given up 
whatever bargaining chips they have when the availability 
of the defense actually comes before us in an argued case. 
Lewis suggests that Monroe and Moor could be justified 
as to result by the "42d Congress' rejection of vicarious 
liability as an operative principle of the 1871 Civil Righ~s 
Act". LFP memo, page 7. I think Bill's memorandum, too, 
although I am not certain, makes the statement that municipal 
corporations still could not be held on a theory of respondeat 
superior for acts of low level officials under § 1983. As I 
understand it, the justification for this rejection of 
respondeat superior liability is that although the 42d Congress/ 
- 11 -
rejection of the Sherman Amendment is not an adequate basis 
for excluding municipal corporations from the definition of 
"person" under the Act, it is an adequate basis for saying 
fuey may not be held on a respondeat superior theory for 
actions of lower-level employees. But if Bill's version 
of the legislative history, which as I have stated above 
is I think a somewhat more careful and accurate version 
than that contained in Monroe, is correct, it affords no 
basis for saying that although cities are "persons" within 
fue Act they are not liable on a respondeat superior basis for 
actions of their numerous employees. The Sherman Amendment 
was not an effort to impose vicarious liability on cities 
and counties for acts of their employees; it was a far more 






as defined in § 1983 for mere failure to prevent private 
vandals from conuni tting crimes against· persons or property 
within the municipal jurisdiction. Just as Congress could 
quite consistently have rejected it and still intend that 
municipal corporations be "persons" within § 1983, Congress 
could have rejected the amendment and still intended that 
"persons", including municipal corporations if they are to 
~ hcluded within that definition, are liable for affirmative 
acts of their employees under a respondeat superior theory. 
In short, I think that once municipal corporations are 
included within the definition of "person" in § 1983, it is 
doctrinally very difficult to say that they are not liable 
on a respondeat superior because Congress rejected the 
Sherman Amendment. 
- 13 -
I guess we have all been judges long enough to know 
that practical considerations may influence us to a greater 
or lesser extent, and that if one feels the practical results 
of a prior statutory holding are outrageous, he will find 
some reason to vote to overrule it notwithstanding stare decisis. 
But it seems to me this is an area where the doctrine of 
stare decisis itself is an important practical argument 
against taking the position that Lewis does. In the first 
place, it is not, as I believe he suggests at one point in his 
memorandum, a question of "six of one, half a dozen of the 
other" so far as practical results are concerned. In a case 
like the present one, where the municipal corporation would 
probably not be liable under Monroe, and the officials sued 
have a good faith-reasonable immunity ·defense under Wood -----
v. Strickland {until that is overruled), there simply will be 
- 14 -
no judgment against anyone upon which plaintiffs may collect. 
Additionally, where one confronts the quite different situation 
of police officers breaking down doors at night, cities and 
counties retain a good deal more authority to control the 
conduct of their employees under Monroe than they would if 
Monroe were overruled. As matters now stand, cities and 
counties may themselves provide for indemnity in cases of 
good faith and reasonable conduct on the part of individuals 
against whom judgments are rendered, or they may seek state 
laws to that effect. This requirement in order to qualify 
IDr indemnity constitutes some pressure on individual officials 
to comply with the Constitution and the laws. But if 
Monroe is to be overruled on the definition of "person", 
/ 
- 15 -
and a doctrinally difficult "no respondeat superior liability" 
substituted in its place, serious inequities will result. 
The middle level municipal official will find himself at the 
close of all the evidence being the sole defendant in many 
cases, since the municipal corporation will have been dismissed 
on the "no respondeat superior" theory. The top dogs in the 
municipal hierarchy, however: for example, the school board 
members in this case, because of their very broad discretionary 
authority over all of the municipal corporation's affairs, 
and because of the fact that the corporation can act only 
through them, will through their acts invariably subject the 
rorporation in itself to liability if the proposed overruling 
is to have any practical consequence. The result will be 
that in many cases a low level municipal employee has a judgment 
- 16 -
against him without a counterpart judgment against his city 
employer, while the city council men against whom judgment 
is rendered will all but invariably have a counterpart judgment 
rendered against the city itself. None of us who have 
practiced need tobe told that the plaintiff in such a case 
will first pursue the municipal corporation, rather than the 
ndividual (however prosperous he may be). Thus the middle 
level employee will frequently have to respond to a judgment 
by himself, subject only to such insurance protection or 
indemnity protection as the city or state has chosen to give 
him, while the head honcho will as a practical matter never 
have to respond because every time a judgment may be rendered 
against him it may also be rendered against the city. 
In conclusion, I think Lewis' memorandum suggesting 
that we would not be violating the policy of stare decisis 
- 17 -
nor actually overruling the holding of Monroe . is wrong. I 
say this with genuine deference and respect, since I know 
that he has devoted as much if not more time and thought to 
the matter than I have. But I cannot believe that countless 
arrangements by way of indemnity ordinances and statutes, 
insurance policies and rates, and the like, have not been 
made in reliance on headnote 4 of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
168: 
"The city of Chicago is not liable under 
§ 1979, because Congress did not intend to 
bring municipal corporations within the 
ambit of that section." 
And we have reaffirmed that statement of the law three times 
in fue intervening sixteen years -- in Moor, City of Kenosha, 
and Mt. Healthy. Whatever conclusion the Court reaches in 
this case, it must overrule Monroe on this point and 
admit that other factors have prevailed over the doctrine 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 75-1914 -
I have read with g at in rest the very helpful memoranda 
of our two Bills and the ensuing correspondence from others. 
Although I indicated at our initial conference of November 4 that 
I was inclined to affirm (with a question mark), that inclination 
was dominated by the holdings in Monroe, Kenosha, and Moor to 
which I felt, as is usually (although not always) the case for all of 
us, some sense of stare decisis deference. 
I think that the research that has been done as a result of 
the present case has proved to be most worthwhile. I have con-
cluded that although we should not so indulge every day, we must 
now concede that the decision in Monroe is questionable. My 
inclination is to overrule it, but perhaps I could be persuaded, 
as are others, not to overrule it but to "confine it to its facts, 11 
even though that device so often is a euphemism for overruling. 
I prefer to refrain from deciding now any school board 
immunity is sue although I would not at all object, as Bill Brennan 
suggests in his letter of February 23, to a statement that that 
question remains open for consideration. 
In sum, I now vote to rever·se. 
fUfi-
lfp/ss 3~/78 
March 6, 1978 
75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
At the special Conference today at which the Court 
took a final vote on the above case, I raised the question 
as to possible disqualification because of the ownership by 
my wife and me of municipal bonds. 
I reminded the Conference that in a case last Term 
(I believe) written by Harry, involving a Contract Clause 
question that could have affected the enforceability of 
every municipal bond in the country, both Justice Stewart 
and I recused ourselves. I view Monell and similar cases 
as being quite different. The Code of Judicial Conduct 
does not require disqualification for the ownership of 
government securities unless the particular government 
issuing the securities is a party to a ~on that may 
affect it. I therefore have not disqualified myself in the 
many cases that come to the Court involving suits by or 
against municipalities, school boards and other agencies or 
entities of government. These involve a broad spectrum of 
cases from damage and injunction claims to the validity of 
tax measures, zoning ordinances, the applicability of 
federal statutes (~-~.,Equal Employment Opportunities 
lfp/ss 3~/78 




75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
At the special Conference today at which the Court 
took a final vote on the above case, I raised the question 
as to possible disqualification because of the ownership by 
my wife and me of municipal bonds. 
I reminded the Conference that in a case last Term 
(I believe) written by Harry, involving a Contract Clause 
question that could have affected the enforceability of 
every municipal bond in the country, both Justice Stewart 
and I recused ourselves. I view Monell and similar cases 
as being quite different. The Code of Judicial Conduct 
does not require disqualification for the ownership of 
government securities unless the particular government 
issuing the securities is a party to a ~on that may 
affect it. I therefore have not disqualified myself in the 
many cases that come to the Court involving suits by or 
against municipalities, school boards and other agencies or 
entities of government. These involve a broad spectrum of 
cases from damage and injunction claims to the validity of 
tax measures, zoning ordinances, the applicability of 
federal statutes (~.~., Equal Employment Opportunities 
A ' I • 
2. 
Act, etc.) and the like. 
It was the unanimous view of the Chief Justice and 
other Justices that there was no occasion to consider 
disqualification in cases of this kind, including Monell 
ss 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
I 
Re: No. 76-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social Services 
This memorandum replies to Lewis' circulation of February 23rd; 
the pressures of preparation for oral argument and Conference have 
prevented me from circulating it sooner. As to the sense of what 
the Congress meant by the word "person" when it enacted § 1983 in 
1971, I think issue is pretty well joined between Bill Brennan 
and me. I would quite frankly concede that if at the time of 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S . 167, the same thorough canvass of the 
legislative history had been made as we have done this Term, the 
Court should have concluded that the word "person" in 1983 did 
not exclude municipal corporations. But it seems to me that the 
exchange of memoranda has likewise shown that this is by no means 
an open and shut question , and that the balance is about sixty-
forty -- a balance which I do not regard as meeting the requirement 
for overruling an issue of statutory construction, as stated by 
I 
- 2 -
John Harlan in his concurring opinion in Monroe, that "it appear 
beyond doubt from the legislative history of the statute" 
that previous decisions "misapprehended the meanin9 of the con-
trolling provision ••• " 365 u.s. 167, 192. 
There is a certain parallel here between stare decisis and 
the doctrine of immunity which we discussed at Conference on 
Friday. One does not logically reach the question of a defendant's 
immunity until one assumes or decides that the plaintiff has 
stated or proved a claim for relief. Likewise, one does not reach 
the question of whether a doctrine should be retained because of 
the principle of stare decisis until one concludes that the case 
was wrongly decided in the first place. There is no need of a 
doctrine of stare decisis to preserve the holdings or the reasoning 
of opinions which a presently sitting Court concludes were correct. 
But this simply brings us to the meaning and importance of 
stare decisis in statutory cases, and that is where I take issue 
with much of Lewis' memorandum. 
Some parts of his memorandum suggest that because the parties 
may not have argued the "person" definitional issue well in Monroe, 
the doctrine of stare decisis is less applicable to Monroe than it 
would be to a case where counsel in briefs and oral argument had 
fully explored the issue. Since only Bill Brennan and Potter were 
- 3 -
on the court at the time of Monroe, I suppose it is idle for the 
rest of us to speculate as to what went on in Conference at that 
case: but I had never understood the principle of stare decisis 
to depend on how well counsel presented to the Court the issue 
which it undertook and did decide. Rather, the principle recog-
nizes that the law should be settled, even though wrongly, so that 
persons and their counsel can govern their actions accordingly. 
In this regard, while municipal counsel cannot predict this 
Court's future views on the quality of advocacy in prior cases, 
they can certainly tell the difference between dictum and holding. 
There surely is no question but what Bill Douglas• opinion for the 
court in Monroe clearly holds that a municipal corporation is not 
a "person" for purposes of § 1983. Indeed, one need only to look 
at the last headnote to the case, on page 168, to find the holding 
that "the city of Chicago is not liable under § 1979 [predecessor 
to § 1983] because Congress did not intend to bring municipal 
corporations within the ambit of that section." The headnote 
indicates that five pages of the Court's opinion were devoted to 
that point. 
In this connection, I recall sitting around the Conference 
table two years ago where several of us wished to overturn another 
part of the decision in Monroe v. Pape deciding that there was no 
- 4 -
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under § 1983. 
The headnote to the case lists this, too, as one of the holdings, 
but indicates that only one page was devoted to its discussion; 
reference to that page (365 U.S., at 183) shows that one paragraph 
of very conclusionary analysis was devoted to the point. Nonetheles~ 
in spite of what I thought at the time a majority felt were serious 
practical difficulties with the rule, a majority nonetheless refused 
to overturn it because of stare decisis. 
Lewis' memorandum says that we should not "overrule" the 
holding of Monroe, but justify its result for other reasons. I 
think this represents only a Eemantical difference from Bill 
Brennan's approach. Here we are not being asked to di$avow dicta, 
in the sense that my memorandum in Bankers Trust v. Mallis urges 
the Court to disregard dicta in United States v. Indrelunas, 411 
U.S. 216 (1973). I think dicta, particularly in an unargued per 
curiam, have always stood on a different footing with respect to 
stare decisis than the process of reasoning necessary to reach 
the Court's result. To say that to now hold that a municipal 
corporation is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 would not 
be to overrule that part of Monroe v. Pape because the same result 
could be justified on a doctrine that § 1983 does not permit 
imposition of respondeat superior liability would be somewhat 
- 5 -
analogous to deciding that the doctrine of judicial review 
enunciated in Marbury v. Madison is no longer the law, but saying 
at the same time that we were not overruling Marbury because the 
rule to show cause could have been discharged on a different ground. 
Preserving only the result of Monroe does nothing to protect the 
settled expectations of municipalities which have fashioned their 
indemnity ordinances and their insurance coverage in reliance on 
this Court's holding that they are not "persons" under § 1983. 
I also disagree with Lewis' statement in his memorandum that 
the cases on this subject are in confusion, and that this case 
presents an opportunity to clarify the law. In my opinion, the 
cases are in no confusion whatsoever as to whether a municipal 
corporation is a "person" for purposes of § 1983. On every one 
of the four occasions which this Court has addressed that issue 
Monroe v. Pape, Moor v. County of Alameda, City of Kenosha v. 
Bruno, and Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle -- we have 
said that it was not. The cases which Lewis refers to as creating 
confusion, and which Bill Brennan and I both discussed at length 
in our memoranda, are the school board cases. But none of the 
results in these cases would have come out differently had the 
Court in them expressly addressed the question of whether a muni-
cipal corporation is a "person" under § 1983~ and since the Court 
. ,, 
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did not address that issue in any of the school board cases 
referred to in the memoranda, there is nothing in any of them 
that would have to be overruled. Thus, to my mind, there simply 
is no "confusion" in the cases; the most that can be said is that 
in some cases involving school board defendants, those defendants 
did not raise a possible defense which was available to the school 
-...... 
corporation, and the Court therefore did not pass upon or discuss 
such a defense. The Court's silence in this regard, unlike its 
holding in Monroe, cannot have given rise to any false expectations. 
Since 1954, every school board has known it is subject to the 
equitable relief granted by our cases, but, since Monroe in 1961 
no municipal corporation has had any reason to believe it could 
be held liable in damages. 
Lewis also expresses greater satisfaction with the practical 
consequences that would result from adoption of his position than 
would from retaining the reasoning of Monroe. There may be a 
good deal to be said for his position if the Court in this case 
were willing to state that municipal corporations had the same 
good faith-reasonable defense to liability as was established for 
municipal officials in Wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 
(1975). To me, that is a rather large "if". Byron, who wrote 
Wood and who recently authored Procunier v. Navarette for the 
·-
- 7 -
Court, is unwilling to commit himself in this case to such a 
defense. Since Bill and John have expressed that same view in 
circulating memoranda, I foresee some doubt as to whether there 
would be five votes to impose it. And of course, once the holding 
of Monroe as to "person" is overruled, those who join in that 
holding but wish to incorporate a good faith defense for municipal 
corporations have given up whatever bargaining chips they have 
when the availability of the defense actually comes before us in 
an argued case. 
In the meantime, municipalities will have no clear guidance 
from this court as they attempt to insure against the financial 
consequences of their officers' good faith inability to predict 
this Court's applications of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
magnitude of the consequences of indecision in this area of the 
law can be grasped by a brief glance at the number and variety of 
cases being held for Monell, which was itself held for Mt. Healthy. 
I guess we have all been judges long enough to know that 
practical considerations may influence us to a greater or lesser 
extent, and that if one feels the practical results of a prior 
statutory holding are outrageous, he will find some reason to vote 
to overrule it notwithstanding stare decisis. But it seems to 
me this is an area where the doctrine of stare decisis itsetf is 
- 8 -
an important practical argument against taking the position that 
Lewis does. In the first place, it is not, as he suggests at 
page 3 of his memorandum, a question of "six of one, half a 
dozen of the other," so far as practical results are concerned. 
In a case like the present one, where the municipal corporation 
would not be liable under Monroe, and the officials sued have a 
good faith immunity defense under Wood v. Strickland (unless that 
is overruled), there simply will be no judgment against anyone 
upon which plaintiffs may collect. 
Lewis suggests that the results in Monroe and Moor could be 
justified by the "42d Congress' rejection of vicariou 
liability as an operative principle of the 1871 civil Rights Act". 
LFP memo, page 7. Bill's memorandum, too, at pp. 46-47, makes 
the statement that municipal corporations still could not be held 
on a theory of respondeat superior for acts of 16~ leveL officials 
under § 1983. As I understand it, the justification for this 
rejection of respondeat superior liability is that although the 
42d Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment is not an ade-
quate basis for excluding municipal corporations from the definiti• 
of "person" under the Act, it is an adequate basis for saying they 
may not be held on a respondeat superior theory for actions of 
lower-level employees. But if Bill's version of the legislative 
- 9 -
history, which as I have stated above is in my opinion a somewhat 
more careful and accurate version than that contained in Monroe, 
is correct, it affords no basis for saying that, although_ cities 
are "persons" within the Act, they are not liable on a respondeat 
superior basis for actions of their numerous employees. The 
Sherman Amendment was not an effort to impose vicarious liability 
on cities and counties for acts of their employees~ it was a far 
more drastic measure, intended to impose liability on "persons"' 
as defined in § 1983 for mere failure to prevent private vandals 
from committing crimes against persons or property within the 
municipal jurisdiction. Just as Congress could quite consistently 
have rejected it and still intended that municipal corporations 
be "persons" within § 1983, Congress could have rejected the 
amendment and still intended that "persons", including municipal 
corporations if they are to be included within that definition, 
are liable for affirmative acts of their employees under a 
respondeat superior theory. In short, I think that once municipal 
corporations are included within the definition of "person" in 
§ 1983, it is doctrinally very difficult to say that they are not 
liable on a respondeat superior because Congress rejected the 
Sherman Amendment. 
When one considers the situation, quite different from that 
f -
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presented here but at the core of congressional concern in enacting 
§ 1983, of police officers breaking down doors at night, serious 
inequities will result if Monroe is to be overruled on its definition 
of "person" and a doctrinally difficult exclusion of respondeat 
superior liability substituted in its place. The middle level 
municipal official will find himself at the close of all the evi-
dence being the sole defendant in many cases, since the municipal 
corporation will have been dismissed for lack of a respondeat 
superior theory. However, the top dogs in the municipal hierarchy, 
(for example, the school board members in this case) because of 
their very broad discretionary authority over all of the municipal 
corporation's affairs, and because of the fact that the corporation 
can act only through them, will through their acts invariably 
subject the corporation itself to liability if the proposed 
overruling of Monroe is to have any practical consequence. The 
result will be that in many cases a low level municipal employee 
has a judgment against him without a counterpart judgment against 
his city employer, while the city councilmen against whom judgment 
is rendered will all but invariably have a counterpart judgment 
rendered against the city itself. None of us who have practiced 
need to be told that the plaintiff in such a case will first pursue 
the municipal corporation, rather than the individual, however 
- 11 -
prosperous he may be. Thus the middle level employee will 
frequently have to respond to a judgment by himself, subject only 
to such insurance protection_or indemnity protection as the city 
or state has chosen to give him, while the head honcho will as a 
practical matter never have to respond because, every time a 
judgment may be rendered against him, it may also be rendered 
against the city. 
Finally, like Lewis, I would prefer to avoid the pressure 
inherent in having to decide whether a Bivens remedy should be 
implied against municipalities under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But that aversion is no reason for disregarding ordinary principles 
of stare decisis and disrupting the settled expectations of 
municipalities. Congress is empowered to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment through appropriate legislation, and it is presently 
considering a bill to provide precisely the relief sought by these 
plaintiffs. Through hearings and investigations, Congress is 
in a far better position than this Court to assess the practical 
impact of the overruling of Monroe. 
In conclusion, I think Lewis' memorandum suggesting that 
we would not be violating the policy of stare decisis nor actually 
overruling the holding of Monroe is wrong. I say this with 
genuine deference and respect, since I know that he has devoted 
l 
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as much if not more time and thought to the matter than I have. 
But I cannot believe that countless arrangements by way of 
indemnity ordinances and statutes, insurance policies and rates, 
and the like, have not been made in reliance on headnote 4 of 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168: 
"The city of Chicago is not liable under 
§ 1979, because Congress did not intend to 
bring municipal corporations within the 
ambit of that section." 
And we have reaffirmed that statement of the law three times in 
the intervening sixteen years -- in Moor, City of Kenosha, and 
Mt. Healthy. Whatever conclusion the Court reaches in this case, 
it must overrule Monroe on this point and admit that other factors 
have prevailed over the doctrine of stare decisis to reach the 
result which Lewis and Bill support. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMI!IER8 0,-
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.iu.prtm.t Clfourl of tqt ~b .ibtftg 
Jl'as4i:nghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll,?ll' 
March 13, 1978 
J 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
Dear Bill: 
With a large investment in this case, I suspect 
you won't mind changing your memo into a dissent. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
CHAMeERS 0,-
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,.JR. 
Dear Bill: 
~tqrrtntt Q}qurt cf tlrt ~ttitt~ ;§tatts 
._aslting~ !9. (!}. 2ll&f'1~ 
May 1, 1978 
No. 75-1914 Monell 
I now have had an opportunity to read your revised 
draft, circulated April 21. 
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points 
raised in my letter of April 11. The new part III on stare 
decisis is quite persuasive, and includes much .of what I 
would have said on this question in a concurring opinion. 
Moreover, if I could persuade you to accept my suggestions 
below, I can join Part II. It contains a helpful - and I 
think correct - explanation of why §1983 does not impose 
liability on government entities for the unauthorized 
misconduct of employees. In view of the fact that our 
previous cases - with the exception of Kenosha v. Bruno -
primarily involved claims of respondeat superior liability 
against municipalities and counties, I think it appropriate 
for the Court to make clear thpt that theory does not 
support a §1983 claim against entities of government. 
In sum, I believe my previously expressed 
concerns have now been reduced to the following narrowly 
focused suggestions: 
1. As you know, I do not view §1983 as 
coextensive with the full power of Congress under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. A number of scholars share this 
view, including Gunther and Monaghan. I would therefore 
appreciate your considering the following clarifications: 
(a) Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph: I 
would substiFute "broad" for "complete". 
(b) Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45: 
Rather than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly 
to exercise the power conferred by §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment", I would simply say that §1983 "represented an 
. . 
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attempt to include all officials and entities within the 
constitutional reach of Congress". It is unnecessary to 
suggest that other features of §1983 are dictated either by 
the Constitution or by 1871 understandings of 
constitutional limits. 
(c) Page 26, middle of first full paragraph: I 
would modify the description of §1 as the only civil remedy 
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps you 
could say that the section provided a "broad" or 
"expansive" civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. Pag~ 30, last sentence in footnote 55 & page 
34, proposed footnote 60: I concur in Potter's view that 
explicit reference to Estelle v. Gamble is undesirable in 
this opinion. There may well be several tenable ways to 
read our decision in Estelle, but I am unwilling to suggest 
in this case that the "deliberate indifference" standard 
has application in contexts other than that of prisons, 
where the inmate is wholly dependent on prison officials 
for the satisfaction of basic human needs. Your discussion 
on pp. 29-30 makes quite clear that official policy can be 
expressed as ·unwritten, informal "custom." I can accept 
this where the custom is unmistakably sanctioned by the 
municipality. And your language at the top of p.34 does 
not foreclose a "deliberate indifference" theory in an 
Eighth Amendment context, where a prison department's 
established policy or "custom" with regard to prisoner 
medical needs "itself inflicts [constitutional] 
injury •••• " In short, I hope you will be willing to drop 
the Estelle sentence in note 55 (or proposed note 60) as 
unnecessary, reserving all mention of the reach of Estelle 
until we have a specific case. 
3. I also agree with Potter that footnote 57 on 
page 32 (with respect to "fault") is unnecessary and 
touches on an issue yet to be resolved. While the 
footnote, as amended in your letter of April 25 to Potter, 
does not commit the Court to any particular proposition of 
law, it may be read as a "signal". In light of our 
reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v. 
Navarette, I would remain silent here. We wi'll have to 
confront the negligence-issue soon enough without inviting 
it. 
4. 
Act of 1976: 
Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' Award 
You describe this as allowing "prevailing 
. . . . 
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parties in §1993 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the 
losing party". I am sure you intend only to state, in 
accord with the statutory language, that the Act merely 
confers discretion on the Court to allow such fees. Also, 
in light of Hutto v. Finney, I am somewhat troubled by your 
characterization of the congressional i ntent on page 39. I 
would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow" 
such awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit 
Monroe." 
5. Your revision of Part IV as to immunity -
leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable. I 
no longer will write on the immunity issue, although my 
previously expressed view remains firm. 
* * * * 
I appreciate your efforts to accommodate the 
various suggestions from other Brothers and me. This is, 
however, a major new precedent and I am strongly disposed 
to move cautiously. If you will make the changes suggested 
above, I will be happy to join you - although I do not 
foreclose the possibility of having minor editing 
suggestions as I reread your comprehensive opinion. 
Also, I still may write briefly to emphasize a 
point or two where we may have shades of difference that do 
not go to the essential merits of your opinion. This would 
not prevent me from joining you. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
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No. 75-1914 Monell 
Dear Bill: 
I now have had an opportunity to read your revised 
draft, circulated April 21. 
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points 
raised in my letter of April 11. The new part III on stare 
decisis is quite persuasive, and includes much of what I 
would have said on this question in a concurring opinion. 
Moreover, if I could persuade you to accept my suggestions 
below, I can join Part II. It contains a helpful - and I 
think correct - explanation of why §1983 does not impose 
liability on government entities for the unauthorized 
misconduct of employees. In view of the fact that our 
previous cases --with the exception of Kenosha v. Bruno--
primarily involved claims of respondeat superior liability 
against municipalities and counties, I think it appropriate 
for the Court to make clear that that theory does not 
support a §1983 claim against entities of government. 
In sum, I believe my previously expressed 
concerns have now been reduced to the following narrowly 
focused suggestions: 
2. 
1. As you know, I do not view §1983 as 
coextensive with the full power of Congress under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. A number of scholars share this 
view, including Gunther and Monaghan. I would therefore 
appreciate your considering the following clarifications: 
(a) Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph: I 
would substitute "broad" for "complete". 
(b) Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45: 
Rather than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly 
to exercise the power conferred by §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment", I would simply say that §1983 "represented an 
attempt to include all officials and entities within the 
constitutional reach of Congress". It is unnecessary to 
suggest that other features of §1983 are dictated either by 
the Constitution or by 1871 understandings of 
constitutional limits. 
(c) Page 26, middle of first full paragraph: I 
would modify the description of §1 as the only civil remedy 
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps you 
could say that the section provided a "broad" or 
"expansive" civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
3. 
2. Page 30, last sentence in footnote ss :~ pagQ 
iltlf ...,0~€1 e'f.i : I concur in Potter's view that explicit 
reference to Estelle v. Gamble is undesirable in this 
opinion. There may well be several tenable ways to read 
our decision in Estelle, but I am unwilling to suggest in 
this case that the "deliberate indifference" standard has 
application in contexts other than that of prisons, where 
the inmate is wholly dependent on the prison officials for 
satisfaction of basic human needs. Your discussion on pp. 
29-30 makes quite clear that official policy can be 
expressed as unwritten, informal "custom." I can accept 
this where the custom is unmistakably sanctioned by the 
municipality. And your language at the top of p.34 does 
not foreclose a "deliberate indifference" theory in an 
Eighth Amendment context, where a prison department's 
established policy or "custom" with regard to prisoner 
medical needs "itself inflicts [constitutional] 
injury .... " In short, I hope you will be willing to drop 
l4.c- ~~4~~~~s-s-,.. 
1\RGt Qi~unnecessary, reserving all mention of the reach 
of Estelle until we have a specific case. 
3. I also agree with Potter that footnote 57 on 
page 32 (with respect to "fault") is unnecessary and 
4. 
touches on an issue yet to be resolved. While the 
footnote, as amended in your letter of April 25 to Potter, 
does not commit the Court to any particular proposition of 
1 aw, it may be read as a "signal". In 1 ight of our 
reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v. 
Navarette, I would remain silent here. We will have to 
confront the negligence issue soon enough without inviting 
it. 
4. Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' Award 
Act of 1976: You describe this as allowing "prevailing 
parties in §1983 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the 
losing party". I am sure you intend only to state, in 
accord with the statutory language, that the Act merely 
confers discretion on the Court to allow such fees. Also, 
in light of Hutto v. Finney, I am somewhat troubled by your 
characterization of the congressional intent on page 39. I 
would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow" 
such awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit 
Monroe." 
5. Your revision of Part IV as to immunity -
leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable. I 
no longer will write on the immunity issue, although my 
previously expressed view remains firm. 
5. 
* * * * 
I appreciate your efforts to accommodate the 
various suggestions from other Brothers and me. This is, 
however, a major new precedent and I am strongly disposed 
to move cautiously. If you will make the changes suggested 
above, I will be happy to join you - although I do not 
foreclose the possibility of having minor editing 
suggestions as I reread your comprehensive opinion. 
Also, I still may write briefly to emphesize a 
point or two where we may have shades of difference that do 
not go to the essential merits of your opinion. This would 
not prevent me from joining you. 
Sincerely, 
)':.; 
~-' 'i: ·j 
t' 
~. ~·~:. ~f- \<!t <j• 
Dea'i.· Bill: 
I now have had an opportunity to read your revised 
draft, circulated ApriJ 2J. ... 
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points 
raised in my letter of April 11. The new part III on stare 
decisis is quite persuasive, and includes much of what_! ___ _ 
would-have said on this question in a concurring opinion. 
Moreover, if I could persuade you to accept my suggestions 
below, I can join Part II. It contains a helpful - and I 
think correct - explanation of why §1983 does not impose 
liability on government entities for the unauthorized 
to·"'~' 
misconduct of employees. In view of the fact that our 
previous cases - with the exception of Kenosha v. Bruno -
primarily involved claims of !~ndeat-!~P~!!9! Jiability 
against municipalities and counties, I think it appropriate 
for the Court to make clear that that theory does not 
support a §1983 claim against entities of government. 
,;. 4~~ In sum, I believe my previously expressed 
concerns have now been reduced to the following narrowly 
focused suggestions: 
_,l! 
1. ·· As you know, I do not view Sl983 as 
coextensive with the full power of Congress under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. A number of scholars share this 
view, including Gunther and Monaghan. I would therefore 
appreciate your considering the following clarifications: 
-r (a) Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph: 
would substitute "broad" for "complete" • . ~. 
(b) Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45: 
Rather than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly 
to exerclse the power conferred by ss of the Fourteenth 
Amendment"_, I would simply say that §1983 "represented an 
! <;' • 
r,; 
·;~ 
. .• r; 
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o', 
attempt to include all officials and entities within the 
constitutional reach of Congress". It is unnecessary to 
suggest that other features of §1983 are dictated either by 
the Constitution or by 1871 understandings of 
constitutional l imits. ' 
(c) Page 26, middle of first -full paragraph: ··· I 
would modify the description of §l as the only civil remedy 
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps you 
could say that the section provided a "broad" or 
"expansive" civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment • 
. ·· 2. Page 30, J ast sentence in footnote 55 & page :.¥ 
34, ~ proposed footnote 60: I concur in Potter's view that 4 
explicit reference to Estelle v. Gamble. is undesirable in 
this oplnion. There may well be several tenable ways to 
read our decision in Es!ell_e, but I am unwilJ i ng to suggest 
in this case that the "deliberate indifference" standard 
has application in cont~xts other than that of prisons, 
where the inmat~ .,. is wholly dependent on prison officials 
for the satisfaction of basic human needs. Your discussion 
on pp. 29-30 makes quite clear ,that official policy can be 
expressed as unwritten, informal "custom." I can accept 
this where the custom is unmistakably sanctioned by the 
municipality. ,And your language at the top of p.34 does 
not foreclose a "deliberate indifference" theory in an 
Eighth Amendment context, where a prison department's 
established policy or "custom" with regard to prisoner 
medical needs "itself inflicts [constitutional] • 
injury •••• "i~!n short, I hope you wi 11 be willing to drop 
the Es!~ll~ s'entence in note 55 (or proposed note 60) as 
unnecessary, · :reserving all ment5 on of the ; each of Estel:.!! .~; 
until we have ~\ specific case. ill """" t... , ... ,_ ,,,~.~~:. "[ 
3 :·_;:r-1;\~ so agree with Potter that footnote 57 on 
page 32 (with respect to "fault") is unnecessary and 
touches on an issue yet to be resolved. While the 
footnote, as amended in your Jetter of April 25 to Potter, 
does not commit the Court to any particular proposition of 
law, it may be read as a "signal". In light of our 
reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v. · 
Navarette, I would remain silent here. We will have to 
confront-the negligence issue soon enough without inviting 
it •. •m' C!;,, '"'-· • ~ 
··<lk&..l:li: '"·~· .. ·;).t~. ·.·. "" ;~.~".· ·"'''"" ~y,,~ll'~ I' ""' · ~ 
4. Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' '' Award 




parties in §1983 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the 
losing party". I am sure you intend only to state, in 
accord with the statutory language, that the Act merely 
confers discretion on the Court to allow such fees. Also, 
in light-of-!fiittQ-V. ~.!EE~.Y, I am somewhat troubled by your 
characterization of the congressional intent on page 39. I 
would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow" 
such awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit 
Monroe.~ • -----· 
. " , ~, 5. revision of Part IV a's to immunity -
leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable. 
no longer will write on the immunity issue, although my 
previously expressed view remains firm. 
A ! 
·'I: appreciate your efforts to accommodate 
I 
various sugge~tions r. from other Brothers and me. T~i.s is ri( 
however, a maJor new precedent and I am strongly d1sposed 
to move cautiously. If you will make the changes suggested 
above, I will be happy to join you - although I do not 
foreclose the possibility of having minor edjting 
suggestions as I reread your comprehensive opinion. 
r ;>f" •!\! 
'"rn·'' . 1.lil!' 
~lso, r s~ill may write briefly to emphasize a 
point or two where we may have shades of difference that do 
not go to the essential merits of your opinion. This would 
not prevent me from joining you. 
Sincerely, 
t:t. 




JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.Ju:prtutt <!Jourl of tJrt ~b .Jtatt~ 
Jfa:,gfri:ngto:t4 ~. <!J. 2!!~'!~ 
May 2, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Department of Social 
Services 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your memo on this case. As you know, my 
clerks have been meeting informally with the clerks from a 
number of chambers (including your own) to hammer out 
rough spots in the second draft of my opinion for the 
Court. I think that this process has produced new 
language which meets all but two of the points raised in 
your memorandum, although in some cases the language 
adopted is slightly different from that you have suggested. 
The two remaining points are footnote 57 and Estelle. 
As Byron's recent memorandum indicated, I have agreed to 
delete note 57. And, although I must say that I am quite 
reluctant to drop the Estelle point, in the interest of 
avoiding a flurry of opinions I will drop the last part of 
note 55 as well as any attempt to resurrect the point in 
note 60. I have also gone through Part II with care to 
remove the word "fault" whenever it might, by negative 
implication, indicate that we are creating a negligence 
cause of action under § 1983. To accomodate the dropping 
of Estelle and references to municipal fault, I will 
recast the last paragraph of Part II as follows (replacing 
what is now the carry-over paragraph on pp. 33-34): 
~ J . I I j .J 
"We conclude, tKerefore, that 1a local government 
may not be sued for 1the tort pu~ely~ its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a 
government's policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly 
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the 
injury that the government as an entity is responsible 
under § 1983. Since this case unquestionably involves 
official policy as the moving force of the 
constitutional violation found by the District Court, 
see pp. 1-2 and n. 2, supra, we must reverse the 
judgment below. In so doing, we have no occasion to 
-2-
address, and do not address, what the full contours of 
municipal liability under § 1983 may be. We have 
attempted only to sketch so much of the § 1983 cause 
of action against a local government as is apparent 
from the history of the 1871 Act and our prior cases 
and we expressly leave further development of this 
action to another day." 
The suggested text will require both footnotes 59 and 60 
to be deleted. 
Rather than attempt to make any more detailed response 
to your memorandum, I will send our well marked-up copy of 
Monell draft 2 to the printer for a third draft. I agree 
with you that "it [is] appropriate for the Court to make 
clear that [respondeat superior] does not support a §1983 
claim against entities of government," and, accordingly, 
will keep Part II in the third draft. If it appears that 
we cannot attract a fifth vote for that Part, I will 
convert it into a plurality opinion in the fourth draft. 
Sincerely., 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
'' 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher Date: May 2, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dpt of Social Services 
WJB's proposed language is open-ended 
("we have no occasion to address, and do not address, 
what the full contours of municipal liability under 
§ 1983 may be"), but it may be innocuous because it 
says nothing. In light of his willingness to drop 
the last sentence in note 55, note 57, note 59 & note 
60, we should permit him a measure of author's 
license. 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE W-.. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
~ttprtntt ~curl of tfrt 2ifn:iUb ~hdtg 
';Wru¥Jrin!lfcn. ~. ~· 2llp'1~ 
May 2, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. _.Department of Social 
Services 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your memo on this case. As you know, my 
clerks have been meeting informally with the clerks from a 
number of chambers (including your own) to hammer out 
rough spots in the second draft of my opinion for the 
Court. I think that this process has produced new 
language which meets all but two of the points raised in 
your memorandum, although in some cases the language 
adopted is slightly different from that you have suggested. 
The two remaining points are footnote 57 and Estelle. 
As Byron's recent memorandum indicated, I have agreed to 
delete note 57. And, although I must say that I am quite 
reluctant to drop the Estelle point, in the interest of 
avoiding a flurry of opinions I will drop the last part of 
note 55 as well as any attempt to resurrect the point in 
note 60. I have also gone through Part II with care to 
remove the word "fault" whenever it might, by negative 
implication, indicate that we are creating a negligence 
cause of action under § 1983. To accomodate the dropping 
of Estelle and references to municipal fault, I will 
recast the last paragraph of Part II as follows (replacing 
what is now the carry-over paragraph on pp. 33-34): 
"We conclude, therefore, that a local government 
may not be sued for the tort purely of its employees 
or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a 
government's policy or custom, whether made by its 
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly 
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the 
injury that the government as an entity is responsible 
under § 1983. Since this case unquestionably involves 
official policy as the moving force of the 
constitutional violation found by the District Court, 
see pp. 1-2 and n. 2, supra, we must reverse the 
judgment below. In so doing, we have no occasion to 
-2-
a ess o not address what the full contours of 
munic1pal liab1 1 We 
attempted 
of action against a ~ocal government as is apparent 
from the history of the 1871 Act and our prior cases 
and we expressly leave further development of this 
action to another day." 
The suggested text will require both footnotes 59 and 60 
to be deleted. 
Rather than attempt to make any more detailed response 
to your memorandum, I will send our well marked-up copy of 
Monell draft 2 to the printer for a third draft. I agree 
with you that "it [is] appropriate for the Court to make 
clear that [respondeat superior] does not support a §1983 
claim against entities of government," and, accordingly, 
will keep Part II in the third draft. If it appears that 
we cannot attract a fifth vote for that Part, I will 
convert it into a plurality opinion in the fourth draft. 
Sincerely., 
~~ I 
I A J J d VI,/~ 
I 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
' .. 
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by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitu-
tional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "cus-
tom" even though such a custom hns not received formal 
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels. 
As Mr. Justice Harlan recognized: "Congress included custom 
and usage [in § 1983] because of persistent and widespread 
discriminatory practices of State officials. . . . Although not 
authorized by \\Titten la"·, such practices of state officials could 
well be so permanent and \Yell settled as to constitute a 
'custom or usage' with the force of law." Adickes v. S. H. 
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167- 168 (1970).~5 
On the other hand. the language of § 1983, read against 
the background of the same legislative history, compels the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be 
held liable unless official municipal aetion of some nature 
caused a constitutional tort. In particulnr, we conclude that 
a municipality cannot be held liable soldy because it employs 
a tortfeasor- or. in other "·orcls, a municipality cannot be held 
liable under § 1983 on a. respondea t superior theory. 
We begin with the language of § 1983 ns passed: 
"[A]ny person who, under color of any hw, statute, 
55 See also Justice Fr:mkfur1er'~ ~tatrment in Nashuille, C. & St. L. R. 
p'o. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 36~, 369 (19-!0): 
·"It would be a narrow concept ion of jmisprurlencr to C'Onfinc the notion of 
.'Jaws' to what is found \\Tittrn on the statutr books, anrl to rlis rt>g:~ rd the 
.gloss which life has written upon it. Settled st:1 tr practice ... can 
establish what is state hw. The Equal Prot{'c tion Chu~r did not write an 
,empty formali 3m into the Con~titution. Deeply emucudcd traditional wa.ys 
,of carrying out s t:~te policy, :::uch as tho~c of which petitioner complains, 
l:.!w th:m the dc:~d word, · n text." 
1 oreover, mH-not in gonrr"l crr:JtP 'I yjoht..io.ll of the Cil.l.l::dit.ut.iOJ.J'as we 
affirmed t\yo Terms :1go, where the Con,.:titution impo~e;:; a duty on st.'1te 
officials to act, :~nd th'cy are driibcr:Jtt'ly indifTcrcnt to th:1t duty-n form 
of inaction which by it s nature will ~rldom be offiri:ll ly adoptrd or writ.ten 
Jock!! policy-§ 19S3 pro,·idcs an aYcnuc of redress. Sec Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 104- 105 (19/G) . 
... 
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall 
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person ... to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the 
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress .... " Globe App., at 335 
(emphasis added ). 
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a govern-
ment that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an 
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the 
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose 
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of 
the existence of an employer-employee relationship \vith a 
tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifica11y 
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B "caused" A to 
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend 
§ 1983 liability to attach where such causation " ·as absent. 56 l 
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370-371 (1976). 
~6 Support for such n ronclu~ion ran br found in thr lrgisbtiv!' history. 
As we have indicated, there is Yirtually no discussion of § 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act. Again, hO\H'\·er, Congrrss' treatment of the Sherman amend-
ment giYes a clue to whether it would have desired to impose respondeat 
superior liability. 
The primary constitu.tional ju;:tific:1tion for the Sherm:m amendment. \\·as · 
that it was a nc·ce.:::~a ry :md proper rrmrdy for thr failure of lor:1lit ic;:; to 
protect cidzcns a.;; the Pri,·ilrgcs or Immunities Clau~r of the Fourternth 
Amendment required . See pp. 10-13, supra. And according to Sherman, 
Shellabarger, and EJmunds, the :mwndmrnt. came into play only when a 
locality was at Ln!lt or had ncglrcted it s duty to prm·ide prot rct.ion. See 
Globe, at. 761 (Sen. Sherman): id .. at 75G (Sen. Edmunds); id., at 751 -752 
(Rep. Shellabarger). But other proponen1 f; of the :llncndmrnt. apparently 
viewed it as a form. of Yi ca rious liability for thr unlawful nets of the 
citizens of the loc:1lity. See id., at 792 (Rep. Butler). And whether 
intended or not., the amendment :~s dmfted did impose a species of 
vicarious liability on municipalities since it could be construed to impose 
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat 
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation 
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the 
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not 
to impose because it. thought imposition of such an obligation 
unconstitutional. To this day, there is disagreement about 
the basis for imposing vicarious liability on an employer for 
the torts of an employee ''"hen the employer itself is not at 
fau1t. 57 Sec \V. Prosser, L::nY of Torts, § 69, at 569 (4th ed. 
1971). Nonetheless, two justifications tend to stand out. 
First in the commonsense notion that no matter how blame-
liability even if a municipality did not know of an impending or ensuing 
riot or did. not have the whcrcwithall to do anything about it-. Indeed, the 
statute held a municipality liable eYen if it h:1d done everything in its 
power to curb the riot.. Sec p. 8 , supra; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Ste\'ens); id., 
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id., at 783 (Rep. Kerr); id., at 791 (Rep. \Villard). 
'\\'bile the first conference substitute was rejected principally on constitu-
tional grounds, see id., at 804 (Rep. Poland), it is plain from the text of 
the second conference substitute--which limited liability to those who, 
having the power to intervene agn inst Ku Klux violence, "neglect [ed] or 
refuse[d] so to do," see Appendix, infra, at. 41, and which was enncted as 
§ 6 of the 1871 Act and is now codified as 42 U.S. C.§ 1986- that Congress 
a1so rejected those elements of vicarious liability contained in the first 
conference subst.itute even while accepting the basic principle that. the 
inl1abitants of a community were bound to provide protection against the 
Ku Klux Klan. Strictly speaking, of cour~e. the fact that Congre~s refused· 
to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few privnte citizens does 
not conclusively cstnblish that it would simibrly have refused to impose 
vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees. Nonethe-
less, when Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious linbility 
presentro to it is combined with the absence of any bnguage in § 1083 
which can easily be cm1strued-to create respondeat supen~r liability, the 
inference that. Congre,;s did not intend to impose such liability is quite 
st,Tona. 
e note, however, that where there is fault in hiring, training, or 
direction, that fault is the b~is for liability under the common law, sec 2 
F. Harper & F. Jnmes, The Ln" of Torts, § 26.1, at 1362-1363 (1956), not 
the fault of the employee-tortfe:~sor vicariously applied to the employer. 
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less an employer appears to be in an individual case, accidents 
might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the cost 
of accidents. See, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & James, ·The Law 
of Torts, § 2G.3, at 1368-1369 (105G). Second is the argument 
that the cost of accidents should be spread to the community 
as a whole on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id., § 2G.5; 
W. Prosser, supra, at 459.~8 
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for 
the Sherman amendment: "The obligation to make compensa-
tion for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitrary enactment of 
statutes, affirmatory law, and the reason of passing the statute 
is to secure a more perfect police regulation." Globe, at 777 
(Sen. Frelinghuysen). This justification was obviously insuf-
ficient to sustain the amendment against perceived constitu-
tional difficulties and there is no reason to suppo~e that a more 
general liability imposed for a similar reason \Yould have been 
thought less constitutionally objectionable. The second jus-
tification was similarly put forward as a justification for the 
Sherman amendment: "we do not look upon [the Sherman 
amendment] as a punishment. . . . It is a mutual insurance." 
/d., at 792 (Rep. Butler). Again, this justification \\'aS insuf-
ficient to sustain the amendment. 
___..::::t L. In sum, a local government may be sued for monetary, 
~ . • declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983 \\·hen it is at 
fault, but not for the fault purely of its employees or agents. 59 
~~~(a.. '.I ~8 A third justification, often cited but which on examination is nppar-
V"~ 1;1 ent.ly insufficient to justify the doctrine of respondeat supen"or, see, e. g., 
' 
J 
c.t..r 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra, n. 61, § 26.3, is that liability follows the 
ft right to control the actions of a tortfeasor. By our deci5ion in Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we would .1ppear to haYe drriclcd th11t the 
mere right to control "·ithout nny control or direction having been rxcrcised 
and without any fnilnre to suprrYisc i~ not rnough to support. § 1983 
liabil ity. See id .. nt. 370-371. 
59 Given the variety of "·ays thnt offiria] polir~' mn~' be drmonstrntrd. we 
do not today attempt to cst.1blish any firm guidelines for d<.'trrmining when 
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It is only when the government's policy, whether made by its 
la,vmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 
to represent official 11olicy, itself inflicts the injury or itself 
authorizes or directs the specific act charged against its officer 60 
that the government is responsible under § 1983. In all other 
cases, a § 1983 action must be brought against the individual 
officers whose acts form the basis of the § 1983 complaint. J . 
III 
Although we have stated that stare decisis has more force in 
statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, 
in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistal,:es 
our conclusion that Congress did not intend to enact a. regime of vicarious 
liability, whntenr offirial action is involved must be sufficient to support a 
conclusion that a local government itself is to blame or is at fault. 
For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we recognized 
that fault is a crucial factor in determining whether relief ma.y run against 
a party for its alleged participation in a constitutional tort. Di:;tinguishing 
the relief approved by the lower courts in Rizzo from that sanctioned 
by this Court in school desegregation cases, the Court explained: 
"Respondents ... ignore a critiral factual distinction between their case 
and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In the latter, segrega-
tion imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for varying 
periods of time, whereas in the instant case the District Court found that 
"the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any 
members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional rights. Those 
against whom injunctive relief was directed in cases such as Swann [v. 
Charlotte-M ecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 ( 1971) ,] and 
Brown [ v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ( 1954),] were not adminis-
trators arid school board members who had in their employ a small number 
·of individuals, which latter on their own deprived black students of their 
constitutional rights to a unitary school system. They were administrators 
and school board members who were found by their own conduct in the 
administration of the school system to have denied those rights. Here, the 
·District Court iound that none of the petition~rs had deprived the 
TP..Spondent cb~ses of any rights secured under the Constitution. 423 U. S., · 
at 377 (emphasis in original). 
(;OSee, however, n. 55, supra. 
... 




JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~ltpt"rntt <!Itlurl qf £4t 'Jfuri.tt~ ~taft,g 
:.a.sJrht~f111t. :!fl. <!I· 21l,?J~~ 
May 4, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services 
of the City of New York · 
Enclosed is completed draft revised primarily to 
accommodate the suggestions of Potter, Byron and Lewis. 
Those appear at pages 25, 26, 27, 30-35, 38-39 and 41. 
The changes at 11, 13-14 and 20- 22 are for purposes 
of clarification and organization only. 
I hope that this circulation can be the basis for a 
final resolution of the Court's opinion. 
W.J.B. Jr. 
5/4/78 
WJB has made all the changes that we a ked 
him to make. You should not feel any relu tance 
in joining this opinion. I wonder if you ould 
point out a problem ~ha ~ave with the irst 
sentence at the tap o • r.:L. Although :JB does 
not intend such a me ·n t he phrase " ere state 
law did not impose such n obligation" ould 
lead to an interpretation that respond at-superior 
liability is possible where state law imposes such 
liability. I would prefer that the phrase be 
deleted. I recognize that this langua~ a peared in~. ) 
previous drafts, but I just noticed/tor the first t~me ~t 
A • ~ 
~!ay 5, 1978 
I • 
Dear Bill: 
As your 3rd draft substantially accommodates my 
concerns (for which I thank you), I am glad to join you. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
B '11: 
There ls one anguage chang that I waul 
apprec'at your ak ng. Th phrase "where tat~ Jaw did 
not pas uch an obligation• (p. 33) cou,d ead to n 
jnterpret~tion th t re pondeat-superior liability is 
pas ib e here tate la impos .s such l abi i.ty. I wou l d 
prefer that the ph~ se be deleted. I recogn ze that this 




§u:prtmt <!fottrt of tltt ',IDttittb ~tat.cn­
'lllaslfiugton, JD. <!f. 2ll,?Jl-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
May s, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914 - 1-bnell v. Depa.rt:rrent of Social 
Services of the City of New York 
Dear Bill: 
I am still with you and hope you will not have 
to nake any further changes. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
LFP/lab 5/8/78 Rider A, pg. 1, 
<)vk ' 
Monell ~ 
Few cases in the history of the Court have been 
cited more frequently than Mo~ v. Pa;p~, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961), decided less than two decades ago. Focusing new 
light on § 1983, the decision offered wider access to the 
federal courts to redress wrongs far beyond those 
contemplated in 1871. It enlarged the concept of "color 
of law", and made clear that exhaustion of state remedies 
was not a precondition to the federal remedy. But Monroe 
curiously exempted local government entities from 
liability at the same time it opened wide the courthouse 
door to suits against officers and employees of such 
entities - even when they had acted pursuant to express 
authorization. The illogic of this result, and the 
unsoundness of the historical reason asserted by the 
MonrQ~ Court in support of it, have been well demonstrated 
by the Court's opinion today. 
Yet, the seriousness of overruling a portion of 
so famous a decision where the Congress by its inaction 
apparently has accepted that portion, prompts me to write. 
'\ ,, 
' r p, .:r: :x 
LFP/lab 5,_ /78 
To: 
From: 
Over the weekend, I 
draft ( 5/1/78) of a concurring opinion. ~""?.if.~ 1 , 
l'~'l ike the opinion and am inclined to render 
It would be ostentatious, however~, for me to repeat the ., 
i(et~. "\*/~ ,:\\' 
substance of points or arguments\iialr.:~ady well made by "'-
Justice Brennan. As ~ have not had his opinion with me, I 
have not been able 1 to check back to see whether 
llfti 
undue repetition in my concurrence. In view of your own 
intim.C!!=~.~~lmiliar i ty with this whole subject, including 
~ 
the Brenn~'n opinlon, I would like your considered judgment 
on this question •. 
"11w, ,, ~1 Also, I ~1 have some lingering doubt as 
appropriateness of including the paragraph on Bivens. 
like the paragraph, and you ar~ famiiia~ with 
' 
about Bi~!, but I would like your view as to whether 




hesitant to add a ten or twelve 
page concurrence to the long opinions already written by 
Justices Brennan and Rehnquist. I therefore suggest that 
you consider possible m1arginal statements both in the 
and notes that could be omitted. For example, I have 
marked portions of pagesi,3 and 4 to be cut from the 
2. 
and placed in a note. On second thought, I believe the 
Brennan opinion quotes. so elaborately from the debate on 
the Sherman Amendment, we need not include the quotations 
from Burchard and Blair. Perhaps the note could simply 
make a reference to their .. .'~statements. I also invite your 
thought as to whether the paragraph on Moor~ (p. 7) can be 
summarized in a conclusory sentence without loss of 
impact. My recollection, however, is that the Brennan 
opinion does not deal adequately with Mo~. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~nvrmu <!J!!ud of tqt ~tb' .:§taUs 
~~t.sfringhm..1tJ. <!J. 20gtJ!.~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE May 8, 1978 
Re: 75-1914- Monellv. Department of 
Social Services of the 
City of New York 
Dear Bill, 
I am content with your circulation 
of May 4, 1978. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.§u:p-r.em~ <~Jcu:rf cf t.Ir~ ~b ~ta-Us 
'JII'aglfhtgtcn, ~· <IJ. 2D.?J!.~ 
May 15, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
of the City of New York 
Dear Bill, 
I have now carefully read your revised opinion 
from beginning to end and I am glad to join. Many 
thanks for your generous and effective efforts in meet-
ing the recalcitrant quibbles from your obstinate 
colleagues. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
M(- &J-_;:c_i? ~u~-
To: Mr. Justice Powell d.- /~~J. ~~,~ . 
From: Sam Estreicher Date: May 15, 197~~ 
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept of Social Services 
1. I have incorporated your editorial changes with 
some minor exceptions. I expl~in my actions in notational 
c omments .on pp. 7 and 9 of your draft. With respect 
to the question you raise on p . 8, the Young fiction 
is that the public official is enjoin~d even though the 
relief in substance operates against the State. As the 
Court explained it in Ex parte Young, an individual 
enfor cing an unconstitutional state statute is shorn 
of a ny of ficial authority derived from that statute and 
may be sued as an ordinary person. In later usage, the 
Ex parte Young fiction has been extended to official-
capacity suits. 
2. I have also made some additional changes of my 
own. Most are self-explanatory, if diff icult to read 
on my copy. Insert 5-A is in response to Jim's point 
that the language on p. 5 was unduly critical of the 
Court . Insert 6-A offers language that is more precise 
than the prior text. I have deleted the joinder discussion 
on p. 7 because in rethinking the point, I hve concluded 
that misjoinder does not raise a juri sdictional question 
if individual public officials are codefendants. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§lt}lrtnu cqcmt of tltt ~nitcb- ~ta'!ts 
2lli~Utltitt¢:ott. ~· cq. 20gi~$ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
May 17, 1978 
Re: No. 75-1914 - Monell v. Department of 
Social Services 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR . 
~utrrtnte QJMtrt ttf tip~ 'Jllttibb $5htftg 
~a£rltin.ghnt, ~· <q. 2.0~,~~ 




No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services 
MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE: 
I propose to substitute the attached for present 
footnote 6 on page 6 of my concurring opinion in the above 
case. 
'L. f. fl. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss S/24/78 75-1914 Monell v. 15ept. of Social Services 
6. The doctrine of stare decisis advances two 
important values of a rational system of law: 
(i) the certainty of legal principles, and (ii) the wisdom 
of the conservative vision, that existing rules should be 
presumed rational and not subject to modification "at any 
time a new thought seems appealing," dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, post, at 5; cf. 0. Holmes, The 
Common Law 36 (1881). But, at the same time, the law has 
recognized the necessity of change, lest rules "simply 
persist ••• from blind imitation of the past." Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). Any 
overruling of prior precedent, whether of a constitutional 
decision or otherwise, disse~ves to some extent the value 
of certainty. But I think we owe somewhat less deference 
to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full 
airing of all the relevant considerations. That is the 
premise of the canon of interpretation that language in a 
decision not necessary to the holding may be accorded less 
weight in subsequent cases. I also would recognize the 
fact that until this case the Court has not had to confront 
squarely the consequences of holding § 1983 imapplicable to 
official municipal policies. 
Of course, the mere fact that an issue was not 
argued or briefed does not undermine the precedential force 
of a considered holding. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 
2. 
(1803), cited by the dissent, post, at 5, is a case in 
point. But the Court's recognition of its power to 
invalidate legislation not in conformity with 
constitutional command was essential to its judgment in 
Marbury. And on numerous subsequent occasions, the Court 
has been required to apply the full breadth of the Marbury 
holding. In Monroe, on the other hand, the Court's 
rationale was broader than necessary to meet the 
contentions of the parties ana to decide the case in a 
principled manner. The language in Monroe cannot be 
dismissed as dicta, but we may take account of the fact 
that the Court simply was not confronted with the 
implications of holding § 1983 inapplicable to official 
municipal policies. It is an appreciation of those 
implications tha t has prompted today's reexamination of the 
legislative history of the 1871 measure. 
-
75-lDl..J-CO\'CC:H (A) 
() :\IO~J·:LL 1'. \'E\\" Y<>HK CITY J>J·:I"I'. OF ~()C'L\L :-;J·:H\"ICJ•:S 
actiu11 contrary to it:-; O\\·n orrlinaiiC('S and tiH' laws of th<' ~tate• 
it is a part of lsicl.'' Brid for Hcspondcnts, snwa, p. :20. 
Thu~ the• ~l'OlliHI of decision in J/omoe was nnt aciYanccd by 
eithrr party aiHl \\"UP broad('l' than nec<'~sary to r<'solvc the 
ronkntio11~ mach- in that case•.': 
i-lin1ilarl:v. in .lfoor '"· Cou11ty uf A/a./1/eda, 411 r. S. fi!l:3 
(l!J7:3). ]Jl'tition('r~ asst'Jted that "tlw County ,,·as vicariously 
liahk forth<' aets of its dep:1ties and sheriff.'' id., at (j\J() , under 
4:? r. ~- C. ~ l!J~S. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim. 
'id., at 710. and 11. '27. \Ye reaffinn<'d M o11roe's reading of the 
statute'. hut. thc'n' ,,·as no chal1e11ge in that case to "the holding 
in Jfonme concC'rning the status nnder ~ Hl8:3 of public entities 
such as tlw C'ounty.'' id., at 700; Brief for PctitioJ1ers, 0. T. 
ln7'2. Xo. 7:2- 10. p. n. 
Only ill City uj Kenosha V. Bruno, 412 e. S. 507 (HJ73), 
did tlw Court confront a ~ 1983 claim based on conduct that 
was both authorized unckr state Ia\\· and the direct cause of 
th<' claiJnPd constitutional in.i ury. Ju Kenosha, ho\\"ever. \\'C 
rai:wd the is:-:uc' of the City's amenability to suit UtHier ~ 1083 
011 our U\\"11 i11itiativc.7 
This linC' of caS('S-- from .llonroe to Kenosha- is difficult 
to reconcile 011 a principlrcl basis \\"ith a parallel sPrics of cases 
in \Yhich the Court has assunwcl sub silellt.io that some local 
------- ---
'' \\'(' owe• ~onH'\I'hnt If'~,.; ddt'I'!' IH'I ' I o :1 clc-C'i~ion 1lint wa ~ n'tHIPn·cl with-
uut IJ!'nc·Jit of a ftdl airing: of :dl till' n·lc·,·:tnl c·oJJ~i<IPration" Thr fac·t that 
11nl il I hi,; c·a.'<' t liP Conrt h:J.' not h:1d 1 o c·onfront .•qu:1 n·l~· I ht• c·on"c'(llH'tlr-c•,.; ) 
of holding § HJ~:) in:tpplil':tblc· to oflic·i:d n!unil'ipal polic·ic·~ nta~· hl' c·on-
.-;ickrl'd in :t~~<'"~in~ till' 'Jltalit~ · of tlic· pr~~·~· ~-~ that \H' an'-2~~ 
J'~l'X;tlllin~ 
~7rlill!/l'l" \. 1/ou·urd. -1:2i 1·. S. J (l!tili), II"<' n·:dlirmpd .1/onro!'. 
I nt t pl'tll iotH•r did not c·onl c•.•t till' propo~ i t Hill 1 h:i! c·ounl ic·:< \I"C'J'(' t•xc·l udt'd 
from tlic• n•ac·h of§ HlS:l nndc·r .1ln111"ur•. irl .. at Hi, aJH!IIic• <Jtl!',.; tion bdon• 
tJ..; c·otH·c·mPd thc• ,.;c·tl}W of pc•J!dt•JJt-party .iuri;-:dil'tion with rc•spc•c·l to a 
~I:IIP-I:J\1' C'laim. Simtlarlr, tlic· p:trlic·~ i11 .1ft.IIC'IIIih!l C'it!l 13unrrl of Hd. \'. 
/)oy/c •. -1:2U t '. :-;, li-1 (Hlii). did IIIII ·'L'C' k :1- 1'< '-<'X: IInin:ttion of our ruling 
111 .11 II/I/"(/('. 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
"'--' 
;%u:.pt"mu C!Icnrl of tltt ~b .§taftg 
:.ag!pttghnt, ~. C!I· 2ll.;JJ!.~ 
May 31, 1978 
Dear Bill: 
Re: 75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social Service 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Regards, 
W.E.B/JI'-
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




Re: No. 75-1914, Jane Monell v. Dept of Social Services 
Dear Potter, 
As you know, I am very troubled by this case. I 
have always thought that, in some respects, this Court's 
rulings in the § 1983 area have been unfortunate. This 
Court has construed the delphic terms of the 1871 measure 
to create a cause of action for all adverse actions 
affecting federal rights undertaken by state and local 
officials, even where an adequate remedy may exist under 
local law, and administrative procedures may be available 
to provide swifter, more certain relief in a manner that 
is faithful to the values of cooperative federalism. 
Moreover, in the understandable urge to narrow the 
occasions for federal court supervision of local 
government, we have submitted occasionally to the 
temptation to read major areas of human conduct out of the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 
(1976). 
While I am not predisposed to extend § 1983's 
reach, this case presents the issue of the proper 
treatment of conduct which lies at the core of the 
considerations that animated the 42d Congress. Affirmance 
of Judge Gurfein's ruling for the Second Circuit means 
that § 1983 does not authorize compensatory relief for the 
actions of local governmental units bearing a direct 
2. 
responsibility for a constitutional deprivation, even 
though such actions are fully consistent with, indeed 
mandated by, state law. Suits against the public official 
in his private capacity are likely to be defeated by the 
assertion of good-faith reliance on state law. Thus, the 
"under color of" state law debate in Monroe v. Pape, 365 
u.s. 167 (1961), is stood on its head. A monetary recovery 
will be possible only for unauthorized state action, the 
very conduct that Felix Frankfurter argued was not 
encompassed by the "under color of" wording of the statute. 
A second consideration is that the absence of any 
remedy -- outside of the types of employment 
discrimination proscribed by the 1972 amendments to Title 
VII -- for authorized state action in violation of 
constitutional requirements may propel this Court to 
recognize a Bivens remedy for all constitutional rights 
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In light of accepted principles of sovereign 
immunity, it is unlikely that a Bivens action will be 
recognized for authorized federal action. But I doubt if 
we can avoid for long recognition of similar claims 
against local government entities. See, e.g., Lowell 
School District No. 71 v. Ker, No. 77-688, March 3, 1978 
Conference. Reexamination of Monroe's interpretation of 
3. 
§1983 would seem preferable to the predictable alternative 
of judicial imposition of a Bivens cause of action for all 
constitutional violations working a compensable harm. 
I am fairly convinced that Bill Douglas' reading 
of the legislative history in Monroe was wrong, and I do 
not understand Bill Rehnquist's memorandum to present a 
defense of that interpretation. Section 1983 was enacted 
as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That section 
passed both Houses virtUally without debate. 
Representative Bingham, a leading supporter, had drafted 
§1 of the Fourteenth Amendment with the case of Barron v. 
Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1834), in mind. As he explained 
during the debates over the 1871 Act, "[i]n that case the 
city had taken private property for public use, without 
compensation ... , and there was no redress for the wrong 
" Cong. Globe App. 84. He viewed §1983's predecessor 
as an appropriate vehicle for seeking redress from takings 
by municipalities that Barron had held to fall outside of 
the reach of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 84-85. Bill 
Brennan is quite right in saying that "it beggars reason 
to suppose that Congress would have exempted 
municipalities from suit, insisting instead that 
compensation for a taking come from an officer in his 
individual capacity rather than from the government unit 
4 . 
that had the benefit of the property taken." While the 
term "person" may be a unusual way of expressing an 
intention to reach units of government, the passage of the 
so-called "Dictionary Act," a month before the civil 
rights bill was introduced, evinces a congressional 
understanding that "the word 'person' may extend and be 
applied to bodies politic " And the same language in 
Senator Sherman's antitrust measure, enacted 19 years 
later, has been construed to include municipalities, 
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 
U.S. 390, 396 (1906), and even foreign governments, 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided 
Janaury 11, 1978), slip op. 7-10. 
Representative Bingham and other Republican 
members of the House broke ranks with their party over the 
Sherman Amendment. That proposal was rejected because it 
sought to impose a duty upon municipalities to curb 
private mob violence. This was deemed an unwarranted, 
extra-constitutional Federal intrusion into an area of 
primary State competence because the obligation sought to 
be imposed -- one addressed to State inaction in the face 
of private lawlessness -- was without basis in the 
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Representative 
Burchard explained: "But there is no duty imposed by the 
5 • 
Constitution of the United States, or usually by State 
laws, upon a county to protect the people of that county, 
against the commission of the offenses herein enumerated, 
such as the burning of buildings or any other injury to 
property or injury to person." Cong. Globe 795. And 
Representative Blair added: "[H]ere it is proposed, not to 
carry into effect an obligation which rests upon the 
municipality, but to create that obligation, and that is 
the provision I am unable to assent to." Ibid. 
Although the matter is not entirely free from 
doubt, as are few things in the realm of legislative 
history, I submit that Republican opponents of the Sherman 
proposal perceived no similar difficulty with § 1 of the 
1871 Act because it sought to impose directly upon the 
official wrongdoer constitutional obligations derived from 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the unrestricted sweep of 
§ 1, the virtual absence of debate over its intended 
reach, and Congress' contemporaneous awareness that the 
term "person" could include "bodies politic," the Monroe 
Court was wrong to read the Sherman Amendment debates as 
definitive evidence of a generalized intention to exclude 
local government units from the reach of § 1983. The 
legislative history can best be understood as limiting the 
statutory ambit to actual wrongdoers, i.e., a rejection of 
6. 
respondeat superior or other principle of vicarious 
liability. 
As a general proposition, the Court should be 
hesitant to overrule prior construction of statutes or 
common law rules, but this cautionary principle may be 
overriden in appropriate circumstances. See, ~' 
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2549 
(1977); State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 
429 U.S. 363 (1977); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court 
of Ky., 410 u.s. 484 (1973); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 
u.s. 88 (1971); Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). This case presents a 
similar occasion to apply Felix Frankfurter's epigram, 
which you quoted in Boys Market: "Wisdom too often never 
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it 
comes late." Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 
600 (1949) • 
f~ rations of stare decisis cut in both 
directi~n the one hand, we have a series of rulings 
holding that municipalities and counties are not "persons" 
for purposes of § 1983. In the somewhat accidental manner 
that characterizes many of our § 1983 decisions, cf. 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 u.s. 160, 186* (1976), we have 
answered a question that was never briefed or argued in 
7 . 
this Court. The claim in Monroe was that the City of 
Chicago should be held "liable for acts of its police 
officers, by virtue of respondeat superior," Brief for 
Petitioners 21, namely, a warrantless, early morning raid 
and ransacking of a~ family's horne. Although Morris 
Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a 
footnote reference to the Sherman Amendment, he ~ 
had no incentive to present a view of the legislative 
history that would have foreclosed relief on a theory of 
respondeat superior:Wrn Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 
~
U.S. 693 (1973}, the only otherAcase presenting a 
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983, 
petitioners asserted a claim of vicarious liability 
against a county under § 1988 and, moreover, did not 
challenge "the holding in Monroe concerning the status 
under§ 1983 of public entities such as the County," id., 
at 700. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), did not 
involve a claim based on § 1983, and petitioners conceded 
that Spokane County was not a "person" under the statute. 
~ Only in City of Kenosha v. ~rune, 412 u.s. 507 (1973), did 
the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that 
was both authorized under state law and directly -- rather 
than vicariously responsible for the claimed 
constitutional injury. 
I ' 
But ~ Kenosha ~ raised the 
A 
~ .wW~ 
jurisdictional question on A~ . own{mo~~~. Thus, the 
8. 
. . d t . f . d . ti"Uh ~~ ~.--4 b t ·.R ia ii . o&;.t 1ssues 1 en 1 1e 1n ~ exc ange e ween 8Q R~~~ 
~~~~~~ 
ac« \Brennan <JiAMii!J;I!Ii S -h~v~ ~o{ been . ventilate on any 
~ 
previous occasion. 
On the other hand, affirmance in this case 
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise 
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases. 
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these 
~~h&&~ 8oa~~ decisions involved claims for monetary 
relief, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 
(1974); Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 414 
u.s. 632 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community 
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 
~~~ 
412 u.s. 441 (1973). -+ e<5rTbeee "Ehe pFeeel"lee e£ aRt 
1\ 
independent basis of jurisdiction in these cases because 
of the joinder of individual public officials as 
-codefendants. I do not understand, however, Bill 
point that some of the decisions involved 
independent school districts, for he also contends th 
"the governing body of an incorporated school distric 
separate from the city" is immune to § 1983 damages 
of this Court often 
made explicit reference to the school-board party, 
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, 
9. 
see, ~, Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977). And 
Congress has specifically focused on this Court's 
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise 
of § 1983 jurisdiction over school boards, even if not 
.£.. ,. t..~ 
premised on considered holdings, has been longstanding,~ J 
I\ 
j,f' /'-'~~,/. ~ 1 lfl!' ~.U-44-~ d.,.(_ ...U II :f-~ 
neter iews, Cf a Rt...-r::lyen- \I a ..McCnu: lb ~ rt....,........., ,..., • c.-•-e..,_l-' 
~~-- .... ~. 
In my view, the only decision that .will ~ave to ~ 
~~UI.. ~ 
4t€ over rule~ is L I I i¢Jtf Kenosha v p p. I would _..1 imi t 
~ ? • ,, 
Monroe and Moor to their facts. The preclusion of 
governmental liability for the tortious conduct of 
individual officials that was neither mandated nor 
~ 
specifically authorized by, and indeed 'lftl!l~ havoe bE@n 
" 
violative of~tate or local law, is consistent with the 
42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an 
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
stand, unless we adopt the view, 
suggested by 11 Rehnquist's decision in that 
case simpl / · d not --
their official capacity. ::zainst ~blic offici ~ri- •••. , 4rt( Be use I)rould s~ recognize a vicarious-liability 
limitation on § 1983 relief in such actions, I do not 
7 
fashion) , Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's 
r ..,, ~~~~ J 
"bifurcated application to municipal corporations 
t\ 
depending on the nature of the relief sought against --
them." 412 u.s., at 513. A public official sued in his 
official capacity, concededly a "person" for purposes of 
injunctive relief, becomes a non-"person" in a suit 
seeking a monetary recovery. Further impairment of 
~ 
Kenosha's reasoning ~1 be necessary because, as Bill 
~ 
Rehnquist's memorandum illustrates, we ~1 have to say 
that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment out of a 
desire to protect municipal treasuries. Kenosha held that 
a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief 
under § 1983 even though no monetary recovery was sought, 
for a municipality was simply not a "person." The question 
arises why protection of the municipal fisc is now viewed 
as the dominant reason for rejection of the Sherman 
Amendment, when a suit seeking redress from authorized 
conduct is brought against a defendant who is conceded to 
be a "person" under the Act. 
~ L..,..~ ~~~. ~ ~ 
~ the prior decisions in this area do not require 
application of the usual stare decisis principle. There is 
~ 
4l ~" tk; ;,...J~/4L j J ~··~- '4r 
~ ~ ~ ~~~ J ~.fj, ....... ll. 
tA ,r ~ 1- .-....,. 1""4 .... r1.-..o ~ ~ , •s+ .-.z... 
ave acquiesced by 1ts 1na 
the Court does will work some alteration of precedent. I 
---""" 'de this case 
eading history, 
he of Monroe and set in motion the 
may compel the constitutionalization of a 
re are at least two conditions that I 
before joining an opinion by Bill Brennan. 
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their ~ 
. •IJ ~ n.... ~~ c: .. .,.~ ~ 
facts, rather than overruled. 1\ We !I!Aswl& ta-ily \iliUl'@ \l&A have '-"-"" 
~ --J. had~occasion previously to consider the availability 
of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional violations 
a.-c ... ~~ 
that are the direct result of a policy .ef~ the government 
entity, rather than simply its failure to curb the 
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v. Goode, 
423 u.s. 362, 377 (1976), discussing .ae Swann and Brown 
~ ~ isR~ . There are substantial line-drawing problems, as 
Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal, 
written policy of the municipal department and school 
board~Jft is the clear case~Second, I would w•~• ~A~ 
~~L recognize a defense for policies promulgated in 
good faith that affect adversely constitutional rights not 
clearly defined at the time of violation, cf. Procunier v. 
tv~ J.tfH., --...,.. ~~.4Q ;)(, Jd.J.. ~·' &\oC..I ~+V" 
~ e&~ lA•• ••'-"••~•.,_, 144~,4,; uf I f tf j , 
.S.M.,..,. f· 12. 
•A 




in 1aFleur, d~ not volve such a clearly 
r cognition of such a defe e will represent a 
the immunity that t e common law generally afforded 
icipal bodies the performance of their 
nctions, and should mitigate the impact 
n..._ ~ .w.. .... ~ .. ~ ec-.=.,..,J~ 
~ ~•c.4t~~-L4 "C....-J 
~ ~ .. W4V~ ~ ,te__ 
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